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ABSTRACT 
In recent years, countries around the world have witnessed a number of corporate 
scandals, varying in their enormity. Nigeria has been no exception, having suffered its 
fair share of these corporate scandals.  
In many countries, the discovery of some new corporate scandal is unsurprisingly 
accompanied by calls, from various quarters, for increased directorial accountability. 
Such calls are then, in their turn, followed by the introduction of new corporate and 
securities regulations, as well as reforms to existing corporate governance codes.  In this 
quest for increased directorial accountability however, almost all the attention tends to 
be placed on the substantive content of the laws and codes governing directors. Much 
less attention, by contrast, has been devoted to the effectiveness of the enforcement 
regimes applying to these laws and codes. Yet, in the absence of effective enforcement, 
substantive rules have little impact. Consequently, while it is important to have 
appropriately developed company law regimes, which impose duties and responsibilities 
on directors, such laws are likely to fall well short of the mark unless they are also well 
enforced. It therefore becomes necessary to examine critically enforcement within the 
context of corporate law.  
In light of the crucial importance of enforcement in securing directors’ compliance and 
accountability, this thesis focuses upon the enforcement of corporate law in Nigeria. It 
analyses three major enforcement regimes in Nigeria: the criminal enforcement regime, 
the private civil enforcement regime and the public civil enforcement regime. Drawing 
on criteria for determining effective enforcement developed in the course of this thesis, it 
argues that the public civil enforcement regime offers the best potential for achieving 
significant real improvement in the enforcement of corporate law in Nigeria. To further 
reinforce the argument made for an enhanced public civil enforcement regime, this 
thesis uses three enforcement case studies derived from the UK and from Australia. The 
enforcement experience in these countries, whose corporate law regimes bear close 
similarities with that of Nigeria, have revealed that the public civil enforcement regime, 
by a clear gap, offers a potentially effective enforcement regime in corporate law. In 
short, then, this thesis argues that attaining effective enforcement of corporate law is 
within Nigeria’s reach but this can however be achieved only if it reforms, and develops, 
public civil enforcement in order to realise the potential benefits of this enforcement 
regime.  
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CHAPTER 1:  INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background  
Companies are a dominant feature of modern society. They own the stores from 
which we buy food and other supplies, they provide the water, gas and electricity 
which we rely on, they also supply many of the services that we require for our daily 
convenience.
1
 They are therefore an integral part of our everyday life. Similarly, in 
recent times, large multinational companies have continued to increase in terms of 
both their size as well as the sphere of their influence. As Anderson and Cavanagh 
note 
Of the 100 largest economies in the world, 51 are corporations; only 
49 are countries…to put this in perspective, General Motors is now 
bigger than Denmark; DaimlerChrysler is bigger than Poland; Royal 
Dutch/Shell is bigger than Venezuela; IBM is bigger than Singapore; 
and Sony is bigger than Pakistan.
2
  
It is therefore evident that companies are increasingly becoming more powerful than 
nations and have become a huge political, economic and social force in today’s global 
world.
3
 In light of the immense power and influence wielded by companies, it is 
essential that those controlling them be subject to checks and balances.  
                                                            
1 See D French, S.W. Mayson & C. Ryan, ‘Company Law’ (29th edn, OUP 2012-2013) 1. 
2 S Anderson & J Cavanagh, ‘Top 200: The Rise of Corporate Global Power’ (Institute for Policy 
Studies) <http://s3.amazonaws.com/corpwatch.org/downloads/top200.pdf> accessed 14th October 
2016.  
3 Note that the terms ‘companies’ and ‘corporations’ are used interchangeably throughout the course of 
this thesis.  
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A company is regarded in law as a separate legal entity.
4
 It is however an ‘artificial’ 
entity
5
 and therefore requires human agents to act on its behalf. The basic company 
model consists of its members (shareholders) and the directors who control and 
manage it. In small companies, it is very common for the members of the company to 
also function as the directors of the company. However, this is less often true in larger 
companies. As Parkinson notes, ‘in all but the smallest companies efficiency 
necessitates the delegation of authority to manage the business to a specialized 
management team’.6  Large public listed companies7 are often ‘widely-owned’ 
making it impossible for all the shareholders to be directly involved in the company’s 
management.
8
  In order for these companies to run efficiently, there is need for 
delegation of power from the shareholders to the directors. It is important to note here 
that the companies which this thesis is concerned with are such ‘widely owned’ 
companies, including those that are publicly listed. These are the sort of companies 
where there has been a delegation of power from the shareholders to the directors 
thereby creating room for those directors to act in their own self-interests to the 
detriment of the company’s shareholders.   
                                                            
4 Salomon v Salomon & Co Ltd [1897] AC 22, HL. 
5 It is worth noting that there are different theories of corporate personhood. See SK Ripken, 
‘Corporations are People Too; A Multi-Dimensional Approach to the Corporate Personhood Puzzle’ 
(2009) 15 Fordham Journal of Corporate and Financial Law 97. Hence, some argue that the company 
is an artificial entity, see JV Schall, ‘The Corporation: What Is It’ (2006) 4 Ave Maria Law Review 
105,118.  Some others have argued that the corporation is a real entity, see W Jethro Brown, ‘The 
Personality of the Corporation and the State’ (1905) 21 Law Quarterly Review 365,370.  Yet still some 
see the corporation as a ‘nexus of contracts’. See MC Jensen & WH Meckling, ‘Theory of the Firm: 
Managerial Behaviour, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure’ (1976) 3 Journal of Financial 
Economics 305. The different theories of the firm have certain elements of truth, they cannot however 
all be used at the same time. This thesis therefore chooses to view the firm as an artificial entity. This 
thesis therefore adopts this term throughout this thesis.  
6 JE Parkinson, Corporate Power and Responsibility: Issues in The Theory of Company Law (OUP 
1993) 51. 
7 A public limited company is a company whose shares can be freely sold to the members of the 
public. However, a public listed company is a public limited company whose shares are listed and 
traded on an official stock exchange. 
8 Widely’ owned means that ownership is in the hands of very many shareholders, each of whom likely 
owns only a small proportion of the total share capital. 
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The delegation of power from shareholders to directors creates an ‘agency 
relationship’,9 which is said to be at the core of the corporate structure.10  Delegation 
allows skilled managers to run corporations even though they lack personal wealth, 
while allowing wealthy individuals to invest even though they lack managerial 
skills.
11
 It is therefore a symbiotic and ‘theoretically’ mutually beneficial relationship.  
The difficulty however arises when the interests of the agent diverges from that of the 
principal within the corporation.
12
  Directors may act in their own interests, to the 
detriment of the shareholders, thereby reducing value to shareholders and the 
society.
13
 This is known as the ‘agency problem’. Therefore, while delegation is 
required for ‘corporate efficiency’, it comes with its unique difficulty which is 
common to all agency relationships.
14
  
Directors generally play an important role in corporations.  Their activities have 
significant effects on their companies’ wealth, the wealth of their shareholders and 
the interests of other stakeholders in those companies.
15
 The law therefore regards 
them as fiduciaries. The significance of directors’ position and responsibility in the 
company was further reiterated by Lord Goldsmith during the debate on the UK 
Company Law Reform Bill 2005, where he said ‘[w]e should remind ourselves that 
being a company director is a wonderful thing for the person who is the company 
director. But it is a position of great responsibility which involves running the affairs 
of a company for the benefit of other people. It is a heavy responsibility that we 
                                                            
9 To be clear the term ‘agency relationship’ used by economists to denote the relationship between 
directors and shareholders does not directly mirror a typical agency relationship in law. 
10 See FH Easterbrook and DR Fischel, ‘Corporate Control Transactions’ (1982) 91 Yale Law Journal 
698,700. 
11 Ibid.  
12 Note that the terms ‘corporation’ and ‘company’ are used interchangeably throughout the course of 
this thesis. They however mean the same thing within the context of this thesis.  
13 Parkinson (n 6) 51. 
14 For further discussion of the agency problem and consequent agency costs, see chapter 2.  
15 A Keay, Directors’ Duties (Jordan Publishing Ltd 2009) 1. 
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should not water down’.16 There is therefore an interest - private and public - in 
ensuring that directors do not take their responsibility lightly and that the company is 
directed, and managed, in the company’s interests.  
In light of this, countries around the world have developed and reformed their 
corporate law regimes in order to mitigate the agency problem and ensure that 
directors manage the company’s affairs in its best interests. These reforms have 
included imposing stringent responsibilities on directors in the form of directors’ 
duties and reporting obligations. Much less attention has however been placed on the 
enforcement of these laws and obligations. The pertinent question then is whether 
these rules are ‘self-enforcing’ and sufficient to secure compliance with the law. The 
answer must be a clear No. As Armour argues, ‘the deterrent effect of a legal rule is a 
function not only of the size of the potential penalty but of the probability of its 
enforcement’.17 In the absence of appropriate enforcement mechanisms, legal rules 
have little deterrent effect and are unable to secure adequate compliance.  As noted by 
McDaniel, ‘a right without a remedy is worthless’.18 Therefore, while it is important 
to put in place good systems of laws that impose duties and responsibilities on 
directors, these laws are unlikely to be of any use in corporate governance unless they 
are well enforced. In short, the effectiveness of a regulatory regime therefore depends 
not just on substantive rules but, also importantly, on the availability of effective 
enforcement mechanisms.  
                                                            
16 Lords Grand Committee, ‘Company Law Reform Bill’ 6 February 2006 GC291,  
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200506/ldhansrd/vo060206/text/60206-40.htm> accessed 
12th October 2016.  
17 J Armour, ‘Enforcement Strategies in UK Corporate Governance: A Roadmap and Empirical 
Assessment’ in J Armour & J Payne, Rationality in Company Law: Essays in Honour of DD Prentice 
(Hart Publishing 2009) 77.  
18 MW McDaniel, ‘Bondholders and Stockholders’ (1988) 13 Journal of Corporation Law 205,309.  
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Nigeria provides the classic example of a country which has been unable to secure 
effective enforcement of its corporate law, in spite of the existence and body of 
substantive laws. Nigeria, with a population of about 186 million,
19
 is Africa’s most 
populous nation and the largest market for goods and services in Africa. The Nigerian 
legislative system is largely rooted in its colonial past and, like many other former 
British colonies, Nigeria inherited many of its rules and regulations from the colonial 
government.
20
 As a result, Nigeria’s company law has over the years been drawn 
from, and closely patterned after, the English common law and various UK 
Companies Acts.
21
   
The Companies and Allied Matters Act 1990 (CAMA) is the current statute 
governing all companies in Nigeria. It makes provisions for financial statements, 
auditing requirements, accounting standards, directors’ duties, shareholders’ rights 
amongst other issues. Similarly, the Investments and Securities Act 2007 (ISA) 
governs the operation of Nigeria’s capital market. It is therefore applicable to public 
listed companies and makes provisions regarding companies’ annual reports and 
accounts, sale of shares to members of the public and investor protection. 
Furthermore, in keeping with international best practice, Nigeria has had a number of 
corporate governance codes and indeed, very recently, released a new National Code 
of Corporate Governance 2016 which commenced operation from the 17
th
 of October 
2016. In spite of these however, as will be seen in the course of this thesis, 
enforcement of corporate law in Nigeria is weak. There is a clear mismatch between 
                                                            
19 United Nations, ‘Nigeria’ <http://data.un.org/CountryProfile.aspx?crName=NIGERIA> accessed 
18th November 2016.   
20 E.N.M Okike, ‘Corporate Governance in Nigeria: The Status Quo’ (2007) 15(2) Corporate 
Governance 175. 
21 The Nigerian Companies Ordinance 1912 drew heavily on the English Companies (Consolidation) 
Act 1908. Similarly, the Nigerian Companies Act 1968 was very similar to the English Companies Act 
1948. 
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the quality of the substantive rules and regulations that apply to companies in Nigeria, 
and the level of enforcement that is achieved in practice.  The main problem besetting 
Nigerian corporate law and governance lies then, not with the substantive rules and 
regulations themselves, but with their enforcement. Consequently, there is a crucial 
need to examine the mechanisms for enforcement of corporate law in Nigeria, with a 
view to achieving improvements that will address such lack of enforcement.  
The foregoing comments explain and justify the overarching goals of this thesis.  
These goals are to demonstrate that Nigeria does indeed have an ‘enforcement 
problem’ in corporate law, to identify the causes of that problem, in terms of the 
weaknesses which undermine existing enforcement regimes in Nigeria, and to offer 
persuasive and practical avenues for reform.   
To accomplish this, the thesis focuses upon three enforcement regimes in particular.   
These are, first, the criminal enforcement regime, second, the private civil 
enforcement regime and, third, the public civil enforcement regime. As noted, the 
purpose of doing so is to identify weaknesses within these regimes and to make 
suggestions for their reform and improvement.  However, it will be useful to give an 
immediate sense, here, of the main reform that is suggested.  Although none of the 
three regimes currently operates in a satisfactory way in Nigeria, this thesis shall 
argue that one of them – public civil enforcement – stands out as offering the best 
potential for achieving substantial and real improvement to the overall enforcement of 
corporate law in Nigeria.  This thesis shall demonstrate that public civil enforcement 
offers significant advantages over both criminal enforcement and private civil 
enforcement, in terms of its potential to realise the proper purposes of enforcement. 
This is partly because of the inherent theoretical advantages of public civil 
enforcement compared to its alternatives, and also because the difficulties which 
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generally plague enforcement regimes in Nigeria are, it will be argued, most likely to 
be avoided in respect of public civil enforcement.   
In short, then, this thesis focuses on demonstrating that public civil enforcement 
should be accorded much greater emphasis in Nigerian corporate law, and identifying 
the reforms that are needed to achieve that.  This should not be taken to imply that the 
other enforcement regimes – criminal, and private civil – have no role at all to play, 
nor that their own effectiveness could not be improved through appropriate reforms.  
Indeed, during the course of this thesis some reforms to these other regimes will be 
suggested.  They are not, however, and to emphasise the point, the focus of the work 
which is, as argued, enhancing and improving public civil enforcement.   
This argument for an enhanced role for public civil enforcement regime in Nigeria is 
further reinforced by empirical studies drawn from the UK and from Australia. 
Analysis of enforcement case studies drawn from these countries support the 
arguments developed here both about the potential superiority of public civil 
enforcement, and about some of the reform measures that are necessary, in Nigeria, to 
realise this potential.  
1.2 Research Questions 
The overarching research question with which this thesis is concerned might be 
expressed as follows: ‘which enforcement regime offers the greatest potential for 
delivering overall effective enforcement of corporate law in Nigeria?’ This thesis is 
therefore primarily concerned with how to ensure that corporate law requirements and 
standards are effectively enforced in Nigeria (whatever ‘effective enforcement’ might 
mean).  
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As mentioned earlier, while there is much literature on the requirements, which 
should be imposed on directors of companies, and the manner in which the content of 
corporate laws and regulations can be improved, much less attention has been placed 
on the enforcement of these corporate law requirements. This is particularly so in 
Nigeria where there is very little existing literature analysing enforcement issues, in 
respect of corporate law. This thesis aims to fill that lacunae in literature and make an 
original contribution to knowledge in this regard.  
 In order to answer the overarching research question which has been identified, this 
research identified a number of subsidiary research questions which must be 
addressed.  
1. What exactly is the agency problem in corporate law, and what substantive 
legal strategies are in place to deal with this (in corporate law systems 
generally, and in Nigeria specifically)?  
2. What role does enforcement play in securing compliance with these legal 
strategies, what are the goals and purposes of enforcement in corporate 
law, and by what criteria should an effective enforcement regime in 
corporate law be judged?  
3. What is the current ‘state of play’ regarding enforcement of corporate law 
in Nigeria, how effective is it, and what are the reasons for its successes or 
failures?  
4. How might enforcement of corporate law be improved in Nigeria? Is the 
author’s hypothesis - that public civil enforcement provides the most 
plausible and desirable means of improving overall enforcement of 
corporate law in Nigeria - compelling? Consequently, should Nigeria 
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focus more of its immediate reform efforts on the public civil enforcement 
regime? 
5.  Can, and should, Nigeria learn from the experience of other countries in 
this regard?  
 
1.3 Structure of Thesis  
To address the subsidiary questions, and in so doing answer the overarching question 
posed, this thesis adopts the following structure and is divided into three main parts. 
Part 1 provides a conceptual framework for the entire thesis. It starts in chapter 2 by 
examining the nature of the agency problem in corporate law. It also examines agency 
costs and the different types of agency costs which arise in corporations. Finally, it 
examines the legal strategies for mitigating agency costs in corporations.  
Chapter 3 examines the enforcement problem in corporate law. It argues that 
enforcement of corporate law is necessary in order to secure compliance.  It starts by 
conceptualising enforcement, before going on to examine the goal and purpose of 
enforcement. It further examines the importance of enforcement in corporate law and 
provides a justification for enforcement using deterrence theory. It then develops 
certain criteria which should be used to measure or determine an effective 
enforcement regime in corporate law. These criteria are deterrence, compensation and 
cost-effectiveness and they form the basis for the analysis of the different 
enforcement regimes in subsequent chapters. Finally, the chapter provides a typology 
of enforcement mechanisms in corporate law and sets out the enforcement regimes, 
which will be the subject of further analysis in the thesis. 
Part 2 examines the Nigerian context of enforcement in corporate law. It starts in 
Chapter 4 by exploring Nigeria’s corporate landscape. It first provides a detailed 
10 
 
history of commercial development in Nigeria. It then examines the legal forms for 
conducting business in Nigeria before moving on to focus specifically on 
incorporated companies. It identifies the structure of the legal framework governing 
companies in Nigeria and describes the regulatory agencies which are integral to this 
structure. This chapter reveals that Nigeria has a network of corporate laws, securities 
laws, corporate governance code and regulatory agencies which can protect 
shareholders’ interests and in theory mitigate the agency problem. The important 
question however is whether reality matches up with this expectation.  
Chapter 5 examines the criminal enforcement regime in Nigeria. It starts by 
discussing the criminal sanctions which are imposed on directors in Nigeria for 
breach. It however notes that the current criminal enforcement regime in Nigeria falls 
far below expectation. It therefore examines the issues and challenges which prevent 
effective criminal enforcement in Nigeria. It argues that the current criminal 
enforcement regime lacks a deterrent effect, is unable to secure effective 
compensation for victims and is not cost effective. It therefore concludes that the 
criminal enforcement regime, for these reasons, cannot be relied on to deliver 
effective enforcement of corporate law in Nigeria.  
Chapter 6 examines the private civil enforcement regime in Nigeria. It starts by 
addressing the various private enforcement actions in Nigeria and identifying their 
respective shortcomings. It then moves on to examine critically derivative actions in 
Nigeria. It demonstrates that this form of proceedings in Nigeria is deficient and 
places an unnecessary burden on potential applicants. It further argues that the 
problems with derivative actions go far beyond its current statutory manifestation. It 
is fraught with several inherent difficulties.  Therefore, while the private civil 
enforcement regime offers some advantages over the criminal enforcement regime, it 
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cannot, on its own, secure any significant increase in the overall enforcement of 
corporate law in Nigeria. Therefore, the private civil enforcement regime is also 
unable to deliver effective enforcement in Nigeria.  
Chapter 7 turns to public civil enforcement. It argues that public civil enforcement 
offers the best option for improving the enforcement of corporate law in Nigeria. It 
starts by analysing the theoretical advantages of public civil enforcement, using the 
criteria for determining effective enforcement which are set out in chapter 3. It argues 
that public civil enforcement generally offers the greatest potential for achieving 
greater deterrent effect, compensation, and cost effectiveness in comparison to the 
criminal and private civil enforcement regime. It then particularly examines the 
current public civil enforcement regime in Nigeria. It notes the shortcomings of the 
current regime and examines the factors that are responsible for this. It nevertheless 
argues that in spite of this, public civil enforcement offers the greatest potential for 
ensuring effective enforcement of corporate law in Nigeria. Asides from the general 
advantages of this regime, it is the most practically workable enforcement regime for 
Nigeria’s corporate law as it avoids many of the difficulties which undermine the 
other enforcement regimes discussed in the last two chapters. It therefore offers the 
greatest benefit for effective enforcement of Nigeria’s corporate law.  
In light of the findings of chapter 7, chapter 8 makes specific proposals for reform of 
the country’s public civil enforcement regime. The suggested reforms include 
identification of an effective enforcement agency, conferment of power to enforce 
breach of directors’ duties on the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), clear 
whistleblowing laws and reporting channels, increase in regulatory oversight, 
complete overhaul of the Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA), regulatory 
accountability, and adequate funding for public regulators. It argues that these 
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reforms, if made, would achieve significant improvements in the enforcement of 
corporate law in Nigeria. It also argues that the reforms are feasible in Nigeria as the 
country has a past record of achieving successful reforms. The suggested reforms are 
therefore not impossible to achieve. 
Part 3 draws lessons from other jurisdictions. Chapter 9 starts by examining the legal 
transplant debate.  This chapter is considered necessary in light of the fact that this 
part of the thesis (chapter 10) draws empirical evidence from the UK and Australia as 
evidence for the superiority of public civil enforcement. In light of the ‘comparative’ 
element of this study, it is considered necessary to examine the legal transplant debate 
in order to demonstrate how the criticisms commonly made against legal transplants 
do not apply to this thesis’ attempt to draw empirical support from the UK and 
Australia. This chapter argues that legal transplants are possible and can indeed be 
successful. However, in order for any legal transplant to be successful, several factors 
must be put in place. These factors are set out in this chapter. Finally, the chapter 
argues that the concerns surrounding unsuccessful legal transplants do not arise with 
regards to this thesis’ attempts to learn lessons from the UK and Australia. 
Consequently, Nigeria can indeed gather empirical evidence, and learn lessons, from 
the enforcement experience of these countries. 
 Chapter 10 then turns to examine three specific enforcement case studies drawn from 
the UK and Australia. This chapter is considered necessary in order to provide 
empirical support for the arguments made for the superiority of public civil 
enforcement in part 2 of this thesis. It therefore reinforces the case for public civil 
enforcement in Nigeria.  The choice of these two jurisdictions - the UK and Australia 
- is based on the several similarities which they share with the Nigerian legal system. 
The first case study examines derivative proceedings in the UK. It demonstrates that, 
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in spite of significant reforms carried out by the UK, derivative proceedings still fall 
short as an effective enforcement mechanism in that country. It therefore reiterates 
that private civil enforcement actions are fraught with inherent difficulties which 
cannot be resolved even by significant statutory reforms as evidenced by the UK 
experience. The chapter then goes on to examine what is arguably the UK’s best 
example of a public civil enforcement regime, namely, its disqualification regime. It 
demonstrates that the disqualification regime has recorded good success in its 
enforcement activities. It does, however, has its own shortcomings in that it is unduly 
focused on directors of insolvent companies. Finally, the chapter examines the 
Australian civil penalty regime. It demonstrates that the Australian civil penalty 
regime has been successful as an enforcement regime. It therefore argues that there is 
overwhelmingly positive evidence in favour of public civil enforcement drawn from 
both the UK and Australian jurisdictions.  
Chapter 11 provides the conclusion for the thesis and highlights areas for further 
research.  
1.4 Research Methodology 
In carrying out its research, this thesis uses a variety of research methodologies. First, 
it makes use of a doctrinal research methodology in analysing the law as it stands in 
Nigeria. In this regard, it analyses Nigeria’s corporate law particularly with regards to 
the private civil enforcement regime. It therefore critically analyses the statutory 
derivative actions regime in Nigeria which is contained in the Companies and Allied 
Matters Act 1990 (CAMA). It does this with a view to identifying its strengths and, 
more particularly, its weaknesses. It also examines certain features of the Investments 
and Securities Act 2007 (ISA) as it applies to directors of listed companies. In 
addition to this, it briefly examines the features of the UK statutory derivative claims 
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regime which is contained in the UK Companies Act 2006 as well as its 
disqualification regime found in the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 
(CDDA).  
Secondly, this thesis, while not a fully interdisciplinary study, makes use of a number 
of other disciplines. In developing its argument on the need for, and justification for, 
enforcement, this thesis makes use of the deterrence theory. This theory is developed 
within the areas of criminology and economics. It is therefore primarily used within 
the field of criminal justice. This thesis however makes use of this theory in 
developing its argument for enforcement as well as its criteria for determining 
effective enforcement.   
Thirdly, in carrying out its research, this thesis makes use of empirical data drawn 
from various sources. In evaluating the effectiveness of the UK statutory derivative 
claims regime, empirical data on the incidence of derivative claims in the UK 
between 2008 and 2016 was derived from the Westlaw UK case law database. 
Similarly, in analysing the effectiveness of the Australian public civil enforcement 
regime, this thesis makes use of empirical data drawn from different reports published 
by the Australian Securities and Investments Commission.
22
 Enforcement data 
obtained directly from other official websites such as the Nigerian Securities and 
Exchange Commission and the UK Insolvency services are also relied on in this 
thesis. These data are useful in developing a clear understanding of the current state 
of affairs with regards to the various enforcement regimes examined. 
Finally, in developing the reforms proposed in this thesis, several insights and lessons 
are drawn from the UK and Australia. Therefore, while this thesis does not engage in 
                                                            
22 See s10.4, Ch. 10.  
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a direct comparative study between the UK, Australia and Nigeria, it uses the UK and 
Australia to provide empirical support for the thesis’ arguments for an enhanced role 
for public civil enforcement. It demonstrates that public civil enforcement has been 
very effective in both the UK and Australia; this is in comparison to private civil 
enforcement which continues to fall short in the UK despite statutory reforms. 
Therefore, the benefits of the public civil enforcement regime go beyond theoretical 
advantages, rather empirical evidence from other regimes show the clear advantage 
offered by the public civil enforcement regime.  
This thesis makes use of both primary and secondary research sources.  The primary 
sources used are case laws, laws and regulations from Nigeria, UK and Australia, and 
finally codes of corporate governance. Secondary sources include published books, 
peer-reviewed articles, online articles, newspapers articles, theses, working papers, 
law commission reports, parliamentary reports, annual reports, conference and 
seminar papers and various websites.  
A number of difficulties were encountered in the course of this thesis. Chief among 
them was the difficulty in obtaining case law on private enforcement actions in 
Nigeria. E-reporting of case law is still at its developmental stage in Nigeria. There is 
only one reliable law reports database, ‘the law pavilion’, which is focused on Courts 
of Appeal and Supreme Courts’ decisions.  Another key problem was the difficulty in 
obtaining enforcement data regarding the success rate of the Australian civil penalty 
regime from the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC). Contact 
was made with key academics in the area of Australian corporate law and the author 
was informed about the general reluctance of ASIC to release private data. The data 
used in this thesis in that regard were therefore restricted to data available in ASIC’s 
annual reports and report of enforcement outcomes.  
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1.5 Two Limits on the Scope of Thesis 
This thesis is focused on the enforcement of corporate law; it is nevertheless 
important to delineate its scope. Two key points will be made in this regard. 
 Firstly, while this thesis analyses enforcement of corporate law, reference to 
‘corporate law’ in this context does not encompass all aspects of that body of law. 
This thesis’ analysis of enforcement of corporate law is therefore limited to those 
corporate law requirements which have a direct and significant impact on the 
interests of shareholders and other stakeholders including the wider community. The 
test for determining this is whether failure to comply with this requirement could 
directly prejudice the interest of shareholders or other stakeholders. Hence the breach 
of corporate law requirements to be considered in this thesis include breach of 
directors’ duties, failure to disclose material information such as interests in 
transactions, issues relating to accounting records such as the financial statements and 
directors’ reports, fraud, money laundering, giving misleading or false information, 
insider dealing and other forms of market abuse or market manipulation. The 
enforcement analysis in this thesis does not therefore include all contraventions of 
corporate law. Minor breaches such as low level record keeping and reporting 
requirements that attract pre-determined administrative sanctions do not fall within 
the scope of this thesis. For example breach of reporting requirements in the 
Companies and Allied Matters Act 1990 (CAMA) such as delay in notifying the 
Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC) about a change in address of registered 
office,
23
 delay in filing notice of location of register of members,
24
 or delay in filing 
notification of change in details of directors or the secretary are not included.
25
 
                                                            
23 CAMA, s46. 
24 CAMA, s84. 
25 CAMA, s292. 
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Similarly, issues such as default in complying with the requirement on keeping 
register of members or in giving notification of the location of the register of 
members
26
 do not fall within the scope of this thesis.   
It is however crucial to note here that this differentiation does not imply that such 
administrative requirements and sanctions do not ‘matter’ or have any effect on 
shareholders. These administrative requirements are intended to ensure accountability 
and protect the integrity of the financial system. However, for the purpose of 
providing a clear focus, and due to word constraints, this thesis enforcement analysis 
is restricted to the aforementioned corporate law requirements.   
Secondly, a familiar distinction has been drawn in corporate law between regulatory 
strategies and governance strategies.
27
 However, the scope of this thesis is limited to 
regulatory strategies and not governance strategies. Therefore, in analysing 
enforcement mechanisms, this thesis focuses solely on enforcement of regulatory 
strategies. It therefore does not focus on enforcement of governance strategies such as 
shareholders’ rights to appoint or remove directors and shareholders’ voting rights 
within the company. As mentioned earlier, it focuses on enforcement of substantive 
rules and standards such as directors’ duties, accounting, and disclosure obligations. 
This is considered necessary as governance strategies in corporate law cover a 
reasonably wide sphere. They cannot therefore be diligently and comprehensively 
examined within the scope of this thesis due to limitations posed by word constraints.  
                                                            
26 See CAMA, ss83-84. 
27 See s2.4, Ch.  2.  
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PART 1 – THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
 
CHAPTER 2:  THE AGENCY PROBLEM AND AGENCY 
COSTS 
 
2.1 Introduction  
Over the years economists and legal scholars have been concerned with the 
mechanisms for ensuring accountability in corporations, including ensuring that those 
who manage the company do so in a way that enhances the company’s interests. This 
is known as the agency problem and is arguably the central theme of corporate law. 
An understanding of agency problems and agency costs is therefore central to any 
study of corporate law. 
Consequently, this chapter briefly examines the agency problem in corporate law. It 
commences in section 2.2 by examining the nature of the agency problem, which 
exists in corporations. It then moves on in section 2.3 to examine agency costs and 
the different types of agency costs which arise in corporations. Section 2.4 then 
examines the legal strategies for mitigating agency costs in corporations. It 
distinguishes between two types of legal strategies namely ‘regulatory strategies’ and 
‘governance strategies’.  It then concludes by noting the need for effective 
enforcement of these legal strategies.  This chapter serves as a foundation for the 
discussion which is to follow in subsequent chapters.  
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2.2 The Agency Problem  
According to Jensen and Meckling, an agency relationship is defined as ‘a contract 
under which one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) 
to perform some services on their behalf which involves delegating some decision 
making authority to the agent.’1 The agency problem arises out of this relationship 
and can be defined as the problem inherent in attempting to induce an agent to act in 
the principal’s interest.2 This problem arises whenever the welfare of one party (the 
principal) depends upon the actions of another party (the agent), and may occur in 
virtually any contractual relationships in which one party promises to perform 
something for another.
3
  
According to Kraakman et al, three generic agency problems arise in corporations.
4
  
The first involves the conflict between the firm’s owners and its managers; in this 
case, the owners are the principals while the managers are the agents. The problem 
here lies in ensuring that the managers act in the owner’s interest and not their own 
personal interest. The second agency problem is the conflict between the controlling 
shareholders (agents) and the minority shareholders (principals). The third agency 
problem is the conflict between the firm (agents) and other parties such as creditors, 
employees and consumers (principals). Our central concern in this thesis is however 
with the first category of agency problem – the conflict between managers and 
owners.
5
 
                                                            
1 M.C Jensen and W.H Meckling, ‘Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behaviour, Agency Costs and 
Ownership Structure’ (1976) 3 Journal of Financial Economics 305, 308. 
2 ibid 309. 
3 Kraakman and others, The Anatomy of Corporate Law: A Comparative and Functional Approach (2nd 
edn, OUP 2009) 35.  
4 ibid 36. 
5 Note that the use of the term ‘owners’ to describe shareholders in the company has been criticised 
and described as ‘misleading. This is particularly more so for large listed companies whose 
shareholders do not possess the rights and responsibilities expected of ‘owners’. See MM Blair, 
‘Corporate “Ownership” (1995) 13 (1) The Brookings Review 16. 
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The basis of the agency problem is the assumption that the interests of principals and 
agents diverge.
6
  In this regard, the shareholders are the principals while the managers 
are the agents in the agency relationship. The shareholder as the principal delegates 
day to day running of the company to the managers, who are the agents.
7
 Delegation 
is ordinarily beneficial to both managers and agents within the corporate entity. It 
enables skilled managers (agents) to use their skills in managing a corporation even 
when they lack the wealth to invest. It also allows wealthy individuals (shareholders) 
to invest even where they lack the skills to manage the entity.
8
 However, the problem 
that arises here is that the agents do not always make decisions that are in the 
principal’s best interests.9 For example the agent may misuse his managerial power 
for personal financial benefits or may not take certain risks which are in the 
principal’s overall interest, due to the belief that those risks might not be in his (the 
agent’s) own best interests.10 There are also problems of ‘information asymmetry’, 
which puts the principal at a disadvantage because of the fact that the agent possesses 
more information than the principal does.
11
  
In understanding the conflicts of interests that may arise between managers and 
shareholders in a corporation, it is useful to make use of Eisenberg’s classification. 
According to Eisenberg, conflicts of interests between managers and shareholders in 
public corporations may come in different forms. The first category is known as 
‘shirking’.12 This occurs because all agents have a possible interest in working at a 
                                                            
6 CWL Hill & Thomas M Jones, ‘Stakeholder Agency Theory’ (1992) 29(2) Journal of Management 
Studies 131, 132. 
7 J Solomon, Corporate Governance and Accountability (4th edn, Wiley 2013) 9.  
8 FH Easterbrook and DR Fischel, ‘Corporate Control Transactions’ (1982) 91 Yale Law Journal 698, 
700.  
9 Solomon (n 7) 9. 
10 CA Mallin, Corporate Governance (4th edn OUP 2013) 17. 
11 ibid 17. 
12 MA Eisenberg, ‘The Structure of Corporation Law’ (1989) 89 (7) Columbia Law Review 1461, 
1471. 
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slow pace and refusing to put in the effort and discomfort required to achieve good 
results. Hence the managers may fail to give the company sufficient attention, 
preferring to spend their time on other leisure activities.
13
   
The second category is described as the problem of ‘traditional conflicts of interest’.14 
This arises because agents may have an interest in diverting the principal’s assets for 
their own personal use through ‘unfair self-dealing.’ This could be by exploiting 
potential business opportunities intended for the company.
15
 Unfair self-dealing may 
also occur where the manager sells assets to the company at a value, which is higher 
than the current market price or where the company loans money to the manager 
interest free.
16
   
The third category is ‘positional conflicts of interest’.17 Those conflicts arise because 
corporate managers are relatively autonomous and therefore have a wide range of 
discretion, which increases their likelihood of maintaining and improving their 
managerial position at the shareholder’s expense. Positional conflicts may arise in 
several ways, for example, managers may seek to improve corporate size in order to 
enhance their power, status and salary even if this is detrimental to shareholders. 
They may also seek to maximize the cash and keep reinvesting it even where it is 
more efficient to distribute to shareholders as dividends, or they may even make it 
very difficult for anyone to monitor their performance.
18
 Managers may also seek 
many perquisites such as holidays charged on the company, private jets, classy cars, 
unnecessary office equipment and the like, thereby reducing shareholder value.
19
 
                                                            
13 Kershaw, Company Law in Context: Text and Materials (2nd edn, OUP 2012) 178. 
14 Eisenberg (n 12) 1471. 
15 Kershaw (n13) 178. 
16 ibid 177. 
17 Eisenberg (n 12) 1471 & 1472. 
18 ibid 1472. 
19  Solomon (n 7)10. 
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According to Eisenberg, positional conflicts are more important than either shirking 
or traditional conflict of interests’.20 While managers may abstain from shirking 
because their self-esteem is linked to their hard work and achievements and may not 
engage in unfair self-dealing due to their sense of morality; these factors may be 
insufficient to prevent positional conflicts.  The top managers’ self-esteem often 
depends on maintenance of their status and as such, they may find it more difficult to 
curb their taste for the finer things of life.
21
  
It is important to note that the agency problem in corporate law arises in corporations 
where there is a delegation of authority from the shareholders to the manager. In a 
firm where the shareholder is also the director and CEO, the interests of all parties are 
‘fully and unavoidably’ aligned and as such, there arises no agency problem.22 
However as the manager’s equity reduces in the company, his incentive to 
misappropriate company resources potentially increases resulting in an increase in 
agency costs.
23
 The interests of the shareholders and managers are no longer fully 
aligned, resulting in the agency problem. The severity of the agency problem may 
also depend on the extent of dispersion of shares in the company. In a closely held 
company (i.e. companies with few shareholders each holding large proportion of 
shares), there is little room for directors to make decisions that benefit them directly 
at the company’s expense. The few shareholders who own significant amount of 
shares in the company have sufficient incentives to monitor management and keep up 
to date with the company’s performance.24 Any evidence of mismanagement by the 
director could therefore result in greater controls over the director’s decision-making 
powers or even his removal. Consequently, the manager’s incentive to act in a self-
                                                            
20 Eisenberg (n 12)1473. 
21 ibid 1473. 
22 Kershaw (n 13)171. 
23 Jensen and Meckling (n 1)172. 
24 Kershaw (n 13) 173. 
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interested manner is reduced.
25
 However in a company with many shareholders (a 
widely owned company), the manager’s incentive to act in a self-interested manner 
can be fully activated as there may be no shareholder with a sufficient incentive to 
monitor management.
26
 It is this problem that Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means were 
chiefly concerned with in their classical book, ‘The Modern Corporation and Private 
Property’, published in 1932.27  A general concern of corporate law has therefore 
been how to align the manager’s interests with the shareholders thereby ensuring that 
managers run the company in a way that enhances shareholder value. Agency theory 
therefore focuses on developing the most efficient incentive in the contract governing 
the principal-agent relationship
28
  that will better align the interests of both parties 
and reduce agency costs. 
2.3 Agency Costs  
Agency costs arise due to the non-alignment of the managers’ interest with 
those of the shareholders.
29
 They occur as a result of the shareholders’ attempts to 
monitor management and are therefore an unavoidable result of agency 
relationships.
30
  In order to limit the divergence of interest between the principal and 
agent, the principal may provide certain incentives to the agent. This may result in the 
principal incurring certain ‘monitoring costs’.31 These ‘monitoring costs’ include the  
                                                            
25 ibid 173. This does not however mean that agency problem never arises in closely held corporations. 
As long as there is some delegation of authority from a principal to an agent, there is a possibility of 
agency problem arising. The agency problem is however often more severe in widely dispersed 
corporations. 
26 ibid 174. See further EM Dodd, ‘Is Effective Enforcement of the Fiduciary Duties of Corporate 
Managers Practicable?’ (1935) 2 (2) The University of Chicago Law Review 194, 196-197.   
27 See AA Berle & GC Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (New York: The 
Macmillan Company 1932). 
28 KM Eisenhardt, ‘Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review’ (1989) 14(1) The Academy of 
Management Review 57, 58. 
29 JS Ang, R.A Cole & JW Lin, ‘Agency Costs and Ownership Structures’ (2000) LV (1) Journal of 
Finance.  
30 Jensen and Meckling (n 1) 328, Jill Solomon (n 7)10. 
31 Jensen and Meckling (n 1) 308. 
24 
 
costs of initiating shareholder engagement, putting  in place incentive schemes for 
management and remuneration contracts to align the interests of shareholders and 
managers.
32
  In addition to this, the agent may also expend resources to guarantee that 
he will not take certain actions that are detrimental to the principal or to ensure that 
the principal is compensated if he takes such actions; this is known as ‘bonding 
costs’.33 This includes the costs of including certain information in the annual report, 
such as risk management information, costs of contractual guarantee to have the 
financial statements audited,
34
 and cost of arranging meetings with shareholders.
35
 In 
addition to this, the principal may also suffer ‘residual loss’ which is the cost to the 
principal resulting from the divergence of interests between principal and agent.
36
 
Examples of this would include losses suffered by the company as a result of the 
manager’s exploitation of certain business opportunities for himself or shirking.37 The 
totality of these costs (i.e. monitoring costs by the principal, bonding costs by the 
agent and residual loss) is defined as ‘agency costs’.38  
The extent of agency costs differs from firm to firm and depends on a variety of 
factors.
39
  It is however practically impossible for both the principal and agents to 
incur zero costs in an agency relationship.
40
 Agency costs are borne by the 
shareholders and as such, they have an incentive to ensure that these costs are 
minimized.
41
 It is therefore necessary to control the agency problem where managers 
are not the residual claimants in the corporation and as such do not bear the costs of 
                                                            
32 Solomon (n 7)10. 
33 Jensen and Meckling (n 1)308. 
34 ibid 325. 
35 Solomon (n 7)10. 
36 Jensen and Meckling (n 1)308. 
37 Kershaw (n 13)177-178. 
38 Jensen and Meckling (n 1)308. 
39 ibid 328. 
40 ibid 308. 
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their decisions.
42
 Without effective control mechanisms, management are likely to 
take decisions that are not in the best interests of the residual claimants.
43
  
2.4 Legal Strategies for Reducing Agency Costs 
The law has a crucial role to play in minimizing agency costs in corporations. This 
can be achieved through rules and procedures that increase disclosure by agents or 
ensure enforcement actions against them.
44
 This section will therefore make use of 
Kraakman et al’s taxonomy in highlighting different legal strategies for reducing 
agency costs. According to Kraakman et al, the law often makes use of ‘legal 
strategies’ in reducing agency costs. These legal strategies can be divided into two 
categories; these are ‘regulatory strategies’ and ‘governance strategies’.45 
2.4.1 Regulatory Strategies 
Regulatory strategies are ‘prescriptive’ and usually prescribe certain terms that 
govern the principal-agent relationship in order to act as a check on the agent’s 
behaviour.
46
 These strategies seek to directly influence the agent’s exercise of its 
powers.
47
 Regulatory strategies may come in different forms as discussed below 
2.4.1.1 Rules and Standards 
Regulatory strategies may be formulated as either ‘rules’ or ‘standards’. Rules are 
usually fairly detailed and precise in specifying how the target of the rule must 
behave. The target therefore knows, before she acts, or ex ante, with a fair degree of 
precision, what behaviour is required. A provision saying ‘do not drive faster than 
30mph on this road’ would be an example of a rule. By contrast, standards are usually 
                                                            
42 EF Fama and MM Jensen, ‘Separation of Ownership and Control’ (1983) 26(2) Journal of Law and 
Economics. 301, 304. 
43 ibid 304. 
44 Kraakman & others (n 3)37. 
45 ibid 37 &38. 
46 ibid 38. 
47 PL Davies, Introduction to Company Law (OUP 2002) 119. 
26 
 
more general, and leave the precise determination of what behaviour the standard 
demands in any particular factual situation to the adjudicator to work out once the 
situation has already arisen. The precise requirement of a standard thus varies from 
situation to situation, and is only ‘crystallised’ for each position ex post or once the 
situation is known. A provision requiring drivers to drive ‘carefully’ would be an 
example of a standard. 
Rules, prescribing specific conduct beforehand, are usually used in the corporation to 
safeguard the company’s creditors and public investors. This could include rules on 
dividend payments,
48
 minimum capital requirement, tender offers and proxy voting.
49
 
This also includes rules governing issuing of shares, prohibiting a company’s 
acquisition of its own shares,
50
 or giving financial assistance to purchase its own 
shares to mention a few.
51
 
Most jurisdictions do not rely solely on rules and therefore make use of standards to 
govern transactions that may be too complex to regulate by specific rules.
52
 As 
mentioned earlier, standards are not as clear as rules and require the judiciary for 
effective administration. Compliance with them is therefore usually determined on a 
case-by-case basis.
53
 Standards may be used to govern ‘intra-company relations’ such 
as insider self-dealing.
54
 Important examples of standards are company law 
provisions governing directors’ duties, which set out behaviours, expected of 
directors.
55
 They also include provisions of the law on disqualification of directors.
56
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These standards are used by adjudicators to determine ex post (after occurrence), 
whether there has been a breach or not.
57
  
2.4.1.2 Entry and exit 
Another category of regulatory strategies involves setting the terms of entry and exit. 
Here the law prescribes certain terms of entry for agents, for example by requiring 
them to disclose certain information before taking on their role as agents. The entry 
strategy is important in ensuring that only the right agents are admitted into the public 
capital market. Another example of entry strategies are the rules requiring disclosure 
of certain information to prospective public investors in order to ensure that they can 
make an informed decision.
58
 Entry strategies would include listing rules, rules 
regulating public offer of shares and prospectuses.  
The law may also prescribe exit strategies such as the grant to shareholders of the 
right to sell or transfer their stock. The doctrine of separate corporate personality 
provides for free transferability of shares.
59
 Hence, the exit strategy allows hostile 
takeovers because shareholders can freely sell their shares
60
 thereby potentially acting 
as an effective disciplining mechanism for management.  
2.4.2 Governance Strategies 
Governance strategies are non-prescriptive laws that seek to assist the principal’s 
control over the agent’s behaviour. Their effectiveness therefore depends on the 
principal’s ability to exercise the powers granted to them.61 Governance strategies 
have been classified into three categories as discussed below 
                                                                                                                                                                         
56 See for example Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 c.46. 
57 Kraakman & others (n 3) 40. 
58 ibid 40. 
59 Davies (n 47)144. 
60 Kraakman & others (n 3) 41. 
61 ibid 38. 
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2.4.2.1 Selection and removal 
This category encompasses the rights granted to shareholders to appoint and remove 
directors. These rights play an essential role in the corporation. They allow 
shareholders to appoint the best persons to manage the company and to remove them 
if they fail to perform.
62
 In most jurisdictions, shareholders have the right to appoint 
and remove directors. For example, the UK Companies Act 2006 grants shareholders 
the powers to appoint and remove directors.
63
 These rights are an important 
controlling device in corporations and play an important role in corporate 
governance.
64
 They can also be useful in addressing the agency problem and ensuring 
that management act in the company’s best interests. 
2.4.2.2 Initiation and Ratification 
Another set of governance strategies is the power of shareholders (principals) to 
intervene in management. Shareholders may generally initiate or ratify certain 
management decisions. It is however worth noting that these governance strategies 
are not as prominent as shareholders’ powers to appoint and remove directors. 
Managerial power is usually delegated to the board of directors and only very crucial 
or huge corporate decisions require shareholder ratification.
65
 The general 
management and control of the corporation is therefore usually vested in the board of 
directors. An example of this is the UK Model Articles for companies limited by 
shares, which confers general management powers on directors.
66
 Despite this, most 
countries’ company law reserves certain important decisions for shareholder 
approval. This includes decisions regarding altering the company’s constitution, 
                                                            
62 Davies (n 47) 127. 
63 See Companies Act 2006, ss.160 &168. 
64 Kraakman & others (n 3) 42. 
65 See CAMA, s 63(3). 
66 See UK Model Articles, Articles 3 & 4. 
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restructuring the company, voluntary winding up and approving certain 
transactions.
67
 
2.4.2.3 Trusteeship and reward 
The last category of governance strategies identified by Kraakman et al consists of 
incentives, which intend to align the interests of the agent with that of the principal.  
The first incentive is the ‘reward strategy’, which rewards agents for acting in the 
principal’s interests.68 An example of this is the performance related pay, which ties 
the agent’s pay to his performance in the company. This includes share option 
schemes
69
 or bonuses for increase in share value.  This strategy gives agents the 
incentive to maximize returns for the shareholder due to the financial rewards of 
doing so.
70
  
The second incentive strategy, which is the ‘trusteeship strategy’, tries to remove 
conflict of interest beforehand by ensuring that agents do not have anything to gain 
by acting in a self-interested manner. An example of this ‘trusteeship’ strategy is the 
use of non-executive directors on the board.
71
 Such non-executive directors only 
function as directors in the company and hold no other managerial position within 
that company.
72
 Where this strategy is used, it is assumed that conflict of interest is 
removed. Non-executive directors do not personally gain from self-interested 
decisions; they are therefore expected to act as a check on management misbehaviour.  
                                                            
67 Davies (n 47)125. 
68 Kraakman & others (n 3) 43. 
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Similarly, the use of auditors to audit financial statements and approve certain 
transactions is a trusteeship strategy intended to remove conflict of interest.
73
  
From the foregoing, we can see that there is a range of legal strategies intended to 
reduce agency costs. It is important to note that these legal strategies are not rigidly 
classified and may sometimes overlap. Furthermore, none of these strategies is 
effective on its own as they all have costs and benefits.
74
 They are however useful for 
understanding the various responses to the agency problem. They will also be useful 
further in this thesis in discussing various enforcement mechanisms. This is because 
the efficiency of these legal strategies depends, largely, on the existence of certain 
institutions to secure enforcement. As noted by Kraakman et al that, ‘Legal strategies 
are relevant only to the extent that they induce compliance’.75  In the absence of 
effective enforcement, these legal strategies may not achieve their intended purpose 
of reducing agency costs.  
2.5 Conclusion  
The central problem of corporate law is the agency problem and the agency costs 
which occur as a result of this. It is therefore necessary that a discussion of 
enforcement in corporate law should commence with a study of the foundational 
problems of corporate law. This has been the focus of this chapter, which has 
examined the nature of the agency problem in corporate law and the consequent 
agency costs which follow. It has also made use of Kraakman et al’s typology in 
discussing the legal strategies, which are in place for mitigating the agency problem 
in corporate law. These legal strategies form the bedrock of this thesis’s classification 
and discussion of enforcement mechanisms in corporate law.  
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As mentioned in the previous section, it is insufficient to have legal strategies for 
mitigating the agency problem in corporate law without ensuring effective 
enforcement of these strategies. It is therefore necessary to examine the concept of 
enforcement in corporate law. 
32 
 
 
CHAPTER 3:  THE ENFORCEMENT PROBLEM IN 
CORPORATE LAW 
 
3.1 Introduction  
The previous chapter examined the agency problem and agency costs as well the legal 
strategies for reducing agency costs. This chapter now turns to the question of 
enforcement itself. It provides the theoretical foundation on which the remainder of 
the thesis will be built. In particular, it aims to conceptualise enforcement itself, and 
to explain why there must be enforcement of corporate law’s regulatory strategies in 
terms of the goals and purposes that enforcement seeks to achieve. It then puts 
forward a set of criteria by which the effectiveness of enforcement can be judged. 
These criteria will be applied to Nigeria itself in subsequent chapters.  
The chapter starts by examining the concept of enforcement in section 3.2 before 
going on to examine the goal and purpose of enforcement in section 3.3. It then 
moves on in section 3.4 to examine the importance of enforcement. Section 3.5 
provides a justification for enforcement of corporate law using the deterrence theory. 
It argues that the deterrence theory justifies the need for enforcement in corporate 
law, as sanctions are an integral part of securing compliance with prescriptions of the 
law or standards. Section 3.6 briefly examines the concept of compensation. Section 
3.7 then goes on to examine the determinants of effective enforcement in corporate 
law. It examines the criteria that can be used to judge or determine an effective 
enforcement regime. It argues that an effective enforcement regime must be able to 
deter offenders and/or compensate the victims of the offence. In addition to this, an 
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optimal enforcement regime must be cost effective. Finally, section 3.8 classifies the 
various enforcement mechanisms in corporate law followed by concluding remarks in 
section 3.9.  
3.2 Conceptualising Enforcement  
The term enforce generally means ‘to make sure that a law, rule or duty is obeyed or 
fulfilled’.1 It may also mean to ‘compel compliance with (a law, rule or obligation)’.2 
Posner has however described enforcement of law as the ‘process by which violations 
are investigated and a legal sanction applied to the violator’.3 While this definition 
partially connotes what enforcement is, the use of the term ‘legal sanctions’ in this 
context makes the definition unduly restrictive and narrow. While sanctions represent 
an integral part of enforcement, those sanctions need not be legal or formal.  
Enforcement can still take place with non-legal or informal sanctions. These non-
legal or informal sanctions may include ‘reputational sanctions’,4 ‘name and shame’, 
‘truthful negative gossip’, or shunning the offender amongst others.5   
Enforcement, then, generally involves two basic elements; the first is the investigative 
element, which involves examining and getting informed about a violation or breach. 
The second element, which is sanction, connotes imposing some sort of penalty on 
the violator. Hence, these two elements ought to be present in any enforcement 
activity. Enforcement may therefore be defined as the process of ensuring compliance 
through investigation and imposition of proper sanctions in case of breach. The term 
                                                            
1 C Soanes & S Hawker, Compact Oxford English Dictionary for University and College Students 
(OUP 2006). 
2 See J Pearsall, The Concise Oxford English Dictionary (10th edn, OUP 1999). 
3 RA Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (9th Edn Wolters Kluwer 2014) 859. 
4 J Armour ‘Enforcement Strategies in UK Corporate Governance: A Roadmap and Empirical 
Assessment’ in J Armour & J Payne, Rationality in Company Law: Essays in Honour of DD Prentice 
(Hart Publishing 2009) 74. 
5 See R C Ellickson, Order without Law: How Neighbours Settle Disputes (Harvard University Press 
1991) for an example of the role of norms and non-legal sanctions in enforcement. 
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enforcement also connotes that the thing being enforced is obligatory; hence, it is 
difficult to discuss enforcement in relation to a rule or duty that is merely 
discretionary. 
3.3   The Goal and Purpose of Enforcement 
The questions to be considered here are what is the goal of enforcement and what 
purpose does it serve? Although the words ‘goal’ and ‘purpose’ are quite similar and 
mean the same thing in some contexts, in other contexts they may have different 
meanings. According to the New Oxford English Dictionary, a goal represents ‘an 
aim or desired result’, while a purpose represents ‘the reason for which something is 
being done’.6 Within the context of enforcement, the goal of enforcement therefore 
connotes the final or end result of enforcement while purpose implies the reason or 
rationale behind enforcement and why enforcement is considered to be necessary.  
3.3.1 The Goal of Enforcement 
According to Stigler, the goal of enforcement is to ensure compliance with rules of 
prescribed behaviour.
7
 He opines that ‘all prescriptions of behaviour for individuals 
require enforcement’.8  This definition aptly describes the whole essence of 
enforcement. While there may be different reasons for enforcement, the central goal 
and intended result of enforcement is to secure compliance. Another commentator, 
Reiff, in identifying the goals of enforcement, goes a step further in postulating that 
the goals of enforcement may depend on whether the right has not been violated (pre 
violation stage), or whether it has been violated but not yet enforced (post violation 
                                                            
6 The New Oxford English dictionary (Clarendon Press) 1998.  
7 G Stigler, ‘The Optimum Enforcement of Law’ in G S Becker and W M Lands (eds), Essays in the 
Economics of Crime and Punishment edited by (National Bureau of Economic Research New York, 
Columbia University Press 1974) 56. 
8 ibid 55. 
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stage) or whether it has been violated and enforced (post enforcement stage).
9
  In the 
pre-violation stage, the goal of enforcement is to enable social interaction and 
improve social cooperation. Enforcement at this stage is needed for social 
cooperation as in the absence of it no one will be willing to accept a promise to 
perform from another or be willing to cooperate. Promises are effectual only where 
the person promised knows it will be fulfilled.  Enforcement here therefore enables 
individuals to honestly commit themselves to act in certain ways thereby preventing 
potential violations. It compels parties to cooperate at the risk of punishment for 
failure to do so. At the post-violation and post enforcement stage, enforcement is 
needed to prevent conflict from resulting in an unending cycle of violation and 
retaliation.
10
 Hence, it helps to contain conflict to prevent it from degenerating into a 
crisis.  
Reiff’s classification of the goals of enforcement into different stages provides clarity 
and enables understanding of the different stages through which enforcement may 
move. However, what Reiff refers to as different goals of enforcement may be more 
properly described as the purpose of enforcement at different stages of violation 
rather than the goals of enforcement.  At the pre-violation stage, enforcement enables 
people to cooperate with and fulfil their promises to each other at the risk of 
punishment. This then ensures compliance with stipulated standards of behaviours 
and agreements made to others. At the post violation and post enforcement stage, 
enforcement enables the offended party to comply with rules of society by refraining 
from unlawful retaliations. When the offended party knows the breach will be 
                                                            
9 M Reiff, Punishment, Compensation and Law: A Theory of Enforceability (Cambridge University 
Press 2005) 45. 
10 ibid 74. 
36 
 
redressed he is less likely to seek retaliation.
11
 He is also more likely to accept the 
result of enforcement due to the threat of sanction for unlawful retaliation.  Therefore, 
enforcement at the different stages ensures compliance both by the offending and the 
offended party. It can therefore be said that at the heart of enforcement is the need to 
ensure compliance with certain rules, standards or expectations and this represents the 
ultimate goal of enforcement.  
3.3.2   The Purposes of Enforcement in Corporate Law 
As mentioned earlier, in section 3.3, the goal of enforcement is different from the 
purposes it is intended to serve. This section therefore examines the purposes of 
enforcement.  Generally, enforcement may serve three main purposes; these are 
deterrence, compensation and retribution.  Rules may be enforced in order to deter 
potential violations, to compensate injured parties, or to provide retribution by 
punishing the violator in a manner that the beneficiary no longer feels the need to 
retaliate. Retribution helps to quench the desire for retaliation by the injured party by 
ensuring that the offender is punished in a way that satisfies the injured party’s desire 
for revenge.
12
 Retributivists believe that the punishment should match the crime in 
some way and what is sometimes used to measure this in the modern day is the 
‘moral gravity’ of the offence.13 Several factors determine the moral gravity of an 
offence; these include the intention and motive of the offender.
14
 With respect to civil 
offences or private law however, moral gravity plays a less significant role. The 
measure of damages payable for breach of contract is likely to be the same whether 
the breach was intentional or negligent or even accidental. For civil violations, the 
                                                            
11 On the link between retribution and retaliation see RA Posner, ‘Retribution and Related Concepts of 
Punishment’ (1980) 9(1) Journal of Legal Studies 71-92. 
12 Reiff (n 9)119. 
13 See CH Whiteley, ‘On Retribution’ (1956) 31(117) Philosophy 154,155-156. 
14 See A Smart, ‘Mercy’ (1968) 43(166) Philosophy 345, 345-359 for a discussion on the moral gravity 
of an offence.  
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injury caused by the violation is the important factor and not necessarily the moral 
gravity of the offence.
15
 Retribution is therefore more apt in response to crimes and 
violent offences rather than in relation to private law. 
In spite of this however, the idea of retribution may sometimes come to play in 
corporate law. This is because there is sometimes a public desire for revenge in 
respect of directors’ misconducts, which have an impact on the members of the 
public.  An example of this is the UK banking crisis, which brought with it a strong 
desire for retribution by aggrieved members of the public. An instance where this 
desire for revenge was actualised is seen in the vandalization of the Edinburgh home 
and car of the former CEO of RBS, Sir Fredrick Goodwin, by a vigilante group called 
‘bank bosses are criminals’.16 The attack came in the wake of statements by Max 
Hastings in the Daily Mail where he stated that ‘the time has come to address the 
entire robber banker culture’ and further encouraged standing outside the homes of 
those failed bank chiefs and throwing rocks through their windows.
17
  This statement 
is a reflection of the public anger and desire for revenge against those bank chiefs by 
members of the public. It also shows that there is sometimes a desire for retribution in 
enforcement of corporate law norms. There are therefore obvious instances of overlap 
between public and private law in relation to corporate law. This perhaps explains 
why criminal liability is imposed for certain wrongdoings by directors. Nevertheless, 
corporate law still largely belongs to private law; therefore, the focus in this thesis 
                                                            
15  Reiff (n 9) 132. 
16 BBC, ‘Sir Fred Goodwin's home attacked’ 25th March 2009    
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/7962825.stm> accessed 8th July 2015. See also A Simpson, ‘Sir Fred 
Goodwin attack: Bank Bosses Are Criminals group claims responsibility’ 25th March 2009. 
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17 M Hastings, ‘Seize their Porsches and throw them in jail! Shameless bankers are worse than Train 
Robbers’ (Daily Mail 23rd march 2009) <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/debate/article-1163623/MAX-
HASTINGS-Seize-Porsches-throw-jail-Shameless-bankers-worse-Train-Robbers.html 23rd march 
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would be on deterrence and compensation as these are the key purposes of 
enforcement in private law, and by extension corporate law. 
3.4 The Importance of Enforcement in Corporate Law 
Many notable corporate law scholars have identified the importance of enforcement 
in corporate law. LLS & V
18
 in their studies on investor protection considered both 
the content of the law and the quality of its enforcement in protection of shareholder 
rights.
19
 They noted that shareholder protection encourages the growth of equity 
markets. However, this shareholder protection includes not just having the rights 
contained in laws and regulations, but also effective enforcement of these rights.
20
  
They also opined that a sound system of legal enforcement could compensate for 
weak rules as active and efficient courts could step in to redress wrongs done to 
investors by management.
21
 Furthermore, in their study showing the impact of 
investor protection on financial markets, they found that effective investor protection, 
which includes both law and effective enforcement, contributed to the growth of the 
financial market in countries that had them. According to them, any corporate 
governance reform needs to focus on certain principles and part of these principles is 
that legal rules are important, and ‘good legal rules are the ones that a country can 
enforce’.22  Therefore, LLS & V did not focus exclusively on legal rules alone; rather 
they acknowledged the equal importance of enforcement in a country’s legal 
environment.  
                                                            
18 LLS & V is the acronym used for Rafael La porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer and 
Robert W Vishny. 
19 R La Porta, F Lopez-De- Silanes, A Shleifer and R W Vishny, ‘Law and Finance’ (1998) 106(6) 
Journal of Political Economy 1113, 1115. See also LA porta et al, ‘Legal Determinants of External 
Finance’ (1997) NBER Working paper no 5879.  
20 La Porta & others, Investor Protection and Corporate Governance’ (2000) 58 Journal of Financial 
Economics 3, 15. 
21 La porta & others, ‘Law and Finance’ (n 19)1140. 
22 La porta & others, ‘Investor Protection and Corporate Governance’ (n 20) 21-22. 
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Similarly, Coffee in his analysis on the impact and importance of enforcement argued 
that the level of enforcement intensity could explain the differences in financial 
development between jurisdictions.
23
 He argued that the main difference between the 
financial development of common law and civil law countries is the level of 
enforcement.
24
  Hence, enforcement plays a major role in a country’s financial 
development. It is therefore insufficient to have rules alone without effective 
enforcement.   
The importance of effective enforcement has also been noted by Goldschmid who 
opined that ‘there is no issue so integral to market confidence as effective 
enforcement’.25 Economies require private investments in order to grow and as noted 
by Millstein ‘capital does not flow to dangerous neighbourhoods’.26 This statement is 
consistent with the results of an empirical study carried out by Bhattacharya and 
Daouk.
27
 In their study, they found that enforcement of insider trading laws was 
generally associated with a reduction in the cost of equity.
28
 Thus, investors are likely 
to invest more in a market that has effective investor protection. Hence, while it is 
important to have strong securities and companies law to reassure investors that their 
                                                            
23 JC Coffee Jr, ‘Law and the Market: The Impact of Enforcement’ 2007) 156(2) University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review 229, 233. 
24 ibid 244. 
25 HJ Goldschmid, foreword ‘Enforcement and Corporate Governance: Three Views’ (Global 
Corporate Governance Forum Focus 3, Washington DC: The International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development/The World Bank, 2005)  
<http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/6ab71c8048a7e7b3accfef6060ad5911/Focus_ENFCorpGov3.p
df?MOD=AJPERES> viii accessed 17th July 2014.  
26 IM Millstein, ‘Non-traditional modes of enforcement’ in Enforcement and Corporate Governance: 
Three Views’ (Global Corporate Governance Forum Focus 3, Washington DC: The International Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank, 2005) 
<http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/6ab71c8048a7e7b3accfef6060ad5911/Focus_ENFCorpGov3.p
df?MOD=AJPERES>, 1 accessed 17th July 2014.  
27 U Bhattachraya & H Daouk, ‘The World Price of Insider Trading’ (2002) 57(1) Journal of Finance 
75-108. 
28 Ferran similarly argues that mere adoption of insider trading laws does not affect the cost of equity 
in a country in the absence of enforcement. Enforcement of insider laws therefore significantly reduces 
the cost of equity. See E Ferran, ‘The Enforcement of Insider Dealing Laws’ in J Armour & J Payne, 
Rationality in Company Law: Essays in Honour of DD Prentice (Hart Publishing 2009) 57.   
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assets are protected, this is simply not enough. As rightly noted by Berglof and 
Claessens, ‘enforcement more than regulations, laws-on-the books or voluntary codes 
is key to effective corporate governance...’29  In the absence of proper enforcement, 
most of the corporate governance mechanisms will be ineffective. The law is 
‘incomplete’ and is unable to cover all foreseeable wrongs; hence, it is important to 
devise enforcement mechanisms to ensure compliance. Enforcement is therefore 
needed to address gaps in the law and to deal with clear violations of the law.
30
  
In spite of the many arguments in favour of enforcement of corporate law as 
highlighted above, some scholars are more sceptical about the innate need for 
enforcement in corporate law. Blair and Stout, for example, have argued that the 
internalised norms of trust and trustworthiness play important roles in discouraging 
misconduct by directors.
31
 They further argued that external incentives such as 
sanctions, which aims at ensuring compliance, could be counterproductive. The next 
section will however rebuff such scepticism, and seek to justify the inherent need for 
enforcement in corporate law.  
3.5 Justification for Enforcement using the Deterrence Theory 
The previous section has examined reasons why enforcement is considered important 
as identified by different scholars. This section will however develop a justification 
for enforcement using the deterrence theory. The analysis of the deterrence theory in 
this section will reveal the inherent need for enforcement in corporate law.   
                                                            
29 E Berglof and S Claessens, ‘Corporate Governance and Enforcement’ in ‘Enforcement and 
Corporate Governance: Three Views’ (n 26) 27. 
30 I Millstein (n 26) 2- 3. 
31 See M.M Blair & L.A Stout, ‘Trust, Trustworthiness and the Behavioural Foundations of Corporate 
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3.5.1 The Deterrence Theory  
The issue of enforcement has concerned economists, legal practitioners, 
criminologists and criminal justice lawyers over the years who have tried to study the 
relationship between enforcement and compliance.
32
 The ‘deterrence theory’33 has 
often been used to highlight the need for enforcement particularly within the field of 
criminal justice. While this theory is more frequently used within the context of 
criminal behaviour and criminal justice, this thesis applies the deterrence theory in 
justifying the need for enforcement in corporate law. 
Deterrence generally means refraining oneself from an act or omission due to the fear 
of penalty. It is more formally defined as ‘the omission of an act as a response to the 
perceived risk and fear of punishment of contrary behaviour’.34 Deterrence could be 
general or specific; it is specific where it deters previous violators who have been 
punished from committing further violations and it is general where it aims to deter 
persons who have not yet violated from doing so.
35
  
The concept of deterrence has a long history and has been evident through the ages. 
Indeed many of the torturous punishments used in ancient times were intended to 
serve as a warning and deterrence to others.
36
  The formal deterrence theory itself can 
however be traced to the early works of two philosophers, Cesare Beccaria and 
Jeremy Bentham. Cesare Beccaria’s essay ‘on crimes and punishment’ written in 
                                                            
32 See for examples G Stigler, ‘The Optimum Enforcement of Law’ in G S Becker and WM Lands 
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36 See J.C Ball, ‘The Deterrence Concept in Criminology and Law’ (1955) 46 Journal of Criminal 
Law, Criminology and Police Science 347. 
42 
 
1764 formed the basis for the deterrence theory.
37
 He was of the opinion that all 
human beings have a self-interest in committing crimes and that crimes could be 
prevented by punishment, which is certain, proportional and swiftly applied. He also 
believed that for punishment to be effective, the disadvantage posed by the 
punishment should outweigh the potential advantage of committing the crime. 
Similarly, Bentham identified the principle of utility in his work published in 1789 
where he stated that ‘Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two 
sovereign masters, pain and pleasure’.38  Utility is the difference between the benefits 
and costs of one’s actions; an individual would therefore generally choose that course 
of action which has greater benefits than costs. Bentham’s original deterrence model 
was therefore based on the premise that compliance with the law depends on 
increasing the severity of punishment to the point that it removes the pleasures 
normally associated with breaking the law.
39
  
Following its initial dominance, the deterrence theory was subsequently neglected for 
nearly two centuries in favour of other perspectives on criminology.
40
 Modern day 
interest in the ‘deterrence theory’ was however reignited in 1968 by Gary Becker’s 
seminal article on Crime and Punishment and Jack Gibb’s article on Crime, 
Punishment and Deterrence.
41
 Becker’s inspiration for his work on the deterrence 
theory was informed by a personal experience where he chose to violate a parking 
                                                            
37 C Beccaria, Of Crimes and Punishment (Jane Grigson tr, Marsilio publishers 1996) 50. 
38 J Bentham, ‘An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation in the works of Jeremy 
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rule based on a calculation in his mind of the cost and benefit of parking illegally.
42
  
According to Becker, all things being equal, the higher the probability of a person’s 
conviction or punishment for offences, the lower the number of offences he 
commits.
43
 This decrease may be substantial or negligible; nevertheless, there is still a 
decrease.  This approach is based on economists’ analysis of choice. It therefore 
assumes that ‘a person commits an offence if the expected utility to him exceeds the 
utility he could get by using his time and other resources at other activities’.44 An 
increase in the probability of conviction and the severity of punishment reduces the 
utility expected from the offence thereby reducing the number of offences 
committed.
45
  
Sociologist Gibbs’s article was closer to Beccaria’s approach as he focused on the 
role of punishment in criminal behaviour. He was therefore keen on examining 
whether punishment was effective in reducing crime. While acknowledging the limits 
of the empirical data on the subject, in his empirical research he found some evidence 
that punishment is effective in ensuring compliance with the law. His empirical study 
therefore revealed that states that had high severity and certainty of sanctions had 
lower homicide rates than states with lower certainty and severity of sanctions.
46
  
The deterrence theory is generally based on the cost-benefit approach to decision 
making. It is therefore argued that people would often choose that course of action 
which offers greater individual benefits than costs. Deterrence theorists generally 
                                                            
42 D Clement, Interview with Gary Becker, (The Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, 1st June 2002) 
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assume that human beings are ‘self-interested, rational and reasoning’ creatures.47 
The theory is therefore based on a view of human beings as ‘rational utility 
maximizers’, who consider the consequences of their actions and are influenced by 
these consequences in their decisions.
 48
  For example, one may decide to get a degree 
if the perceived future benefits are greater than the costs. Similarly, when given the 
opportunity to commit a crime or violate a law, an individual weighs the costs and 
benefits of doing so in comparison to other options.
49
 A person would therefore 
commit a crime where the expected benefits outweigh the expected costs.
50
 The 
expected benefits here would include tangible benefits such as monetary gains as well 
as intangible benefits such as reputational gains.  The costs would include monetary 
expenses incurred to commit the crime, time expended and the anticipated 
punishment for committing the offence.
51
 An essential element of the deterrence 
theory is therefore the ‘psychological’ process an individual goes through before 
committing a wrongful act.
52
 Hence, supporters of the deterrence theory advocate the 
need to ensure that ‘amoral’ persons calculate that it is in their best interests to 
comply with, rather than to break, the law.
53
 Clearly then, punishment or sanctions for 
violations are a central part of the deterrence theory. Punishment generally leads to 
undesirable change in wellbeing. Therefore, a rational potential violator would 
usually consider the risk of undergoing that undesirable change when deciding 
whether to commit an offence or wrongful act.   
                                                            
47 R Paternoster (n 35) 782. 
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Several factors have been thought to determine the deterrent effect of punishment;
54
 
this thesis would focus on four key ones.
55
 The first is the certainty of punishment. It 
is argued that the greater the likelihood that punishment will be imposed, the higher 
the deterrent effect of that punishment. The second factor is the speed with which 
punishment is applied. This is also known as celerity (swiftness) of punishment. The 
idea is that when punishment is swiftly applied, there is a greater association between 
the criminal acts and its costs in the minds of offenders. The third element, which is 
also considered very essential, is the severity of punishment. To ensure its 
effectiveness, punishment should be sufficiently severe and proportionate to the 
offence.
56
 In addition to the three factors mentioned above which have been generally 
identified by scholars, a final factor which affects deterrence is the variety of 
sanctions available. This factor may be considered an offshoot of the ‘severity’ factor. 
In order to effectively deter, it is necessary to have a good range of sanctions for 
punishing any offence committed. This will ensure that an appropriately severe 
punishment is imposed for every wrong committed.   Hence, in order to sufficiently 
deter offences, the certainty, severity and celerity of punishment should be increased. 
Similarly, the enforcer should have a good variety of sanctions at its disposal.  
3.5.2 Criticisms of the Deterrence Theory  
The general deterrence theory is commonly used in criminal justice to theorize about 
the efficiency of legal sanctions.
57
 It has been the subject of much discourse, 
particularly in the area of criminal justice, it has however also been the subject of 
some criticisms. Two of such criticisms will be addressed here.   
                                                            
54 Note that the terms punishment and sanction are used interchangeably in the course of this thesis.  
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punishment. See Ball (n 36) 348. 
56 See Beccaria (n 37) 49-70; see also S.S Simpson, Corporate Crime, Law and Social Control 
(Cambridge Studies in Criminology, 1st edn, Cambridge University Press 2002) 23. 
57 Williams & Hawkins (n 49) 546. 
46 
 
The first criticism is based on the premise that deterrence itself is a complex 
phenomenon and depends on a wide range of factors. Robinson and Darley have 
criticised the deterrence theory on the basis that in order for a law to deter potential 
offenders certain conditions must exist. These are that the potential offender must be 
aware of the law, he must be able to calculate that the cost of violation is greater than 
the benefit, and he must be willing to let this calculation influence his conduct at the 
time of offence.
58
 Robinson and Darley however argue that potential offenders rarely 
know the law, cannot calculate the expected costs versus benefits of their actions and 
do not make rational self-interested decisions.
59
  
While this viewpoint may be accepted for ordinary criminal offenders or offenders 
who are motivated by substances like drugs, alcohol or influenced by passion (crimes 
of passion), the same seems less true of the sorts of people who ‘on average’ tend to 
be rational. At the inevitable risk of some simplification, directors are, on average, 
likely to be people who are relatively well educated and informed. Moreover, their 
training and experience would often require them to make rational and well-reasoned 
business decisions on a day-to-day basis. They are therefore fully capable, and indeed 
well versed, in making rational decisions that involve costs-benefits calculations.  
Directors in large public listed companies also know that the control of the company 
lies with them and that shareholders may not have the incentive to monitor or enforce 
their rights,
60
 they may therefore have a higher incentive to mismanage the company. 
An increase in the certainty, celerity, variety and severity of sanctions would 
therefore provide the incentive required for compliance.  
                                                            
58 P.H Robinson and J.M Darley, ‘The Role of Deterrence in the Formulation of Criminal Law Rules: 
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The second criticism of the deterrence theory is based on the argument that members 
of a society do not comply with rules and standards due to the fear of sanctions. 
Rather, they comply because they have internalised certain norms and values of the 
society. Consequently, compliance with the law is not as a result of the fear of 
potential sanctions, but due to internalised norms. Toby argues that punishments are 
unnecessary because the ‘socialisation’ process prevents most deviant behaviour.61 
This is because persons who have accepted and internalised the moral norms of the 
society would not commit crimes. It is therefore only the ‘unsocialised’ who will be 
deterred by a plain calculation of the punishment and pleasure of committing a 
crime.
62
 Toby’s argument is therefore based on the premise that societal norms and 
values play a greater role in securing compliance. Similarly, Tyler argues that people 
are influenced by social values of right and wrong, and only obey the law if they 
believe it is legitimate and moral.
63
 
Truly, people refrain from violating the law for several reasons. For some it may be 
due to their moral values or religious beliefs, while others may be influenced by the 
stigma associated with violating the law.
64
 Hence, individuals may refrain from 
violating the law or committing an offence because they have internalized the norm. 
In spite of this however, this thesis argues that the deterrence theory is applicable in 
several respects. While societal norms and individual values play an important part in 
defining our conducts or condemnation of wrongful actions, those norms and values 
are nevertheless influenced by the punishments available for actions classified as 
wrongful by the society. The ‘internalisation of norms’ argument ignores the fact that 
                                                            
61 J Toby, ‘Is Punishment Necessary?’ (1964) 55 Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology & Police 
Science 332,333. 
62 ibid.  
63 T.R Tyler, Why People Obey the Law (Princeton University Press 2006). 
64 See J Gibbs, Crime, Punishment and Deterrence (Elsevier 1975)12. 
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enforcement actually reinforces social condemnation of particular actions.
65
 
Therefore, if an individual condemns an action but subsequently discovers that the 
action is not punished, the severity of condemnation towards that wrong is likely to 
reduce. Hence, while individuals may refrain from certain illegal acts, not due to fear 
of punishment but because they evaluate that act to be wrong, that moral evaluation is 
itself greatly influenced by the sanctions available for that wrong. Similarly, in the 
absence of sanctions, persons who are inclined to comply due to their internalised 
norms or values, may be discouraged from doing so if they perceive that those who 
fail to comply are not punished. Sanctions therefore contribute both to the 
internalization of norms as well as deterrence of potential offenders who fail to 
internalize those norms.  
As mentioned earlier, an individual may refrain from committing an offence or 
violation due to several reasons asides from the fear of sanctions, hence any empirical 
assertion of deterrence is hardly irrefutable. The deterrence theory however does not 
assert that the threat of sanctions deters all individuals in all circumstances.
66
 As 
argued by Dodd one would have to be an especially  ‘hostile critic’ of directors to 
deny that a good number of them are motivated by a genuine desire to comply with 
corporate law, not just because it is ‘legal and safe’ to do so but, because they believe 
it is the morally right thing to do.
67
 Consequently, the deterrence theory does not 
apply to all individuals or, more specifically, all directors.  It is nevertheless 
sufficient to say that ‘in some situations, some individuals are deterred from some 
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crimes by some punishments’.68 Hence, while we cannot assert that deterrence applies 
in all situations and that people always calculate the costs and benefits of their actions 
before committing a violation, there are definitely some individuals who are deterred 
only by punishment.   
3.5.3 Some Empirical Evidence of Deterrence in the Corporate Context 
Having looked at the theoretical arguments on deterrence, it is necessary to examine 
whether there is any empirical evidence in support of deterrence. The general 
empirical evidence on deterrence suggests that increase in the likelihood of 
conviction and punishment as well as increase in the severity of punishment do 
indeed have a deterrent effect on the general populace and individuals who have an 
incentive to commit crime.
69
 Therefore, while many may not agree with the notion of 
criminals as rational calculators, a number of empirical studies have shown that 
criminals respond to certain variables such as increases in the probability of being 
caught and the severity of penalty.
70
 This is irrespective of the intention behind the 
crime or whether the crime is committed by white-collar offenders.
71
 For example, 
there are empirical studies to show that an increase in police officers in the US in the 
1990s could be partly responsible for the decline in crime rate.  This could perhaps be 
due to an increase in the certainty of punishment.
72
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70 R Posner, ‘Economic Analysis of Law’ (n 4) 258; see also I Ehrlich, ‘Crime, Punishment and the 
Market for Offences’ (1996) 10(1)   Journal of Economic Perspectives 43-67 whose empirical study 
was consistent with the fact that punishment and other incentives have a deterrent effect on offenders. 
71 R Posner, ‘Economic Analysis of Law’ (n 4) 258. 
72 R Paternoster (n 35) 791. See more specifically S.D Levitt, ‘Using Electoral Cycles in Police Hiring 
to Estimate the Effect of Police on Crime’ (1997) 87 American Economic Review 270,271; T.B 
Marvell and C.E Moody, ‘Specification Problems, Police Levels, and Crime Rates’ (1996) 34 
Criminology 609, 623. 
50 
 
Although the word ‘crime’ was used in Becker’s analysis, he however intended his 
analysis to cover all violations and not just felonies.
73
 As such, the deterrence theory 
has been used in different areas of law including within the corporate context. The 
theory has therefore been used to explain tax compliance as well as compliance by 
corporate entities with rules and laws. The question has frequently been whether 
certainty and severity of punishment influence compliance.  
Klepper and Nagin in their study on tax compliance analysed the deterrent effect of 
enforcement and found that taxpayers’ compliance was based on the perceived risk of 
detection and prosecution for non-compliance. They found that taxpayers make a 
cost–benefit analysis in their decision to comply and the effect of their calculations 
was closely related to the enforcement process.
74
 Similarly, in an empirical analysis 
by Zubcic and Sims on the effect of enforcement actions by ASIC (Australia’s 
Securities and Investment Commission) on corporate compliance, it was found that 
the number of complaints against companies which had previously been the subject 
of prior enforcement or investigation was much lesser than companies who have not 
previously been subject to enforcement action.
75
 This empirical analysis therefore 
supports the argument that enforcement action affects compliance of companies who 
have previously been the subject of enforcement action.
76
   
A study by Welsh on the effect of increased sanctions and enforcement activity on 
corporate compliance also shows that there is a link between increased enforcement 
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and increase in compliance.
77
 During the interviews conducted on the impact of 
enforcement regime on the incentive to comply, most interviewees (which included 
company secretaries, compliance managers and partners) agreed that the introduction 
of new enforcement regimes caused them to pay more attention to their compliance 
system. Similarly, a court decision on enforcement was also found to have 
incentivized companies to pay more attention to their compliance policies as they 
realized that there is a real risk of prosecution for corporate offences.
78
  
In a study by Gunningham, Thornton and Ragan which was conducted to understand 
the motivation for firms’ environmental behaviour; most respondents stated that the 
threat of fines or prison sentence was a principal motivating factor in their 
environmental actions.
79
 The fear of detection and penalties was therefore an 
important factor precipitating changes within the firms. Many respondents to the 
study also believed that without effective enforcement, compliance would decrease 
over time. The compliant firms would lose confidence in the system due to the 
injustice inherent in the lack of sufficient punishment for offenders.
80
 In a similar 
study, the response by the interviewees also showed that enforcement helped to 
reassure compliant companies that they are not ‘foolish’ for complying since their 
competitors who fail to comply are apprehended and penalised.
81
 Furthermore a 
majority of firms reported taking an environmental action or reviewing their 
compliance system upon hearing about enforcement actions taken against another 
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79 N Gunningham, D Thornton and RA Kagan, ‘Motivating Management: Corporate Compliance in 
Environmental Protection’ (2005) 27(2) Law & Policy 294. 
80 Ibid 294- 309. 
81 D Thornton, N Gunningham and RA Kagan, ‘General Deterrence and Corporate Environmental 
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company.
82
 From the foregoing, it is clear that there is an obvious link between 
enforcement actions and level of compliance even within the corporate context.  
3.5.4 Deterrence theory and Directors’ Compliance 
To recap, thus far it has been argued that the deterrence theory is indeed applicable to 
efforts to secure compliance by directors with corporate law requirements. As 
mentioned in section 3.5.2, Directors are often well-educated and rational persons 
who can fully calculate the costs and benefits of their actions. Therefore, in order to 
ensure compliance by directors, the costs of non-compliance must outweigh the 
potential benefits. To increase these costs, the certainty, variety, severity and celerity 
of sanctions must be increased.  Where the probability of punishment is low, 
management may continue to engage in breach of corporate law requirements to the 
detriment of shareholders. Similarly, sanctions imposed for directors’ breach must be 
varied, reasonably severe and swiftly applied after the breach. This will ensure that 
directors who are predisposed to engaging in certain misconducts are deterred from 
doing so due to the costs of noncompliance thereby securing both specific and general 
deterrence. Hence, both the offending directors as well as other directors would have 
a greater incentive to comply thereby enhancing corporate governance. 
While effective enforcement of corporate law is unlikely to totally eradicate all forms 
of mismanagement, it nevertheless has a role to play in reducing it. As Becker argues, 
the optimal level of crime will rarely be zero. Hence, there will always be some level 
of crime in the society.
83
 Similarly, agency costs can never be zero as confirmed by 
Jensen and Meckling.
84
 However, it is possible to find the right mix of certainty, 
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celerity, variety and severity of sanctions that will reduce agency costs and agency 
problems to optimal levels. 
In the absence of effective enforcement of directors’ duties and norms of conduct, 
there is unlikely to be proper compliance.
85
 Directors often do not ‘passively ‘obey 
the legal rules or standards that apply to them.
86
 Thus, while having directors’ duties 
and other norms may provide some educational benefit, they are unlikely to be 
regarded as useful in the absence of effective enforcement.
87
 An effective regulatory 
regime therefore needs both substantive rules and effective enforcement 
mechanisms.
88
  
3.6 Compensation 
Before moving on to consider the criteria for judging effective enforcement in 
corporate law, it is worth examining briefly the concept of compensation.  
Compensation may be defined as the award of a sum of money which is, as far as 
possible, equivalent to the claimant’s loss.89 The loss may be pecuniary (such as 
financial loss) or non-pecuniary (such as reputational loss, anxiety, pain and 
suffering). The remedy, which is used to achieve compensation either in torts or in 
contracts, is award of damages. Damages are therefore generally intended to 
compensate for loss suffered.
90
 In torts, physical losses are usually the subject of the 
action for damages. However, for breach of contract, commercial (financial) losses 
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are often the subject of the action.
91
  Within the context of corporate law, damages 
may therefore be claimed for financial losses suffered as a result of directors’ breach.  
Damages for breach are granted to compensate for loss suffered by the innocent party 
and not to punish the wrongdoer.
92
 The aim of compensatory damages is therefore to 
put the claimant in the position he would have been if the breach had not occurred.
93
 
An important aspect of compensation is the concept of ‘causation’. 94 Damages would 
generally not be awarded to compensate loss that was not caused by the breach. An 
inherent requirement of compensatory damages is therefore that the defendant’s 
breach must have been a cause of the claimant’s loss. Thus the claimant must be able 
to establish that ‘but for’ the breach he would not have suffered the loss. 95  
Directors are subject to certain duties and obligations under corporate law. Hence, 
where there has been a failure to comply with any of those duties or obligations, there 
has been a breach for which damages may be awarded by the court.  This is in line 
with Lord Diplock’s decision in Photo Production Ltd v Securicor Transport Ltd,96 
where he stated that ‘[e]very failure to perform a primary obligation is a breach of 
contract’. Compensation for loss suffered as a result of directors’ breach is therefore a 
key purpose of enforcement in corporate law.   
There are several issues surrounding the concept of compensatory damages. One of 
these concerns the measure of damages and whether damages may be calculated 
using the ‘expectation measure’ or the ‘reliance measure’.97 Another issue, which has 
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been the subject of much discussion, is the development of a ‘compensation culture’ 
particularly in the area of personal injury claims.
98
 These issues are however beyond 
the scope of this thesis and would not be the subject of further analysis.  For our 
purposes, it is nevertheless sufficient to say that compensation in the form of an 
award of damages may be obtained where there has been a breach such as a breach of 
directors’ duties. 
3.7 Criteria for Judging an Effective Enforcement Regime in Corporate 
Law 
As discussed in the previous sections, enforcement of corporate law is necessary in 
order to secure compliance. An important issue is how to determine whether an 
enforcement regime is effective: what criteria can be used to judge the effectiveness 
of an enforcement regime in corporate law. This thesis proposes two such criteria, 
which can be used to determine the effectiveness of an enforcement regime. The first 
is that the enforcement regime must meet the purpose of enforcement namely 
deterrence and/or compensation. The second criterion is that the enforcement regime 
must be cost effective. Each will be discussed in turn below.  
3.7.1 Deterrence and/or Compensation  
As discussed in section 3.3.2 Enforcement in corporate law may generally serve two 
main purposes these are deterrence and compensation.  A key criterion of an effective 
enforcement regime or enforcement action is therefore its ability to fulfil an 
enforcement purpose. 
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The first issue to be discussed is whether every enforcement action needs to meet 
both deterrence and compensatory purposes in order to be properly regarded as 
effective enforcement? If this question were answered affirmatively, it would mean 
that an enforcement action would be considered ineffective if it only fulfils one 
purpose - deterrence or compensation. The nature of an enforcement action generally 
determines whether it can fulfil both deterrence and compensatory purposes or just 
one of these purposes. Certain enforcement actions can however only possibly fulfil 
one purpose. Therefore, the inability of an enforcement action to meet both deterrence 
and compensatory purposes does not imply that the enforcement action is ineffective. 
It is nevertheless essential that an enforcement action in corporate law be able to 
either deter potential offenders or compensate the victims for loss suffered. Failure to 
achieve either of this makes the enforcement action or regime inherently ineffective.  
The second, and perhaps more important, question is whether either deterrence or 
compensation can be regarded as the primary purpose of enforcement in corporate 
law. Deterrence generally relates to the offender or potential offenders while 
compensation deals with the victim of the wrongdoing. Therefore, while deterrence is 
aimed at preventing further occurrence of the wrong, the aim of compensation is to, 
as much as possible, restore the victims to the position in which they were before the 
wrong was inflicted.
99
 Several reasons may be advanced for advocating deterrence as 
the primary purpose of enforcement in corporate law. One directly relates to the fact 
that the central theme of corporate law and corporate governance is the reduction of 
agency costs and problem, which has at its core a need to deter directors from 
misconduct.  In addition to this, however, there are several other reasons why the 
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compensatory purpose cannot reasonably be regarded as the primary purpose of 
enforcement in corporate law.  
The first is in regards to the difficulty with compensating victims of wrongs 
committed by directors. Compensation involves awarding a sum of money to a victim 
or defendant for loss suffered.
100
 Therefore, in order to properly compensate, the 
victims of the wrong must be identifiable. The issue with compensation in corporate 
law is however the difficulty with identifying and adequately compensating the 
victims of directors’ breach. The interest of the company is often considered 
synonymous with that of the shareholders;
101
 there is therefore a case for arguing that 
the direct victims of directors’ misconducts are the shareholders. This immediately 
raises the question of how to adequately compensate all the shareholders who have 
suffered loss due to the directors’ breach. This difficulty becomes more acute where 
the company is a widely held company with hundreds or perhaps thousands of 
shareholders.  
Asides from the shareholders of the company, breach by directors may also cause loss 
to other stakeholders such as creditors, employees, customers,
102
 and members of the 
public.
103
  In such cases, it will be difficult to identify all the victims or to fully 
compensate them. Furthermore, while a number of people in these circumstances may 
desire to claim compensation, there will remain a substantial number who will be 
unable to prove their claim or unwilling to claim compensation. There are therefore 
difficulties with properly compensating victims of directors’ breach.  Another 
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problem with compensation as the primary purpose of enforcement is the difficulty 
with obtaining ‘perfect compensation. ‘Perfect compensation’ restores the victim to 
the same position he would have been if no injury occurred.
104
 This is however 
impossible to attain in principle as monetary loss is not the only loss suffered by 
victims of directors’ misconducts. Therefore, losses such as emotional distress, 
inconvenience and pain may not be adequately compensated. 
In addition to the difficulty with adequately compensating all the victims of a breach, 
another problem lies with the very nature of the compensatory remedy. As mentioned 
earlier, compensation is generally intended to reimburse for loss suffered, therefore 
where no loss is suffered compensation is generally inapplicable. The implication of 
this is that if compensation were accepted as the key purpose of enforcement in 
corporate law, enforcement would generally be considered unnecessary in cases 
where the company has not suffered any loss from the directors’ breach. It is 
therefore only when the company has suffered a loss that breach will be enforced. 
Many would however disagree with the idea of permitting directors to breach the law 
without redress as long as the company has not suffered any loss. Similarly, if 
compensation is considered the primary purpose of enforcement in corporate law, 
directors may easily defend themselves on the basis that their breach has not caused 
any loss to the company or its shareholders or may even argue that the company has 
gained from the breach.
105
 
Even where the company has suffered loss, which can be compensated, compensation 
as the key purpose of enforcement still causes some difficulties. Reisberg has 
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identified some of these difficulties in his analysis of the purpose of derivative 
actions.  He argues that the compensatory rationale cannot fully justify derivative 
actions for several reasons.
106
 First, the compensation from the derivative action may 
not accrue to the persons who were shareholders at the time of injury. In a public 
company, share ownership changes very frequently such that those who owned the 
shares at the time of wrongdoing are unlikely to be the same owners at the time of 
recovery. Secondly, injury to the company is not necessarily synonymous with injury 
to the shareholders as their loss may even exceed that of the company. Thirdly, while 
the total amount recovered from derivative actions may be substantial; the amount 
that accrues to any individual shareholder is unlikely to be significant based on 
individual shareholding.
107
 Fourthly, derivative actions do not always result in 
tangible relief and finally, compensation can be more easily achieved through other 
means without need for recourse to costly litigation.
108
 It is therefore difficult to fully 
justify derivative action based on its compensatory benefits. Reisberg however opined 
that a derivative action might have deterrent benefits to prevent misconduct not only 
at the particular company to whom a duty is breached but also to other companies.
109
 
Therefore, shareholders can still benefit as a result of the deterrent effect of the 
derivative action at the other companies where they hold shares. Hence, for him, the 
primary rationale or justification for derivative actions is its deterrent benefits and not 
compensation. 
The difficulties identified by Reisberg above also apply to many other enforcement 
actions in corporate law. Therefore, as with derivative actions, most other 
                                                            
106 A Reisberg, ‘Shareholders’ Remedies: The Choice of Objectives and The Social Meaning of 
Derivative Actions’ (2005) 6(2) European Business Organisation Law Review 227,249. 
107 ibid 247-248. 
108 A Reisberg, Derivative Actions and Corporate Governance: Theory and Operation (OUP 2007) 58-
59. 
109 Reisberg, ‘Shareholder Remedies: The Choice of Objectives’ (n 106) 250. 
60 
 
enforcement actions are primarily justified by their deterrence purpose. In spite of this 
however, the compensatory purpose still plays a major role in enforcement of 
corporate law and is not to be discarded. While many enforcement actions are 
primarily intended to deter with an ancillary compensatory purpose, some other 
enforcement actions are primarily compensatory and are equally important. Similarly, 
some enforcement actions straddle both categories.  Compensatory enforcement 
actions can therefore sometimes have a deterrent effect. This would be the case where 
the compensation is set at a level which is sufficient not only to reimburse victims of 
the offence but also to properly deter potential offenders. In this regard, the 
enforcement action has fulfilled a dual purpose of compensating and deterring, 
although the former remains its primary purpose. An instance where this would be the 
case is where punitive damages are awarded.
110
 In most instances however, the 
compensation awarded is usually set at a level which is only sufficient to compensate 
victims without necessarily having any deterrent effect on the offender.  
In order for an enforcement action to have a deterrent effect, the penalty must be high 
enough to remove any benefit that is otherwise gained from the breach.
111
 An 
enforcement action may however require only payment of compensation to the 
victims without necessitating disgorgement of the ill-acquired profit or wealth.  
Where the compensation payable is significantly lower than the profit derived from 
the fraud or other misconduct, the enforcement action is unlikely to have any 
deterrent effect. Even where the wrongdoer is required to fully disgorge the profit 
made, this is still unlikely to have a deterrent effect as it only restores the wrongdoer 
back to the position he would have been had he not committed the offence.  A classic 
example of a case where the penalty was purely compensatory is the case of Re 
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Produce Marketing Consortium Ltd
112
   where Knox J held that the court’s 
jurisdiction under s214 of the UK Insolvency Act 1986 was ‘primarily compensatory 
not penal’. Therefore, the amount the director was liable to contribute was limited to 
the amount by which the company’s assets had depleted by the director’s conduct.  
Similarly, while a compensatory enforcement action may infrequently deter, 
enforcement actions primarily intended to deter do not often fulfil a compensatory 
purpose.  Enforcement actions often focus exclusively on deterrence without any 
form of compensation to the aggrieved persons. This is mostly due to the nature of 
particular enforcement actions which are intended to deter further offences rather than 
compensate victims. Enforcement actions such as criminal proceedings against 
directors, fines, reputational sanctions, directors’ disqualification and shareholders 
exit from the company are by their nature intended to deter further offences rather 
than compensate victims for losses suffered. They therefore generally do not offer 
any compensatory benefit to the victims of the breach.  
There are therefore instances where some tension may exist between deterrence and 
compensation as purposes of enforcement. An enforcement action which provides 
optimal deterrence will often not provide optimal compensation. An example of this 
will be the derivative action remedy discussed above which might deliver optimal 
deterrence without adequate compensation. This would be the case, for example, 
where a derivative action is pursued in spite of the fact that the costs of pursuing the 
action outweighs the damages which will be paid to the company.
113
 Similarly, an 
optimal compensation may not provide an optimal deterrence as seen in the case of 
Re Produce Marketing Consortium Ltd
114
 mentioned above where the damages 
                                                            
112 (1989) 5 BCC 569, 598. 
113 Reisberg, ‘Derivative Actions and Corporate Governance’ (n 109)55. 
114 See fn. 112. 
62 
 
ordered by the court was purely compensatory. Private law in many countries also 
restricts punitive damages perhaps due to the absence of sufficient protection for 
defendants in civil proceedings compared to criminal trials.
115
 Compensation is 
therefore often restricted to disgorgement of profit whereby the wrongdoer gives up 
his gains from the injury but remains in the same position he would have been if  the 
wrong not been committed. Hence in these situations, optimal compensation may be 
obtained with minimal or no deterrence.  
It is therefore hardly possible to obtain both optimal deterrence and optimal 
compensation in one enforcement action. As mentioned earlier, the nature of an 
enforcement action determines which purpose it meets. However, in those rare cases 
where there is a direct conflict between a deterrence and compensation purpose, 
preference must be given to the primary purpose of enforcement in corporate law, 
which is deterrence.  
The discussion in this section has shown the various issues surrounding deterrence 
and compensation as the key purposes of enforcement in corporate law. Where an 
enforcement action or regime is able to meet both deterrence and compensatory 
purposes, it is highly commendable. However, an enforcement action or regime is 
considered effective if, at the very minimum, it fulfils one of these two purposes. 
Failure of an enforcement action to either deter future wrongdoers or compensates 
victims of the wrong therefore makes it ineffective.  
3.7.2 Cost – Effectiveness  
The second criteria for judging the effectiveness of an enforcement action or regime 
in corporate law is its cost effectiveness. It is simply insufficient for an enforcement 
regime to fulfil an enforcement purpose; it has to be cost effective as well.  Cost 
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effectiveness within this context connotes that the benefits of procuring the 
enforcement action outweigh its costs. Consequently, asides from ensuring that 
enforcement fulfils its purpose of compensating and/or deterring, it is also essential to 
go a step further to ensure that the benefits of pursuing that enforcement activity 
balances or outweighs its costs. Costs and benefits in this regard may be understood 
in two different senses. The first is the cost and benefit of the enforcement regime to 
the society as a whole. The second concerns the cost and benefit of each individual 
enforcement action to the particular company in respect of whose directors the action 
is brought. It is also important to note that the costs and benefits of enforcement in 
this respect are not measured in purely pecuniary terms, rather intangible costs and 
benefits may be considered. 
The potential benefits of enforcement to society (public benefits) may include greater 
deterrence, enhanced compliance with corporate law and standards, increased 
investments as investors feel more secure, more stable companies, improved financial 
markets, stronger capital market and overall improved corporate governance. On the 
other hand, the public costs of enforcement may include the financial costs of 
investigating and enforcing, time expended in pursuing enforcement actions, possible 
reduction in the willingness of qualified persons to take up executive positions, 
negative publicity potentially leading to reduced investments, and the increased 
pressure on corporate regulators and enforcement agencies.   
Asides from the general benefits and costs of enforcement to the society, there are 
also some specific (private) costs and benefits of enforcement to the companies 
whose directors are the subject of enforcement action. The potential private benefits 
of enforcement actions to companies include the compensation paid to the company, 
the deterrent effect of an enforcement action on the offending director and other 
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directors, improved accountability by directors, increased compliance with corporate 
governance standards, greater returns to shareholders and possible reduction in 
agency costs.  Costs of enforcement to companies would include monetary expenses, 
time spent in pursuing the enforcement action and the potential negative publicity for 
the company. It would also include the chilling effect of the enforcement action on 
directors causing them to be more risk averse, the possibility of ‘soured future 
relations’ with the erring directors,116 and the possible reduction in the pool of 
qualified persons willing to act as directors as a result of fear of potential sanction.  
In determining whether an enforcement action or regime can be classified as 
effective, a key consideration should be the costs and benefits of that enforcement 
system. Where the costs of procuring an enforcement action outweigh its benefits, 
that enforcement action is to be regarded as ineffective.  
3.7.2.1 Why Costs and Benefits? 
The first question to be addressed is whether all enforcement regimes and actions 
should be driven by a cost-benefit calculation. One may argue that a cost-benefit 
analysis is unnecessary in designing an enforcement regime or in taking a decision to 
enforce wrongdoing. It may be argued that the only necessary thing in enforcement is 
proof that there has been a breach and that enforcement of that breach would either 
deter wrongdoing or compensate victims of the misconduct. After all anyone who has 
committed a wrong should face the consequences of doing so. This view is quite 
moral and perhaps justified in certain circumstances.  The problem with this single-
minded view of enforcement, however, is that it justifies taking an enforcement 
action even where it would have serious negative consequences that can defeat the 
very purpose for enforcing.  Suppose that a public company (perhaps a financial 
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institution) is quite large and connected to other companies that its failure would 
affect not only other companies, but also the livelihood of several members of the 
community. If an enforcement action were to be commenced against directors of that 
company which would potentially lead to its bankruptcy, the most reasonable course 
of action would be to refrain from that particular course of action and look for another 
alternative that has less dire consequences. It is therefore very important that before 
any enforcement action is taken its costs must be weighed against its potential 
benefits. It can therefore only be considered truly effective where its benefits 
outweigh its costs.  
Another possible counter argument to the cost and benefit approach to enforcement is 
that it is unfair and immoral to allow certain wrongs go un-redressed based on an 
economic calculation of its costs versus its benefits. It may then be argued that all 
wrongs ought to be redressed and compensation paid where necessary. Admittedly, it 
can be considered more equitable to always pursue enforcement whenever there has 
been a breach. However, the problem with this argument is that enforcement 
resources are generally limited. It is therefore necessary for potential enforcers to 
weigh the costs and benefits of an enforcement action before embarking on it.
117
 As 
noted in earlier parts of this chapter, the goal of enforcement is to secure compliance 
and this is the end which every enforcement regime and action should seek to 
achieve. However, this goal of compliance should not be pursued in a manner that is 
detrimental to the society and the companies that the law seeks to protect. It is 
therefore not simply the case that the end justifies the means with regards to 
enforcement actions. Hence, it is important to weigh the costs and benefits of 
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enforcement in order to ensure that its pursuit does not have a counterproductive 
effect.  
 Therefore, while several factors may determine the design of an enforcement regime 
or action, the cost and benefit analysis has a crucial role to play in the determination 
of effective or optimal enforcement. An enforcement regime should therefore be 
designed in a manner that seeks to maximise benefits and minimise costs. The 
important question to answer in designing an enforcement regime should therefore be 
whether its features would provide more benefits than costs.  
3.7.2.2 Public Costs and Benefit versus Private Costs and Benefits 
As noted earlier in section 3.7.2, costs and benefits may be used in two different 
senses. They may be used in the general sense of the costs and benefits of 
enforcement to the society (public costs and benefits); they could also be considered 
in the more specific sense of the costs and benefits of individual enforcement actions 
to companies (private costs and benefits).  Hence, the cost-benefit calculation has at 
least two different levels.  
 Although there are areas of interplay between the two, some tension may occur 
between the public costs and benefits of enforcement and the private costs and benefit 
of enforcement to the individual company. This is due to the fact that the public 
benefits of enforcement do not always translate to individual (private) benefits for the 
company. A public enforcement action may offer immense public benefits in terms of 
enhanced general deterrence and increased compliance with the relevant rules and 
standards. It may nevertheless offer little private benefit to the company or may 
indeed be detrimental to it as a result of, say, the adverse publicity, or the distraction 
to management, caused by the public enforcement action. A public enforcer is 
however likely to focus on the public costs and benefits of an enforcement action in 
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deciding whether or not the action is worth pursuing. It may therefore commence an 
enforcement action which offers little or no private benefit to the company. 
Similarly, a company may refrain from embarking on a private enforcement action 
where it believes the action offers no private benefit to it but imposes costs on it.  A 
private enforcement action by a company may be costly to it in terms of reduction of 
share value due to the consequent negative publicity, valuable time wasted, loss of the 
directorial skills, and cost of searching for a replacement. It may however impose 
zero costs on the society rather it may be socially beneficial to it due to the general 
deterrent effect of the enforcement action. In this instance, there is an obvious conflict 
between the public benefits and the private benefits of enforcement.   
Companies as economic actors would generally be expected to choose the course of 
action which is more beneficial and less costly to them. Private enforcers in the 
company will therefore calculate the private benefits and costs of enforcement rather 
than the public costs and benefits. Hence, shareholders seeking to bring derivative 
actions would expectedly be concerned with the benefits to the company and its 
shareholders of bringing the action rather than the public benefits.  This in itself is 
hardly surprising, as the law does not compel private individuals to bring actions that 
are contrary to their interests. Thus, a principal who suffers loss as a result of the 
agent’s conduct is not compelled to seek redress for the wrong no matter how 
offensive the conduct is to public policy.
118
  Hence, even where the pursuit of 
enforcement is beneficial to the society, a private agent cannot be compelled to seek 
redress where the costs to it of doing so are greater than the benefits. A potential 
criticism of private enforcement actions could therefore be the limited number of such 
enforcement actions. This will be the subject of more analysis in chapter 6.  
                                                            
118 Gevurtz (n 116) 300. 
68 
 
The main challenge therefore lies in designing an enforcement regime that aligns, to a 
reasonable extent, the public benefits of enforcement to the society with the private 
benefits to the company. This is the major challenge for the design of an optimal 
enforcement regime.  
3.8   Categorisation of Enforcement Mechanisms in Corporate Law 
At this stage, it is apt to try to gain an understanding of what exactly is meant by 
enforcement mechanisms in corporate law and what actions may be properly 
classified as enforcement. In order to understand enforcement, it is necessary to 
classify all the means of enforcement into different forms.  When most people 
conceive enforcement, they are usually thinking about enforcement through the 
courts. However, while judicial enforcement actions are important, they are not the 
only means by which a legal right can be enforced.
119
  If we take such a narrow view 
of enforcement, we risk excluding other important ‘informal’ mechanisms, which 
may be used to secure compliance without the need for judicial proceedings.
120
  
Enforcement can be classified based on different criteria. It could be classified based 
on the process of enforcement; hence, we could have judicial and non-judicial 
enforcement, official and unofficial, private and public, or even formal and informal 
enforcement.  Enforcement could also be classified based on the well-being which the 
mechanism is intended to protect; we could classify enforcement into physical, 
financial or psychological. Yet still, we could classify enforcement based on the 
extent to which the enforcement mechanism is subject to individual control. Thus, 
some enforcement mechanisms could be in the sole control of the beneficiary while 
others will be under the control of the state.
121
 The method of classification used 
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would usually depend on the feature desired to be given prominence. It is however 
important to note that each category need not be mutually exclusive and as such there 
may be overlapping areas. 
Reiff in classifying enforcement mechanisms divides them into six categories these 
are; physical force, strategic power, moral condemnation and regret, social criticism 
and withdrawal of benefit of social cooperation, automatic enforcement and legal 
sanctions.
122
  More specifically within the context of corporate law, Armour makes 
use of a four- way taxonomy in analysing the enforcement mechanisms in corporate 
law. According to him, enforcement strategies in UK corporate governance could be 
divided into public enforcement and private enforcement and further divided into 
formal and informal enforcement.
123
 This thesis would however make use of a 
different classification in analysing the different enforcement mechanisms in 
corporate law.  
3.8.1 Enforcement of Regulatory Strategies or Governance Strategies? 
In attempting to classify enforcement in corporate law, it is necessary to consider 
whether enforcement is only relevant in relation to prescriptive rules (regulatory 
strategies) or whether non-prescriptive norms (governance strategies) should also be 
considered.
124
 Kraakman et al opine that enforcement is most directly related to 
regulatory strategies such as rules and standards.
 125
 Governance strategies on the 
other hand are largely dependent on actions by the principal to secure the agent’s 
compliance. This tempts us to restrict our view of enforcement to regulatory 
strategies only. However, while enforcement may relate strictly speaking to rules or 
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standards, it may be worthwhile to take a holistic view of enforcement with its goal in 
mind and view it as all measures taken to secure compliance. The action or inaction 
that results in ‘enforcement’ may not be clearly contained in a rule or code but may 
be implied by both parties.
126
 If enforcement is restricted to only those remedies that 
strictly owe their existence to law, there is a risk of excluding other forms of 
enforcement like moral and social enforcement.
127
  Since the primary goal of 
enforcement is to ensure compliance, then all measures taken to ensure compliance 
may rightly be described as enforcement. This view is supported by Armour who 
considered both regulatory and governance strategies in his analysis of enforcement, 
and further opined that whether such governance strategies can properly be classified 
as enforcement is merely a ‘semantic question’.128 Hence, for him, the important 
thing is that the exercise of such rights or the threat of it may influence the manager’s 
decision in choosing self-interested behaviour. 
3.8.2 Enforcement Classification 
 This thesis makes use of a three-way table in classifying enforcement namely private 
civil enforcement, public civil enforcement and criminal enforcement. This 
classification broadly tracks the enforcement regimes which are actually used by 
different jurisdictions. As mentioned in section 3.8.1, enforcement is relevant to both 
regulatory and governance strategies. The classification adopted in this thesis 
however directly relates to regulatory strategies. This does not however imply, in any 
way, that governance strategies are less important in any discussion of enforcement in 
corporate law. Conceptually, enforcement is also directly relevant to governance 
strategies. However, for the purposes of this thesis, and due to word constraints, this 
thesis is unable to fully analyse enforcement with regards to both regulatory and 
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governance strategies. It has therefore chosen to focus on regulatory strategies as this 
category covers most enforcement actions in corporate law.  
Private civil enforcement, as the name implies, are civil enforcement actions that are 
instituted by private parties. The private enforcer in this regard is often the company 
or its shareholders.
129
   Public civil enforcement, on the other hand, denotes those 
civil enforcement actions that are instituted by regulatory authorities. This category 
includes both judicial and non-judicial proceedings. Hence, the courts or the 
regulatory authority may impose the sanction on the violators. Criminal enforcement 
actions, as the name implies, are simply enforcement actions that involve some form 
of criminal proceedings.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
129 Note that different jurisdictions have varying rules regarding those who have a right to commence 
private enforcement actions against directors. For example, in the UK, Derivative claims can only be 
instituted by ‘a member of the company. See s260 Companies Act 2006. In Nigeria however, other 
persons aside from a member of the company can institute a derivative action. See further Chapter 6 on 
private civil enforcement actions in Nigeria.  
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Table 3.1: Classification of Enforcement Mechanisms in Corporate Law  
 
The analysis of enforcement actions for the rest of this thesis would be carried out 
within the scope of these three enforcement categories viz -private civil enforcement, 
public civil enforcement, and criminal enforcement. The analysis would reveal the 
strengths and more particularly, the weaknesses of the different enforcement regimes. 
As mentioned earlier, the limitations of the enforcement analysis in this thesis is that 
it focuses on regulatory strategies. It therefore does not include governance strategies 
in its analysis.
130
 
                                                            
130 For the distinction between regulatory and governance strategies see Chapter 2, section 2.4.  
PRIVATE CIVIL 
ENFORCEMENT 
PUBLIC CIVIL 
ENFORCEMENT (Judicial 
& Non-Judicial Enforcement) 
CRIMINAL 
ENFORCEMENT  
 Derivative 
proceedings 
 Shareholder’s 
personal action 
 Action by 
administrator or 
liquidator 
 Representative 
actions 
 Corporate actions 
 Director disqualification 
 Civil judicial proceedings 
initiated by regulators 
 Public civil sanctions imposed 
by regulators (pecuniary 
penalties, compensation orders, 
suspensions) 
 Warnings and threat of 
sanctions by public regulators. 
Criminal proceedings for  
offences such as:  
 Fraud 
 Insider Dealing  
 Market Abuse 
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3.9 Conclusion 
While the issue of enforcement has generally been the subject of discourse in 
economics, criminal justice and law, enforcement specifically within the context of 
corporate law has been given much less attention. Hence, much more focus has been 
placed on the content of corporate law, also commonly known as ‘law in books’, 
rather than its enforcement or ‘law in action’.131 Enforcement within the context of 
the corporation is however as important as or even arguably more important than the 
substantive content of the law.  
As discussed in the course of this chapter, enforcement of corporate law is essential 
for securing compliance with law, rules or standards.  Hence, the ideal is not just to 
create rules, but to put in place appropriate and effective enforcement mechanisms in 
order to secure compliance.  The next part of this thesis will therefore analyse 
enforcement regimes in corporate law specifically within the context of the Nigerian 
society. As mentioned earlier, the three enforcement regimes which this thesis will 
focus on are criminal enforcement, private civil enforcement, and public civil 
enforcement. This will be discussed in turns in chapters five, six, and seven 
respectively.  
                                                            
131 R Pound, ‘Law in Books and Law in Action’ (1910) 44 American Law Review 12. 
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PART 2 - THE NIGERIAN CONTEXT 
 
CHAPTER 4:  THE NIGERIAN CORPORATE 
LANDSCAPE 
4.1 Introduction 
Part 1 of this thesis provided theoretical foundations for its analysis. It examined the 
agency problem in corporate law as well as the enforcement problem in corporate 
law. Part 2 now turns the focus on to Nigeria itself. Chapter 4 begins by examining 
the Nigerian corporate landscape. It provides a detailed overview, in order to provide 
an understanding of the context within which corporations operate in Nigeria.  
The chapter starts in section 4.2 by examining the history of commercial development 
in Nigeria divided between pre-colonial, colonial, and post-colonial developments.  
Section 4.3 then examines the legal forms for conducting business in Nigeria before 
moving on to focus specifically on incorporated companies. Section 4.4 addresses 
ownership patterns of public companies in Nigeria while section 4.5 turns to the legal 
framework governing companies in Nigeria. Section 4.6 identifies the public agencies 
with responsibilities for the regulation of public listed companies in Nigeria while 
section 4.7 concludes.  
4.2 History of Commercial Development in Nigeria 
Nigeria, one of the most populous countries in Africa, came into being in its present 
form in 1914 after the amalgamation of the Northern and Southern Protectorates by 
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Sir Frederick Lugard.
1
 The name Nigeria was given to the country by Sir Lugard 
based on the recommendation of Flora Shaw who suggested that the country be 
named after the River Niger.  Whilst Nigeria as a country is a creation of the British 
colonialists, its people nevertheless have a strong pre-colonial history.
2
 Consequently, 
this section would look at the pre-colonial, colonial, and post-colonial history of 
commerce in Nigeria.  
One crucial point to note before any treatment of Nigeria’s history is that prior to the 
amalgamation in 1914, Nigeria as a country did not exist. Any history of Nigeria 
before that time is therefore really a history of some individual territories that now 
make up Nigeria. As a result of this, some may consider it an anomaly to discuss the 
history of ‘Nigeria’ pre-1914 when the entity was not even in existence. For the sake 
of convenience however, the name ‘Nigeria’ will still be used in treating the pre-1914 
history.  
4.2.1 The Pre- Colonial Period 
Local trade in goods has been in existence in Nigeria for a very long time. In the pre-
colonial period, exchange of goods (not services) was a feature of many communities 
and villages.  Villages had specific local market days during which people exchanged 
goods.
3
 This was however only a small part of the local trade as more trading took 
place on a more informal level in form of exchange between neighbours. Foodstuffs 
were the major item for sale during this period although other items such as horses, 
slaves, beads, cloths, salt, and calabashes were also traded.
4
 While much of the trade 
                                                            
1 M Crowder, A Short History of Nigeria (Frederick A Praeger rev. edn. 1966) 21. 
2 Crowder ibid 21. 
3 R.O Ekundare, An Economic History of Nigeria 1860-1960 (Methuen & co ltd 1973) 50. 
4 See E Isichei, A History of Nigeria (Longman 1983) Ch. 3. 
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then was between local communities, certain items, which were not universally 
available, were however transported over long distances to be traded.
5
   
The predominant international trade during the pre-colonial era was the slave trade. 
However, even during the peak of this trade, slavers bought other items such as ivory 
and food commodities.
6
 During this era, the Europeans merchants that traded in 
Nigeria did so as individuals with the exception of a few trading companies.
7
 After 
the abolishment of the slave trade however, there was a shift in focus to the export of 
palm oil, which then became the main export item.
8
  
4.2.2 The Colonial Period  
The first British government influence in Nigeria was in 1851 when the British 
attacked Lagos in order to force Kosoko (the king of Lagos) to discontinue the slave 
trade.
9
 Lagos subsequently became a British colony in 1862 and this marked the 
beginning of the spread of the British rule to Southern Nigeria and Northern Nigeria. 
On the 1
st
 of January 1914, the Colony and Protectorate of Southern Nigeria and 
Protectorate of Northern Nigeria were united to form the territory that is now known 
as Nigeria.
10
 The law applicable to the country at that time was the common law, 
doctrines of equity and statutes of general application which were in force in England 
on the 1
st
 of January 1900.
11
 Trade with the British government and other African 
colonies dominated during this era. As such, there were both exportation and 
                                                            
5 ibid 84. 
6 ibid 97. 
7 Ekundare (n 3) 53. 
8 Isichei (n 4) 98. 
9 Ekundare (n 3) 60. 
10 A Burns, History of Nigeria (5th edn, 7th imp, George Allen and Unwin Ltd 1958) 212. 
11 By implication, all the laws governing the corporate form in England such as the Limitation of 
Liability Act 1855, the Joint Stock Companies Act 1856 & the Companies Act 1862 were applicable in 
Nigeria. 
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importation of goods.
12
 Agriculture was the focus of international trade during that 
period and the key export items were palm products (palm oil and palm kernel), 
cocoa, rubber, groundnut and groundnut oil. 
13
  
The 1850s heralded the influx of British traders into Nigeria partly due to the 
statutory recognition of limited liability in England.  This facilitated traders in 
pooling their resources together, thereby expanding their trading activities.
14
 Trade in 
Nigeria during this period was monopolistic as a few expatriate (predominantly 
British) companies handled most of it.  Some of the important English trading 
companies operating in Nigeria at the time include the River Niger Navigation & 
Trading Company, the Company of African Merchants, the Anglo-African Company, 
John Holt & Co, Messrs Miller Brothers & Co, the British Nigerian Syndicate, the 
African merchants of Bristol, the Merchants of London-Liverpool, and the United 
African Company. In addition to these English firms, there were also some German, 
Lebanese and Syrian firms trading in Nigeria.
15
 
During this period, indigenous entrepreneurship was largely undeveloped due to the 
dominance of foreign commercial firms and the restrictive trade regulations, which 
prevented indigenous traders from getting access to much needed capital.
16
 While, 
there was certainly some level of participation in international trade by indigenous 
traders, there is no reliable evidence that may be used to judge their level of 
participation in relation to the foreign firms.
17
 The Nigerian traders at that time relied 
on individual capital resources, as the partnership and joint stock companies’ business 
                                                            
12 C.B Anyansi-Archibong, Strategy and Structure of Enterprise in a Developing Country (Avebury 
1988) 81. 
13 See Ekundare (n 3)79-83. 
14 ibid 90. 
15 Ibid 91&218. 
16 A Apena, Colonization, Commerce and Entrepreneurship in Nigeria: The Western Delta 1914-1960 
(Peter Lang 1997) 155. 
17  Ekundare (n 3) 219. 
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form were not attractive to them. This was partly because they valued their 
independence and lacked confidence in any partnership arrangement.
18
 Another 
obstacle to the growth of indigenous traders was the difficulty with making contact 
with foreign manufacturers. Most foreign manufacturers preferred to do business with 
the more established foreign firms as they had better knowledge of those foreign 
firms than the indigenous traders did. 
 The situation however changed in the latter colonial period as some new and strong 
indigenous firms appeared on the scene. This caused some of the foreign firms, such 
as John Holt and UAC, to withdraw from retail trade and collection of export produce 
directly from farmers. The withdrawal of these foreign firms from certain aspects of 
foreign trade may be linked to both political and economic reasons. The political 
reason for withdrawal is linked to the strong influence that indigenous business men 
had in Nigerian politics causing foreign businessmen some anxiety to avoid been 
dragged into any domestic political ‘mess’. The economic reason was linked to the 
sharp increase in the cost of keeping retail posts in several parts of the country 
making this business venture unprofitable for the expatriate firms. There are however 
no statistics to show the exact number of indigenous businesses that sprang up during 
this period.
19
  
4.2.3 The Post-Colonial Period  
After the country’s independence in 1960, its economy was still largely dominated by 
multinational companies. However, Nigeria, like most other newly independent 
nations, viewed these foreign companies with suspicion due to their ties with past 
                                                            
18  ibid 344. 
19 Ibid 345 & 346. 
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colonialists.
20
 It sought to remedy this by ensuring indigenous ownership and control 
of the key sectors of the economy.
21
 In order to achieve this, the Government 
established state owned corporations which controlled industries such as 
telecommunication, electricity, postal and telegraphic services, shipping and air travel 
amongst others.
22
 In addition to those sectors that were wholly owned and controlled 
by state corporations, the Government also promoted indigenous ownership and 
control of many other sectors. This was done by the promulgation of Nigeria’s 
Indigenisation Decree in 1972.  
The Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree of 1972 (decree no 4) otherwise known 
as the Indigenisation Decree came into force in 1974.
23
 The main purpose of the 
Indigenisation Decree was to ensure that Nigerians attained control of their own 
economy.  It was therefore intended as ‘…an assertion of economic nationalism…’24  
By virtue of this decree, twenty two enterprises listed in Schedule I were reserved 
exclusively for Nigerians, and foreigners were not permitted to  hold stakes in such 
enterprises.
25
 The enterprises contained in this schedule were those thought to be 
within the competence of indigenous people. Schedule II of the same decree also 
listed thirty-three enterprises in which Nigerians were required to hold 40 per cent 
equity. Foreigners could hold shares in such enterprises as long as Nigerians held at 
least 40 per cent equity. The enterprises contained in this list were those which 
                                                            
20 O Amao, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility, Multinational Corporations and The Law in Nigeria: 
Controlling Multinationals in Host States’ (2008) 52(1) Journal of African Law 89-113. 
21 B Ahunwan, ‘Corporate Governance in Nigeria’ [2002] Journal of Business Ethics 269, 270. 
22 ibid 270. 
23 A.A Akinsanya, ‘State Strategies Toward Nigerian and Foreign Business’ in I.W Zartman (ed), The 
Political Economy of Nigeria (Praeger 1983) 160. 
24 T.J Biersteker, ‘Indigenization in Nigeria: Renationalization or Denationalization’ in I.W Zartman 
(ed), The Political Economy of Nigeria (Praeger 1983) 188. 
25Akinsanya, (n 23) 162. 
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required more capital or technical expertise.
26
   In industries not listed in Schedules I 
and II, such as those requiring high technology, foreign investors were permitted to 
hold unrestricted equity. In addition to all these developments, the Federal Military 
Government acquired 55 per cent equity in petroleum production and 60 per cent 
equity in petroleum distribution.
27
 Similarly, the Government acquired 40 per cent 
equity in all foreign owned banks and 49 per cent in all foreign owned insurance 
companies.  
Surprisingly, the indigenisation decree did not affect the enthusiasm of transnational 
corporations investing in Nigeria. Most transnational corporations complied with the 
equity-sharing requirement of the indigenization decrees, and indeed only two out of 
the hundreds of transnational operating in the country at that time chose to leave.
28
 
The decree therefore did not affect the flow of foreign capital into the country.  The 
reason for this apparent anomaly is that these transnational corporations found ways 
to beat the system by retaining managerial control of their corporations.
29
   These 
corporations had a wide range of strategies by which they retained control, one of 
which was ‘fronting’.30 It is therefore doubtful whether the indigenisation decree was 
effective in ensuring indigenous ownership and control of enterprises.
31
 In spite of 
this, the Indigenisation decree still had a positive impact on Nigeria’s corporate 
landscape as it led to a great increase in the number of incorporated companies in 
                                                            
26 I Achebe, ‘The Legal Problems of Indigenization in Nigeria: A Lesson for Developing Countries’ 
(1988-1989) 12 Hastings International & Comparative Law Review 637,642. 
27 Akinsanya (n 23) 161. 
28 Biersteker (n 24) 192. 
29 ibid 193.  
30 Fronting was done by placing Nigerians in apparent positions of ownership or responsibility while in 
reality control still rested with the foreigners. Other methods used by transnational corporations to 
retain control include widespread distribution of shares, negotiation of exemptions from the 
government, changes in voting rules prior to indigenisation and outright bribery of government 
officials. See Biersteker (n 24)194-201 for further discussion of these measures.  
31 Biersteker (n 24) 201. 
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Nigeria.
32
 As the next section will explore more fully, companies have now become 
an important part of the country’s economic development especially with regard to 
industrial and commercial enterprises.
33
  
4.3 Legal Forms of carrying out Business in Nigeria 
There are three major forms recognised by law for conducting business in Nigeria. 
These are: 
 Sole proprietorship 
  Partnership 
 Incorporated companies  
The sole proprietorship is the businessperson who does her business alone while a 
partnership arrangement is a business formed by two or more persons. A partnership 
is expected to consist of no more than twenty partners except in cases of a partnership 
of legal practitioners, chartered accountants or a cooperative society.
34
 The sole 
proprietorship and partnership remain important forms of doing business in Nigeria.  
The sole proprietorship is the oldest form of business unit and remains the most 
popular in the country; in spite of this, it remains the weakest business form. It lacks 
continuity as the illness or death of the owner may lead to its demise. It also lacks the 
outside capital, which is needed for expansion and growth.
35
 While a partnership 
business form is an improvement on the sole proprietorship, it still faces some of the 
                                                            
32 J.O Orojo, Company Law and Practice in Nigeria (2nd edn, vol 1, Sweet & Maxwell 1984) 15. The 
oil boom also played an important role in the growth of Indigenous companies 
33 ibid 23. The Indigenisation decree was also repealed in 1995 and replaced with the Nigerian 
Investment Promotion Commission Act (Decree no 16 of 1995) which removed restrictions on foreign 
ownership and participation in enterprise with very few exceptions. 
34 See CAMA, s19. The Sole Proprietorships and Partnerships are classified as business names under 
the Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA) and can be registered under pt. B of the CAMA. Sole 
proprietors and Partners may however carry on business without registering as long as they trade with 
their real names. See CAMA, s573. 
35 Orojo, ‘Company Law and Practice in Nigeria’ (n 32) 24. 
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problems involved in the sole proprietorship. Its shortcomings also include a lack of a 
perpetual succession, lack of outside capital, legal limitations on the number of 
partners and unlimited liability.   
 4.3.1 Incorporated Companies  
Under the Nigerian law, any two or more persons may form and incorporate a 
company.
36
  An incorporated company may be limited by shares, limited by 
guarantee or unlimited.
37
  A company limited by shares has the liability of its 
members limited to any amount, if any, remaining unpaid on its shares. A company 
limited by guarantee is one which has its members’ liability limited to the amount 
they respectively agree to contribute to the company’s asset in event of winding up. 
An unlimited company is one in which its members liability is unlimited.
38
 Any of the 
above companies may choose to be private or public. However, even within the 
category of ‘public companies’, it is possible to distinguish further between public 
companies that are listed and those that are not. This thesis is however primarily 
concerned with public companies that are also listed i.e. public listed companies.
39
   
In Nigeria, in contrast to the UK, there are no reliable statistics on the total population 
of registered companies. Therefore, data on the exact percentage of public versus 
private companies, limited versus unlimited companies, or companies limited by 
shares versus companies limited by guarantee is unavailable. This can be attributed to 
the fact that the Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC) has only recently commenced 
                                                            
36 CAMA, s18. Certain persons are however not qualified to join in the formation of the company. 
These are minors (persons less than 18 years), people of unsound mind, undischarged bankrupts, and 
persons who have been disqualified from acting as directors under the Act. See further CAMA, s 20. 
37 CAMA, s 21. 
38 Ibid. 
39 According to the Nigeria Stock Exchange, listing is defined as the process by which a security is 
admitted to trading in a market or on a board of a stock exchange.  See Nigerian Stock Exchange, 
‘glossary of investment and market terms’ <http://www.nse.com.ng/investing/becoming-an-
investor/glossary-of-investment-terms> accessed 4th July 2017.  A public listed company may 
therefore be defined as a company whose shares are admitted for trading on the stock exchange.  
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the move towards a system of electronic registration of companies;
40
 prior to that, 
registration was completed by submission of paper documentation.  
Concerning the proportion of listed companies, which makes up the Nigerian 
corporate landscape, available dated evidence suggests that only 13.3% of businesses 
in Nigeria are listed on the stock exchange.
41
 This survey was however completed 
nearly two decades ago, at the turn of the democratic era in Nigeria, it is therefore 
unlikely to portray a true picture of the current economic situation.   
In spite of the lack of reliable data on the percentage of listed companies that make up 
Nigeria’s corporate landscape, there is nevertheless some data on the number of listed 
companies registered on the stock exchange.  According to data obtained directly 
from the Nigerian Stock Exchange, there are currently 173 companies listed on the 
stock exchange.
42
  However while this data gives us an idea of the number of listed 
companies in Nigeria, it does not provide information on the proportion of the 
corporate landscape which these companies represent. It is therefore difficult to 
estimate the economic importance of listed companies in Nigeria. 
4.4 Share Ownership Pattern of Nigerian Companies  
There has been some debate regarding the share ownership pattern of public listed 
companies in Nigeria. Much of this uncertainty is concerned with whether share 
ownership in Nigeria may be regarded as concentrated or widely dispersed or a 
hybrid of both. An understanding of the share ownership structure of Nigerian 
companies is however necessary for any discussion of its corporate law and 
governance. The solution to the agency problem in public companies with 
                                                            
40 Corporate Affairs Commission, ‘CAC Closes Manual Registration in Five States and FCT’ 
<http://new.cac.gov.ng/home/cac-closes-manual-registrations-five-states-fct/> accessed 4th July 2017.  
41 TA Oyejide & A Soyibo, ‘Corporate Governance in Nigeria’ (Paper presented at the conference on 
corporate governance, Accra, Ghana, 29-30 January, 2001) 7. 
42 Nigerian Stock Exchange, ‘Listed Companies’ <http://www.nse.com.ng/Listings-site/listed-
securities/listed-companies> accessed 4th July 2017. 
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concentrated share ownership would usually differ from that of widely owned public 
companies.
43
  An attempt to use the initiatives designed to reduce the agency problem 
in a widely owned economy for a more concentrated one is therefore likely to be 
unsuccessful.  
Different scholars have attempted to analyse the share ownership structure in Nigeria. 
Ahunwan in his analysis opined that the share ownership structure in Nigeria is that 
of majority or concentrated ownership.
44
 He argues that the major driving force 
behind the current share ownership structure in Nigeria was the Government’s post-
independence indigenisation policy discussed earlier on in this chapter.
45
 While this 
now repealed indigenisation policy might not have been overtly successful in 
ensuring that enterprises in Nigeria are controlled by indigenes, Ahunwan argues that 
it had a significant impact on the share ownership structure of Nigerian companies. 
The major way in which the Decree affected the share ownership structure of 
companies is that due to its prohibition of 100% ownership in several sectors, many 
foreign corporations had to divest their shareholding. The divested shares were 
mostly bought by the Nigerian government with the remaining being bought by a few 
wealthy Nigerians.
46
   
In his empirical analysis on the share ownership pattern of corporations in Nigeria, 
Ahunwan classifies corporations in Nigeria into four categories. Group A comprises 
of those corporations whose shares  are fully owned by the Government.
47
 Group B 
comprises of those corporations which are jointly owned by the Federal Government 
                                                            
43 I.O Bolodeoku, ‘Corporate Governance: The Law’s Response to Agency Costs in Nigeria’ (2006-
2007) 32 Brooklyn Journal of International Law 467. 
44 Ahunwan (n 21)272 
45 See s4.2.3 above 
46 Ahunwan (n 21) 271. 
47 This group includes companies such as petroleum refineries, insurance companies, hotels, and 
banks. 
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and foreign crude oil producing companies. In this group, the government holds 
majority shares.  Group C comprises of public listed corporations which are jointly 
operated by foreign and local investors. The foreign investors in this group are mostly 
subsidiaries of multinational companies and they hold majority shares in many of 
those corporations.  The last category -Group D - comprises of private corporations 
not listed on the stock exchange. This category of corporations is predominantly 
family owned. Ahunwan concludes from this analysis that the share ownership 
structure in Nigeria is that of majority or concentrated ownership. Companies in 
Group A are fully owned by the government, and in Groups B, C & D majority share 
ownership is held by the government, foreign investors and families respectively.
48
  
Nmehielle and Nwauche however reached a different conclusion on the share 
ownership structure of Nigerian companies. According to them, the indigenisation 
programme in Nigeria led to a diffusion of Nigerians’ shareholdings while the foreign 
shareholdings in those companies remained concentrated.
49
 They argued that after the 
abolition of the indigenisation decree, there remained a large number of firms with 
dispersed Nigerian shareholders and dominant foreign shareholders. The privatization 
of state owned enterprises in Nigeria through public offer also contributed to 
diffusion of shareholding. They therefore opine that shareholding in Nigeria is largely 
diffused. The scholars however concede that this is not the complete picture of the 
share ownership structure in Nigeria. There are several cases of majority 
shareholdings borne out of family ownership of companies where family members 
still hold majority shares. There is also a substantial amount of Nigerian and foreign 
institutional shareholders thereby making it clear that some companies have majority 
                                                            
48 Ahunwan (n 21) 271-272. 
49 V.O Nmehielle and E.S Nwauche, ‘External-Internal Standards in Corporate Governance in Nigeria’ 
(2004) The GWU Law School Public Law Research Paper No. 115, 8 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=627664&download=yes> accessed 30th January 
2015.  
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shareholders. They therefore conclude that ‘…Nigeria is not characterised by one 
typology of companies’.50  
Tanko, in his analysis on the impact of Nigeria’s privatization programme on its share 
ownership structure, opined that shareholding in Nigeria is widely dispersed.
51
 He 
argued that the first round of Nigeria’s privatization programme greatly widened the 
investor base as shares were bought by over 800,000 shareholders leading to a large 
number of shareholders each holding only a tiny proportion of shares.
52
 Bolodeoku 
however, contrary to Tanko’s views, opines that Nigeria has a combination of 
concentrated and diffused share ownership. He notes that virtually all public 
companies in Nigeria have shareholders holding a substantial proportion of the 
company’s issued shares, with some shareholders even holding a clear majority. 
Widely dispersed shareholders however usually hold the remaining equity in such 
companies.
53
 Scholarly opinion on the share ownership pattern of Nigerian companies 
is clearly divided  into three; those who believe that  share ownership is concentrated, 
those who believe it is highly dispersed and those who opine that it is a mixture of 
both systems. There is therefore a case for agreeing with Nmehielle and Nwauche’s 
statement that Nigeria is not characterised by one category of companies.  
4.5 The Legal Framework 
The legal framework governing companies in Nigeria can be broadly classified into 
three. These are  
 Companies Law 
 Securities law 
                                                            
50 ibid 8 & 9. 
51 M Tanko II, ‘The impact of Privatization on Capital Market Development and Individual Share 
Ownership’ (2004)< http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=689702&download=yes>  
accessed 13/02/2015. 
52 ibid. 
53 Bolodeoku (n 43) 471 & 472. 
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 Corporate governance Codes 
4.5.1 Companies Law 
Company law is foreign to the customs of Nigeria and as such, its history is a part of 
the history of received English laws introduced into the Nigerian legal system.
54
  The 
first companies’ statute in Nigeria was the Companies Ordinance 1912 (the 1912 
Ordinance) which was mainly based on the English Companies (Consolidation) Act 
1908. This 1912 Ordinance is important in the history of Nigerian company law as for 
the first time in Nigeria it made provision for the incorporation of companies by 
registration. The 1912 Ordinance was amended in 1917, and in 1922, both ordinances 
(the 1912 and 1917 ordinance) were consolidated to form the Companies Ordinance 
1922 (the 1922 Ordinance). This 1922 ordinance continued in force until 1968 when 
it was repealed and replaced with the Companies Act 1968 (the 1968 Act).
55
  
The 1968 Act was a major improvement from the previous Companies Ordinances as 
it made provisions for increased accountability by directors and better shareholder 
participation in companies’ affairs. One of its most important features was that it 
required foreign companies desiring to do business in Nigeria to be incorporated 
locally.
56
 The 1968 Act like its predecessor (the 1922 Ordinance) was a reflection of 
the UK Companies’ Act of 1948. It therefore also incorporated some of the 
recommendations of the UK Jenkins committee.
57
 It was listed under the exclusive 
legislative list in the 1979 Nigerian constitution and granted original jurisdiction to 
the Federal High Court in respect of companies’ affairs and disputes.58   
                                                            
54 Orojo, ‘Company Law and Practice in Nigeria’ (n 32) 1.  
55 ibid 1-6. 
56 J.O Orojo, ‘An Overview of the Companies and Allied Matters Decree 1990’ in E.O Akanki (ed) 
Essays in Company Law (1st edn, University of Lagos Press 1992) 1.  
57 M.O Sofowora, Modern Nigerian Company Law (Soft Associates 2002) 11. 
58 ibid 11. 
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In spite of the improvements in the 1968 Act, it was still lacking in several respects 
and criticised by many. As such, the onus was placed on the Nigerian Law 
Commission to carry out a review and reform of Nigerian company law.
59
 In coming 
up with the reform, the company law in Nigeria and the UK was examined, similarly 
the laws of various foreign countries including Ghana, India, Canada, and USA were 
considered.
60
 After comprehensive reviews and consultations, the Companies and 
Allied Matters Decree (no 1) 1990 came into being with effect from the 1
st
 of January 
1990.  
4.5.1.1 The Companies and Allied Matters Act 1990 
The main Act regulating companies in Nigeria is the Companies and Allied Matters 
Decree No 1 of 1990 now known as the Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA) 
Cap c20 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 1990.
61
 It makes comprehensive provision 
for all issues relating to companies including formation and registration of 
companies, memorandum and articles of association, directors’ duties, appointment 
and removal of directors, disqualification of directors, conduct of general meetings, 
shareholders’ rights, financial reporting and auditing requirements and winding up of 
companies to mention a few. Most of the rules contained in Part A of CAMA, which 
regulates companies, apply generally to both public and private companies with very 
few exceptions.
62
 This thesis is however focused on public listed companies and 
would therefore specifically examine the position of CAMA on some of those 
pertinent corporate law issues affecting shareholders in public listed companies. 
                                                            
59 Orojo, ‘An Overview of the Companies and Allied Matters Decree’ in Akanki (n 56) 2. 
60 ibid 3. 
61 CAMA is divided into four parts; Part A regulates companies, Part B - business names, Part C - 
incorporated trustees and Part D is the citation and commencement.  
62 Examples of these exceptions are CAMA, s211 which requires public companies to have statutory 
meetings, also s359 (1) which requires an audit committee for public companies. 
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4.5.1.1.1 Organs of the Company 
A company may operate through three organs; the two main organs under CAMA are 
the board of directors and the general meeting.
63
 The third organ is the managing 
director to whom the board of directors may delegate all or any of its powers.
64
  The 
board of directors is responsible for management of the company’s business and may 
exercise all the company’s powers except those which have been vested in the general 
meeting.
65
 Hence, in the absence of any contrary provision in the Act or the 
company’s articles, the power to manage the company’s business is primarily vested 
in the board of directors. Consequently, the only powers that the board cannot 
exercise are those expressly conferred on the general meeting.
66
 The board is also not 
bound to obey the instructions of the general meeting provided it is acting within the 
confines of powers conferred on it and with good faith and due diligence.
67
 
Shareholders therefore cannot by ordinary resolution passed in general meeting 
interfere with the management powers vested in the directors.
68
 From this provision, 
one may conclude that the board of directors have been vested with enormous powers 
under the Nigerian company law; this however does not mean that the general 
meeting have been left helpless as they have various powers under CAMA which will 
be discussed further in this chapter. 
4.5.1.1.2 Directors 
CAMA explicitly sets out the legal position of directors in the company. Directors are 
regarded as agents of the company and trustees of the company’s money, properties 
and powers. Hence, they are required to account for all the company’s money in their 
                                                            
63 CAMA, s 63(1). 
64 CAMA, s 64. 
65 CAMA, s 63(3). 
66 Y.H Bhadmus, Corporate Law and Practice (Chenglo Ltd 2009)188. 
67 See CAMA, s63 (4). 
68 Bhadmus (n 66)188. 
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control and would be liable to refund any money that has been mishandled.
69
  CAMA 
requires all companies to have at least two directors. The first directors may be 
determined by the subscribers to the memorandum of association or named in the 
articles of association; subsequent directors are however to be appointed by the 
general meeting. The general meeting may also re-elect and reject directors, and 
while the board of directors have powers to appoint new directors to fill any casual 
vacancy, such appointments must be approved by the next general meeting.
70
  
At each general meeting one-third or the number closest to one third of all directors 
must retire from office. The directors to retire are the ones who have been the longest 
in office. The members in general meeting may then elect other persons to fill the 
position of the retired director, or the retiring director if he offers himself for re-
election, will be considered re-elected. 
71
 This is known as retirement by rotation and 
is intended to enable shareholders to exercise their powers to dispense with 
unproductive directors by automatic retirement. 
72
 
Another important provision in CAMA is the disqualification of directors.
 73
   The 
Federal High Court is granted powers to disqualify a person from being a director or 
from taking part in the management of any company for a period not more than 10 
years. A disqualification order may be made against a director who has been 
convicted of an indictable offence in respect of promotion, formation or management 
of a company or has been found guilty of fraud in relation to the company, or guilty 
of an offence in the course of winding up a company.  An application for a 
                                                            
69 CAMA, s283. 
70 See CAMA, ss247-249. 
71 CAMA, s259. 
72 Nmehielle and Nwauche (n 49) 13; CAMA, s 259. 
73 See generally CAMA, s254. See also CAMA, ss 257 & 258.  
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disqualification order may be made by the official receiver, the company’s liquidator, 
a creditor or member of the company.  
Directors’ Duties 
CAMA makes comprehensive provision for directors’ duties in Nigeria. While these 
duties are contained in the Act, they however owe their origin to common law and 
equity.  Directors’ duties can be broadly classified into two types. These are the 
fiduciary duties of good faith and the common law duties of care and skill.
 74
  
Fiduciary Duties  
Directors are regarded as being in a fiduciary relationship towards the company and 
are therefore required to observe utmost good faith towards the company and act in 
its best interests.
75
  
The duties imposed on directors under CAMA are :  
i.   Duty to act in the company’s best interest s.279 (3&4)  
 CAMA requires directors to act in the best interests of the company as a whole.   
s.279 (3) provides that  
a director shall act at all times in what he believes to be the best 
interests of the company as a whole so as to preserve its assets, 
further its business, and promote the purposes for which it was 
formed, and in such manner as a faithful, diligent, careful and 
ordinary skilful director would act in the circumstances. 
The phrase ‘best interests of the company’ is very ambiguous and subject to various 
interpretations. The pertinent question is what exactly are the best interests of the 
                                                            
74  Nmehielle and Nwauche (n 49) 14. 
75 CAMA, s 279(1). 
92 
 
company? Does the company have its own interests as a legal person or are its 
interests synonymous to that of its stakeholders? The company as an artificial entity is 
incapable of having interests of its own.
76
 At common law, however, the company’s 
interests are often considered synonymous with that of its members as a whole.
77
 It 
can therefore be said that directors under CAMA have a duty to act in the interests of 
the company’s shareholders as a whole. 
ii. Duty to exercise powers only for proper purpose s.279 (5).  
A director is expected to exercise his powers only for the purpose for which they are 
specified.  The main purpose of this duty is to ensure that the powers which have 
been conferred on directors are used only for the purpose for which they have been 
given and not an improper purpose. Hence, directors are not to exercise their 
directorial powers to retain control of the company in their own interest or to ‘feather’ 
their own nests.
78
 Where the director’s power is exercised for a purpose which is 
outside its limits (‘collateral purpose’), the courts may intervene.79 Directors who 
have acted honestly in the company’s interests may still nevertheless be in breach of 
this duty if their powers have been exercised for a purpose for which it has not been 
conferred.
80
 Many of the cases in which the issue of improper use of power has arisen 
are instances where the directors have used their powers to allot shares improperly to 
prevent a takeover.
81
  
 
                                                            
76 See J.E Parkinson, Corporate Power and Responsibility: Issues in the Theory of Company Law 
(OUP 1993) 76-77 
77 D Kershaw, Company Law in Context: Text and Materials (2nd edn, OUP 2012)337. 
78 See P.L Davies & S Worthington, Gower’s Principles of Modern Company Law (10th edn, Sweet & 
Maxwell 2016) 16-28. 
79 S Mayson, D French & C Ryan, Company Law (29th edn, OUP 2012-2013) 479. 
80 Ibid 481. 
81 See Hogg v Cramphorn Ltd [1967] Ch 254 where the directors used their powers to issue shares to 
attempt to frustrate a takeover bid which they in good faith decided was not in the company’s best 
interests. See also Howard Smith v Ampol Petroleum Ltd [1974] AC 821. 
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iii. Duty not to fetter discretion to vote s.279(6)  
Directors are required not to fetter their discretion to vote in a particular way. They 
are therefore expected to exercise independent judgement. Directors sometimes 
undertake to act in accordance with the instructions of an ‘outsider. This can occur 
where a holding company has nominees on the board of the subsidiary company or 
where the right to appoint a director is given to a class of shareholders or debenture 
holders.
82
 Directors however must still preserve a significant degree of discretion as 
to how they would exercise their power. This duty therefore acts to prevent directors 
from fettering their discretion by, for example, contracting with a third party 
regarding how the discretion vested on them by the articles will be exercised or how 
they will vote at future board meetings.
 83
  The nature of this duty was explained by 
Lord Denning in Boulting v Association of Cinematograph, Television and Allied 
Technicians
84
 that ‘it seems to be that no one, who has duties of a fiduciary nature to 
discharge, can be allowed to enter into an engagement by which he binds himself to 
disregard those duties or to act inconsistently with them’. Hence, a director is not 
expected to enter into any agreement by which he contracts to disregard his duties or 
act in a manner which is contrary to them. This duty will however generally not be 
broken where it is established that an agreement entered into by a director, in good 
faith, was in the company’s best interests.  
iv. Duty to avoid conflict of interests s.280 
Directors are required not to put themselves in a situation where their personal 
interests conflict with their duties to the company. Directors are therefore not allowed 
to make secret profit. They are expected to be loyal to the company and committed to 
                                                            
82 Boyle & ors (eds), Boyle & Birds Company Law (8th edn, Jordan Publishing 2011)639. 
83 A Dignam and J Lowry, Company Law (9th edn OUP 2016) 338; Boyle & ors ibid 640. 
84 [1963] 2 A.B 606,626. 
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its profitability alone.
85
  If a director makes a secret profit or gets any unnecessary 
benefit as a result of his position in the company, he will be liable to account to the 
company.  However where the director discloses his interest to the general meeting 
before the secret profit was made, he may escape liability.
86
 Disclosure made after 
secret profit has been made does not count and director will still be liable to account 
for such profit.
87
   Directors also have a duty not to misuse corporate information and 
this duty remains even after they are no longer  directors in the company.
88
  
CAMA also prohibits directors from accepting a bribe, gift or commission from any 
person in respect of any transaction with the company.
89
 There is however a loophole 
here as it allows gifts made in gratitude to directors post transaction as long as such 
gifts are declared to the board and recorded in the minute book.
90
 Given Nigeria’s 
corruption and extortion culture, this is a major loophole as directors can solicit for 
bribes which will be disguised as gifts given in gratitude post-transaction.  
v.  Duty of Care and Skill s 282 CAMA 
The directors’ duty of care and skill requires directors to act in good faith, in the best 
interests of the company and with the degree of care, diligence and skill which ‘a 
reasonably prudent director would exercise in comparable circumstances’.91  Failure 
to take reasonable care in accordance with CAMA may give rise to an action in 
negligence and breach of duty.  The standard required of directors in regards to this 
duty is not subjective, rather it is an objective one based on what a reasonable director 
                                                            
85 J.E.O Abugu, ‘Directors’ Duties and the Frontiers of Corporate Governance’ (2011) 22(10) 
International Company and Commercial Law Review 322,327. 
86 CAMA, s 280(6). 
87 CAMA, s 280. 
88 CAMA, s 280(5). 
89 CAMA, s 287(1). 
90 CAMA s 287(3). 
91 CAMA, s 282. 
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would do in such circumstances. Subjective considerations may however also apply 
based on the level of specialised skills that a particular director possesses.
92
  
In addition to these duties, directors also have a duty under CAMA to account for all 
the company’s monies over which they exercise control and must refund any money 
which has been inappropriately paid away.
93
 They also have several other duties with 
regards to giving appropriate notification to the Corporate Affairs Commission in 
respect of certain occurrences such as change of name, change of head office, 
creation of debentures etc. These duties imposed on directors cannot be waived by the 
articles of association, the company’s resolutions or any other contract.94 CAMA also 
clearly specifies that both executive and non-executive directors are subject to the 
same standard of care with relation to their duties under CAMA.
95
 Hence, non-
executive directors may not feign ignorance or claim that they simply made decisions 
based on the representation of executive directors. They are expected to seek 
independent information from other employees in the company where required.
96
 
4.5.1.1.3 The General Meeting 
As mentioned earlier the General Meeting is one of the main organs of the company 
under CAMA.
97
  CAMA provides for three types of general meetings; these are the 
statutory general meeting, annual general meeting and extraordinary general meeting.  
The statutory general meeting is required to be held by every public company within 
the first six months of its incorporation.
98
 The annual general meeting is to be held 
every year and not more than 15 months is expected to elapse between one annual 
                                                            
92 Dignam and Lowry, (n 83) 343. 
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97 See s4.5.1.1.1 
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general meeting and the next.
99
 The extra ordinary general meeting may be convened 
by the board of directors or the members of the company. Members holding not less 
than one-tenth of the paid up capital or not less than one-tenth of voting rights may 
requisition an extraordinary general meeting, and directors upon receipt of such 
requisition will convene a general meeting.
100
  
 CAMA requires twenty-one days’ notice to be given for all general meetings; failure 
to give notice to any person entitled to it invalidates the meeting unless such failure is 
as a result of accidental omission.
101
 In addition to this notice, public companies are 
required to advertise the notice of meeting in at least two daily newspapers.
102
 
Members of the company are also entitled to receive the company’s financial 
statement which must be sent at least twenty-one days before the annual general 
meeting.
103
  
Voting at general meetings is by show of hands unless a poll is demanded, however 
voting by proxy is permitted under the law.
104
 CAMA also prohibits the issue of non-
voting and weighted shares and requires that shares issued in a company may carry 
only one vote per share.  No company may by its articles contravene this provision.
105
 
CAMA further provides for two types of resolutions, these are the ordinary and 
special resolution. An ordinary resolution is one which is passed by a simple majority 
of votes cast by members of the company. A special resolution is one passed by at 
least three-fourth of votes cast by members of the company at a meeting of which 21 
days’ notice has been given stating clearly the intention to propose a special 
                                                            
99 See CAMA, s 213. 
100 CAMA, s 215 
101 CAMA, ss. 217 & 221. 
102 CAMA, s 222. 
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resolution.
106
 All resolutions of public companies are required to be passed at general 
meetings.
107
 
Members in general meeting have been vested with certain powers under CAMA. 
The general meeting in this regard refers to shareholders decisions in a ‘properly 
convened meeting’.108 The general meeting has powers to ratify the board of 
directors’ actions and make recommendations to them.109 They have the power to 
determine directors’ remuneration.110 They are also vested with the power to act 
where the board of directors is unable to act or disqualified from doing so. 
111
 
In addition to this, one of the most important powers which the general meeting 
possesses is the power to appoint and remove directors. The general meeting has the 
power to re-elect directors, reject appointment of directors made by the board and 
appoint new directors.
112
 They also have the power to remove directors. A director 
may be removed before the expiration of his term of office by an ordinary resolution 
of members in general meeting. This power to remove directors remains constant 
notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the director’s contract of employment or 
company’s articles. Hence, a non-performing director may be removed at any time by 
the general meeting. It is however important to note that this provision does not 
deprive the removed director of any entitlement to compensation for termination of 
employment.
113
  
                                                            
106  CAMA, s 233. 
107 CAMA, s 234. 
108 Amao & Amaeshi, (n 20) 121. 
109 CAMA, s 63 (5). 
110 CAMA, s 267. 
111 CAMA, s 63(5) a. 
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These powers granted to shareholders in order to exercise some control over 
directors’ activities may be classified as governance strategies or rights.114 
Governance strategies may play a role in securing directors’ compliance and overall 
enforcement of corporate law.
115
  It is however argued that their effectiveness as an 
enforcement mechanism is somewhat limited by various problems. While 
shareholders have voting rights which include the right to remove an erring director, 
there are however several difficulties with exercising this right especially in widely 
held companies.
116
  One of these difficulties is the collective action problem.
117
 This 
problem is particularly acute in public listed companies as it is very difficult for 
shareholders in such companies to coordinate their activist efforts. Indeed, Black 
argues that in a widely dispersed corporation, shareholder passivity is unavoidable 
due to the collective action problem.
118
 The cost and time involved in coordinating 
the several shareholders in the company would usually prevent any coordinated 
action against management.
119
  Asides from the collective action problem, other 
difficulties that prevent shareholders’ effective use of their voting rights include the 
free rider problem, shareholder apathy, information asymmetries and conflict of 
interests.
120
 As a result of these problems, the effectiveness of shareholders’ 
                                                            
114 See Kraakman and others, The Anatomy of Corporate Law: A Comparative and Functional 
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governance rights as an enforcement mechanism is significantly limited as noted by  
Lord Wedderburn, the idea of shareholder democracy and shareholder control over 
managerial conduct is ‘fallacious’.121   
In light of the limitations of governance strategies in securing effective enforcement, 
there is a need to look to regulatory strategies as a means of filling this gap and 
ensuring effective enforcement. CAMA makes provisions for these regulatory 
strategies and their enforcement. It therefore provides mechanisms which may be 
used to enforce directors’ duties. These include derivative actions, representative 
actions and personal actions.  These enforcement actions will be discussed in chapter 
6.  
As noted above, CAMA is a very detailed legislation addressing various issues of 
importance in corporate governance. It covers many common law principles and case 
laws intended to ensure directors accountability and good governance in companies, 
it is therefore to be commended.  In light of this, Bolodeoku in his analysis of 
CAMA’s response to agency problems gives it a ‘pass mark’122 and notes that the 
statute’s response to agency costs and problems are ‘impressive’.123 In spite of this 
however, CAMA is in need of reform in several other regards. This is more so in light 
of the fact that it is over two decades old, therefore most of its provisions are 
significantly outdated.
124
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4.5.1.2 Companies Regulation 2012 
CAMA gives power to the Minister of Trade and Investment to make regulations for 
giving effect to some provisions of the Act.
125
  In pursuance of these powers, the 
Companies Regulation 2012 was made to take effect from the 1
st
 of January 2013. 
This legislation mostly deals with procedural issues and is intended to complement 
the substantive company law (CAMA) and to fill some gaps in it.  Some of the 
procedural issues it addresses include registration of companies, business names and 
incorporated trustees, compliance with notice requirements under CAMA,
126
 and the 
various forms to be used in complying with statutory requirements. The regulation 
also increased filing fees and puts in place stiffer penalties for late filing of 
documents with the Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC).
127
  It also provides for 
electronic filing of documents with the CAC.
128
 Hence, the regulation mainly covers 
procedural matters especially in relation to dealings with the CAC rather than 
substantive issues, which directly affect companies. 
 
4.5.2 Securities Laws 
In addition to CAMA, public listed companies are also governed by securities laws 
and regulations. These will be the discussed in this section 
 
                                                                                                                                                                         
<http://new.cac.gov.ng/home/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Draft-Bill-for-the-Repeal-of-CAMA-and-
Enactment-of-New-Act.pdf> accessed 19th January 2017.   
125 CAMA, ss. 16, 585 and 609. 
126 Such as notice of alteration in share capital, transfer of shares, change in directorship, change of 
name, and alteration of memorandum and articles of association. 
127 Companies Regulation 2012,  
<http://new.cac.gov.ng/home/corporate-affairs-commission-companies-regulation-2012/> 
 accessed 28th February 2015. 
128 Companies Regulation 2012, s.11. 
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4.5.2.1 The Investments and Securities Act 2007 
The Investments and Securities Act 2007 (ISA) is the law that governs the operations 
of the Capital Market in Nigeria. It establishes the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) as the apex regulator of the Nigerian capital market and provides 
for its powers and functions.
129
 It also regulates all aspects of the capital market 
including registration and regulation of capital market operators, investigation and 
monitoring of capital market operators and regulation of all sales of securities.   
One of the functions of the SEC as stated by ISA is to ‘protect the integrity of the 
securities market against all forms of abuses including insider dealings’.130  Hence 
ISA prohibits all forms of fraudulent activities in relation to securities such as 
manipulation of the securities market,
131
 dissemination of false, misleading or illegal 
information in relation to sale of securities,
132
 insider trading and abuse of 
information obtained in an official capacity by a public officer.
133
 Engaging in any of 
the proscribed activities attracts both criminal liability of either imprisonment or 
fine
134
 as well as civil penalties.  ISA further regulates all Mergers and Takeovers and 
vests in SEC the power to review, approve and regulate all mergers, acquisitions, 
takeovers and all other forms of business combinations.
135
 It also establishes an 
Investment and Securities Tribunal which has jurisdiction to hear disputes and 
determine questions of law relating to the capital market.
136
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4.5.2.2 The Nigerian Stock Exchange Listing Requirements  
Companies desiring to be listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE), in addition to 
complying with CAMA, ISA and other industry specific rules and regulations, must 
also comply with the NSE listing requirements. The NSE listing requirements 
stipulate the conditions for listing and other requirements that listed companies must 
comply with.  Companies applying for listing must be registered public companies in 
Nigeria and the securities to be listed must be registered with the Securities and 
Exchange Commission.  With regards to corporate governance, the listing 
requirements ‘encourages’ companies to comply with the SEC Code of Corporate 
Governance 2011.
137
   
4.5.3   Code of Corporate Governance in Nigeria 
Nigeria, in keeping up with international best practice, has adopted various corporate 
governance codes over the past couple of years.  The first corporate governance code 
in Nigeria was the Code of Best Practices on Corporate Governance in Nigeria 2003. 
However due to its inadequacies in dealing with the corporate governance problems 
in Nigeria, it was replaced by the Code of Corporate Governance in Nigeria 2011 
(SEC Code) which commenced on the 1
st
 of April 2011. Much recently, however, the 
Financial Reporting Council of Nigeria released the new National Code of Corporate 
Governance 2016 (NCCG).
138
 The NCCG is made up of three separate codes:  
 the code of corporate governance for the private sector (the private sector 
code)  
 the code of corporate governance for not for profit entities (NFPO code) 
                                                            
137 As will be seen below, the SEC Code of Corporate Governance 2011 has been replaced with a 
National Code of Corporate Governance.  
138 Note that the NCCG was recently suspended in January 2017 based on the directive of the Federal 
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 the code of corporate governance for the public sector.  (the public sector 
code) 
Prior to the release of the NCCG, Nigeria had a general corporate governance code as 
well as three other industry specific corporate governance codes.
139
 There was 
however a need to harmonize the various industry specific codes in light of the 
confusion occasioned by conflicting provisions in the different codes. The NCCG 
therefore redresses this problem by providing a unified corporate governance code.  
The code of corporate governance for the private sector (the private sector code) 
which recently came into operation on the 17
th
 of October 2016 is applicable to all 
public companies whether or not they are listed.
140
 This chapter will therefore focus 
on this code as it applies to public listed companies in Nigeria, which are the subject 
of concern in this thesis. The private sector code is aimed at promoting 
accountability, transparency, integrity and importantly minority shareholder and 
stakeholder protection.
141
 Compliance with the private sector code is mandatory; 
violations of the code may therefore result in both personal sanctions against the 
persons who have breached its provisions as well as sanctions against the companies 
who are involved in the violation.
142
 
 
                                                            
139 These were the Code of Corporate Governance for Banks in Nigeria Post Consolidation 2006 issued 
by the Central Bank of Nigeria and applicable to all banks operating in Nigeria; the Code of Corporate 
Governance for Licensed Pensions Operators 2008 issued by the National Pension Commission and 
applicable to all Pension Fund Administrators and Pension Fund Custodians operating in Nigeria; and 
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140 See the private sector code, s2.1. Note however that the code applies to certain private companies, 
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141 The private sector code, s1.2. 
142 The private sector code, s37. 
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4.5.3.1 Features of the Private Sector Code 
4.5.3.1.1 Board of Directors.  
The private sector code makes comprehensive provision for the composition, 
responsibilities and role of the board of directors. The main purpose of the board is to 
provide leadership to companies and ensure that management act in the best interests 
of the shareholders  and other stakeholders. The private sector code provides for the 
composition and structure of the board. The board is required to have not less than 
eight members and it ought to have a mix of both executive and non-executive 
directors. The majority of the board members are also required to be non-executive 
members; however, at least half of these non-executive members should be 
independent directors.
143
 The main purpose of having independent non-executive 
directors is to ensure the level of objectivity required to maintain investors’ trust and 
confidence in the company.
144
  Consequently, where a majority of independent non-
executive directors dissent on an issue discussed by the board, that decision can only 
be valid where at least 75% of the full board vote in favour of it.
145
  
The private sector code fills up some lacunae in the provisions of CAMA, hence it 
covers certain areas were the Act is silent or inadequate.  Thus, while CAMA does 
not explicitly set out the role of the board and the directors, the code makes provision 
for this.  It makes explicit provision for the responsibilities and duties of the board as 
a whole, as well as that of the chairman, the chief executive officer, executive 
directors, and non-executive directors.
146
  
In accordance with international corporate governance standards, the private sector 
code also requires the separation of the position of the Chairman and the Chief 
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Executive Officer.
147
 This is in order to avoid over concentration of powers in one 
individual. For better clarity of the chairman’s role in the company, the private sector 
code explicitly provides that the chairman is to be a non-executive director. He is also 
required to avoid getting involved in the company’s day-to-day operations, as this is 
the main responsibility of the chief executive officer and the management team.  It 
also particularly provides that the managing director or chief executive officer shall 
not go on to be the chairman of the same company.
148
 This provision is especially 
important in order to preserve the independence and impartiality of the chairman.  
In order to preserve the independence of the board, the private sector code requires 
that no more than two members of the same or extended family should be on the 
board of a company at the same time.
149
 Cross memberships on the boards of two or 
more companies is also particularly discouraged.
150
 The board is required to meet at 
least once every quarter and the private sector code recommends that directors be 
required to attend at least two third of those board meetings. Good attendance record 
at board meetings is therefore included as a criterion for re-nomination of directors at 
general meetings.
151
 Directors are also required to present themselves for re-election 
at regular intervals of at least every three years.
152
 In order to guide shareholders’ 
decision on re-election of directors, names and biographical details of directors 
nominated for re-election as well as their performance evaluation should be made 
available to shareholders
153
. This provision potentially serves to ensure that 
shareholders are able to make informed decisions regarding re-election of directors 
thereby protecting their interests.  
                                                            
147 Ibid s5.9.  
148 ibid s6.1.1 & 6.1.2. 
149 Ibid s5.1.2.  
150 Ibid s5.10.  
151 Ibid s7.1.  
152 Ibid s14.1.  
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4.5.3.1.2 Shareholders Protection 
Provisions protecting shareholders are also contained in the private sector code. It 
provides for shareholder meetings, which are the primary avenue for interaction 
between shareholders, management and the board. Shareholder meetings are required 
to be conducted in a manner that will allow full participation by shareholders.
154
  
Members must also be given sufficient notice of meeting (21 days) and the meetings 
when held should be at a location which is easily accessible to shareholders.
155
 The 
private sector code also provides for protection of shareholder rights and equal and 
fair treatment of all shareholders. The board is charged with the responsibility of 
ensuring that shareholders rights are protected and preserved. This particularly 
includes the right to appoint and remove directors.
156
 All shareholders are therefore 
expected to be treated equally irrespective of the size of their shareholding; they are 
also entitled to equal access to information.
157
 The private sector code also 
particularly provides that minority shareholders should be adequately protected from 
‘abusive action’ by controlling shareholders.158 In order to further protect minority 
shareholders and other external stakeholders, the private sector code prohibits insiders 
from transferring assets and profits out of the company for their personal benefit or 
for the benefit of those in control of the company.
159
  
The important role that institutional shareholders play in corporate governance is also 
recognised in the private sector code. Therefore, institutional shareholders are 
encouraged to actively participate in the companies in which they invest in order to 
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ensure good corporate governance.
160
 In particular, they are expected to demand 
compliance with the provisions of the private sector code and report incidences of 
non-compliance to the regulator.  Shareholder associations are also recognised by the 
code.  Consequently, companies are required to ensure that dealings with shareholder 
associations are transparent.
161
  
4.5.3.1.3 Other Features 
The private sector code makes clear provision on companies audit requirements 
including the role of the audit committee, internal and external audit functions.
162
 It 
also makes provision for whistleblowing. Companies are required to have a whistle 
blowing policy which should be known to employees, shareholders, other 
stakeholders and the general public. The board has the duty for implementing this 
whistle blowing policy, as well as a whistleblowing mechanism, in order to provide a 
channel for reporting illegal or unethical behaviour.
163
 The private sector code also 
prohibits insider trading. A comprehensive definition of persons who are considered 
insiders is therefore also provided by the code.
164
  
4.6 Regulatory Agencies  
Nigeria has a number of regulatory agencies that govern and monitor the activities of 
companies. Some of these apply only to companies within specific industries, and are 
therefore beyond the remit of this thesis. Two, however, apply to companies generally 
and it is on these that this section shall focus.  
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4.6.1 The Corporate Affairs Commission 
The Corporate Affairs Commission (otherwise known as the CAC) was established 
by the Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA) 1990. It was created in order to 
administer the Act and regulate the formation and management of companies. The 
CAC was appointed to replace the Companies Registry, a department within the 
Federal Ministry of Trade and Commerce which was responsible for administering 
the previous Companies’ Act of 1968.165  The need for a separate body to properly 
administer the Act arose due to the fact that the Companies registry was unable to 
effectively carry out its duties partly as a result of its lack of independence.
166
  
The CAC’s headquarters is located in the Country’s Federal Capital Territory. 
However, it is still required to have offices in all the states of the Federation.167 It 
consists of members drawn from different sectors of the commercial world and is 
headed by the chairman. Its members are as follows:  
1. The chairman 
One representative from the following associations 
2. Nigerian Association of Chamber of Commerce, Industries, Mine and Agriculture 
3. Nigerian Labour Congress 
4. Nigerian Bar Association 
5. Institute of Chartered Accountants of Nigeria 
6. Manufacturers Association of Nigeria 
7. Nigerian Association of Small Scale Industries 
8. Institute of Chartered Secretaries and Administrators 
Other members include 
                                                            
165 Corporate Affairs Commission, <http://new.cac.gov.ng/home/> accessed 26/01/15.    
166 Sofowora (n 56) 15. 
167 See CAMA, s1 (3). 
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9.   A representative of the Securities and Exchange Commission 
10.   One representative each from the following federal ministries:  
 Trade and Tourism 
 Finance and Economic Development 
 Justice 
 Industry, 
  Internal Affairs, and finally 
11.  The Registrar-General of the Commission.168  
 The members of the CAC are appointed for three years and may be reappointed for 
another term of two years. Any of the members may however be removed by the 
minister on the approval of the president.169  
4.6.1.1 Functions of the CAC 
The functions of the Commission include: 
1. The regulation and supervision of companies including its formation, registration, 
management and winding up. 
2. Conducting investigation into companies’ affairs where the interest of 
shareholders and the public requires it.  
3. Performing other functions specified by any Act or enactment.  
4. Carrying out all activities that may be required in order to give full effect to the 
provisions of the CAMA.
170
  
As we can see from No. 2 above, the CAC is responsible for investigating the affairs 
of companies. It can therefore appoint inspectors to investigate a company’s affairs 
                                                            
168 CAMA, s2. 
169 CAMA, s3(2). 
170 CAMA, s7. 
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and report on them based on the application of members holding at least one quarter 
of the issued shares. Where the company has no share capital, investigations may be 
conducted on the application of not less than one quarter of members on the 
company’s register or on the application of the company itself.171 The CAC may also 
appoint inspectors to investigate a company’s affairs and report on them based on a 
court order to do so. If the inspector appointed to investigate in this regard considers 
it necessary to investigate the affairs of the company’s subsidiary or holding company 
he is permitted to do so.172  The inspector appointed to investigate has the power to 
access all the company’s books and documents, he also has the power to examine on 
oath the officers and agents of the company both past and present. Similarly, the 
inspectors have the right to access documents relating to directors’ bank accounts 
where there is reasonable ground to believe that the account has been used for some 
illegal purpose.173 
 
4.6.2 The Securities and Exchange Commission  
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is the main regulator of Nigeria’s 
capital market and therefore plays an important role in its corporate governance.  Its 
origin can be traced back to 1962 when the Capital Issues Committee (CIC) was 
established. The CIC was established under the umbrella of the Central Bank of 
Nigeria and was responsible for examining the application of companies seeking to 
raise funds from the capital market and give recommendations for the right timing for 
those issues. It was also merely a consultative and advisory body without any 
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regulatory framework.
174
   However due to an increase in economic activities in 
Nigeria and the promulgation of the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree in 1972, 
it soon became apparent that there was a need for establishment of a formal body to 
regulate the capital market. This led to the establishment of the Capital Issues 
Commission to replace the CIC.  
In order to enable the Capital Issues Commission cope with emerging challenges and 
further develop the market, the Financial System Review Committee was set up. The 
recommendations of that Committee led to the establishment of SEC by the Securities 
and Exchange Commission decree no 71 of 1979. SEC effectively commenced 
operation on the 1
st
 of January 1980 and was granted powers to regulate the Nigerian 
Capital Market.
175
  
 SEC is led by a nine-member board which consists of the chairman, the director-
general, three full time commissioners, a representative of the federal ministry of 
finance, a representative of the CBN and two part time commissioners.
176
 Its 
headquarters are located in the Federal Capital Territory; it however has offices in 
seven other zones. It operates through four major directorates which are the office of 
the director general, operations, finance and administration, and legal and 
enforcement.
177
  
4.6.2.1 Functions of SEC 
SEC is responsible for both the regulation and the development of the Nigerian 
capital market. As far as its regulatory role is concerned, this is carried out through 
                                                            
174 Securities and Exchange Commission, Nigeria, < http://sec.gov.ng/about/what-we-do/ >   accessed 
25/08/2016. 
175 ibid.  
176 See ISA, s3 (1). 
177 Securities and Exchange Commission, Nigeria  
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making rules to guide the capital market, registration of securities and market 
intermediaries, and surveillance of the capital market to ensure early detection of 
illegal activities. It is also responsible, in this regard, for investigation of alleged 
breaches of the rules and regulations of the capital market as well as enforcement of 
breach of these rules and regulations.
178
  With regards to its enforcement function, 
SEC is responsible for ensuring that enforcement action is taken against any market 
operator who is found culpable of a breach of capital market rules. In cases where the 
breach is of a criminal nature, the case may be forwarded to the Nigerian Police 
Force, the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) or the Attorney 
General of the Federation.  In other cases, SEC may convene a meeting of the 
affected parties in order to reach a resolution.  However, where the case is more 
serious or where parties have failed to reach a resolution or failed to comply with the 
decision reached at the meeting, the erring party will be called to appear before the 
Administrative Proceedings Committee, which is a quasi-judicial court with civil 
jurisdiction. Appeals from the Administrative Proceeding Committee go to the 
Investment and Securities Tribunal.  
As noted above, the second major role of SEC is to ensure development of the capital 
market.  In order to achieve this, it encourages investor participation in the market by 
ensuring increased publicity for its activities through dissemination of information to 
the public. This is achieved through television and radio programmes to promote 
awareness, organisation of workshops and seminars, publications, town hall meetings, 
arranging quiz and essay competition in secondary schools and introduction of capital 
market studies in tertiary institutions.
179
  SEC’s website also contains relevant 
                                                            
178 Securities and Exchange Commission Nigeria, ‘What We Do’ <http://sec.gov.ng/about/what-we-
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179 Ibid. See also E.K Aigbekaen, ‘The Challenges of Establishing an Efficient Securities Settlement 
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information which can be useful for investors seeking better knowledge of the capital 
market.  
4.7 Conclusion  
On paper, Nigeria’s corporate law appears reasonably comprehensive and detailed. It 
addresses the same functions - incorporation, management, shareholder protection, 
and securities – as the comparable corporate laws of other countries such as the UK 
and Australia. It has substantive provisions addressing the central issue of agency 
costs, as well as both regulatory and governance strategies for mitigating these costs. 
In addition to this, Nigeria has two major regulatory agencies charged with 
overseeing this regulatory landscape and ensuring compliance. In spite of all this, 
however, as will be seen in next three chapters, corporate law in Nigeria is barely 
enforced. The central difficulty in Nigeria therefore rests in the disparity between the 
law and its enforcement. As discussed in the previous chapter, enforcement of 
corporate law is important for various reasons including securing the growth of equity 
markets as well as the overall financial development of a country.
180
 There is 
therefore a crucial need to ensure that corporate law is effectively enforced in Nigeria. 
Consequently, the next three chapters will examine the different enforcement regimes 
in corporate law which were identified in chapter 3.
181
  Specifically, the criminal 
enforcement regime, private civil enforcement regime and public civil enforcement 
regime will be the subject of analysis in chapters five, six, and seven respectively. 
                                                                                                                                                                         
Transforming the Nigerian Capital Markets (Ms Arunma Oteh, SEC Former Director General, SEC 
Press Briefing 2010) 5.  
180 See s3.4, chapter 3.  
181 See table 3.1, chapter 3.  
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CHAPTER 5:  CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT IN 
NIGERIA 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter discussed the Nigerian corporate landscape. It examined the 
laws and regulations governing companies in Nigeria as well as the regulatory 
agencies in charge of securing compliance with those statutory provisions. Chapter 5 
now turns to examine the first of the three enforcement categories identified in 
chapter 3.
1
 The chapter will highlight the difficulties with the use of the criminal 
enforcement regime in Nigeria and the reasons why the criminal enforcement regime 
cannot be relied on to deliver effective enforcement of corporate law. A caveat is 
necessary here. The criminal enforcement regime encompasses a wide range of 
offences. We cannot hope to examine them all here.  Instead, our focus is an 
analytical one; to analyse (and explain) why criminal proceedings are currently, and 
inevitably, unable to deliver effective enforcement of corporate law. To achieve this 
analytical purpose, this chapter will concentrate its examination to two significant 
criminal provisions, namely insider dealing and fraud. These two substantive 
provisions will be used to illustrate the inherent shortcomings in reliance on criminal 
proceedings as a means of securing effective enforcement of corporate law in Nigeria.  
The chapter starts in section 5.2 by giving a brief overview of the offences for which 
criminal sanctions are imposed on company directors in Nigeria. It then moves on in 
section 5.3 and 5.4 to examine the Nigerian context of criminal enforcement as well 
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as the different issues and challenges which affect the criminal enforcement regime 
for corporate law in Nigeria. Some of the issues identified include corruption, lack of 
judicial independence, institutional and infrastructural deficiencies as well as 
procedural difficulties. Section 5.5 focuses on examining the deterrent effect, 
compensatory benefit, and cost effectiveness of the criminal enforcement regime in 
Nigeria. It argues that the current regime lacks a deterrent effect, is unable to secure 
effective compensation for victims and is not cost effective. Section 5.6 therefore 
argues that the criminal enforcement regime cannot be relied on to deliver effective 
enforcement of corporate law in Nigeria and offers some concluding remarks.  
5.2 Overview of the Nigerian Criminal Enforcement Regime 
Nigeria, like most other countries, relies on criminal sanctions where considered 
necessary in the public interest. Although corporate law essentially belongs to private 
law and has been described by some scholars as a nexus of contracts,
2
 there are 
however instances where government intervention is needed in the public interest. 
The activities of companies can, and indeed do often, have a direct effect on 
countries’ economic stability, it therefore becomes necessary to regulate and impose 
criminal sanctions on corporate executives where necessary to preserve the country’s 
economic interest. Nigeria, in recognition of this, imposes criminal sanctions for 
certain misconducts by directors.   
Offences for which criminal sanctions may be imposed on directors in Nigeria 
include insider dealing, false trading and market rigging, securities market 
manipulation, making false or misleading statements, fraudulently inducing others to 
deal in securities, disseminating illegal information and fraudulent means. These 
                                                            
2 See E F Fama & M C Jensen ‘Separation of Ownership and Control’ (1983) 26(2) Journal of Law 
and Economics 301-325; M C Jensen and W H Meckling, ‘Theory of the Firm: Managerial 
Misbehaviour, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure’ 1976(3) Journal of Financial Economics 305-
360. 
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offences are contained in the Investments and Securities Act 2007 (ISA) and the 
penalty for breach is  a fine of not less than N500,000 or an amount equal to double 
the amount of profit made or loss averted by using the information or imprisonment 
for a term not more than seven years by imprisonment.
3
   
 More specifically, in relation to financial institutions, the Banks and other Financial 
Institutions Act Cap B3 LFN 2004(BOFIA) prohibits managers and officers of the 
bank from having any personal interest either directly or indirectly in any advance, 
loan or credit facility.  Any interest in loans or credit facilities must be declared to the 
bank.  Loans or credit facilities should also not be granted without due compliance 
with the rules and regulations of the bank neither should any manager or director 
benefit as a result of a grant of loan or credit facility by the bank.
4
 Failure to comply 
with these provisions is an offence, which is liable on conviction to a fine of N100, 
000 or imprisonment for a term of three years.  Any gain or benefit gotten as a result 
of breach will also be forfeited.
5
 
It is worth noting here that some of the offences listed above especially the ones 
contained in ISA, do not strictly belong to company law. Rather they can be regarded 
as issues which properly belong to securities laws. Persons who are outsiders in the 
company such as auditors, stockbrokers, or even government officials may commit 
these offences. It has therefore been said that these issues or offences exist only at the 
‘margin of company law’.6  In spite of this, however, it is proper to address these 
issues within the scope of this thesis as oftentimes insider dealing and other forms of 
                                                            
3 See generally ISA, part XI. See also ISA, s315. For a further discussion of Nigeria’s market abuse 
provisions see O Orojo, Company Law and Practice in Nigeria (5th edn, Lexis Nexis 2008) Ch. 25. 
4 BOFIA  2004, s18(1). 
5 BOFIA 2004, s18(2). 
6 P L Davies and S Worthington, Gower’s Principles of Modern Company Law (10th edn, Sweet & 
Maxwell 2016) 30-1. 
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market abuse are committed by directors in breach of companies laws and their duties 
to the company. The company therefore has a key interest in curbing activities of this 
sort. 
5.3 The Nigerian context  
As noted in the previous chapter, Nigeria has a comprehensive legal framework 
governing the activities of companies.
7
 While these laws regulating companies in 
Nigeria are imperfect and in need of significant review, many would agree that they 
are nevertheless sufficient to ensure a reasonable level of compliance. The 
fundamental problem with Nigeria is however not the laws themselves, rather with 
the enforcement of those laws. Any attempt to improve these laws without addressing 
this fundamental problem would therefore be an effort in futility.  
Insider dealing by company executives has long been a problem in Nigeria and is 
indeed credited to have been one of the main causes of the financial crisis and stock 
market crash that occurred between 2008 and 2009 in Nigeria.
8
 The crash resulted in 
a drastic decline of the Nigerian stock market from N12.6 trillion in March 2008 to 
N3.99 trillion in February 2009. As expected, many new investors lost practically all 
their investments.
9
 Information obtained after the stock market crash revealed that 
some directors of listed companies had engaged in large-scale insider dealing and 
                                                            
7 See generally Chapter 4 on the Nigerian Corporate Landscape. 
8 See S.L Sanusi, ‘The Nigerian Banking Industry – What Went Wrong and The Way Forward’ 
(Convocation Lecture by Mr Sanusi Lamido Sanusi, Governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria, to mark 
the annual convocation ceremony of Bayero University, Kano 26 February 2010) 
<http://www.cenbank.org/out/speeches/2010/the%20nigerian%20banking%20industry%20what%20w
ent%20wrong%20and%20the%20way%20forward_final_260210.pdf > accessed 16th October 2015. 
9 Punch Editorial Board, ‘Preventing another Capital Market Crash’ October 7 2013 
<http://www.punchng.com/editorials/preventing-another-capital-market-crash/> accessed 20th July.  
118 
 
grant of unprotected loans to family members and friends.
10
 In spite of the 
devastating effects of the crash, there are suggestions that insider dealing still occurs 
in Nigeria although, until date, there has been no record of any conviction for insider 
dealing.
11
 
Similarly, over the years there have been various allegations of fraud and gross 
misconduct against company directors in Nigeria. However, few of these cases have 
ever been prosecuted.  A well-publicised instance of fraud and financial manipulation 
by a company director in Nigeria was the case of Cadbury Nigeria Plc.  In June 2006, 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) upon receipt of Cadbury’s annual 
report and accounts expressed concerns on issues in the report such as declining 
profitability, worsening leverage ratio, deteriorating cash flow, inadequate disclosure, 
non-compliance with corporate governance code and obtaining loans to pay 
shareholder dividends contrary to SEC regulations.   Subsequently the company’s 
chairman engaged the services of an independent firm (PWC) to investigate the 
allegations.  SEC also constituted a committee to investigate the issue, which 
confirmed misstatements in Cadbury’s account worth approximately N13 Billion.12 
Investigations revealed that the company’s CEO - Mr Bunmi Oni - in collaboration 
with the company’s board had since 2002 manipulated the financial reports that were 
being issued to the public and filed with SEC using ‘stock buyback, cost deferrals, 
                                                            
10 See T Salako, ‘Shareholders still Licking the Wounds of Meltdown’ May 18 2015 
<http://thenationonlineng.net/shareholders-still-licking-the-wounds-of-meltdown/> accessed 20th July 
2015. 
11 A Garba, ‘Impediments to Effective Enforcement of Insider Trading Regulations in Nigeria’ (2013) 
3(1) International Journal of Management 13, 17.  
12 See T Osundolire, ‘SEC blacklists Oni, Akadiri over Cadbury’s doctored account’, 10th April 2008 
<http://www.thenationonlineng.net/archive2/tblnews_Detail.php?id=48570> accessed 3rd July 2015.  
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trade loading and false suppliers’ stock certificates’.13  Cadbury Nigeria Plc also had 
an offshore account into which offshore remuneration was paid to directors which 
was not recorded at all in the company’s books. These payments were also made 
without the approval of the remuneration committee.
14
 As a result of this, a fine of 
N13.88 million was imposed on Cadbury for falsifying its accounts.
15
 The CEO 
(Bunmi Oni) and the finance director (Ayo Akadiri) were banned from operating in 
the Nigeria Capital market, being employed in the financial services sector and 
holding any directorship positions in any public company in the country. Other 
directors and management staff involved in the fraud were also suspended from 
operating in the Nigerian capital market, being employed in the financial services 
sector and holding directorship in any public company in Nigeria for a varying 
number of years.  The offending CEO and other erring directors and managers were 
then referred to Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) for further 
investigation and prosecution.
16
  However to date there is no evidence that the 
offenders were ever prosecuted by the EFCC.  
In addition to this, there have been various other publicized allegations of fraudulent 
conduct against directors, particularly in the banking industry. In 2009, the Central 
Bank of Nigeria’s (CBN) audit of Nigerian banks revealed large-scale fraud 
perpetrated by several bank executives in their various roles. The audit revealed poor 
corporate governance at banks coupled with fraud and ‘unserviced’ loans worth 
                                                            
13 Reuters, ‘Nigeria Fines Cadbury Unit for False Accounting’, 11th April 2008 
<http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/04/11/cadbury-nigeria-sec-idUSL1181158820080411> accessed 
3rd July 2015. 
14 S.C Okafor, G.O Okafor and G Ofoegbu, ‘Corporate Fraud in Nigeria: A Two Case Study’ (2013) 
6(3) International Journal of Research in Management Issue 9, 14. 
15 The Cadbury Nig. Plc fraud and false financial reporting saga caused its stock price to crash 
drastically from an all-time high of N65.52 in December 2005 to N8.65 by October 2009. See Okafor, 
Okafor & Ofoegbu (n 14) 12. 
16 Osundolire, (n 12). 
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billions of naira.  Insider abuse was also rife at several banks and many CEOs had 
established special purpose vehicles to lend money to themselves in order to enable 
them manipulate stock prices and purchase properties all over the world.
17
  Several 
governance malpractices went unchecked in banks for example one bank borrowed 
money to purchase private jets, which were registered in the CEO’s son’s name. 
Another bank set up fake companies to enable perpetration of fraud.
18
 The sheer 
enormity of the fraud perpetrated by these directors left everyone highly dismayed. 
In order to save the banking system from collapse, the Central Bank of Nigeria 
(CBN) had to take over five banks and injected N620 billion into the banking system. 
The resulting banking crisis had devastating effects on the Nigerian capital market 
which led to a loss of over N7 trillion worth of share values.
19
  Consequently, the 
executive officers of eight banks in Nigeria were sacked by the CBN, five of which 
were arraigned before the court by the EFCC for various offences ranging from 
outright fraud, market manipulation, concealment and grant of credit facilities 
without adequate security. In spite of this however, the manner in which this high 
profile criminal cases have been prosecuted have shown the deficiencies within the 
criminal enforcement system in Nigeria. In light of this, the next section would 
examine some of the issues and challenges which beset the effective use of criminal 
sanctions in enforcing corporate law. 
 
                                                            
17 S.L Sanusi (n 8) 5. 
18 ibid 5. 
19 Editorial Board Punch newspaper, ‘Tighten Laws on Bank Fraud’ 31st May 2013   
<http://www.punchng.com/editorials/tighten-laws-on-bank-frauds/ > accessed 20th July 2015. 
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5.4   Issues and Challenges besetting Criminal Enforcement in Nigeria 
As noted above, the Nigerian criminal enforcement regime is lacking in certain 
respects, it is therefore worth considering some of these issues which prevents 
effective use of the criminal enforcement regime.  
5.4.1 Corruption and Lack of Judicial Independence 
According to Transparency International, corruption is defined as the ‘abuse of 
entrusted power for private gain. It can be classified as grand, petty and political, 
depending on the amounts of money lost and the sector where it occurs’.20 The World 
Bank also defines corruption as ‘the abuse of public office for private gain’.21 
Corruption is a major problem for many developing nations of the world and Nigeria 
is no exception to this. Corruption in Nigeria has a long history and has been in 
existence even before the country’s independence in 1960. The successive military 
regimes further institutionalised corruption in Nigeria causing it to eat deep into its 
moral fabric.
22
 It is generally believed that corruption pervades every sector of the 
Nigerian society and is widely considered to be the bane of its development.
23
 It has 
also seriously affected the country’s image thereby adversely affecting its ability to 
attract much needed foreign investment.
24
 In the 2014 corruption perception index by 
Transparency International, Nigeria was ranked 136 out of 174 countries; it also 
                                                            
20 Transparency International, ‘What is Corruption’ <http://www.transparency.org/what-is-
corruption/> accessed 20th October 2015. 
21 World Bank, ‘Helping Countries Combat Corruption: The Role of the World Bank’ Sept 1997 
<http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/anticorrupt/corruptn/coridx.htm> accessed 20th October 
2015. 
22 A.Y.Shehu, ‘Combating Corruption in Nigeria- Bliss or Blister?’ (2004) 12(1) Journal of Financial 
Crime 69, 70. 
23 N.A Goodling, ‘Nigeria’s Crisis of Corruption-Can the U.N Global Programme Hope to Resolve this 
Dilemma’ (2003) (36) Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 997.  
24 A Nwabuzor, ‘Corruption and Development: New Initiatives in Economic Openness and 
Strengthened Rule of Law’ (2005) 59(1) Journal of Business Ethics 121,123. 
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scored 27 points out of 100.
25
  This shows that corruption remains a major problem in 
Nigeria. While the country has over the years attempted to tackle this scourge of 
corruption,
26
 the general perception is that these initiatives have been relatively 
unsuccessful in curtailing corruption in Nigeria. Several factors are responsible for 
the pervading corruption in Nigeria; however, those seeking to explain the causes of 
corruption in developing nations have often pointed their fingers at the large scale 
poverty in those nations.
27
 However while poverty may explain what may be 
described as ‘petty corruption’, corruption on a low scale by low level government 
officials, it does not explain the more serious incidents of corruption perpetuated by 
top government officials such as judges.
28
  
An independent, fair and efficient judiciary is considered a key aspect of any 
country’s rule of law and the courts are expected to be the last hope of aggrieved 
persons for getting justice. It is however generally believed that the incidents of 
corruption in Nigeria extends to judges as well.
29
 In a country where ostentatious 
display of wealth earns one respect in the society, it appears that some judges have 
traded their integrity and honour for amassment of wealth.  Therefore, those who can 
pay or potentially influence a judge’s career may be able to dictate the outcome of the 
                                                            
25 Transparency International, ‘Corruption Perceptions Index 2014: Results’  
<http://www.transparency.org/cpi2014/results>   accessed 26th August 2016.  
26 Some of the past initiatives to combat corruption in Nigeria include the War Against Indiscipline 
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court’s decision.30 Although judicial corruption exists in many countries of the world, 
in Nigeria, it has been described by one commentator as a ‘full-blown national 
plague’ and a common feature of the Nigerian judicial system.31  Similarly, Adeleke 
and Olayanju opine that ‘corruption is a virus that does not spare any level in the 
judiciary. From the lowest court to all the courts of record, cases or instances of 
corruption are legion’.32 It is suggested that many judges in Nigeria adopt the attitude 
of other public officials in Nigeria who use their public position as an opportunity to 
acquire wealth. As Oko noted that ‘judicial corruption - abuse of judicial power for 
private gain - is no longer an aberration or isolated conduct. It is disturbingly a 
dominant and recurrent feature of the Nigerian judicial system’.33  
Over the years, there have been various allegations of corruption in the Nigerian 
judiciary commonly played out on the pages of Nigerian newspapers.  In 2013, two 
High Court judges were suspended and recommended for retirement by the National 
Judicial Council for misconduct bordering on corruption.
34
 Again, in 2013, the 
Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) revealed that it had uncovered 
illicit funds in the accounts of some judges running into hundreds of millions as well 
as multimillion assets.
35
 The former president of the Court of Appeal, Justice Isa Ayo 
Salami, also noted that ‘The problem of corruption in the judiciary is real and has 
                                                            
30 ibid 15. 
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33 Oko (n 29) 25. 
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eaten deep into the system…’36 He further suggested that some judges (current and 
retired) act as middlemen by collecting money from litigants and using it to bribe the 
presiding judge or intimidate judges to alter the course of justice.
37
  In 2015, the Chief 
Justice of Nigeria revealed that in the past five years, 64 out of the 1020 superior 
court judges have been sanctioned for corruption.
38
 More recently, a raid carried out 
by the Department of State Services (DSS) revealed that the sum of $800,000 
(£645,200) in cash was found in the homes of certain senior judges who had been 
suspected of corruption. The DSS revealed that the raid was considered necessary due 
to the luxurious lifestyle of certain judges as well as complaints received from 
members of the public over judgements procured fraudulently.
39
 While it would 
clearly be an exaggeration to indict all judges in Nigeria for corruption, it seems 
plausible to conclude that corruption remains a problem in the Nigerian judiciary 
particularly with regards to high profile cases.  
Closely related to the issue of corruption in the Nigerian judiciary is the problem of 
the lack of judicial independence which leaves judges vulnerable to political 
influences. Corruption in the Nigerian judiciary has been blamed on several factors 
which primarily include the influence of politicians, businessmen and monarchs.
40
  
The United Nations basic principles on the independence of judiciary states that ‘The 
judiciary shall decide matters before them impartially, on the basis of facts and in 
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37 Ibid. 
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accordance with the law, without any restrictions, improper influences, inducements, 
pressures, threats or interferences, direct or indirect, from any quarter or for any 
reason’.41   The judiciary therefore ought to be an independent arm of government 
free from any form of external pressure. This is however not the case in Nigeria as the 
judiciary receives a crucial part of its funding from the executive arm of government. 
The appointment of judges is also done by the president - or governor of the state- 
based on the recommendation of the National Judicial Council, subject to the 
approval of the legislature.
42
  Judges are therefore subject to pressure from the 
executive arm of government. In a measure of country’s judicial independence by the 
World Economic Forum in its Global Competitiveness Report 2014-2015, Nigeria 
was ranked 102 out of 144 countries and scored 3.1 out of 7 points.
43
 This data shows 
that the Nigerian judiciary cannot be considered to be fully independent and free from 
external influence. The U.S Department of State also noted this problem and stated 
that ‘Although the constitution and law provide for an independent judiciary, the 
judicial branch remained susceptible to pressure from the executive and legislative 
branches and the business sector. Political leaders influenced the judiciary, 
particularly at the state and local levels…’44   
The likelihood of political influence is greater in high profile cases and although this 
is more prevalent with cases involving political office holders, it nevertheless occurs 
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in commercial cases as well. Company executives of large companies often have 
good connections with political office holders. They therefore enjoy political good 
will which means that attempts to prosecute them may end up being frustrated as the 
outcome of those cases can be influenced by their political godfathers. This has led to 
suggestions among the Nigerian populace that the few directors who have been 
prosecuted for their wrongdoings merely fell on the wrong side of their godfathers 
otherwise, they would not have been prosecuted. An example of the political 
goodwill that company executives enjoy is seen in the grant of a state pardon by the 
former president Goodluck Jonathan to Muhammed Bulama, the former CEO of the 
defunct Bank of the North, who had been jailed for stealing from the bank and abuse 
of office.
45
  One wonders why a state pardon was granted in this case and it can be 
suggested that the convicted former CEO simply had the right political connections to 
enable him be let off even after committing fraud in the course of his executive 
position.  
At its most basic level, widespread corruption erodes the public’s confidence in the 
country’s justice system. This lack of confidence means that incidences of 
wrongdoings are less likely to be reported given the general belief that justice is 
unlikely to be done. Similarly, investigators and prosecutors may have less incentive 
to carry out proper investigations, institute criminal proceedings and prepare 
diligently for the trial due to the perception that all the efforts made would be futile if 
the presiding judge is corrupt. Judicial corruption therefore has a ripple effect which 
affects not just judges but also all other parties involved in the enforcement process. 
The criminal enforcement regime relies on a well-functioning and independent 
judiciary. Therefore, where the judiciary is corrupt and lacks independence it has a 
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knock-on effect on criminal enforcement as it significantly reduces the likelihood that 
offenders would be detected and successfully prosecuted.  
5.4.2   Institutional Defects in the Nigerian Judicial System 
Beyond the problems of judicial corruption and the lack of judicial independence, 
addressed above, the Nigerian judicial system also faces a range of other, what we 
might call, ‘institutional problems’ which impact on its ability to administer justice 
and enforce laws effectively. One of the major institutional problems is the endemic 
delay which plagues trials in Nigerian courts. Although the Nigerian constitution 
provides for fair and speedy trials,
46
 speedy trials are incredibly rare in Nigeria and 
cases are hardly treated with any sense of urgency. Delay therefore represents one of 
the major problems plaguing enforcement through the court system in Nigeria. Oko’s 
research shows that an average trial at a court of superior record in Nigeria can take 
as long as 5 to 6 years, with another 3 to 4 years spent on appeal proceedings.
47
  
Criminal trials of accused persons are also often adjourned for varying reasons.  
Some accused persons may not be brought to court or may be brought late to court 
due to reasons such as the lack of an available vehicle to convey the accused persons 
to court.
48
 
Frynas’ empirical research likewise revealed delay in the disposal of cases to be one 
of the factors affecting access to courts in Nigeria. He noted that 
Delay in the disposal of cases is perceived as the fourth most 
important problem of access to courts in Nigeria. This appears to be 
due primarily to the congestion in the courts, which manifests itself 
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through the high number of pending cases. Cases in Nigerian courts 
including appeals may take over 10 years before reaching a final 
verdict. Sometimes the original litigants will have died by the time 
the judgement is made.
49
 
This delay in disposal of cases coupled with the uncertainties about the outcome of 
the case has the potential to discourage prosecutors from instituting criminal 
proceedings against directors. Delay in the Nigerian judicial system is attributable to 
different sources. Some delay can be attributed to the lack of necessary infrastructure 
while others are due to the ineptitude of the lawyers and perhaps the enforcement 
agencies. Incessant strike actions by the Nigerian judiciary due to the failure of the 
government to meet its demands further compounds this problem. In January 2015, 
the Judiciary Staff Union of Nigeria commenced on an indefinite nationwide strike 
which involved all the courts in the country.  The strike was due to the failure of the 
government to implement the orders of a Federal High Court granting financial 
autonomy to the judiciary.
50
 The strike went on for several months in many states of 
the country and four months into the strike, fifteen out of the thirty-six states in 
Nigeria had failed to reach an agreement and were still on strike.
51
  Many states did 
not suspend the strike action until June 2015,
52
 thereby effectively paralysing the 
state’s judicial system for about six months. These institutional problems with the 
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Nigerian judiciary which result in delays in disposal of cases affect administration of 
justice, and potentially discourage the use of the court system in enforcement of 
corporate law.  
5.4.3 Infrastructural problems  
 Another problem with the Nigerian judicial system is the lack of necessary 
infrastructure for quick and efficient dispensation of justice. Infrastructural 
deficiencies such as dilapidated court rooms, outdated technological equipment (such 
as the use of typewriters in some courts) and lack of research facilities all hinder the 
speedy administration of justice. One can hardly expect judges to work effectively 
and at a fast pace when they lack the necessary facilities to do so.
53
 Judges in some 
states in Nigeria still have to record court proceedings and their subsequent 
judgement in long hand and many court libraries are outdated.  The absence of jury 
trials in Nigeria means that judges have to determine both issues of fact and issues of 
law during proceedings. This task is however inherently difficult due to the lack of 
stenographers. Hence, a Nigerian judge has to record all the evidence adduced in long 
hand while still trying to deduce the true facts from the attitude of the parties.
54
  It is 
therefore not surprising that trials in Nigerian courts take such a long time. 
Infrastructural deficiencies in the courts hinder speedy and consequently fair trial in 
Nigeria and the absence of modern facilities provides an enabling environment for 
corrupt practices to thrive.  Many Nigerian courts are not equipped with modern 
technological facilities. Consequently, they cannot make use of audio or visual 
presentations or power point slides which will be useful in fully understanding the 
case and reaching a suitable conclusion. This would be especially useful in criminal 
proceedings against directors who may have committed the crime using sophisticated 
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means, which would require expert evidence and other forms of visual presentation to 
ease the judge’s understanding. The inability to present the required technical 
evidence due to the lack of necessary infrastructure means that the prosecution who is 
expected to discharge the requisite burden of proof is already placed at a 
disadvantage.
55
 Other issues such as the irregular power supply means that court 
proceedings may be interrupted or even suspended due to lack of power supply. 
Repeated adjournments are therefore a norm in Nigerian courts and lawyers 
sometimes prey on this in order to lengthen trials and perhaps frustrate the opposing 
parties.  
A study conducted by the Human Rights Watch highlighted the problems plaguing 
the Nigerian judicial system. It noted that  
Court facilities are hopelessly overcrowded, badly equipped, and 
underfunded. Interpreters may be non-existent or badly trained. 
Court libraries are inadequate. There are no computers, photocopiers, 
or other modern equipment; and judges may even have to supply 
their own paper and pens to record their judgments in 
longhand…There are long delays in bringing both criminal and civil 
cases to court… Corruption is a pervasive feature of court cases, 
whether criminal or civil.
56
 
While the state of affairs in the Nigerian judiciary has definitely improved in the 
years since this human rights watch report was published, it can be said that some of 
the problems highlighted here still plague several courts around the country. The U.S 
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Department of State more recently noted the problems facing the Nigerian Judiciary 
in the following words  
…Understaffing, underfunding, inefficiency, and corruption 
prevented the judiciary from functioning adequately. Judges 
frequently failed to appear for trials, often because they were 
pursuing other sources of income or due at times to threats against 
them. In addition, court officials often lacked the proper equipment, 
training, and motivation to perform their duties, with their lack of 
motivation primarily due to inadequate compensation. 
There was a widespread perception that judges were easily bribed 
and that litigants could not rely on the courts to render impartial 
judgments. Citizens encountered long delays and alleged receiving 
requests from judicial officials for bribes to expedite cases or obtain 
favorable rulings.
57
 
The Nigerian court system is therefore plagued with several difficulties which hinder 
enforcement through the court system. The judiciary is not adequately funded and as 
such, it cannot effectively carry out its job of administering justice. Speedy and 
impartial trials cannot occur in the absence of an enabling environment. In the 
absence of relevant infrastructure such as conducive court rooms, regular power 
supply, well stocked and up to date libraries and  provision of IT equipment such as 
computers, audio and visual aids,
58
 the Nigerian courts may continue to fall short of 
its duties to enforce laws. This is especially so with the trial of economic crimes 
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which are inherently difficult to follow and interpret and as such require 
technological assistance to ease understanding. 
5.4.4   Ineffective or Lax Prosecution  
The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) is the financial intelligence 
unit in Nigeria charged with investigation and enforcement of all economic and 
financial crimes. It has power to prevent, investigate and prosecute economic and 
financial crimes.
59
  The prosecution of company directors who have engaged in fraud, 
market abuse or other forms of financial malpractice is therefore within its power. 
This government agency has however been unable to, in most cases, successfully 
prosecute offences by company directors. The EFCC was responsible for the 
prosecution of the bank executives, mentioned earlier, who were indicted for various 
misconducts. It however was largely unsuccessful as many of the cases were 
dismissed based on technicalities which the prosecutors ought to have been aware of. 
An example of this is the case of the former Managing Director of the defunct Bank 
PHB, Francis Atuche who was charged with stealing N25.7 Billion meant for the 
bank’s shareholders.  The EFCC instituted a twenty-seven count charge which 
included stealing and conspiracy against Francis Atuche, his wife and the bank’s 
chief financial officer. The accused persons were however discharged and the case 
struck out after the judge ruled that the EFCC failed to prove that the case falls within 
the jurisdiction of the State High Court.
60
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 A similar case was instituted by the EFCC against Okey Nwosu, the former 
Managing Director of Finbank Plc, for several crimes including grant of reckless 
loans worth over N9.3 billion, securities market manipulation, insider abuse, 
economic crimes and money laundering. The case was however struck out by the 
appellate court in November 2014 on the grounds that matters arising out of the 
capital market are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal High Court. In the 
same vein. Erastus Akingbola, the former Managing Director of Intercontinental bank 
was prosecuted on a twenty-two count charge which included money laundering, 
market manipulation, and conspiracy to grant unsecured credit facilities. Seven other 
non-executive directors and members of the board of directors were also arraigned on 
an eighteen-count charge for conspiring with Akingbola to grant loans without 
security worth over N36 billion to companies in which they were directors. They 
were also accused of taking $10,000 as holiday allowances contrary to the CBN code 
of conduct for banks.
61
 In December 2014, the Court of Appeal however struck out 
the charge against Erastus Akingbola on the ground that the subject matter of the 
alleged offences was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal High Court and 
not the Lagos State High Court in which it had been instituted.
62
 
 In light of all these, some commentators have accused the judiciary of frustrating the 
war against corruption. It has been argued that the judiciary ought to be more 
concerned with substantial justice rather than allowing legal technicalities to pervert 
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the cause of justice.
63
 However, compliance with legal technicalities and procedural 
rules such as rules on jurisdiction and acceptable evidence are essential to ensure that 
justice is not only done, but also seen to have been done.
64
 It therefore behoves the 
prosecution to ensure that it does its due diligence in adhering to all the required rules 
of criminal trials.  
A skilled prosecutor is expected to have good technical knowledge of the law and 
should therefore know which court has the jurisdiction to try its cases. It is therefore 
surprising that the EFCC prosecutors instituted criminal proceedings in courts that 
lacked the requisite jurisdiction to try the case.  It may also be argued that there has 
also been some lack of diligence in the manner in which the EFCC conducts its 
prosecutions thereby contributing to the delay in the disposal of cases. During the 
trial of Sebastian Adigwe, one of the five indicted bank executives, the judge 
expressed disappointment over the manner in which the trial was being handled by 
the EFCC.  It was reported that the EFCC on one occasion failed to produce its 
witness thereby forcing the court to adjourn proceedings. At the adjourned date, the 
trial was again stalled due to the fact that the name of the prosecution’s witness who 
was being called to testify was not included in the witnesses list served on the 
defendant’s counsel.65 One would expect that the EFCC being a specialist agency in 
charge of financial and economic crimes would be more diligent in its prosecution, 
this however does not appear to be the case. It is also common in Nigeria for 
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prosecutors to file charges which are clearly unrelated to the available evidence or to 
have a misjoinder of offences and offenders.
66
  
In the absence of prosecutors who have good knowledge of the law and are well 
skilled and diligent in prosecuting economic crimes, cases that have reasonable 
substance would be easily dismissed by the court on the basis of legal technicalities 
or lack of diligent prosecution. Where there is very little likelihood of successful 
prosecution for misconducts by company directors, the law prescribing criminal 
sanctions is made of no effect in deterring offenders thereby defeating its very 
purpose.  
5.4.5   General Procedural Difficulties with Criminal Sanctions 
Due to the punitive nature of criminal sanctions, the law often requires standards 
which are higher than required for civil trials. Criminal procedure laws, evidence laws 
and even human rights laws therefore imposes different checks on criminal trials.
67
 
One major example of the distinction between criminal trials and civil trials in this 
regard is the burden and standard of proof required. The ‘burden of proof’ is used to 
refer to the duty which rests on a party to establish a case or establish the facts in a 
specific issue while the ‘standard of proof’ refers to the ‘degree to which the proof 
must be established’.68 The burden of proof in any proceedings rests on the person 
who would fail if no evidence were adduced by either side.
69
 In criminal cases, the 
general rule is that the prosecution bears the burden of proving the defendant’s 
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guilt.
70
 Hence, in a criminal prosecution for fraud, insider dealing or other forms of 
market abuse, the prosecutor has the burden of proving that the defendant carried out 
the act in question with the intention of committing the offence or that he committed 
the said act recklessly or negligently.
71
 
 In addition to proving the necessary facts, the prosecution is also required to prove 
its case beyond reasonable doubt.
72
 Reaching this required standard of proof is 
however often very difficult when prosecuting offences in corporate law as some of 
the breaches may have gone undetected for several years. Adducing the required 
evidence may therefore require dealing with piles of documents, examination of 
different corporate and personal bank accounts and may necessitate the testimony of 
several witnesses who may be unavailable or even reluctant to testify.
73
 The high 
standard of proof required also means that several factors can easily lead to a 
dismissal or acquittal in such cases. Issues such as failure to prove intention, 
unreliable witnesses, difficulty in obtaining expert evidence, inconsistencies in expert 
witness, lack of jurisdiction and other technicalities may be fatal to the prosecution’s 
case.  
In recognition of the difficulties in using criminal laws to enforce economic crimes, 
Rider argues that the criminal law has not proven itself to be an efficient means of 
battling economic crimes due to different technical, practical, procedural and 
institutional reasons.
74
 He argues that criminal law requires a very high burden of 
proof, is generally slow, excessively procedural, highly restrictive in terms of 
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acceptable evidence and very inflexible. Consequently, only few jurisdictions have 
been successful in relying mainly on criminal sanctions in regulating financial 
markets. He noted that even the Royal Commission sitting under Lord Penzance in 
1878 recognised the fact that the criminal law is ‘inflexible and slow’.75 In addition to 
this, the current global economy has far reaching effects on detection, investigation 
and prosecution of misconducts in the financial market due to the fact that  some 
witnesses and necessary evidence may be out of reach or incredibly expensive to 
obtain.
76
   
Insider dealing has proven to be especially difficult to prosecute in many countries. In 
a survey by Olayiwola, on the effectiveness of insider dealing regulation, 85% of the 
respondents noted that while insider dealing is prohibited in Nigeria, compliance and 
enforcement is ‘inconsistent’.77  Even in the UK, experience has shown that it is 
difficult to obtain a conviction for the offence of insider dealing due to difficulties in 
detecting the offence coupled with the standard of evidence and proof required in 
criminal trials.
78
 Successful criminal prosecution of insider dealing is therefore often 
a herculean task for many prosecutors. As noted by Linda Thomsen, former director 
of the enforcement division at the US Securities and Exchange Commission ‘it is 
important to understand how difficult it is to build an insider trading case. They are, 
unquestionably, amongst the most difficult cases we are called upon to prove, and 
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despite careful and time-consuming investigations, we may not be able to establish all 
of the facts necessary to support an insider dealing charge.’79   
In light of this, Tomasic and Pentony in their analysis of the obstacles to the use of 
criminal law to enforce insider dealing noted that the problems with proving insider 
dealing make regulatory authorities reluctant to prosecute insider dealing cases.
80
 
Offences such as insider dealing and market abuse often involve certain technicalities 
which make them increasingly complex to prosecute. Defendants in such cases also 
typically have good access to legal and expert advice which can have the effect of 
protracting and unduly complicating prosecution of such crimes.
81
 The complexity of 
such crimes therefore means that they are often dismissed for lack of evidence.
82
  
The law of evidence in several respects also applies differently to criminal 
proceedings and civil proceedings. Criminal proceedings are generally guided by 
certain legal rules and conducted in specific legal language. Hence, rules regarding 
presumption of innocence, the accused’s character, hearsay rule, confessions, and 
privilege against self-incrimination all form an important part of criminal 
proceedings
83
 and may make criminal convictions more difficult to secure. The court 
may therefore be asked to disregard relevant incriminating evidence about the 
defendant when it does not conform to the rules of evidence. The legal arguments, 
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evidence and witness testimony must also comply with the rules of evidence.
84
 
Failure to comply with any of the technicalities associated with criminal trials may 
potentially lead to a dismissal of the case. Directors who are the subject of criminal 
prosecution are also likely to be able to spend more resources in hiring well skilled 
lawyers who can dispute the prosecution’s evidence and devise different strategies to 
defeat the prosecution’s case.85 There are therefore general procedural difficulties 
with successfully securing a criminal conviction and these difficulties are no less 
acute in criminal proceedings for breach of directors’ duty or other requirements.  
5.4.6 Mens Rea Requirement for Criminal Convictions  
The Mens Rea requirement for criminal convictions represents another difficulty with 
using criminal sanctions to enforce corporate law. It is an important principle of 
criminal law that a person cannot be convicted of a crime unless the prosecution has 
proven beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant acted in a certain way which is 
contrary to criminal law and that the defendant had a ‘defined state of mind’ in regard 
to the proscribed activity.
86
 The action or behaviour of the defendant is called the 
Actus Reus while the state of mind is referred to as Mens Rea. The principle of Mens 
Rea requires that defendants can only be held criminally liable for offences which 
they intentionally committed. The basis of this principle is that criminal liability 
should only be imposed on persons who are well aware of their actions and its 
possible consequences and can therefore be said to have chosen this course of action 
and its consequences.
87
 This is based on the principle that human beings are 
autonomous persons with the capacity to choose between different courses of action. 
                                                            
84 Croall, ‘White Collar Crimes’ (n 73) 95. 
85 See further ibid 96. 
86 D Ormerod, Smith and Hogan’s Criminal Law (14th edn, OUP 2015) 50. 
87 A Ashworth and J Horder, Principles of Criminal Law (7th edn, OUP 2013) 155. 
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As such, they should be held liable for whatever actions they take.
88
 There are 
different forms of Mens Rea which form some sort of hierarchy. At the very top is 
intention followed by recklessness, belief and suspicion.
89
  
In order for a director to be successfully prosecuted and convicted for fraud, insider 
dealing or other misconduct under ISA, it must be shown that there was some form of 
guilty mind. This is a common theme which runs through the securities offences 
proscribed under ISA.
90
 Therefore, in order to secure a conviction for insider dealing, 
it needs to be shown that the defendant traded in the securities with knowledge that 
the information was ‘unpublished price sensitive information’.91 The implication of 
this is that the prosecutor in a criminal charge for insider dealing needs to prove 
beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant knew that the information in his 
possession was unpublished price sensitive information and he traded based on this 
knowledge. In this instance, expert witness would usually be required to prove that 
the information traded in was price sensitive information. This expert witness may 
however be difficult to obtain and where gotten, the evidence given may become too 
technical for the judge to follow and fully understand.
92
  
Similarly, it is a defence to an offence of false trading that the trade was done without 
the intent or purpose of creating a false or misleading appearance of trading.
93
 Hence, 
it needs to be shown that there was an intent to create a false appearance of trading in 
order to be found guilty of this offence. A person is also not liable for making false or 
                                                            
88 ibid 155. 
89 Ormerod (n 86) 116. 
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negligence. See generally part XI ISA. 
91 See ISA, s111.  
92 FSA, ‘Insider Dealing in the City’ (speech by Margaret Cole, director of enforcement, FSA, London 
school of economics) <http://www.fsa.gov.uk/library/communication/speeches/2007/0317_mc.shtml> 
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misleading statements unless it is shown that the person ‘knowingly, recklessly or 
negligently’ made or disseminated the false information.94 In the same vein, the 
offence of market manipulation also requires some evidence of ‘intent’. Hence, the 
defendant needs to have carried out the said transaction with an intent to induce 
others to trade in the securities of the company.
95
 
As noted earlier the burden of proving facts necessary for conviction in a criminal 
trial rests on the prosecution. The prosecutor is therefore faced with the difficult task 
of proving that the defendant had the intention of committing the said offences. 
Establishing intention in securities offences without any documentary evidence such 
as emails or other overt evidence could however prove to be enormously difficult for 
the prosecutor. The job of the prosecutor in proving a guilty mind in this regard 
therefore becomes a herculean one. While negligence and recklessness may be 
relatively easy to prove, the same cannot be said with proof of intention or 
knowledge. Hence, the difficulty with successfully prosecuting insider dealing lies in 
proving that the person had knowledge that the information in his possession was 
inside information and consequently traded on the basis of that knowledge.  A person 
cannot be convicted of insider dealing unless there is evidence that he knew that the 
information in his possession was inside information. 
96
 The defendant may however 
easily claim that the timing of his trading was merely coincidental and not as a result 
of inside information. Hence, in the English case of R v Holyoak, Hill and Morl,
97
 the 
prosecution could not establish that the defendants had knowledge that the 
information they held was price sensitive information when they dealt in the shares of 
a takeover target just seven minutes before the takeover deal was announced.  This is 
                                                            
94 ISA, s107. 
95 See ISA, s106. 
96 FSA (n 92).  
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usually the case with prosecuting offences of this nature as the prosecution would 
usually have no direct evidence that a person had inside information and was aware 
of the nature of the information.
98
  Imputing knowledge to an accused person is very 
difficult in the absence of an admission by the accused person and even very strong 
circumstantial evidence would often be insufficient to prove guilt beyond reasonable 
doubt in such circumstances.  
5.4.7 Difficulties with Detection and Investigation of Offences 
Another problem militating against enforcement of corporate law using criminal 
sanctions is the difficulty with detecting and investigating such offences.  A regime of 
criminal sanctions for insider dealing or any form of fraud or market abuse can only 
be truly effective where there is an efficient system for detecting and investigating 
suspected cases.
99
  Such offences however belong to the category of white collar 
crimes which are generally difficult to detect as they are usually carried out using 
complicated transactions which can only be detected by staff skilled in that area.
100
 
This is perhaps why insider dealing and market abuse is rarely detected in Nigeria 
even though it occurs on a regular basis and is credited to have been one of the main 
causes of the stock market crash.  
White collar crimes are generally unreported due to the inability of its victims to 
detect that an offence has been committed.
101
  This is especially true of misconducts 
committed by directors of companies in the course of their duty. This is particularly 
due to the information asymmetry existing in large public companies which makes it 
difficult for shareholders to have access to full information on issues regarding the 
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company. Directors are generally aware of their wrongdoing and the harm caused by 
it while shareholders often do not have access to this information.
102
  Hence, 
shareholders are often unaware that an offence which is liable to criminal sanctions 
have been committed. Although the board of directors are likely to know when a 
director has acted in a way that is liable to criminal prosecution, they are unlikely to 
take any step that may lead to criminal prosecution of a fellow director. This is 
because the board of directors are a group and are subject to ‘group dynamics’.103   
Another category of persons who may have information about criminal misconduct 
by directors are the employees of the company. These category of persons are 
however also unlikely to report the wrongful conduct for fear of losing their jobs. 
This is especially so in a country like Nigeria which lacks proper laws to protect 
whistle-blowers from victimization or makes provision to compensate them.
104
 With 
the harsh economic climate in Nigeria and the high level of unemployment, it is 
unlikely that incidences of fraud or other criminal practice will be reported by 
employees who have knowledge of them due to fear of reprisals. The only option 
available is therefore for the regulators to detect and investigate such offences 
themselves. This is however very difficult to do as many white-collar offences can 
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only be detected through inspections and investigations that are costly and time 
consuming.
105
  
The Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC) and the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) are in charge of regulating and supervising companies in Nigeria. 
The CAC is granted power to appoint inspectors to investigate the affairs of a 
company and report back to it.
106
  If from the inspector’s investigation report, there is 
evidence that any person has in relation to the company been guilty of an offence for 
which he may be criminally liable; such cases are to be referred to the Attorney 
General of the Federation.
107
 In spite of these investigatory powers conferred on 
CAC, there is no evidence that it uses these powers. The fraudulent activities of bank 
executives in Nigeria which led to their prosecution was exposed by CBN audit of 
banks. Perhaps if this audit had not been done, their fraudulent practices might have 
gone on unchecked.  
SEC on the other hand generally lacks powers to conduct routine investigations into 
the affairs of companies. Its powers to conduct routine inspections and investigations 
are restricted to capital market operators.
108
 Hence, the investigative powers do not 
extend to the directors of public listed companies who may be involved in insider 
dealing or other forms of fraud. While the Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) has a 
market surveillance team whose duty it is to closely monitor the market to identify 
potential abuse, the absence of any reported detection of insider abuse suggests that 
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the team may be lacking the expertise and tools necessary for detection. In the 
absence of any avenues for detecting criminal misconduct by company directors, 
there is unlikely to be any enforcement activity. Potential offenders can therefore 
carry on their wrongful activities unabated, as there is little likelihood of being 
detected and prosecuted. 
5.5 Deterrence Effect, Compensatory Benefit and Cost- Effectiveness of 
the Nigerian Criminal Enforcement Regime 
Having examined the difficulties with the criminal enforcement regime, we are now 
in a position to measure the success – or failure – of this regime specifically against 
the criteria for determining effective enforcement which was described and defended 
in chapter 3.
109
 This section will therefore examine the deterrent effect, the 
compensatory benefit, and cost effectiveness of the criminal enforcement regime in 
Nigeria.  
5.5.1 Deterrent Effect of the Criminal Enforcement Regime 
 In addition to providing retribution for offences committed, criminal sanctions 
generally aim at deterring further offences. It is often argued that criminal sanctions 
compared to other forms of sanctions would deter prospective offenders and ensure 
compliance.
110
 According to the European Commission, there are three main reasons 
why criminal sanctions – including imprisonment – are considered by some national 
regulators to have a stronger deterrent effect than administrative or civil sanctions.
111
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Firstly, making the most serious market abuse offences subject to criminal sanctions 
sets clear boundaries in law that these behaviours are unacceptable, and therefore 
sends a clear message to the public that the society takes these offences seriously. 
Secondly, successful prosecution of such offences usually leads to wide media 
coverage thereby deterring potential offenders by showing that the relevant 
authorities are serious about tackling these offences.  Thirdly, research has shown that 
criminal sanctions have a strong deterrent effect due to the negative stigma associated 
with criminal conduct. The strongest argument for introducing criminal sanctions to 
enforce insider dealing and other forms of market abuse is therefore based on its 
deterrent effect. 
Offences committed by directors in the course of their duty belong to a category of 
offences that are generally described as ‘white collar crimes’. According to 
Sutherland, a white collar crime can be defined as ‘a crime committed by a person of 
respectability and high social status in the course of his occupation’.112 While this 
definition has been criticized by several scholars, it is nevertheless sufficient for the 
purposes of this thesis as it captures crimes committed by company directors as a 
result of their position in the company. It has been suggested by some scholars that 
white collar offenders are more ‘deterrable’ than other offenders.113 Hence, it is 
frequently argued that the deterrence theory is more applicable to white collar 
offenders than ordinary offenders because their offences are usually rationally 
motivated.
114
 Chambliss in his research findings on the deterrent influence of 
punishment also noted that white collar offenders belong to a category of persons 
                                                                                                                                                                         
 <http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/securities/docs/abuse/SEC_2011_1217_en.pdf >  accessed 10th 
sept 2015. 
112 E.H Sutherland, White Collar Crime (foreword by Donald R Cresssey, Holt, Rinehart and Winston 
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who are most likely to be deterred by punishment or the threat of it.
 115
  This is 
because they fulfil two conditions; firstly, they have a low commitment to crime as a 
way of life and secondly, their actions or offences are merely instrumental. Because 
committing crimes is not a way of life for many white collar offenders, it is argued 
that they are very likely to be deterred by punishment or its threat.  
 Similarly, Geerken and Gove argued that the deterrence theory is more applicable to 
upper and middle class individuals than those in the lower class.
116
 According to 
them, ‘the effectiveness of the deterrence system will increase as the individual’s 
investment in and rewards from the social system increases’.117  Persons who are 
future oriented and think of factors like their career and family are therefore usually 
more concerned with the consequences of being caught for committing an offence 
perhaps because they have more to lose from a criminal conviction. Individual 
corporate criminals are therefore more ‘deterrable’ because they have more to lose 
from a criminal conviction such as their social status, respectability, income, job and 
a comfortable family life.
118
  
In order for deterrence to apply, the prospective offender must be able to rationally 
calculate the costs and benefits of his actions. As discussed in chapter 3,
119
 directors 
easily fall into this category as many of their actions are motivated by economic 
calculations.  Their social background also means that they can rationally calculate 
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the cost and benefit of the crime based on the punishment for the crime and the 
probability of being caught.
120
 Hence, they are likely to consider the cost of losing 
their employment, comfort, reputation, and social status as well as the public shame 
and stigma associated with criminal prosecution and conviction. The shame that 
comes from criminal prosecution and conviction can therefore deter misconduct by 
directors. Similarly, the thought of being sent to prison can also be a strong deterrent 
in light of the negative publicity which comes with jail sentences.
121
 The 
imprisonment of a corporate director could therefore serve as a powerful deterrence to 
other directors as they become aware that such crimes are not taken lightly by the 
society.
122
  
In spite of all the scholarly evidence citing the deterrence potential of criminal 
sanctions, it is important to pause and remind ourselves of the factors that really 
influence deterrence. As discussed in chapter 3, there are four main factors which 
determine the deterrent effect of any sanction or enforcement regime. These are 
severity, certainty, celerity and variety of punishment’.123 Therefore, in order for any 
sanction to deter a prospective offender, it must be sufficiently severe and fit the 
offence in question.
124
 In addition to this, there must be a significant likelihood that 
the wrongdoing will be detected and punished.
125
 The prescribed sanctions must also 
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be imposed swiftly.
126
 All these factors need to be present in order for an enforcement 
action to effectively deter. Hence, the threat of imprisonment will lack a deterrent 
effect if there is little or no risk of detection and conviction.
127
 This is irrespective of 
the severity of the sanctions on paper as there is little risk of the sanction being 
imposed. Similarly, where the sanction imposed is not swiftly applied, it affects the 
deterrent effect of the punishment. Therefore, while criminal prosecution could 
potentially provide good deterrence, this deterrent potential can be seriously 
undermined by these key factors. 
Nigeria currently faces challenges in successfully detecting, prosecuting and 
convicting company directors for offences committed in the course of duty. In recent 
times, there has been only one successful prosecution and conviction of a company 
director in Nigeria. In that case, Cecilia Ibru, the former Chief Executive Officer and 
Managing Director of Oceanic International Bank Plc, was charged with money 
laundering offences on a three count charge of negligence, reckless grant of credit 
facilities worth billions of dollars and mismanagement of depositors’ funds. On 
conviction, she was sentenced to just six months in prison and required to forfeit 
shares and other acquired assets worth over N191 billion (£617,154,000).
128
 Two of 
the three offences to which the accused person pleaded guilty to are punishable by an 
imprisonment term not exceeding five years without an option of fine, 
nevertheless she was sentenced to just six months. Ibru’s sentence for the offences 
committed left many Nigerians outraged and highly disillusioned in the country’s 
justice system. Asides from the apparent injustice of this, it is clear that the severity 
of the sanction imposed in this case is significantly low. Where the punishment upon 
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conviction is low or disproportionate to the offence committed, it removes its 
deterrent effect.  
 Asides from the inadequacy of the sanction imposed, there is also very little 
likelihood of being detected and successfully prosecuted for such offences in Nigeria. 
It is almost impossible to secure a conviction against a company director in Nigeria 
even in the unlikely event that the criminal misconduct is discovered. Following the 
audit of banks by the Central Bank of Nigeria in 2009, many bank executives were 
indicted for various criminal offences. However, Cecilia Ibru’s case, mentioned 
above, remains the only one where a conviction has been recorded. The other cases 
were dismissed for various reasons. Hence, in Nigeria, the likelihood of being 
successfully prosecuted for an offence as a director is very slim. This problem is then 
coupled with all the inherent difficulties with criminal enforcement such as the high 
burden of proof and mens rea requirement. The criminal enforcement regime 
therefore scores very low with regards to the ‘certainty of sanctions’. The variety or 
range of sanctions available under the criminal enforcement regime for offences 
committed by directors in the course of their duty is also restricted to imprisonment 
and fines.
129
 The range of sanctions available is therefore quite limited.  
In addition to this, the endemic delay and other difficulties with the Nigerian judicial 
system also mean that in the unlikely event that criminal prosecution of such offences 
succeed, there would have been a long lapse of time between the commission of the 
offence and the imposition of sanctions. Hence, the ‘celerity’130 of sanctions also rank 
very low. Therefore, while the criminal enforcement regime may generally have 
potential to provide good deterrence, in Nigeria this is not the case. The additional 
problems, which have been discussed in the previous section, such as corruption, lack 
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of judicial independence, infrastructural problems and procedural difficulties also 
serve to exacerbate the problem. The Nigerian criminal enforcement regime therefore 
lacks a deterrent effect. The situation is unlikely to change in the short term, as many 
of the problems hindering the deterrent effect of criminal enforcement are endemic 
and deep-rooted.
131
  Consequently, Nigeria cannot, and should not, rely on the 
criminal enforcement regime to deliver effective enforcement of corporate law as it 
lacks the elements which will assure effective deterrence.  
5.5.2 Compensation and the Nigerian Criminal Enforcement Regime 
As discussed in chapter 3, compensation is a key purpose of enforcement in corporate 
law.
132
 However, as mentioned, whether or not an enforcement action meets a 
compensatory purpose generally depends on its nature. Criminal enforcement actions 
are primarily targeted at punishing offenders and deterring future offences. They are 
therefore not generally focused on compensating victims of the offence. In spite of 
this however, a country’s criminal justice system may allow the courts to award 
compensation orders to victims. This compensation order will often be awarded in 
addition to any other criminal penalty imposed on the defendant. This is the case in 
Nigeria.  
The Administration of Criminal Justice Act 2015 (ACJA) is the legislation which 
provides for the administration of criminal justice in the Federal Capital Territory and 
other federal courts in Nigeria.
133
 Section 319 of this Act provides that the court may, 
in the course of criminal proceedings or while passing judgement, order the defendant 
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or convict to pay compensation to persons who have been injured by the offence 
where the court considers that substantial compensation would be recoverable if a 
civil action were brought in respect of the case.
134
 Hence, in theory, victims of 
offences committed by directors may be compensated for loss suffered as a result of 
the breach. The ACJA is however a relatively new provision there is therefore no 
evidence that it has been applied by the courts in respect of offences committed by 
directors in the course of their duty.
135
  
Asides from the fact that the ACJA is relatively new, it is also doubtful whether it 
can, on its own, secure effective compensation for victims of offences committed by 
directors. As discussed in the previous section, 
136
 the Nigerian criminal enforcement 
regime is generally beset with several difficulties. While some of these difficulties are 
applicable to criminal enforcement proceedings generally, many others are specific 
difficulties faced by the Nigerian criminal enforcement regime. Nigeria therefore 
faces immense difficulties in successfully detecting offences, prosecuting, and 
convicting directors for offences committed.  Payment of compensation to the victims 
of an offence committed by a director however directly depends on detection and 
successful prosecution of the said offence. Therefore, where the offence itself goes 
undetected or is not successfully prosecuted, the victims inherently do not obtain any 
compensation. Consequently, the difficulties in the Nigerian criminal enforcement 
regime which hinders its deterrent effect, also interfere with its compensatory 
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benefits. The situation is unlikely to change in the short term due to the several 
inherent difficulties with the regime. The Nigerian criminal enforcement regime is 
therefore unable to deliver compensatory benefits to persons who have suffered loss 
as a result of directors’ breach.  
5.5.3 Cost effectiveness of the Criminal enforcement regime 
As noted in chapter 3, in order for an enforcement action or regime to be regarded as 
effective, its benefits must outweigh its costs.
137
 The enforcement regime must 
therefore be cost-effective. Where the costs of an enforcement action outweigh its 
benefits it remains unattractive to the potential enforcer irrespective of the status of 
the enforcer. In private enforcement actions, the decision to litigate rests with the 
company and its shareholders who would usually make those decisions based on a 
cost benefit analysis. In criminal cases however, the decision whether or not to 
prosecute rests with the prosecutors. Prosecutors often have limited resources as such 
they cannot validly prosecute every crime.
138
 They therefore have to make their own 
cost benefit analysis. It is therefore worth considering the potential costs and benefits 
of criminal enforcement and whether it is an effective means of enforcing corporate 
law.  
Criminal sanctions have several benefits and costs. On the benefit side, the major 
advantage of criminal sanctions is its deterrent effect. As noted above, criminal 
sanctions have the potential to deter further offences partly due to their punitive 
nature and the shame associated with criminal trials and convictions.
139
  Many people 
would agree that imprisonment is more unpleasant than fines or other civil penalties; 
it therefore has a potential deterrent effect. In addition to this, some of the other 
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potential benefits of using criminal sanctions are improved accountability by 
directors, retribution for the offending directors, improved corporate governance, 
enhanced confidence in the financial market, better protection for shareholders, and 
increased investments in the financial markets thereby promoting economic 
growth.
140
 On the other side of the equation, the costs of criminal enforcement can be 
classified into tangible and intangible costs. The tangible costs of criminal 
enforcement include the cost of acquiring the necessary expertise and technological 
equipment for detecting fraudulent practices, the cost of conducting investigations, 
the cost of acquiring the necessary evidence and witnesses required for proving the 
case in court, the cost of prosecuting the case,
141
 and the financial costs of 
imprisonment.
142
 The intangible costs of criminal enforcement includes the time 
expended in criminal trials, the potential negative publicity for the company and the 
possible chilling effect on the willingness of qualified persons to take up executive 
positions.  
While the intangible costs of criminal sanctions may be more easily defended or 
waived aside on the grounds of its overall public benefit, the same cannot be said of 
the tangible costs. Detection, investigation and prosecution of corporate law offences 
requires investment of considerable resources. Insider dealing, for example, can only 
be detected and prosecuted if the regulators have the skills, training and tools needed 
to detect any unusual transaction in securities and price movement.
143
 This requires 
                                                            
140 The benefits listed here include both public and private benefits.  
141 This includes out of pocket expenses to expert witnesses and the costs paid to the prosecutors. It is 
also more expensive to prosecute a case than to deal with it informally outside the court system. See 
also M Levi, Regulating Fraud: White Collar Crime and the Criminal Process (Tavistock publications 
1987) 183. 
142 Keeping prisoners in prison imposes costs on the government as such this costs needs to be factored 
into the general cost of enforcement. 
143 O.O Oladele, ‘Disclosure in Secondary Securities Transactions in Nigeria’ 2008 19(8) International 
Company and Commercial Law Review 264. 
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investment of millions in hiring manpower and obtaining the sophisticated computer 
systems needed to detect any form of unusual trading activity. For instance, it is 
reported that the UK Financial Conduct Authority has spent tens of millions of 
pounds in hiring staff and developing computer systems to enable identification of 
suspicious trading.
144
  This shows that undertaking the task of detecting these 
offences is not a cheap task for any regulator. In the absence of such detection 
devices, the regulator would either have to rely on conducting routine investigations 
into the activities of companies or wait until it gets some notification from other 
parties that some wrongful act is being perpetrated. As noted earlier, the likelihood of 
getting such third party information is slim especially in Nigeria.
145
 Similarly 
conducting routine investigation of companies is an expensive activity for any 
regulator. Criminal enforcement of corporate law in Nigeria is therefore a costly 
venture as it would require huge investment of financial resources in order for it to 
have any deterrent effect.   
Many government agencies in Nigeria are underfunded, hence criminal enforcement 
for corporate or securities offences have to compete for scarce enforcement resources 
with other conceivably more serious crimes.
146
  In a country like Nigeria which  still 
grapples with crimes such as terrorism, oil bunkering, kidnapping and armed robbery 
to mention a few, policy makers are likely to  give more priority to these other crimes 
than breaches of corporate and securities laws. Therefore, while effective criminal 
enforcement can be immensely beneficial, the costs of attaining this level of 
enforcement in Nigeria are great and may outweigh its benefits in the eyes of the 
                                                            
144 D Enrich and H Agnew, ‘U.K Agency Struggles in Fight Against Insider Trading’ (Wall Street 
Journal)  January 4, 2014    
<http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303640604579296520563211360> accessed 30th 
July 2015. 
145 See s5.4.7 
146 Lomnicka, (n 67) 159. 
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potential enforcers. In light of the high costs associated with this enforcement regime, 
it is argued that the criminal enforcement regime in Nigeria cannot, and should not, 
be relied on to deliver effective enforcement of corporate law. 
5.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the criminal enforcement regime in Nigeria and the 
difficulties which currently pervade it. As discussed in the course of this chapter, 
criminal enforcement generally has potential to provide effective deterrence. In spite 
of this however, the problems besetting Nigeria’s criminal enforcement regime 
prevents it from being of much use in enforcing corporate law in Nigeria.  
The costs of criminal enforcement, its limited deterrent and compensatory benefit, the 
lack of judicial independence, institutional and infrastructural deficiencies in Nigeria, 
as well as procedural difficulties associated with the criminal enforcement system all 
come together to make this enforcement regime a somewhat unattractive and 
ineffective one. This does not imply that the criminal enforcement regime for breach 
of corporate law requirements should be totally ignored. Rather it suggests that it 
should be used only as a supplementary enforcement method in light of the fact that it 
suffers from significant difficulties. This is further compounded by the fact that the 
difficulties which plague this enforcement regime are only a reflection of general 
problems within the Nigerian society. They are therefore deep-rooted problems which 
are unlikely to disappear in the shorter term. Consequently, criminal enforcement 
cannot be relied on to deliver effective enforcement of corporate law in Nigeria.  In 
light of this, the next two chapters will examine other enforcement regimes for 
corporate law in Nigeria. Consequently, chapter 6 would examine the private civil 
enforcement regime while chapter 7 looks at the public civil enforcement regime. 
These enforcement regimes would be examined with a view to discovering whether 
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they offer any advantage over the criminal enforcement regime discussed in this 
chapter, and can therefore potentially deliver effective enforcement of corporate law 
in Nigeria.                        
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CHAPTER 6:  PRIVATE CIVIL ENFORCEMENT IN 
NIGERIA 
6.1 Introduction  
The previous chapter examined the criminal enforcement regime in Nigeria. It argued 
that the criminal enforcement regime in Nigeria is incapable of delivering effective 
enforcement in Nigeria due to several inherent difficulties. This chapter now turns to 
examine the second of our three enforcement regimes, namely private civil 
enforcement. As with chapter 5, it likewise argues that this form of enforcement 
currently is, and inevitably will remain, largely ineffective in Nigeria. As with the 
criminal enforcement regime, some of the problems in respect of private civil 
enforcement might appear to be merely temporary difficulties, or merely contingent 
on remediable shortcomings within the Nigerian justice system. However, as with 
chapter 5, the purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate that some of these difficulties 
are inherent in the very nature of private civil enforcement. This chapter therefore 
argues that whilst the private civil enforcement regime in Nigeria can, and should 
doubtless, be improved, these improvements are unlikely to lead to much significant 
improvement in its effectiveness as an enforcement regime in corporate law. 
Consequently, private civil enforcement cannot, and should not, be substantially 
relied on to deliver effective enforcement of corporate law in Nigeria.  
The chapter starts in section 6.2 by overviewing four major private civil enforcement 
actions. These are corporate actions, actions by administrators and liquidators, 
personal actions and finally derivative actions. It undertakes some critique of the first 
three enforcement actions before moving on to focus on derivative actions which 
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section 6.3 then examines in detail.  The focus on derivative actions is justified and 
appropriate given that so many countries seem to place such significant reliance on 
derivative actions as a private enforcement mechanism in corporate law.
1
 It is 
therefore worth examining whether this enforcement action can indeed deliver 
effective enforcement in Nigeria. Section 6.3 examines various aspects of the 
Nigerian statutory derivative actions regime. It examines CAMA’s requirements 
regarding those who may apply to bring derivative actions under the regime. It further 
examines the procedure for commencing derivative actions as well as CAMA’s 
position on the effect of shareholder approval on an application for leave to 
commence a derivative action. Section 6.4 then discusses the inherent difficulties 
with derivative actions as an enforcement mechanism. Section 6.5 analyses whether 
derivative actions have significant potential to be an effective enforcement 
mechanism. It considers its effectiveness in light of its ability to provide effective 
deterrence and compensation as well as its cost effectiveness. It argues that while the 
derivative action is considerably better than the criminal enforcement regime in terms 
of its ability to provide effective enforcement, it nevertheless falls short in several 
regards. It is therefore unable to, on its own, secure effective enforcement of 
corporate law. Section 6.6 offers some concluding remarks and provides a signpost to 
the next chapter.  
6.2 Overview of Private Civil Enforcement Actions  
As the name suggests, private civil enforcement actions are civil proceedings that are 
instituted by private parties in respect of breach or wrongdoing by directors. There 
are four major types of civil enforcement proceedings that may be instituted where 
                                                            
1 For example, the UK has historically relied significantly on derivative actions as a private 
enforcement mechanism for breach of directors’ duties. See A Keay, ‘An Assessment of Private 
Enforcement Actions for Directors Breaches of Duty’ (2014) 33(1) Civil Justice Quarterly 76, 84. 
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there has been a breach: corporate actions, action by administrators or liquidators, 
personal actions and derivative actions.  The next sections will examine each of these 
enforcement actions and identify the difficulties with each one of them.  
6.2.1 Corporate Actions  
Directors duties are generally owed to the company.  Therefore, where there has been 
a breach, it is the company itself which has power to take proceedings to redress the 
wrong. This is the effect of the rule in Foss v Harbottle.
2
 This common law rule is 
also preserved in section 299 of the Companies and Allied Matters Act 1990 
(CAMA). Hence, the company is required to be the one to seek redress for wrongs 
done to it. The company is an artificial legal entity; therefore, its decisions are taken 
through its organs – generally the board and the general meeting.  Power within the 
company is generally divided between these two organs and neither organ can usurp 
the power which has been conferred on the other organ. The power to bring legal 
proceedings on the company’s behalf is however generally vested in the board of 
directors. Therefore, where there has been a breach by a director (or any other party), 
the board has the power to decide whether or not to sue.
3
  
In spite of this general litigation power which is conferred on the board, there are 
several reasons why the board might not, and are indeed unlikely to, institute 
enforcement action against a director who has committed a breach. These reasons 
may be broadly classified into two different categories. The first category will be 
referred to as ‘altruistic’ reasons. These are reasons which are genuinely in the 
company’s interests. Thus, the board may believe that legal action is not in the 
company’s best interest.  For example, the board may decide not to take enforcement 
                                                            
2 (1843) 2 Hare 461 
3 See CAMA, s 63(3) which provides that the board of directors may exercise all the powers of the 
company except those which have been expressly vested by the in the general meeting. 
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action in respect of an actionable breach because it considers it costly to do so. These 
costs may include monetary costs as well as intangible costs such as the time and 
effort which will be required to pursue the action. The board may also consider that 
the enforcement action is not in the company’s interests4 or that the action has little 
chance of succeeding.
5
  
The second category of reasons why directors may decide not to take enforcement 
action will be referred to as ‘self-interested’ reasons. These are reasons which are 
purely in the board or its directors’ self-interests and may generally be contrary to the 
company’s interests.  For example the board may refuse to sue because they feel 
some  loyalty towards the wrongdoing director or because they consider that such 
actions may reflect poorly on them.
6
 Directors also often develop friendship and 
loyalty ties to each other similar to those found among family members or members 
of a society and are therefore unlikely to decide to sue fellow directors whom they 
may regard as friends. 
7
 In addition to this, the board of directors are a group and are 
therefore subject to ‘group dynamics’.  As Keay has pointed out that, it is difficult for 
members of a group to be totally objective when dealing with something that has or 
may be done by a member of the group.
8
 There is also a risk of ‘back scratching’ 
whereby directors ignore another director’s breach in the hope that they will get the 
same treatment if they found themselves in a similar situation.
9
 Directors are 
therefore unlikely to make the litigation decision against the erring director as a 
                                                            
4 This could be due to reasons such as the distraction to management, loss of managerial resources or 
even its potential effect on the company’s reputation. See H Hirt, ‘The Company’s Decision to Litigate 
against Its Directors: Legal Strategies to deal with The Board of Directors’ Conflict of Interest’ [2005] 
Journal of Business Law 159,165-166. 
5 Keay ‘An Assessment of Private Enforcement Actions’ (n 1) 79. 
6 ibid  
7 D Kershaw, Company Law in Context: Text and Materials (2nd edn, OUP 2012) 591. 
8 A Keay, ‘The Authorising of Directors’ Conflict of Interest: Getting A Balance? (2012) 12(1) Journal 
of Corporate Law Studies 129, 140. 
9 Kershaw (n 7) 591. 
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means of protecting their own interest in case they fall into the same position, and 
even where they do they may fail to pursue it diligently such that the action will fail. 
These reasons explain why corporate actions against directors are rare. Hence, while 
corporate actions may be instituted for directors’ breach, in practice this is rarely the 
case.
10
 Corporate actions are therefore generally ineffective as an enforcement 
mechanism for redressing directors’ breach.  
6.2.2 Action by Administrator or Liquidator of an Insolvent Company. 
Private enforcement actions may also be commenced by the administrator or 
liquidator of an insolvent company. A liquidator or administrator’s investigations 
may reveal that the company directors have breached their duties to the company. 
They may therefore commence enforcement action against the offending director. 
The power of a liquidator to bring an action in the company’s name or on its behalf is 
preserved by Section 425(1)a CAMA. Hence, in the event of a winding up, a 
liquidator may bring an action against a director for breach which occurred in the 
course of managing the company.  
Liquidators may however face certain difficulties in bringing private enforcement 
actions. For example, they may find it difficult to obtain the funds required to 
commence private actions. Similarly, the breach may have occurred long before the 
liquidators’ appointment such that the necessary evidence for proving the case might 
no longer exist.
11
 In addition to these difficulties, the reality is that liquidators are 
often more keen on saving as much of the corporate estate for the creditors’ benefit 
rather than commencing enforcement action against the badly behaved directors.  
Therefore, while a liquidator may be keen on retrieving corporate assets which have 
                                                            
10 D Ahern, ‘Directors’ Duties: Broadening the Focus Beyond Content to Examine the Accountability 
Spectrum’ (2011) 33 Dublin University Law Journal 116. 
11 Keay, ‘An Assessment of Private Enforcement Actions’ (n 1) 81.  
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been wrongfully transferred to directors, he is likely to be less enthusiastic in 
pursuing other ‘speculative’ claims like negligence against directors where the 
outcome is less assured.
12
  
6.2.3 Personal Actions  
Shareholders may in certain restricted circumstances bring personal actions against 
directors. In personal actions, the wrong in question needs to have been suffered by 
the shareholder(s) personally and not the company. Hence, the anxiety surrounding 
the rule in Foss v Harbottle do not apply here.  As mentioned earlier, directors’ duties 
are owed to the company and not individual shareholders,
13
 therefore many 
jurisdictions restrict the bringing of personal actions by shareholders against 
directors. In the UK, for example, in order to bring a personal action against a 
director, a shareholder must prove two conditions. First, the shareholder must be able 
to show that the defendants breached a legal duty owed to him personally (perhaps 
under the law of contract or torts). Hence there must have been a ‘special factual 
relationship’ between the director and shareholder which gave rise to fiduciary duties 
owed by the director to the shareholder. Second, the shareholder has to show that the 
loss suffered as a result of the breach is ‘separate and distinct’ from that of the 
company and not merely reflective.
14
 The shareholder’s loss must therefore not 
merely be a reflection of the company’s loss.15   
With respect to Nigeria, Section 300 CAMA preserves shareholders’ general rights to 
bring personal actions. In addition to personal actions, shareholders may also bring 
                                                            
12 Pursuing private actions in these circumstances are also unlikely to be cost effective. See J.E 
Parkinson, Corporate Power and Responsibility: Issues in the Theory of Company Law (OUP 1993) 
239. 
13 Percival v Wright [1902] 2 Ch. 421 Ch D. 
14 R Cheung, ‘The No Reflective Loss Principle: A View from Hong Kong’ (2009) 20(7) International 
Company and Commercial Law Review 223,228. 
15See Johnson v Gore, Wood & co [2002] 2 A.C 1, HL. 
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representative actions. Where a representative action is brought, a shareholder is 
suing on behalf of himself and other members who have the same right which is 
alleged to have been infringed. Where a member brings a personal action or 
representative action, he or she will not be entitled to any damages against the 
company but only to a declaration or injunction restraining the company and directors 
from the particular act.
16
  It must be noted that personal actions are intended for the 
benefit of the claimant shareholder and not the company. Therefore, enforcement of 
directors’ breach through personal actions are unlikely to result in any significant 
gain for the company.  
Another action which may be classified as ‘personal’ actions are those which are 
brought on the grounds that the company’s affairs are being conducted in a manner 
which is oppressive or unfairly prejudicial. Section 310 CAMA gives standing to a 
range of specified persons to make a petition to the court on the basis of unfair 
prejudice.
17
 In an unfair prejudice action, the core of the action is not the wrong done 
to the company; rather the action is premised on the fact that the action is prejudicial 
to the claimant. Hence, the reliefs that are claimed in an unfair prejudice action are 
also personal remedies and not corporate relief. 
18
  
While actions based on unfair prejudice may be brought by shareholders of any 
company, whether private or public, these actions are however more often used in the 
case of small private companies. This is due to the fact that members of such 
                                                            
16 CAMA, s301. Costs may also be awarded by the courts in respect of personal or representative 
actions. See CAMA, s301(3). 
17 The persons who may apply to the court on the basis of ‘unfair prejudice’ are members of the 
company, directors or officers of the company (present and former), the Corporate Affairs 
Commission, and any other person who the court considers to be a proper person to commence the 
action. CAMA, s310. 
18 The most frequent relief granted in an unfair prejudice action is an order for a purchase of the 
petitioner’s shares. The unfair prejudice action therefore does not seek to enforce directors’ obligation 
to adhere to their duties or other statutory requirements. See Andrew Keay, The Corporate Objective 
(Edward Elgar 2011) 253-254.  
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companies can clearly establish that they had certain ‘legitimate expectations’ when 
joining the company which have not been met.
19
 While shareholders of public listed 
companies may, in principle, commence an unfair prejudice petition, the concept of 
‘legitimate expectations’ does not generally apply to them.20  Shareholders in public 
listed companies are less able to show that they were given certain expectations by 
the directors or managers and may therefore be unsuccessful in unfair prejudice 
petitions.
21
 In light of this, the unfair prejudice petition would not be the subject of 
further analysis in this chapter as this thesis is generally concerned with public listed 
companies and not private companies.  
6.2.4 Derivative Action 
The fourth and arguably most important private civil enforcement action is the 
derivative action. In light of the difficulties with the earlier discussed forms of private 
civil enforcement proceedings, the rest of this chapter would focus largely on 
derivative actions. A derivative action is a means by which shareholders (usually 
minority shareholders) can enforce the company’s rights where directors have 
breached their duties to the company.
22
 It was developed as an equitable remedy in 
order to prevent a wrong done to the company from going un-redressed.
23
 
A discussion on derivative actions necessarily starts from the rule in Foss v 
Harbottle
24
 as it established the legal position of minority shareholders in respect of 
                                                            
19 A Keay, ‘Company Directors Behaving Poorly: Disciplinary Options for Shareholders’ (2007) 
Journal of Business Law 656,678. 
20 See Re Astec (BSR) Plc [1998] 2 BCLC 556, 589.  A.J Boyle, Minority Shareholders’ Remedies 
(Cambridge University Press 2002) 111.  While in widely held corporations, shareholder ‘legitimate 
expectations’ on issues such as management, employment or other matters are possible, they are 
unlikely to arise. See further Daniel Attenborough, ‘Enforcement of Corporate Conduct under the 
Equitable Maximisation and Viability Principle’ (2013) 33(4) Legal Studies 650,672.  
21 Keay, ‘Company Directors Behaving Poorly’ (n 19) 679.  
22 A Reisberg, Derivative Actions and Corporate Governance: Theory and Operation (OUP 2007) 1.  
23 See Smith v Croft (no 2) [1988] Ch 114,185. 
24 (1843) 2 Hare 461. 
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court claims.  The rule in Foss v Harbottle is to the effect that when a wrong has been 
done to the company, it is only the company that can bring an action to redress such a 
wrong. Thus, a shareholder generally has no right to bring an action on behalf of the 
company to redress a wrong done to the company.
25
  This rule is based on two 
fundamental principles of law, which are the principles of a company’s separate legal 
personality and the principle of majority rule. 
As mentioned earlier in section 6.2.1, power to bring corporate actions are vested in 
the board of directors who, for various reasons discussed earlier, are unlikely to bring 
action to redress wrongs committed by other director(s). As a result of the difficulties 
with getting the board to commence action where the directors are themselves the 
wrongdoers, exceptions to the rule in Foss v Harbottle were developed by the 
common law courts to permit derivative actions.  
Derivative actions under the common law were permitted where 
1. The wrong done amounted to ‘fraud on the minority’; and  
2. The wrongdoers are in control of the company and as such are unlikely to pursue 
a claim to redress the wrong done.
26
  
By virtue of Nigeria’s colonial history, the English Common Law and Doctrines of 
Equity are applicable in Nigeria.
27
 Cases decided by English courts are also of 
persuasive authority in Nigeria although they are not binding.
28
 Consequently, the 
rule in Foss v Harbottle and its exceptions under common law have been applied by 
                                                            
25 V Joffe QC and others, Minority Shareholders: Law, Practice and Procedure (OUP 2011) 32. 
26 Edwards v Halliwell [1950] 2 All E.R 1064, Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Newman Industries Ltd 
(No 2) [1982] Ch. 204. 
27See for example The Law (Miscellaneous Provisions)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
Law Lagos Laws 1973 cap 65, s 2. The applicability of received English laws to Nigeria is however 
subject to the existence of equivalent Nigerian legislation. Hence, where there is a local enactment on 
any matter, the received English law will not apply. See A.O Obilade, The Nigerian Legal System 
(Spectrum Books Limited 1979) 77 
28 Obilade ibid 135. 
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Nigerian courts as a means of providing equitable relief to minority shareholders 
where the wrongdoing would otherwise have escaped redress. In the case of Edokpolo 
v Sem-Edo Wire Industries Ltd
29
 the court (in its lead judgement delivered by 
Nnamani J.S.C) established the operation of the rule in Foss v Harbottle in Nigeria to 
the effect that the court will not interfere with a company’s internal management. 
Consequently, where a wrong has been done to the company, it is the company that 
must sue for redress. The rule in Foss v Harbottle has also been applied by the 
Nigerian Courts in several other cases.
30
 In 1990, the Nigerian provisions on 
derivative actions were codified in the Companies and Allied Matters Act 1990 
(CAMA). These will be the subject of analysis in the next section.  
6.3 The Statutory Derivative Actions Regime in Nigeria  
In 1990, the Nigerian rules on derivative actions were codified in the Companies and 
Allied Matters Act (CAMA). Section 299 restates the common law ‘proper plaintiff’ 
rule,
31
 and provides that, where an irregularity has been committed in the course of a 
company's affairs or any wrong done to the company, only the company can sue to 
remedy that wrong or ratify the irregular conduct. Sections 303-309 CAMA then 
contain a number of provisions regarding the bringing of actions on behalf of the 
company.  
Section 303(1) empowers applicants to apply to the court for leave to bring derivative 
actions while section 303(2) contains conditions, all of which must be satisfied before 
leave can be granted. Those conditions are:  
                                                            
29  (1984) LPELR-1017(SC). 
30 See Sparks Electronics Nig. Ltd. v. Ponmile (1986) 2 NWLR (Pt. 23) 516; Mbene v. Ofili (1968) 
NCLR 293; Yalaju-Amaye v A.R.E.C. Ltd. (1990) NWLR (Pt. 145) 422; Omisade v. Akande (1987) 2 
NWLR (Pt. 55). 
31 See Foss v Harbottle (n 2). 
168 
 
a) The wrongdoers are the directors who are in control, and will not take necessary 
action; 
b) The applicant has given reasonable notice to the directors of the company of his 
intention to apply to the court;  
c) The applicant is acting in good faith; and 
d)  It appears to be in the interest of the company that the action be brought, 
prosecuted, defended or discontinued.
32
  
Before going on to analyse these provisions, it must be noted here that the goal of the 
Nigerian Law Reform Commission (‘the Nigerian Commission’) in codifying the 
derivative actions regime was to give shareholders a ‘wider scope within which to 
enforce their rights and also the company’s’.33  It seems however that the Nigerian 
Commission has been unable to achieve this goal. The difficulties with the criteria for 
bringing derivative actions under the statutory regime will be the subject of further 
analysis in this chapter. 
6.3.1 Applicants for leave to bring Derivative Actions  
Section 309 CAMA provides for persons who may apply for leave to bring derivative 
actions. These are:   
a) A registered holder or a beneficial owner and a former registered holder or 
beneficial owner, of a security of a company 
b) A director or an officer or a former director or officer of a company; 
c) The Commission; or 
                                                            
32 CAMA, s303 (2). 
33 The Nigerian Law Reform Commission, ‘Working Papers on the Reform of Nigerian Company Law 
Volume 1-Review and Recommendations’ (1987) 239. 
169 
 
d) Any other person who in the discretion of the court is a proper person to make an 
application under section 303 of this Act. 
6.3.1.1 Registered Holders and Beneficial Owner of Securities (Present and 
Former) 
CAMA allows both present and former shareholders (including beneficial owners) to 
institute derivative actions.  One knotty issue here is whether former shareholders 
ought to be regarded as holding sufficient interest in the company to justify bringing a 
derivative action. This question is very important as it borders on the proper plaintiff 
rule which is fundamental to company law. In order to have locus standi to 
commence any action, the plaintiff is expected to have sufficient interest in the 
matter. Therefore ‘A cannot as a general rule, bring an action against B to recover 
damages or secure other relief on behalf of C for an injury done by B to C’.34 The 
problem then is whether a former member can be regarded as having sufficient 
interest in a company in order to justify bringing a derivative action.  
Breaches of directors’ duties may sometimes have profound negative effect on a 
company forcing some shareholders to try to mitigate their losses by selling their 
shares and leaving the company. In those circumstances, where the shareholder feels 
compelled to sell her shares in order to avoid complete loss, those shares may be sold 
at less than their optimal value. There is therefore a case for arguing that it is 
reasonable to allow former members to commence action to redress the directors’ 
breach which forced them to sell their shares. Derivative actions are however 
intended for the company’s benefit, their proceeds therefore go to the company and 
not the shareholder who institute the action. In light of this, it is difficult to see how a 
former shareholder can have sufficient interests in a company where it is no longer a 
                                                            
34 Prudential Assurance Co Ltd (n 26) 210. 
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member and would therefore not benefit from any award made to the company. There 
is therefore arguably no reasonable basis for allowing past members to institute 
derivative actions.  
While it may be argued that this stage is merely the application for leave stage and 
should be made as open as possible, there is still a need to curb unnecessary 
applications which are potentially distracting for the directors who have to defend 
them. Past members are more likely to commence derivative actions for reasons such 
as personal vendetta rather than more altruistic reasons. There is therefore a need to 
reduce the likelihood of this happening by restricting such actions to only current 
members who potentially have interests in the company’s welfare rather than past 
members who may not be genuinely concerned about its interests.   
6.3.1.2 Directors or Officers of the Company (Present and Former) 
CAMA allows both present and former directors and officers of the company to bring 
derivative actions. The first question here is whether former directors of a company 
have sufficient interest in it to justify bringing a derivative action. The argument 
stated in the previous section in respect of granting former shareholders permission to 
bring derivative actions also applies here. Former directors are more likely to bring 
derivative actions due to personal vendetta or to get even with some other directors 
rather than due to genuine interest in the company. Hence, they should be disallowed 
from bringing derivative actions as they cannot be regarded as having sufficient 
interest in the corporation.  
Concerning current directors’ rights to bring derivative action, the first issue that 
comes to mind is whether this is justifiable in light of the general litigation powers 
which have already been granted to the board as a whole.
35
 One therefore wonders 
                                                            
35 See CAMA, s 63(3). 
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whether directors, who are not shareholders, should be given standing to commence 
derivative actions. While the board generally has litigation powers, there is a case for 
allowing individual directors to bring derivative actions. Certain groups of directors 
within the board may control board decisions and may therefore be able to effectively 
prevent the board from bringing enforcement action against a director who has 
committed a breach. This would be the case where, say, several board members have 
familial relationship with the director who has committed a breach.  In this instance, 
there would be a general reluctance to redress the wrong. Informational asymmetries 
also exist in many companies, especially large public listed companies;
36
 shareholders 
are therefore unlikely to be aware that a breach has occurred. In such circumstances, 
it would be beneficial for the director who is aware of the breach to commence a 
derivative action to redress a breach. 
6.3.1.3 The Corporate Affairs Commission  
The Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC) is allowed to apply for leave to bring 
derivative actions. As noted in chapter 4, the CAC has powers to investigate the 
affairs of a company.
37
  In the course of investigating the company’s affairs, it may 
gain knowledge of certain wrongdoing to the company by the directors, which the 
members may not even be aware of. This power granted to the CAC to bring 
derivative action is therefore a potentially important enforcement tool, which may be 
of great advantage to the company. Minority shareholders, especially in large public 
listed companies, are unlikely to have knowledge of wrongs done to the company by 
directors. Knowledge of the wrongdoing is however perhaps the most important 
factor in any enforcement attempt. The CAC may therefore leverage on the 
                                                            
36 See W.W Bratton & M. L Watcher, ‘The Case against Shareholder Empowerment’ (2010) 158(3) 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 653, 666 who argue that ‘dispersed, diversified shareholders 
labour under informational asymmetries…’ 
37 See s4.6.1.1. 
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knowledge obtained in the course of investigating the company’s affairs in order to 
seek redress on behalf of the minority shareholders who cannot do so themselves.  
6.3.1.4 Proper Persons  
Section 309(d) allows the court to permit any other person who in its discretion it 
believes to be a ‘proper person’ to apply to bring a derivative action. What this 
provision essentially means is that any person may be allowed to bring a derivative 
action as long as the court considers him or her to be a proper person to do so. This 
‘proper persons’ category is however quite ambiguous. It contains no criteria which 
will guide the courts in its decision on whether or not a person is a ‘proper person’ to 
bring a derivative action. While the courts have the discretion to refuse permission in 
cases where it does not consider the applicant a proper person, the presence of this 
provision in CAMA potentially leaves directors open to litigation from different 
parties. Some criteria to guide the courts in its decision would therefore be 
preferable.
38
  
6.3.2 Procedure for Commencing Statutory Derivative Actions 
In order to bring a derivative action, the applicant must first apply for leave of court 
to do so. The application for leave to bring a derivative action is required to be by 
originating summons on notice to the directors. This was the decision of the court in 
Agip Nig. Ltd v Agip Petrol Int’l 39 where the applicant had applied for leave to bring 
a derivative action by means of a writ of summons and ex parte application to prevent 
                                                            
38 An example of a criteria that can be used to determine a proper person would be that of ‘direct 
financial interest’ which was used in the Canadian case of Re  Daon development corporation (1984) 
54 B.C.L.R 235 (S.C) where it was held that ‘proper persons ‘…have a direct financial interest in how 
the company is being managed and are in a position – somewhat analogous to minority shareholders – 
where they have no legal right to influence or change what they see to be abuses of management of 
conduct contrary to the company’s interest’. 
39 (2010) 5 NWLR (pt. 130). This decision is in line with Rule 2 of the Companies Proceedings Rules 
1992 which provides in s2(1) ‘except in the case of the application mentioned in rules 5 and 6 of these 
rules and application made in proceedings related to the winding up of companies, every application 
under the Act, shall be made by originating summons’.   
173 
 
the alienation of the company’s shares to another party. The court held that an 
applicant for leave of court to commence derivative action must do so by originating 
summons on notice to the company in order to enable the company or its directors 
present their view of the case. The company must also be made a defendant to the 
claim in order to ensure that it will be bound by any judgement given.
40
 As mentioned 
in section 6.3, applicants for leave to bring derivative actions are required to satisfy 
certain criteria. These will be discussed in turns below. 
6.3.2.1 Wrongdoer Control  
As noted above, an applicant seeking to bring a derivative action is required to 
establish wrongdoer control.  The ‘wrongdoer control’ requirement is derived from 
the common law position where minority shareholders seeking to bring derivative 
actions were required to show that the wrongdoers themselves are in control and 
would not take any action to redress their own wrong.
41
 The wrongdoer control 
requirement was intended to provide an avenue for minority shareholders to seek 
redress against directors’ breach in circumstances where the wrongdoers are in 
control and would ordinarily not allow the company to sue.
42
  Therefore where the 
shareholder bringing a derivative action holds a majority of shares (51% and above) 
there would presumably be no justifiable reason why a derivative action should be 
allowed. The majority shareholder can simply bring the action in the name of the 
company in exercise of powers granted by s63 (5)b CAMA.
43
 In this regard, the 
wrongdoer control requirement prevents shareholders from suing derivatively in 
circumstances which would amount to an abuse of the derivative action remedy.   
                                                            
40 See also Abubakri v Smith (1973) 6 S.C 24. 
41 See Edwards v Halliwell (n 26). 
42 See Prudential Assurance Co Ltd (n 26) 211. 
43 CAMA, s63 (5) b allows members in general meeting to institute proceedings on the company’s 
behalf where the board of directors refuse to do so.  
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While the wrongdoer control requirement has its benefits in preventing abuse of the 
derivative action remedy, it nevertheless produces several difficulties and therefore 
acts as an obstacle in the path of shareholders seeking redress for the company. The 
major difficulty with the wrongdoer control requirement is that the concept itself is 
quite vague and imprecise. The pertinent question is what exactly is wrongdoer 
control and how can it be proven? Traditionally under the common law, the 
wrongdoer control condition required that the wrongdoers had ‘de jure’ control, 
meaning a majority of voting shares,
44
 and were using that majority to secure a 
particular course of action in spite of the plaintiff’s expressed objections.45 The 
difficulty with this approach is however particularly evident where the company is 
‘widely’ owned.46 In small private companies, it is conceivably easier to prove ‘de 
jure’ control by the wrongdoing directors.  In larger companies, however, it would be 
especially rare for the directors, either singly or collectively, to own a majority of 
shares. Strict de jure control by the wrongdoing directors is therefore highly 
unlikely.
47
 Worse still, in larger companies it is common for many shares to be held 
by nominees and trustees, such that it becomes extremely difficult for an individual 
shareholder to prove who controls the shares, or whether some shareholders are 
connected with, or have been influenced by, the wrongdoers.
48
  Similarly in any listed 
company there will always be a significant number of shareholders who do not vote 
                                                            
44 See K.W Wedderburn, ‘Derivative actions and Foss v Harbottle’ (1981) 44 Modern Law Review 
202, 205. 
45 S Watkins, ‘the Common Law Derivative Action: An Outmoded Relic’ (1999) 30 Cambrian Law 
Review 40, 51. 
46 ‘Widely’ owned means that ownership is in the hands of very many shareholders, each of whom 
likely owns only a small proportion of the total share capital.  
47 A.J Boyle, Minority Shareholder Remedies (Cambridge University Press) 27. 
48  Reisberg, Derivative Actions (n 22) 92. 
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at all, such that control can often easily be exercised with as little as 20% or 30% of 
votes.
49
  
Directors may also exert significant control over the outcome of a shareholder 
meeting even without holding any substantial shares in the company. Control could 
be attained by coercion, undue influence, familial relationship, friendship ties to 
majority shareholders, bribery of majority shareholders to mention a few. For 
example, in a public company, a person can control votes if shareholders are made to 
believe that he can turn around good profit for the company. In such cases, although 
the shareholders exercise their right to vote, those votes have been tainted by the 
wrongdoers inducement as the shareholders are unlikely to vote against the wishes of 
that person.
50
 Independent shareholders can also be coerced or pressured to vote in a 
particular way or may be made to vote on a resolution in respect of which they lack 
complete information.
51
 
The difficulty with the wrongdoer control requirement was recognised in the case of 
Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Newman Industries Ltd (no 2)
 52
  where the Court of 
Appeal stated that control ‘…embraces a broad spectrum extending from an overall 
absolute majority of votes at one end, to a majority of votes at the other end made up 
of those likely to be cast by the delinquent himself plus those voting with him as a 
result of influence or apathy’. The Court of Appeal in that case therefore expanded 
the concept of control from strictly de jure, to ‘de facto’53, control.  
                                                            
49 Ibid 93. 
50 Ibid 92. 
51  Watkins, (n 45) 51. 
52 [1982] Ch 204, 219. 
53 ‘De-facto’ control may include situations where the directors manipulate the proxy voting system to 
their advantage, or where they exercise some control over the manner in which votes are cast, or where 
they deceive the voters by distorting their view of the facts of the case such that they are unable to 
make an informed decision. See L.S Sealy, ‘Foss v Harbottle- a Marathon where Nobody Wins’ (1981) 
40(1) Cambridge Law Journal 29, 30. 
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However, even this idea of ‘influence’ advocated by the Court of Appeal is itself 
ambiguous and cannot be easily proven. It is very difficult to conceive of all the 
means through which wrongdoing directors can influence a general meeting and 
obtain a favourable decision. Furthermore, fundamental information asymmetry 
problems exist in many public companies such that directors usually possess more 
information than shareholders do.
54
 While in small private companies, it might be 
easier to prove de facto control, the same cannot be said of large public companies.  
Except in very small companies where the shareholders may, presumably, know each 
other’s personal circumstances, it would be hard for a shareholder to know whether 
other shareholders have been subject to some influence or control by the directors. 
This problem is further exacerbated by a system where bribery and corruption are 
familiar problems. Directors can therefore easily pay bribes to majority shareholders 
ahead of general meetings in order to secure a favourable vote.  
The requirement to prove wrongdoer control poses many practical difficulties as 
highlighted above and places applicants seeking to bring derivative action in an 
incredibly difficult and disadvantageous position. It is extremely burdensome and an 
unnecessary hurdle in the way of shareholders seeking redress for wrongs done to the 
company. It is also merely a relic of Nigeria’s common law heritage and should 
therefore be expunged from CAMA in order to properly meet the ends of justice.  
6.3.2.2 Reasonable Notice 
CAMA provides that an applicant for leave to bring a derivative action must show 
that reasonable notice has been given to directors of the intention to bring a derivative 
action if they (the directors) fail to institute legal proceedings.
55
 Derivative actions 
have the effect of depriving directors of the right to exercise their powers to make 
                                                            
54 See Bratton & Watcher, (n 36) 666. 
55 CAMA, s303(2) b. 
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litigation decisions; hence, it is arguably justifiable that they should be given notice 
of an intention to commence derivative actions. Directors should be given the 
opportunity to exercise their power to institute litigation themselves before any other 
person does so on the company’s behalf.56  It can also be argued that the reasonable 
notice requirement is beneficial as it can help prevent frivolous and unfounded 
litigation. The major problem with this reasonable notice requirement however is that 
it fails to specify what exactly constitutes ‘reasonable notice’. Several questions also 
arise in this regard such as who should be given the notice? Is it sufficient to serve 
notice on the erring director or should the entire board be put on notice? What form 
should the notice take? How much notice period should be given to directors? These 
are questions which require answers that are not found in the CAMA or Nigerian case 
law. Hence an applicant seeking leave to bring a derivative action is left confused as 
to the right steps to take and also faces a huge possibility that leave will be refused for 
failing to give reasonable notice; even though no guidance is given regarding what 
exactly this means. This provision might be contrasted with the Canadian provision 
on the subject. Section 239(2a) of the Canada Business Corporations Act (CBCA) 
1985 specifies both the length of notice that must be given (at least fourteen days’), 
and the addressee of the notice (the directors of the corporation or its subsidiary). A 
similar provision would be highly beneficial in providing guidance to prospective 
claimants in Nigeria.  
Another possible concern with the reasonable notice requirement to directors is that it 
may give directors ample opportunity to cover their tracks or to reorganize their 
                                                            
56 Allowing the board to sue, where it is willing to do is also in line with section 63(3) CAMA which 
provides that the board of directors may exercise all the powers of the company except those which 
have been expressly vested by the articles in the general meeting. 
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affairs in a way that will prevent detection of their wrongdoing.
57
  Directors may also 
exercise their powers to take over such proceedings with the intention of doing so in a 
sloppy manner thereby preventing any proper redress of the wrong done.  One further 
concern with the ‘reasonable notice’ requirement is that it is absolute. CAMA does 
not provide exceptions or flexibility in cases where it will be impracticable to give 
notice to the directors.  There may however be instances where it is practically 
impossible to serve notice on directors or where it will be a futile venture to expect 
directors to make an independent and unbiased decision in respect of the issue.
58
 
Some flexibility to enable the court waive this requirement where necessary would be 
therefore more helpful than a compulsory requirement for all applicants to give 
notice. 
6.3.2.3 Good Faith 
An applicant for leave to bring a derivative action must show that she is acting in 
good faith.  The good faith requirement appears to have been derived from the 
equitable doctrine that he who comes to equity must come with clean hands. 
Applicants will therefore generally be disallowed from benefitting from their own 
misconduct.
59
 Hence, in Towers v African Tug Co
60
 it was held that a shareholder in a 
company who has benefitted from the proceeds of an ultra vires act committed by the 
directors with full knowledge of the facts could not then maintain an action against 
those directors. The good faith requirement is common in most common law 
                                                            
57 K Aina, ‘Current Developments in The Law on Derivative Action in Nigerian Company Law’ 
<http://www.academia.edu/7175946/CURRENT_DEVELOPMENTS_IN_THE_LAW_ON_DERIVA
TIVE_ACTION_IN_NIGERIAN_COMPANY_LAW>, 13 accessed 24th August 2016. 
58 ibid 13. 
59 E.C Mujih, ‘The New Statutory Derivative Claim: A Paradox of Minority Shareholder Protection: 
Part 2’ (2012) 33(4) Company Lawyer 99,101. 
60 [1904] 1 Ch. 558. 
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jurisdictions that have a statutory derivative action regime.
61
 The term good faith is 
not described in CAMA and indeed can hardly be defined with precision. As 
Reisberg notes that ‘the definition of good faith is somewhat tortuous and indirect’.62 
Its exact meaning would usually depend on the context of the case and as such, its 
determination is better left to the court’s discretion.  
In Nigeria, there are no reported cases on good faith within the context of derivative 
actions, however generally the courts have held that an action is in good faith where it 
has been done ‘honestly’, irrespective of whether it has been done negligently.63 In 
examining what good faith means within the context of derivative actions, it is 
helpful to examine decisions on the subject from courts in other jurisdictions. In 
determining ‘good faith’ for the purposes of a derivative action, the court may 
consider two issues. First, the court may consider whether the applicant has an honest 
belief that there are good grounds for the complaint and that the action has a 
reasonable chance of success. Second, it will consider whether the claimant has some 
collateral purpose in bringing the action which would amount to an abuse of 
process.
64
  In order to satisfy the ‘good faith’ condition, it has been held that the 
derivative action should be brought bonafide in the company’s interests and not for 
some ulterior purpose. Hence, in the English case of Barrett v Duckett
65
 the Court of 
Appeal held that the claimant had an ulterior motive in bringing the derivative action 
which was not being pursued in the company’s best interest but rather as a result of 
                                                            
61 See Canada Business Corporations Act RSC 1985 c C-44, s 239(2) b; UK Companies Act 2006, 
s263(3) a.  
62 A Reisberg, Theoretical Reflections on Derivative Actions in English Law: The Representative 
Problem’ (2006) 3(1) European Company and Financial Law Review 69,102. 
63 See Shodeinde v Reg. trustees of Ahmadiya (1983) LPELR-3064 (SC). 
64 J.P Sykes, ‘The Continuing Paradox: A Critique of Minority Shareholder and Derivative Claims 
under the Companies Act 2006’ (2010) 29(2) Civil Justice Quarterly 205-234, 219. See also A Keay 
and J Loughrey, ‘Something Old, Something New, Something Borrowed: An Analysis of the New 
Derivative Action under the Companies Act 2006’ (2008) 124 Law Quarterly Review 469, 489. 
65 [1995] B.C.C 362. 
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the matrimonial dispute between the applicant’s daughter and the defendant. The 
action was refused because it was not brought bonafide rather it was brought because 
of personal vendetta.  
Ill feelings alone would however usually not be considered as evidence of bad faith as 
to decide otherwise would frustrate derivative actions in a large number of cases.
66
 As 
Palmer J noted in the Australian case of Swansson v Pratt
67
 that ‘it is not the law that 
only a plaintiff who feels goodwill towards a defendant is entitled to sue’. Hence, the 
fact that there is some animosity between the applicant and the defendant is not 
sufficient evidence of bad faith. However where the action is solely motivated by 
personal vendetta, good faith would be considered absent.
68
 The court in determining 
an applicant’s good faith may also consider whether the applicant has come with 
clean hands.
69
 An applicant will not be regarded as a proper person to bring a 
derivative action where the applicant’s conduct is tainted or where the applicant has 
knowingly benefitted from the wrongdoing that is now being complained.
70
  
In addition to this, it has been held by the English Court of Appeal that a derivative 
action ought to be brought for the company’s benefit and not for some other 
purpose.
71
 In spite of this however, the fact that the applicant would get some 
personal benefit from bringing the derivative action is often not necessarily an 
evidence of bad faith as long as the main purpose of the action is to benefit the 
                                                            
66 J Tang, ‘Shareholder Remedies: Demise of the Derivative Claim’ 2012 1(2) UCL Journal of Law 
and Jurisprudence 178,193. 
67 [2002] NSWSC 583; (2002) 42 A.C.S.R 313 @ [41]. 
68 One possible problem here is the difficulty in differentiating between an action which is motivated 
by malice or animosity and that which is motivated by personal vendetta. See Keay and Loughrey (n 
64) 487-488. 
69  The ‘clean hands’ requirement has been criticized by Payne who opines that a derivative action is 
brought for the benefit of the company therefore the minority shareholder’s behavior ought to be 
irrelevant to the court’s decision.  See J Payne, ‘“Clean Hands” in Derivative Actions’ (2002) 61(1) 
Cambridge Law Journal 76, 81. 
70 See Nurcombe v Nurcombe (1984) 1 B.C.C 99269. 
71 ibid 99273. 
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company. This was the decision of the court in the English case of Iesini v Westrip 
Holdings Ltd
72
  where Lewinson J held that ‘if the claimant brings a derivative claim 
for the benefit of the company, he will not be disqualified from doing so if there are 
other benefits which he will derive from the claim’. The most important issue is that 
the applicant must bring the claim for the company’s benefits even if there are other 
personal benefits to be derived from bringing the action.
73
 It follows therefore that the 
determination of good faith lies more in the intent or motive behind the derivative 
action and can only be judged based on individual facts. 
6.3.2.4 Interest of the Company 
In order to grant leave to bring derivative action, the court must be satisfied that it 
‘appears’ to be in the company’s interests to do so.  It is important that derivative 
actions be allowed only where it is in the company’s interest. This requirement is 
therefore important in order to sift out vexatious suits or actions that are just intended 
to harass directors for decisions made in the course of business. Directors may 
sometimes make business decisions which go awry, they cannot however be dragged 
to court for every business decision that goes wrong. Hence, it is important to 
distinguish those actions that may be in the company’s interest from those just 
intended to subject directors to unnecessary scrutiny.  Derivative actions which are 
not in the company’s interest would lead to a waste of time and resources. They could 
also make directors overtly cautious and risk averse in making business decisions, 
which could have an adverse effect on companies as a whole.
74
 
In spite of the many benefits of this requirement, it nevertheless comes with its own 
unique challenges. The first problem here is the difficulty with determining that an 
                                                            
72  [2010] BCC 420, 448. 
73 ibid 422 
74 See Reisberg, (n 22) 49.  
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action is in the company’s interest at the preliminary stage when the main claim is yet 
to be litigated. Determination of this issue would invariably entail delving into the 
merits of the case itself leading to a mini trial at the leave stage, and perhaps even 
involving the examination and cross-examination of witnesses.
75
  This has been the 
experience in Canada. Kaplan and Elwood note that the ‘interests of the corporation’ 
test under the British Columbia Company Act
76
 has become a ‘significant, costly and 
time-consuming battleground in leave proceedings’.77 Parties often ‘produce 
voluminous affidavits, apply for and receive orders to cross-examine on the 
affidavits, pursue document production motions and opposition’ thereby wasting a 
large amount time and money.
78
 Having such a lengthy and inevitably costly trial 
merely to determine whether an action is in the company’s interest is itself hardly in 
the company’s best interests. The very point of applying the ‘interest of the company’ 
criterion is to protect the company from being burdened by the cost of unnecessary 
litigation, not to add to those costs.
79
   
A second problem with this criterion lies with the difficulty in the exact determination 
of the phrase ‘interest of the company’. While it is important that a derivative action 
be allowed only where it is in the company’s interest, that ‘interest’ can hardly be 
judged with certainty or precision. The interest of the company may be subject to 
different interpretations depending on the criteria used to judge it. The determination 
of a company’s interest in a derivative action also raises different factual and legal 
                                                            
75 F.A Gevurtz, ‘Who Represents the Corporation? In Search of a Better Method for Determining the 
Corporate Interest in Derivative Suits’ (1985) 46 University of Pittsburgh Law Review 265,302.  An 
example of the potential that a preliminary process could to lead to a lengthy hearing is seen in the 
hearings conducted to approve settlement of derivative actions in the USA which have sometimes 
dragged on as long as proper trials.  
76 Note that the British Columbia Company Act is now replaced by the Business Corporations Act 
2002 which came into force in 2004. 
77 W Kaplan Q.C and B Elwood, ‘The Derivative Action: A Shareholder’s “Bleak House”?’ (2003) 36 
(3) University of British Columbia Law Review 443,460.  
78 Ibid.  
79 Gevurtz (n 75) 304. 
183 
 
issues for the court’s consideration. Some of the issues to be considered include the 
probability of the plaintiff’s success in the action, the potential size of recovery, and 
the different costs to the company.
80
 The costs to the company would include both the 
financials cost of defending the action as well as other intangible costs such as the 
potential distraction to the company’s personnel, the time lost in defending the action 
and its impact on the company,
81
 the effect of the suit on the employee’s morale and 
the possible negative publicity which might accrue to the company.
82
 Another 
intangible cost that may be considered is the possibility of strained relations with the 
defendants and the availability of other qualified personnel to replace the defendant if 
necessary.
83
  
All of the issues to be considered by the court in determining the interest of the 
company would involve substantial discovery and can barely be done without delving 
into the merits of the case.  There are also substantial difficulties in assessing the 
extent of the intangible costs which will be incurred in bringing a derivative action.  
Intangible costs such as time lost in pursuing a derivative action and its impact or the 
adverse effects of the action on the company’s employees can hardly be calculated 
with precision. An additional difficulty with this criterion lies in the wide discretion 
given to judges to determine whether or not an action is in the company’s interest. No 
criteria are given which may guide the courts in their decision. It therefore leaves 
room for judicial arbitrariness.  
The discussion in this section has shown that each criterion which a prospective 
applicant is required to satisfy comes with its own unique difficulty. While some such 
                                                            
80 Ibid 298. 
81 The directors may be tied up in litigation for a lengthy period detracting them from their real 
responsibilities to the company. 
82 Gevurtz (n 75) 299 
83 ibid 299. 
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as the ‘wrongdoer control’ requirements are inherently problematic and should be 
expunged, others such as the ‘reasonable notice’ and ‘interests of the company’ 
requirement are in need of some clarification. Although it is necessary to have some 
mechanism for screening out frivolous derivative actions intended to waste the 
company and its directors time and resources, the approach adopted by CAMA is 
ineffective as it places an undue burden on potential applicants.  It is also highly 
ambiguous leaving room for judicial arbitrariness and corruption to thrive. The 
Nigerian statutory derivative actions regime is therefore in need of significant reform.  
6.3.3 Shareholder Approval and Derivative Actions under CAMA 
The preceding section has identified the various weaknesses of the Nigerian statutory 
derivative actions regime. It is however important to also identify its strengths, if any. 
One particular strength of the Nigeria’s statutory derivative action is its provision on 
the effect of shareholders’ approval on derivative actions. This is found in section 305 
CAMA which provides that  
An application made or an action brought or intervened in under 
section 303 of this Act shall not be stayed or dismissed by reason 
only that it is shown that an alleged breach of a right or a duty owed 
to the company has been or may be approved by the shareholders of 
such company, but evidence of approval by the shareholders may be 
taken into account by the court in making an order under section 304 
of this Act. 
Shareholder approval may generally be in the form of an authorisation or ratification. 
‘Authorisation’ occurs where a prospective breach is approved before it occurs (ex 
ante) while ‘ratification’ is said to have taken place where a past breach is approved 
after its occurrence (ex post). The provision of section 305 is to the effect that 
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shareholder approval is merely a ‘discretionary factor’ that the courts may take into 
account in deciding whether to grant leave, but which does not preclude leave being 
granted. Majority shareholders are therefore, in effect, deprived of the power to 
decide which breaches will be enforced and which ones will be forgiven. In light of 
this, it may be argued that this provision is prejudicial to the time honoured principle 
of majority rule which is to the effect that once the majority approves of a breach 
committed against the company then an individual shareholder is precluded from 
bringing an action in respect of that breach.
84
  
In spite of this however, an argument may be made in support of this provision. 
Indeed, it can be argued that section 305 is highly beneficial as it prevents the 
majority from retaining the power to determine which breaches will be enforced 
thereby potentially compromising the company’s interests.85 It is easy to imagine 
instances where the majority will have selfish interests in approving a breach of duty 
to the detriment of the company’s interests. This is more so in a country like Nigeria 
where some companies have majority shareholders holding a large percentage of 
shares.
86
 It is therefore possible that one or two majority shareholders who have 
personal relations with directors may use their large shareholdings to prevent redress 
of a breach in their own personal interest thereby neglecting the company’s interests. 
While the principle of majority rule remains a core part of company law and should 
not be discarded, it should however be applied with some flexibility. Section 305 
does not discard this fundamental rule rather it refrains from making it a bar to 
derivative actions choosing instead to allow judges exercise their discretion in the 
matter. 
                                                            
84 See Edwards v Halliwell (n 25). 
85 I.O Bolodeoku, ‘Corporate Governance: The Law’s Response to Agency Costs in Nigeria’ (2006-
2007)32 Brooklyn Journal of International Law 467,517. 
86 See section 4.4, chapter 4. 
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In addition to this, the issue of shareholder approval particularly ratification in 
derivative actions has been the subject of much debate and uncertainty. Section 305 is 
therefore highly commendable in its flexible approach as it avoids all the problems 
associated with an absolute bar approach. Hence all the legal arguments regarding 
what constitutes a valid ratification and whether the wrongdoers can vote to ratify 
their wrong do not apply here.
87
 The decision is left to the court who can then judge 
each case on its individual facts rather than a generic bar to derivative actions where 
the breach has been approved which might lead to injustice in certain cases. 
Admittedly, the discretion given to the court in this regard may be criticized for its 
subjective nature which produces some level of uncertainty;
88
 nevertheless this does 
not defeat the beneficial effect of this provision. There will always be some conflict 
between the need to promote certainty in derivative actions and the need to ensure the 
ends of justice are met. As noted by Watkins ‘… the balancing of these two 
legitimate interests may perhaps be seen as the greatest ideological challenge facing 
proponents of derivative action reform’.89 In this regard, the need to meet the ends of 
justice perhaps trumps the need for legal certainty.  
The discussion in the last three sections have shown that there are difficulties with the 
Nigerian statutory derivative actions regime which hinders their effectiveness as an 
enforcement mechanism.  The Nigerian statutory derivative action regime is therefore 
in need of significant reforms. The pertinent question to ask however is whether these 
reforms, if executed, would significantly improve the effectiveness of derivative 
actions as an enforcement regime in Nigeria. This question must be answered 
negatively. The problems with derivative actions as an enforcement mechanism in 
                                                            
87 See C Riley, ‘Derivative Claims and Ratification: Time to Ditch Some Baggage’ [2014] Legal 
Studies 34(4) 582-608 for analysis of the argument on ratification of breaches of directors’ duties.  
88 See Watkins (n 45) 58. 
89 ibid 58 
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corporate law are not limited to the substantive provisions of the law. Derivative 
actions are generally fraught with other inherent difficulties, which prevents their 
effective use as an enforcement action in corporate law. Hence, even if necessary 
reforms were carried out to the Nigerian statutory derivative actions regime, the 
future still looks bleak in terms of its ability to serve as an effective enforcement 
mechanism in corporate law. These inherent difficulties will be the subject of 
discussion in the next section.  
6.4 Inherent Difficulties with Derivative Actions as an Enforcement 
Mechanism.  
Derivative actions are generally fraught with certain inherent difficulties. Several 
commentators have identified these difficulties. Indeed Parkinson argues that ‘there 
are motivational and technical problems that deter the bringing of private 
proceedings, notwithstanding that an action might self-evidently be beneficial to the 
company’.90 These ‘problems’ which include lack of incentive, the funding problem 
and information asymmetry will be discussed in this section.  
6.4.1 Lack of Incentive 
The fundamental difficulty which hinders shareholders from instituting derivative 
actions or other private enforcement actions is the lack of incentive to do so. Minority 
shareholders generally do not have the incentive to bring derivative actions. This 
incentive problem arises from the fact that a derivative action is an enforcement 
action brought on the company’s behalf. The company is the real plaintiff in a 
derivative action and therefore in most cases any damages or other relief obtained 
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goes directly to the company.
91
 Hence, even when the derivative action is successful, 
it is the company that benefits from the damages awarded and the claimant may only 
receive an indirect benefit in the event that the proceedings lead to a rise in share 
price.
92
 This sort of pro rata gain is not even guaranteed as a successful derivative 
action may lead to a reduction in share value and not an increase possibly due to bad 
publicity associated with the case or loss of confidence in the directors’ abilities.93 
Hence, shareholders generally lack the incentive to commence litigation for claims in 
respect of which they cannot directly benefit.
94
  
In addition to the fact that claimant shareholders do not directly benefit from 
instituting derivative actions, they are further faced with the ‘free rider’ problem. The 
free rider problem arises because shareholders who do not participate in bringing the 
litigation or bear any risk involved in litigating will benefit from the claim if it is 
successful. This may cause shareholders to refrain from litigating in order to prevent 
other shareholders from benefitting from their efforts or even in the hope that 
someone else will commence the enforcement action.
95
  A minority shareholder who 
seeks to bring a private enforcement action would have to spend considerable time 
and effort in investigating the board’s activities and then pursuing the enforcement 
action.
96
 After expending the time and effort involved in litigating, other shareholders 
easily freeride on the activist shareholders’ efforts. Therefore, where the action 
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succeeds, all the shareholders benefit including those who did nothing. A prospective 
plaintiff who is aware that the company and other shareholders will free ride on his 
efforts is unlikely to have an incentive to sue. He is more inclined to leave it to 
someone else to do the ‘dirty work’. However if all shareholders share this view, then 
the likelihood of getting a shareholder who will take the bold steps to institute 
litigation is quite slim.
97
 The incentive problem is therefore one of the biggest 
difficulties preventing shareholders from bringing derivative actions which cannot be 
resolved even by reform of the rules governing derivative actions.  
6.4.2 The Cost Problem 
The question of costs in derivative actions is an important issue in any discussion of 
derivative actions. This is because it affects, to a large extent, the impetus to use 
derivative actions as a mean of seeking redress for directors’ misconducts. As 
Reisberg has pointed out that ‘litigation is expensive’ and cost represents a major 
obstacle preventing shareholders from bringing derivative actions to enforce rights 
due to the company.
98
 The question of cost will therefore often be the first factor 
which would influence a shareholder’s decision whether or not to pursue a derivative 
action.
99
  The significance of the cost issue was also recognised by Kershaw who 
argued that the extent to which derivative actions would function as an effective 
enforcement mechanism depends not only on the rules providing access to derivative 
actions but also on the rules which determine who bears the legal costs of instituting 
derivative actions.
100
  
CAMA makes some provision for reimbursing the costs incurred in bringing 
derivative actions. Section 304(2)d CAMA provides that the company may be 
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ordered to pay ‘reasonable legal fees’ incurred by the applicant in connection with the 
derivative action. The court is also given the power to order the company to pay 
‘interim costs’ to the applicant even before the final disposition of the action.101 There 
are however certain problems with this indemnity provision contained in CAMA. The 
first is in regards to the fact that the court’s power in indemnifying the plaintiff for 
costs incurred is merely discretionary. Hence, there is no guarantee that the court will 
order reimbursement of legal fees.  This is a major problem for an applicant 
considering bringing a derivative action because in the event that the court decides 
not to make an indemnity cost order, the applicant will be faced with a mountain of 
legal fees to deal with. This provision also does not specify whether the outcome of 
the case may have any bearing on the grant of the cost order.
102
 In addition to this, the 
provision clearly stipulates that the company will only be ordered to pay ‘reasonable 
legal fees’. This is however problematic as the term is itself ambiguous, one therefore 
wonders what amount would be considered ‘reasonable’ by the courts. 
Aside from the specific difficulty with the indemnity cost order provision in CAMA, 
indemnity cost orders generally do not provide any incentive for shareholders to bring 
derivative actions.  Therefore, while it is sometimes believed that indemnity cost 
orders can provide a substantial incentive to use derivative actions, this is not the 
case.  As argued by Reisberg that the view that indemnity cost orders can increase 
shareholders’ incentive to litigate ‘ignores the realities of derivative action 
litigation’.103 He argues that providing an indemnity order does not cure the funding 
problem neither does it provide a strong incentive to litigate. Shareholders who bring 
                                                            
101 CAMA s308. 
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derivative actions have very little to gain from it even if the action is successful.
104
 A 
derivative action, as noted earlier in this chapter, is intended to be used to redress 
wrongs done to the company as a whole. Hence, even when the litigation is 
successful, the damages are awarded to the company. The applicant in a derivative 
action is therefore in a very precarious position, as there are no direct personal 
benefits from bringing a derivative action rather the applicant faces the prospects of 
incurring significant costs. If the derivative action is successful the company as a 
whole benefits, however the increase in the value of the shareholder’s shares is 
unlikely to be sufficient to justify all the efforts involved in bringing the derivative 
action.
105
  In addition to this, the applicant is faced with the prospects of paying not 
only his own legal fees but also that of the other party if he loses the case. This is 
based on the fact that in many common law jurisdictions, including Nigeria, ‘costs 
follow events’.106 Thus, the applicant may have to pay not only his own legal costs, 
but also that of the other party. In these circumstances, there is a real incentive for 
prospective applicants to decide to do nothing, but rather wait for someone else to 
take action to redress the wrong done. 
The cost problem causes general difficulty with the derivative actions regime even in 
the presence of a suitable legal framework governing it. Commenting on this 
difficulty with regards to Australia, Tomasic opines that the failure of private 
enforcement actions for breaches of Australian corporations’ law has been attributed 
to the costs of bringing such enforcement actions and the evidentiary problems faced 
by those who litigate such cases.
107
 The cost problem is therefore a fundamental 
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aspect of private enforcement actions which cannot be easily resolved.  Attempts to 
increase private enforcement actions simply by indemnifying the plaintiffs for their 
costs or lowering the procedural requirements faced by shareholders are therefore 
unlikely in themselves to secure a significant increase in private enforcement 
actions.
108
  
6.4.3 Information Asymmetries 
Another problem which makes it difficult to effectively enforce breach of corporate 
law using derivative actions is the lack of access to information by potential litigant 
shareholders. Enforcement of a standard requires not only information regarding the 
standard but also information about its breach.
109
 Shareholders however often lack 
sufficient information about directors’ misconduct to enable proper enforcement. 
Information asymmetries exist in companies, especially public listed companies, 
which makes it difficult for shareholders to get access to full information about any 
issue.
110
 Management, to a certain extent, determine the type of information that 
shareholders receive hence shareholders may feel that they are too uninformed or not 
in the best position to question management.
111
  Directors also know the amount of 
harm caused by their misconduct while shareholders do not.
112
 Therefore, even where 
shareholders have become aware of a problem possibly through press speculation or 
‘whistle blowing’, they are faced with the difficulty of gathering sufficient 
information to enable them prove the wrongdoing.  This can be particularly important 
in derivative actions as most of the information would be in the hands of the 
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directors. 
113
 Shareholders therefore often lack the information which is needed to 
build a strong derivative action case. Directors on the other hand have access to all 
the information and in house counsels (legal advice) to which shareholders do not 
have access. Consequently, shareholders are in a particularly weak position with 
regards to assessing the strength of their claim against directors.
114
 
Although shareholders receive information about the company through the 
company’s annual reports and other company documents circulated to them as well as 
through the general meetings, these sources of information are often inadequate.
115
  
While the profit and loss account may reveal poor performance, it will not identify 
the particular businesses or transactions that resulted in that poor performance.
116
 The 
directors’ report is also unlikely to be of help in this regard. Cases of directors’ 
malpractice are therefore not likely to be brought to the members’ attention. 
Similarly, auditors owe no duty to investigate management’s effectiveness or to 
comment on business decisions made by directors. Therefore, even auditors are 
unlikely to be a good source of information about managerial misconduct.
117
  
 In addition to this, shareholders do not have a general right to information about the 
company’s affairs asides from information which the company is statutorily required 
to disclose. Shareholders also often have only limited rights with respect to inspection 
of company documents and indeed have no right to inspect certain company files. 
Similarly, opportunities to ask questions at the annual general meeting are unlikely to 
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be of much use in these instances.
118
 Therefore shareholders suffer from severe 
‘informational disadvantages’ when compared to the board.119  
In the face of all this overwhelming difficulties the incentive problem, the cost 
problem, and information asymmetries, most shareholders would consider it better to 
transfer their shares rather than litigate. The question then is if most shareholders 
would rather not litigate as it is considered a better option to transfer the shares, how 
is effective enforcement to be attained using derivative actions? While Nigeria’s 
statutory derivative actions regime suffers from several defects and is in need of 
substantial reform, these reforms, if done, are still unlikely to lead to any significant 
increase in the use of this enforcement mechanism. Derivative actions, as an 
enforcement mechanism, are inherently problematic due to the various issues which 
have been discussed above. It is therefore doubtful whether it can be an effective 
enforcement mechanism in corporate law.  
6.5 Effectiveness of Derivative Actions as an Enforcement Mechanism in 
Nigeria 
This section will examine whether derivative actions have the potential to be, an 
effective enforcement mechanism. The criteria which will be used to judge the 
effectiveness of derivative actions as an enforcement mechanism are those set out in 
section 3.7 of chapter 3. These are deterrence, compensation and cost-effectiveness. 
6.5.1 Deterrence and Compensation 
As discussed in chapter 3, for an enforcement mechanism to be considered effective, 
it must be able to deter the offenders and/or compensate the victims of the 
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wrongdoing. It is therefore worth considering whether the derivative actions remedy 
can be an effective means of deterring offenders or obtaining compensation.  
Deterrence generally depends on the severity, certainty, variety and celerity of 
sanctions.
 120
  In order for an enforcement action to sufficiently deter, the sanctions 
accompanying it must be sufficiently severe. Similarly, the variety, certainty and 
celerity of sanctions must be sufficiently high.
121
  As seen in chapter 5, criminal 
enforcement falls short with regards to these criteria as the certainty of sanctions in 
the criminal enforcement regime is very low. Similarly, delays in the judicial process 
also means that criminal sanctions are very often not swiftly applied. Therefore, while 
criminal sanctions are severe, they fall short with regards to the other criteria.  
Derivative actions are a civil enforcement mechanism. Therefore, they are not 
plagued with some of the difficulties confronting criminal enforcement. For example, 
the standard of proof in civil proceedings is generally based on the balance of 
probabilities, rather than proof beyond reasonable doubt, which obtains in criminal 
proceedings.
122
 Similarly, most of the other protections available to a defendant in 
criminal proceedings do not apply in civil litigation.
123
 Therefore, derivative actions 
are arguably in a better position as an enforcement mechanism in comparison to 
criminal enforcement actions.  
In spite of this however, there are several reasons which hinder the deterrent effect of 
derivative actions as an enforcement mechanism. The first factor to be considered is 
the severity and variety of sanctions. Derivative actions are a private civil 
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enforcement action therefore, the reliefs, which are obtainable, include damages, 
injunctions or declarations. The sanctions available in respect of private civil 
enforcement actions are quite varied however; they have a limited range in terms of 
their varying level of severity. More particularly, damages in commercial cases 
(including derivative actions) are generally compensatory rather than punitive,
124
 
therefore they are unlikely to be sufficiently sever to deter future offenders, as they 
are not intended to punish.  
Certainty of sanctions is also a crucial determinant of the deterrent effect of an 
enforcement action. In order for an enforcement action to have a deterrent effect, 
there has to be a good likelihood that a sanction will actually be imposed where an 
offence is committed. Therefore, where there is little or no probability that the 
sanction will be imposed; the enforcement action is unlikely to reasonably deter 
potential offenders. A search of the law reports database in Nigeria has however 
revealed that there has been no successful derivative action case brought under the 
statutory derivative actions regime.
125
  
As discussed in section 6.3, the statutory derivative actions regime in Nigeria has 
several shortcomings, which hinder its use as an enforcement mechanism.  Section 
6.4 has however further revealed that the difficulties with the derivative action regime 
are not limited to the legal framework governing it. Therefore, while changes in the 
legal framework-governing derivative actions may slightly improve the use of this 
enforcement mechanism, as will be seen in chapter 10, they are unlikely to lead to 
any substantial increase. This is because the difficulties discussed in section 6.4 
above do not relate to the substantive provisions of the law governing derivative 
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actions, rather they are problems which are inherent in derivative actions. Therefore, 
even if Nigeria were to reform its current derivative action regime, this is unlikely to 
lead to a significant increase in effective enforcement of corporate law. The ‘certainty 
of sanctions’ associated with derivative actions is therefore low. In light of the low 
certainty of sanctions which pervades derivative actions in Nigeria, it follows that the 
‘celerity’ of sanctions (speed with which sanctions are imposed) is also low. This 
problem is further compounded by the fact that the Nigerian judicial system is 
characterised by delay in disposal of cases.
126
 Consequently, in the unlikely event that 
a derivative action is instituted in the court, they are unlikely to be quickly 
determined.  
Derivative actions in Nigeria therefore lack a deterrent effect on potential offenders; 
consequently, they cannot be regarded as an effective enforcement mechanism in 
Nigeria. While it may be argued that the defects in the Nigerian statutory derivative 
action regime can be redressed through a comprehensive reform process, the 
discussion in this chapter has shown that the difficulties with derivative actions as an 
effective enforcement mechanism run very deep. They cannot therefore be fully 
redressed simply by changing the content of statute. This conclusion will be further 
reinforced in chapter 10 when we examine the UK as a case study of a country, which 
has undergone a comprehensive reform of its derivative action regime. Therefore, 
while some may argue that the deterrent effect of the derivative action regime can be 
improved by changing the law in that regard, evidence from other jurisdictions that 
have attempted similar reforms shows that this is not the case.  
 With regards to derivative action’s compensatory effect, it must be noted that the 
availability of compensation generally depends on the claimant’s success in the legal 
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action. Therefore, where derivative actions are very rarely brought or only 
unsuccessful where brought, there is no likelihood that compensation will be 
obtained. This appears to be the case with derivative actions. Hence derivative actions 
and indeed private civil enforcement generally, cannot be relied on to deliver either 
effective deterrence or compensation. It is therefore not a primarily effective 
enforcement regime for corporate law in Nigeria as it is unable to meet the key 
purposes of enforcement.  
6.5.2 Cost Effectiveness 
As discussed in section 3.7.2, an effective enforcement action must be cost effective.  
In terms of benefits offered, private civil enforcement actions may offer both 
deterrence and compensatory benefits to the company. They may therefore deter both 
the misbehaving director and other directors from breaching their duties to the 
company. They may also in certain circumstances offer compensatory benefits to the 
company.
127
 As mentioned above, the derivative actions regime in Nigeria currently 
lacks both deterrence and compensatory benefits. Similarly, as argued, this is unlikely 
to change due to the inherent difficulties which hinder the effectiveness of this 
enforcement mechanism. Therefore, the private enforcement regime in Nigeria 
currently offers little benefit to the company and its shareholders. This situation is 
unlikely to change in the near future as discussed in the previous section.  
In spite of this apparent lack of benefits, it is still worth considering what the tangible 
and intangible costs of private enforcement actions are. Private enforcement actions 
generally have both intangible and tangible costs. The intangible costs would include 
the potential negative publicity for the company, the ‘chilling effect’ that litigation 
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may have on the company’s directors causing them to become risk averse128, the 
effect of litigation on directors’ productivity,129  and the possibility of strained 
relations with the director who has been sued. The tangible costs here connote the 
financial cost of bringing private enforcement actions. Due to the difficulty with 
calculating the exact extent of the intangible costs mentioned, focus would be placed 
here on the tangible costs. It may be argued that private enforcement actions such as 
derivative actions would generally be more financially cost effective than criminal 
enforcement actions.
130
 In spite of this however, private civil enforcement actions are 
also very costly to procure.  Private civil enforcement actions make use of the judicial 
system. Therefore, all the financial costs, which are generally associated with legal 
proceedings, are present. The costs here would include court fees, lawyer’s fees, costs 
of investigating and acquiring necessary evidence as well as other miscellaneous 
expenses. As mentioned earlier litigation is expensive,
131
 it is therefore not generally 
the most financially cost effective enforcement mechanism.  
With regards to the cost- benefit balance of private civil enforcement actions in 
Nigeria, the costs of bringing this enforcement action clearly outweighs its benefits. 
As seen in the previous section, the derivative actions regime in Nigeria currently has 
no deterrent or compensatory benefit. The benefit side of the balance is therefore 
lacking. With regards to its costs, while the intangible costs of private civil 
enforcement actions may be ignored on the basis that they may never occur, the same 
cannot be said of the tangible costs. As mentioned earlier, the financial costs of 
bringing litigation are significant. An enforcement mechanism which avoids the 
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financial costs associated with litigation is therefore a more cost effective option 
when compared to private civil enforcement actions. 
In light of this, it has become clear that the private civil enforcement regime falls 
short with regards to its deterrent effect, compensatory benefit and cost effectiveness. 
This is however unlikely to change in the future due to the inherent problems with 
this enforcement regime. The private civil enforcement regime therefore fails to offer 
a potentially effective regime for enforcement of corporate law in Nigeria. This is not 
to imply that the private civil enforcement regime plays no role in the enforcement of 
corporate law, however the benefits it offers in terms of increased and effective 
enforcement of corporate law are sub optimal.  
6.6 Conclusion  
Many countries rely on private enforcement of corporate law,
132
 possibly due to the 
private nature of this area of law; Nigeria is no exception to this. In spite of this, 
however, derivative actions have not been particularly successful in securing effective 
enforcement in Nigeria. In this chapter, we noted a number of problems that currently 
exist in respect of the Nigerian version of derivative actions, namely the range of 
persons allowed to bring derivative actions, retention of the common law wrongdoer 
control requirement, the reasonable notice requirement, and the difficulties which 
arise as a result of the interest of the company requirement. However, we also noted 
that, even if these problems were addressed, there would remain a series of 
difficulties inherent in derivative actions as an enforcement mechanism. These 
include the lack of incentive to bring derivative actions, the cost problem and 
information asymmetries. The conclusion is inevitable. Irrespective of however ‘well’ 
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derivative actions in Nigeria are reformed, these inherent weaknesses and 
shortcomings would remain.  
Therefore, although derivative actions have certain advantages over the criminal 
enforcement regime, they cannot, on their own, secure any significant increase in 
overall enforcement of corporate law in Nigeria. While much of the analysis in this 
chapter has focused on derivative actions, as it is the key private civil enforcement 
mechanism in respect of actions against directors for their breach of duty, the 
shortcomings identified are generally inherent in, and apply to, other private civil 
enforcement actions. Private civil enforcement, like criminal enforcement, is unable 
to deliver effective enforcement. Consequently, there is an important need to seek an 
alternative enforcement regime which has greater potential for delivering effective 
enforcement of Nigerian corporate law. While it is somewhat impossible to create a 
perfect enforcement regime, one must seek to create, and focus on, that which offers 
the greatest potential for effective enforcement. In light of this, the next chapter 
(chapter 7) will examine the public civil enforcement regime with a view to 
discovering whether it offers any advantages over both the criminal enforcement and 
private civil enforcement regimes. 
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CHAPTER 7:  PUBLIC CIVIL ENFORCEMENT IN 
NIGERIA 
 
7.1 Introduction 
As seen in the last two chapters, the criminal enforcement and private civil 
enforcement regimes suffer from significant weaknesses.  While these enforcement 
regimes are not without their benefits and can indeed make very useful contributions 
to a country’s enforcement system, they are unable to secure effective enforcement of 
corporate law in Nigeria.
1
 This chapter, therefore, turns to the third of our three 
enforcement regimes, namely the public civil enforcement regime which offers the 
best potential for effective enforcement of corporate law in Nigeria. It argues that 
compared to the other enforcement regimes, the public civil enforcement regime is 
able to deliver effective enforcement of corporate law. It offers effective deterrence, 
greater potential for securing compensation for victims, and is the most cost effective 
enforcement regime. It is therefore the best option in terms of meeting the criteria for 
effective enforcement. In addition to this, the public civil enforcement regime can 
avoid, or mitigate, many of the difficulties which plague the different enforcement 
regimes in Nigeria. It is therefore the best and most feasible option for achieving 
effective enforcement of corporate law in Nigeria within a shorter time frame. 
Consequently, in reforming its corporate law enforcement regime, there is need for 
Nigeria to focus those reform activities on improving its public civil enforcement 
regime as it offers the greatest potential for delivering effective enforcement. While 
this does not preclude subsequent reforms to the criminal and private civil 
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enforcement regimes, these are currently less of a priority in light of the fact that they 
offer less increase in the overall effectiveness of Nigeria’s corporate law enforcement.  
The term public civil enforcement in this thesis generally refers to civil enforcement 
actions that are undertaken or instituted by public regulatory bodies. The sanctions 
imposed under this regime are considered civil in the sense that a lesser standard of 
proof is generally applicable to actions brought under this regime.
2
 The public nature 
of the enforcement regime is also defined by the fact that an official regulatory or 
enforcement body institutes the enforcement actions in this regime. It is crucial to 
note that the public civil sanctions discussed under this enforcement regime refer to 
sanctions that are imposed by regulatory agencies, quasi-judicial bodies as well as the 
courts.
3
 A regime would therefore count as public civil enforcement irrespective of 
whether or not the sanctions are imposed by the court. Indeed, a key advantage of this 
regime lies in the fact that sanctions can be imposed by regulatory bodies. The 
discussion in this chapter is therefore not restricted to sanctions imposed by the courts 
and is indeed largely focused on civil enforcement by regulators. 
 The chapter begins in section 7.2 by examining the existing public civil enforcement 
regime in Nigeria, and specifically the public civil sanctions which are imposed on 
directors under the Investments and Securities Act 2007 (ISA).  It also examines the 
regulatory bodies which are responsible for implementing and enforcing the public 
civil enforcement regime. Section 7.3 critically analyses the potential theoretical 
advantages of public civil enforcement over both criminal enforcement and private 
civil enforcement in terms of the criteria for determining effective enforcement 
discussed in chapter 3. It argues that the public civil enforcement regime offers 
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several advantages over both the criminal enforcement and private civil enforcement 
regimes. It is therefore the best enforcement regime for corporate law in Nigeria in 
terms of delivering effective enforcement. Section 7.4 then specifically examines the 
Nigerian public civil enforcement regime with regards to the imposition of public 
civil sanctions on directors for breach of corporate law. It views the Nigerian regime 
through the lens of its deterrent effect, compensatory benefits and cost effectiveness. 
It argues that the Nigeria public civil enforcement regime falls short in terms of 
‘certainty of sanctions’ as sanctions are hardly imposed on directors. It therefore 
moves on in section 7.5 to examine the possible reasons for the deficiencies in the 
Nigerian public civil enforcement regime. In spite of the challenges with the current 
public civil enforcement regime in Nigeria, Section 7.6 nevertheless argues that the 
public civil enforcement regime will work in Nigeria. It makes this argument based 
on the fact that it avoids many of the difficulties which undermine the other 
enforcement regimes discussed in the last two chapters. It therefore argues that the 
public civil enforcement regime offers the best potential for increasing, and securing, 
effective enforcement of corporate law in Nigeria. Finally, it offers some concluding 
remarks in section 7.7.  
7.2 Existing Public Civil Enforcement Regime in Nigeria 
Certain public civil sanctions are imposed on directors in Nigeria. These sanctions 
include disqualification orders, pecuniary penalties, forfeiture, compensation orders 
and public censure. The provisions of the law imposing these sanctions will be briefly 
examined here. Similarly, the public regulatory authorities charged with the 
responsibility of imposing these sanctions will be identified.  
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7.2.1 The Investments and Securities Act 2007 (ISA)  
The Investments and Securities Act 2007 (ISA) imposes civil sanctions on directors 
for breach of its provisions. Asides from the criminal sanctions imposed by ISA for 
market abuse offences which have been discussed in chapter 5, ISA also imposes 
certain public civil sanctions. Section 305 ISA provides that where a person 
(corporate or individual) has engaged in any form of market abuse or other violation 
of ISA, or has encouraged another person to engage in such behaviour, the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) may impose a pecuniary penalty or other penalty it 
considers appropriate on the offender.
4
 In addition to this, SEC may also publish a 
statement notifying the public that the offender has engaged in market abuse or other 
forms of violation.
5
 
SEC also has the power to require persons who have breached its laws or regulations 
to compensate any person who has suffered a direct loss as a result of the breach.  
Where appropriate, it may also require the offender to forfeit to the victim any direct 
benefit or advantage derived from the breach.
6
 
7.2.2 Disqualification Orders  
In addition to ISA mentioned above which imposes penalties on directors for breach 
of its provisions, one enforcement action which is worth mentioning separately is the 
disqualification order.  This is necessary as disqualification orders are commonly 
regarded as an important enforcement action.  
                                                            
4 ISA, s305 (3). 
5 Ibid.  
6 See ISA, s303. 
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In many countries, including the UK, director disqualification orders are imposed 
only by the court.
7
 This is however not the case with Nigeria as disqualification 
orders in Nigeria may be imposed by SEC as well as the courts. Section 254 of the 
Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA) generally provides for disqualification 
of persons from being directors or taking part in the management of the company.
8
 A 
disqualification order under this section can only be imposed by the court and is not 
to exceed a period of ten years. 
 In addition to the court’s disqualification powers mentioned above however, SEC 
also has the power to impose disqualification orders on directors of public companies. 
This power has been confirmed by the Nigerian Court of Appeal in the case of 
Olubunmi Oladapo Oni v Administrative Proceedings Committee of Securities and 
Exchange Commission & Anor.
9
 In that case Bunmi Oni, the former Managing 
director of Cadbury Nig. Plc, filed an appeal against the decision of the 
Administrative Proceedings Committee of the SEC disqualifying him from operating 
in the Nigerian capital market, being employed in the financial services sector and 
holding directorship in any public company. Section 13z (bb) of ISA gives SEC the 
power to ‘disqualify persons considered unfit from being employed in any arm of the 
securities industry’. Part of the appellant’s grounds of appeal in that case was whether 
the power of the Administrative Proceedings Committee and SEC in that regard 
extends to members of board of directors of companies registered under CAMA. The 
Court of Appeal held that any public company that issues stocks, shares and 
debentures is part of the securities industry. Consequently, SEC has the power to 
                                                            
7 See Company Directors’ Disqualification Act 1986 (CDDA). Note that the CDDA allows directors to 
give disqualification undertakings which allows the directors to voluntarily disqualify themselves 
without need for court action.  
8 See generally CAMA, s 254 for the circumstances in which a person may be disqualified. See also 
CAMA s257.  
9 (2013) LPELR-20795(CA). 
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check the activities of directors of public companies as they are part of the securities 
industry.  The Court therefore held that SEC has the power to disqualify persons it 
considers unfit from being employed in the securities industry. These include 
directors of public companies.
10
 The exercise of this power does not however detract 
from the disqualification powers conferred on the courts by CAMA. Hence, both SEC 
and the courts have powers to disqualify directors of public companies in Nigeria. 
7.2.3 Public Civil Enforcement Agencies in Nigeria 
As noted earlier, SEC is granted power by ISA to impose civil sanctions on directors 
for breach of its laws and regulations. It carries out its enforcement activity through 
its Administrative Proceedings Committee (APC) and the Investments and Securities 
Tribunal (IST). The APC is an administrative body which is established for the 
purpose of hearing cases regarding violations of the ISA and SEC rules and 
regulators. Similarly, the IST is a quasi-judicial tribunal which is vested with 
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine questions of law or disputes generally 
arising from the operation of ISA.
11
 It has civil jurisdiction to hear cases and impose 
sanctions, and appeals from its decisions goes straight to the Court of Appeal.
12
 It can 
therefore impose civil sanctions on directors of public listed companies for breach of 
any provision of ISA or any other breach relating to the operation of the securities 
industry.
13
 In addition to its exclusive original jurisdiction, the IST also has exclusive 
jurisdiction to hear appeals from the decisions of the APC.
14
 This was the decision of 
the Court of Appeal in the case of Mufutau Ajayi v Securities and Exchange 
                                                            
10 Ibid. 
11 ISA, ss. 284(1) and 294. 
12 See ISA, ss. 290 & 295. 
13 See Court of Appeal decision in Oni v Administrative Proceedings Committee (2013) LPELR-
20795(CA) which confers jurisdiction on SEC in respect of directors of public companies.  
14 ISA, s289. 
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Commission.
15
 The IST is also granted the power to impose a range of sanctions 
including fines, suspensions, withdrawal of registration or licences, specific 
performance and restitution.
16
  
In addition to SEC’s enforcement powers, the Nigerian Corporate Affairs 
Commission (CAC) has oversight responsibilities with regards to incorporated 
companies in Nigeria. Asides from its role as a companies’ registry, the CAC is 
responsible for conducting investigations into the affairs of companies where the 
shareholder and the public’s interest demand.17 It is also expected to perform other 
activities necessary for giving full effect to the provisions of CAMA.
18
 This would 
include ensuring that companies and their directors comply with the requirements of 
CAMA with regards to reporting requirements.   
7.3 Theoretical Advantages of Public Civil Enforcement  
Civil enforcement by public authorities theoretically has several advantages over both 
private civil enforcement and criminal enforcement thereby making it a potentially 
more suitable enforcement system in several circumstances. In section 3.7 of chapter 
3, it was argued that an effective enforcement regime should pursue two purposes, 
namely deterrence and/or compensation. It was also argued that, in addition to 
fulfilling the purpose of enforcement, an ideal enforcement regime should be cost 
effective. The costs of instituting an enforcement action must therefore not outweigh 
its benefits. 
 In this section, it is argued that public civil enforcement enjoys several theoretical 
advantages over both criminal enforcement and private civil enforcement regimes in 
                                                            
15 (2007) LPELR-4533 (ca). 
16 See ISA, s293. 
17 CAMA, s7 (1). 
18 Ibid. 
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respect of fulfilling the conditions for effective enforcement. This section will 
therefore examine the potential advantages of public civil enforcement with regards 
to its deterrent effect, its compensatory benefit and its cost effectiveness.  
7.3.1 Deterrence  
In chapter 3 it was argued that, in order for an enforcement regime to be regarded as 
effective, it must have the ability to deter potential offenders. Moreover, we noted 
that deterrence generally depends on four factors namely severity, celerity, certainty 
and variety of sanctions.
19
 These factors have been discussed in Chapter 3 and do not 
bear repeating here. This section will however examine how the public civil 
enforcement regime fares in relation to those factors which commonly determine 
deterrence. The factors, which will be discussed in this section in relation to 
deterrence, are the variety of sanctions, severity of sanctions, celerity of sanctions and 
certainty of sanctions.   
7.3.1.1 Variety of Sanctions  
One factor which potentially affects deterrence is the variety of sanctions available 
for enforcement. In order to effectively enforce, it is necessary for regulators to have 
a wide range of sanctions available for their use.
20
 Giving regulators a wide range of 
sanctions to choose from will enable them to choose which sanction best fulfils their 
purpose while still preserving the rights of the directors suspected of the breach.
21
 In 
light of this, Lochner and Cain argue that one of the components of effective 
regulatory enforcement is the enforcement agency’s ability to impose a wide range of 
                                                            
19 See s3.5.1, Chapter 3. See also J.M Ivancevich and others, ‘Deterring White-Collar Crime’ (2003) 
17(2) The Academy of Management Executive (1993-2005)114, 121.   
20 M. Gething, ‘Do We Really Need Criminal and Civil Penalties for Contraventions of Directors 
Duties?’ (1996) 24(5) Australian Business Law Review 375, 380. 
21 Commonwealth of Australia, ‘Review of Sanctions in Corporate Law’ (2007) discussion paper 
<http://archive.treasury.gov.au/documents/1182/PDF/Review_of_Sanctions.pdf>, 2.33 accessed 13th 
November 2015. 
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enforcement sanctions thereby ensuring that the agency is not forced to choose 
between ‘low-cost, low impact remediation and high cost, high impact criminal 
sanctions’.22  
Similarly, Ayres and Braithwaite argue that a regulator should have a range of 
sanctions at its disposal.
23
 Where the only sanctions available are drastic ones, the 
regulator is likely to use those sanctions only for the most serious offences as it will 
be morally unfair to impose serious penalties for minor infractions.
24
 Failure to use 
sanctions imposed by laws or regulations however makes those sanctions to lack any 
deterrent effect. In the same vein, where the only sanctions available to regulators are 
threats of criminal sanctions with its connected costs and procedural restrictions, the 
recipients are likely to view the threat of sanctions as an empty threat.
25
 This 
invariably reduces the deterrent effect of the sanctions contained in the books. It is 
therefore worth considering whether the variety of sanctions under a public civil 
enforcement regime are wider or narrower than what is available under both the 
criminal enforcement and private civil enforcement regimes.  
7.3.1.1.1 Comparison between variety of sanctions available under the criminal 
enforcement and public civil enforcement regimes  
It is arguable that the public civil enforcement regime offers a greater variety of 
sanctions than the criminal enforcement regime. Generally, with criminal 
enforcement actions, the usual sanctions imposed are imprisonment, fines, public 
                                                            
22 T. Lochner and B. E Cain, Equity and Efficacy in the Enforcement of Campaign Finance Laws 
(1998-1999) 77 Texas Law Review 1891, 1902. 
23 I Ayres and J Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate’ (OUP 
1992) 35. 
24 ibid 36. 
25 Lochner and Cain (n 22) 1902. 
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shaming and in rare extreme cases, corporal and capital punishment.
26
 However, for 
public civil enforcement the sanctions that can be imposed include stiff pecuniary 
penalties, compensation orders, restitution orders, disqualification orders, injunctions, 
suspensions, specific performance, disgorgement of profits, and public censure. This 
wider range available to regulators ensures imposition of appropriate sanctions in 
different circumstances. Hence, for example, where a disqualification order is 
considered inappropriate because the director is an otherwise fit and proper person to 
manage the company, an alternative penalty such as a high level of fine will usually 
be appropriate to deter the director from further misconduct.
27
  With criminal 
enforcement regimes however, the enforcer is restricted in the sanction which can be 
imposed on the offender and is indeed often restricted to imprisonment or fines. 
It is also essential for sanctions to fit the offence as otherwise they are unlikely to 
have any deterrent effect. Criminal sanctions are however often only appropriate 
where criminality is involved or where directors have acted fraudulently or 
dishonestly.
28
 They are therefore usually used for offences that society considers 
serious or substantial.
29
 Within the corporate law context, this may mean that the 
misconduct is ‘intentional or repeated’, or may affect the market in such a way that it 
necessitates punishment to provide good deterrence or retribution.
30
 Extension of 
criminal sanctions for all breaches or violations could however result in 
                                                            
26 T. C. Newkirk and I.L Brandriss, ‘The Advantages of a Dual System: Parallel Streams of Civil and 
Criminal Enforcement of the US Securities Laws’ (1999) 3(2) Journal of Money Laundering Control 
176,178. 
27 Gething, (n 20)387-388. 
28 Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Parliament of Australia, ‘Company 
Directors’ Duties: Report on the Social and Fiduciary Duties and Obligations of Company Directors’ 
(1989) (Cooney Report), 13.16. 
29 Commonwealth of Australia, ‘Review of Sanctions in Corporate Law’ (n 21) para 2.18. 
30 Ibid 2.18. 
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‘overcriminalization’.31 Hence, in those circumstances where criminal sanctions are 
considered unnecessary due to the fact that the misconduct is not sufficiently serious, 
public civil sanctions ought to be used.
32
 Public civil sanctions therefore play a huge 
role in ensuring enforcement in circumstances where criminal sanctions are 
unsuitable or where rules of criminal proceedings would prevent redress.   
Similarly, public civil sanctions may also be useful where the available evidence is 
insufficient to sustain a criminal conviction or where the offence committed clearly 
lacks culpability.
33
  In these circumstances, public civil sanctions may be considered 
the more appropriate enforcement system. Imposition of criminal penalties in the 
absence of fault or in respect of wrongdoings that are not morally blameworthy 
reduces the efficiency and fairness of the legal system. The use of public civil 
sanctions in these circumstances therefore potentially helps to reduce the chances of 
over deterrence and under deterrence thereby creating a balance.
34
  
7.3.1.1.2 Comparison between variety of sanctions available under the private 
civil enforcement and public civil enforcement regimes. 
The range of sanctions available in a public civil enforcement regime is also wider 
than those in the private civil enforcement regime. Although the private civil 
enforcement regime offers a reasonable variety of sanctions which include specific 
performance, injunctions, declarations, and award of damages, it is still arguable that 
they do not offer as much variety as the public civil enforcement regime. Sanctions 
such as directors’ disqualification, suspensions and public censures are generally 
unavailable in private civil enforcement actions. Similarly, the range of sanctions 
                                                            
31 J. C Coffee Jr, ‘Paradigms Lost: The Blurring of the Criminal and Civil Law Models. And what can 
be done about It.’ (1992) 101(8) Yale Law Journal 1875, 1880. 
32 Commonwealth of Australia (n 21) 2.35. 
33 S Simpson, Corporate Crime, Law and Social Control (CUP 2002) 63. 
34 ibid 74. 
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available in public civil enforcement actions range from very severe to modestly 
severe. This is unlike the private civil enforcement regime where most of the 
sanctions available fall within a similar range, in terms of their severity. Hence, 
public civil enforcement regimes still offer some advantages over private civil 
enforcement in respect of the wide variety of sanctions available.  
7.3.1.2 Severity of Sanctions 
7.3.1.2.1 Comparison between severity of sanctions available under the criminal 
enforcement and public civil enforcement regimes  
Certainly, criminal enforcement regimes can offer the most severe sanctions. 
Imprisonment is the clearest example of this as only very few people would consider 
a fine of any amount to be as severe as imprisonment for life or say twenty years.
35
  
The possibility of imposing a severe prison sentence on an offender gives the criminal 
enforcement regime a clear advantage over other civil enforcement regimes in terms 
of the severity of its sanctions. Imprisonment is generally unavailable under a public 
civil enforcement regime; this is largely due to its retributive and severe nature. Civil 
enforcement actions must therefore rely on alternative and potentially less severe 
forms of punishment.  
In addition to the severity of prison sentences, it is also argued that sanctions imposed 
under a criminal enforcement regime attract greater stigma than sanctions imposed 
under alternative enforcement regimes.
36
 According to Galbiati and Garoupa, 
criminal convictions generally attract higher stigma due to two main reasons.
 37
 The 
                                                            
35 R Posner, ‘Optimal Sentences for White Collar Criminals’ (1979-1980) 17 American Criminal Law 
Review 409,411.  
36 A Keay and M Welsh, ‘Enforcing Breaches of Directors’ Duties by a Public Body and Antipodean 
Experiences’ (2015) 15(2) Journal of Corporate Law Studies 255,260. 
37 R Galbiati and N Garoupa, ‘Keeping Stigma out of Administrative Law; An Explanation of 
Consistent Beliefs’ (2007) 15 Supreme Court Economic Review. 273,274. 
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first is due to the publicity of convictions. Criminal proceedings and convictions are 
often in the public sphere and are therefore generally judged in the court of public 
opinion. This is unlike civil sanctions which may be imposed quite privately. They 
therefore attract greater public stigma.  The second reason is the information about 
guilt which is transmitted by a criminal conviction. Galbiati and Garoupa argue that 
due to the higher standard of proof required in criminal law, criminal convictions 
more reliably convey information about guilt and therefore impose higher stigma.
38
 
Thus even if the fines imposed under a criminal regime are not as severe as civil 
pecuniary penalties, the former nevertheless still carry greater stigma.  
In light of this, it can be argued that criminal enforcement regimes impose more 
severe sanctions than public civil enforcement regimes. Nevertheless, criminal 
sanctions are not invariably  more severe than public civil sanctions. There may be 
instances where the consequences of imposing a civil penalty will be more severe 
than the consequences of a fine imposed criminally.
39
 For example, a disqualification 
order imposed on a director may bar that person from being employed in that position 
for a very lengthy period. This penalty may then justifiably be regarded as being more 
severe than a small criminal fine
40
 even with its associated stigma. Indeed, evidence 
given in the Australian Cooney’s report showed that disqualification orders 
represented the greatest threat to directors in spite of the existence of other sanctions 
such as imprisonment and fines.
41
  It was therefore an effective deterrence.  
Similarly, fines imposed under the public civil enforcement regime may be greater, 
and impose more costs on offenders, than fines imposed as criminal sanctions. A 
                                                            
38 ibid 274 
39 R Tomasic, ‘Corporate Crime’ in D Chappell and P Wilson, The Australian Criminal Justice 
System: The Mid 1990s (Butterworths 1994) 257. 
40 Ibid 257. 
41 Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Parliament of Australia, ‘Company 
directors’ (n 28) 13.26. 
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regulatory authority can order payment of compensation, impose fines and order 
payment of enforcement costs such as attorney’s fees and court costs.42 These costs 
can quickly add up, imposing very severe financial punishments and consequently 
increasing the possibility of deterrence. This further adds credence to the claim that 
public civil penalties where effectively used may have an arguably greater deterrent 
effect than criminal sanctions.  
7.3.1.2.2 Comparison between severity of sanctions available under the private 
civil enforcement and public civil enforcement regimes 
Sanctions imposed under a public civil enforcement regime are quite similar to the 
ones available for private enforcement actions. Nevertheless, the availability of 
certain severe sanctions, which are generally unavailable under the private civil 
enforcement regime, offers the public regime an advantage in this regard. One key 
example is directors’ disqualification. As mentioned above, disqualification orders 
can deprive the director of her livelihood; they therefore represent a very potent 
threat.  Similarly, enforcement actions by regulators often attract more publicity, and 
moral condemnation than private enforcement actions which are often kept in the 
private sphere. They therefore impose greater stigma. While private enforcement 
actions may be seen merely as an internal company dispute between directors and 
disgruntled shareholders, an enforcement action by a public authority is likely to be 
viewed differently.
43
 Hence, while the sanctions available under both regimes are 
very similar, overall public civil enforcement is more severe. 
                                                            
42 Simpson (n 33)74. 
43 A. Keay, ‘The Public Enforcement of Directors’ Duties: A Normative Enquiry’ (2014) 43 Common 
Law World Review 89,110. 
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7.3.1.3 Certainty of Sanctions 
Certainty of sanctions refers to the probability or likelihood that sanctions or 
punishment will be imposed after committing an offence or misconduct. According to 
Simpson, certainty of sanctions is the most important factor that determines 
deterrence.
44
 This is because the higher the likelihood that punishment will be 
imposed, the greater its deterrent effect. It is therefore worth considering whether the 
public civil enforcement regime offers greater certainty than the criminal and private 
civil enforcement regimes. 
7.3.1.3.1 Comparison between certainty of sanctions available under the criminal 
enforcement and public civil enforcement regimes 
As noted above, criminal sanctions are generally considered to be more severe than 
civil sanctions and should consequently have a better deterrent effect, this is however 
not the case.  There is often a very low probability that offenders will be criminally 
punished. This is generally due to the difficulties involved in successfully obtaining a 
criminal conviction thereby undermining the deterrent effect of criminal sanctions. 
Therefore, while in theory criminal sanctions should have a greater deterrent effect, 
the reality is often far from this.  
One of the major reasons for this is the procedural requirements imposed on criminal 
proceedings by the law which makes it difficult to secure a conviction.  As seen in 
chapter 5,
45
 the punitive nature of criminal sanctions requires that criminal procedure 
laws, evidence laws and even human rights law sets standards which are higher than 
what is commonly required for civil sanctions.
46
 Criminal convictions are therefore 
                                                            
44 Simpson, (n 33) 23. 
45 See s 5.4.5, Chapter 5.  
46 See E Lomnicka, ‘Capital Markets Regulation in Nigeria and the UK: The Role of the Courts’ 
(2002) 46(2) Journal of African Law 155,159. 
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often difficult to obtain reducing the certainty of criminal sanctions. Civil sanctions 
do not always face the same procedural restrictions. Therefore, one of the major 
advantages of a public civil enforcement regime is the procedural flexibility and ease 
it offers. For example while the burden of proof required in criminal trials is proof 
beyond reasonable doubt, civil trials only require proof on balance of probabilities.
47
 
This potentially increases the chances of success in civil trials compared to criminal 
trials.
48
  
 Similarly, criminal law’s focus on intent and subjective awareness potentially affects 
the deterrent effect of criminal enforcement, as the courts are unlikely to impose a 
criminal sanction in the absence of intent or some other form of guilty mind. Its 
insistence on ‘greater evidentiary certainty’, compared to that expected in civil 
proceedings, may also reduce the chances of success for prosecutors.
49
  The ease of 
proof and procedural flexibility available under the public civil enforcement regime 
therefore increases the likelihood that sanctions will be imposed thereby potentially 
enhancing its deterrent effect.
50
  
7.3.1.3.2 Comparison between certainty of sanctions available under the private 
civil enforcement and public civil enforcement regimes 
The public civil enforcement regime generally offer more certainty of sanctions than 
the private civil enforcement regime.  While private enforcement actions do not 
encounter the same procedural difficulties as criminal enforcement actions, they 
nevertheless face other types of procedural and substantive restrictions. For example, 
                                                            
47 See Evidence Act 2011, Part IX for the burden and standard of proof required in both civil and 
criminal cases in Nigeria. 
48 J. Oberg, ‘Is It “Essential” to Imprison Insider Dealers to Enforce Insider Dealing Laws? (2014) 
14(1) Journal of Corporate Law Studies 111,128. 
49 J. C Coffee Jr, ‘Paradigms Lost: The Blurring of the Criminal and Civil Law Models. And What Can 
Be Done About It.’ (1992) 101(8) Yale Law Journal 1875, 1878. 
50 Keay and Welsh (n 36) 262. See also M Gillooly and N.L Wallace-Bruce, ‘Civil Penalties in 
Australian Legislation’ (1994) 13(2) University of Tasmania Law Review 269, 270.  
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many jurisdictions require the fulfilment of stringent conditions before shareholders 
can bring derivative actions reducing the likelihood of success in such private 
enforcement actions.
51
 Similarly, cost problems, free rider problem and information 
asymmetries all act as disincentives to private parties (such as shareholders) in 
commencing private enforcement actions.
52
 Public civil enforcement actions however 
less often face such restrictions thereby increasing the chances of success. In addition 
to this, public civil sanctions can often be imposed by regulators without recourse to 
court. This greatly reduces all the procedural requirements and technicalities 
associated with court proceedings thereby potentially increasing the chances of 
success. 
7.3.1.4 Celerity of Sanctions 
Finally, in order for an enforcement action to deter, the sanction or punishment must 
be swiftly applied to ensure that there is a clearer association between the wrongful 
act and its costs (the punishment) in the minds of potential offenders. 
7.3.1.4.1 Comparison between the celerity of sanctions available under the 
criminal enforcement, private civil enforcement and public civil enforcement.  
Public civil enforcement regimes seems to have an advantage over both the criminal 
and private civil enforcement regimes in this regard. Since public civil enforcement 
regimes often confer on regulatory agencies the power to impose sanctions,
53
 
enforcement can be secured without recourse to the courts. This can accelerate the 
imposition of punishment as the procedural formalities associated with the court 
system are avoided. This is especially true for a country like Nigeria, where the 
                                                            
51 See for example UK Companies Act 2006, Part 11. For a full discussion of these restrictions with 
regards to Nigeria see generally chapter 6. 
52 For further discussion of these difficulties, see s6.4, Chapter 6.  
53 F. E Zimring, ‘The Multiple Middlegrounds between Civil and Criminal Law’ (1992) 101(8) Yale 
Law Journal 1901, 1906. 
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judiciary suffers from delay in the disposition of cases.
54
 In addition to this, lower 
evidentiary burdens required by regulators for imposing public civil sanctions may 
allow less time to be spent preparing for the case, thereby ensuring that sanctions are 
more swiftly applied.  
Asides from the procedural flexibility offered by public civil enforcement, it also 
offers greater powers to regulators. Regulators therefore have greater autonomy over 
the enforcement process and can control, to some extent, the speed with which cases 
are resolved. This can be contrasted with the criminal enforcement regime where 
regulators may experience less control over the enforcement process due to the 
powers which have been vested in the prosecutors and the courts. Therefore, failings 
on the part of the prosecutors or the court officials are likely to significantly reduce 
the speed with which the sanctions are applied. Similarly, with private civil 
enforcement, much of the power lies with the courts. Therefore, general delays in 
resolution of court cases affect the speed with which such private actions are 
resolved. The advantage offered by the greater powers vested in regulators under the 
public civil enforcement regime has been  identified by Zimring who emphasises that 
the main advantage of the civil penalty regime over criminal sanctions does not 
necessarily lie in its ease of proof or procedural flexibility, rather its main advantage 
lies in the greater power conferred on administrative agencies.
55
 The greater powers 
conferred on the regulator could therefore have some effect on the speed with which 
sanctions are applied, thereby enhancing the deterrent effect of the public civil 
enforcement regime.  
To sum up, public civil enforcement ‘scores’ better overall than either criminal 
enforcement or private civil enforcement in terms of deterrence. Only on the measure 
                                                            
54 See section 5.4, Chapter 5 for a discussion of this issue in Nigeria. 
55 F. E Zimring (n 53) 1906.  
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of ‘severity’ of sanctions is public civil enforcement outscored by criminal 
enforcement. However, even on this, the problems otherwise besetting criminal 
enforcement more than negate this slight advantage.  Similarly, while private civil 
enforcement actions such as derivative actions could potentially deter, their 
effectiveness is still somewhat limited.
56
 As noted by Parkinson that ‘deterrence, and 
the creation and refinement of standards of conduct and performance, have the quality 
of ‘public goods’ which private enforcers, pursuing only private gains, are liable to 
under-produce’.57 Public civil enforcement therefore outscores both the criminal and 
private enforcement actions. It therefore generally has a greater deterrent effect than 
both criminal and private civil enforcement regimes.  
Table 7.1  
Summary Table on Deterrence 
 Criminal Enforcement 
Regime 
Private Civil 
Enforcement Regime  
Public Civil 
Enforcement Regime  
Variety 
of 
Sanction  
 Very narrow range of 
sanctions available due to 
their retributive nature.  
 
 Wider variety of sanctions 
than criminal enforcement. 
 Range of sanctions 
however still restricted to 
‘non-punitive’ sanctions. 
 Offers greatest variety 
of sanctions ranging 
from modestly severe 
to very severe 
sanctions. 
 This ensures that 
appropriate sanctions 
can be imposed in 
                                                            
56 See A. Keay, ‘The Public Enforcement of Directors’ Duties: A Normative Enquiry’ (2014) 43 
Common Law World Review 89,110. 
57 J.E Parkinson, Corporate Power and Responsibility: Issues in the Theory of Company Law (OUP 
1993) 238. 
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 Criminal Enforcement 
Regime 
Private Civil 
Enforcement Regime  
Public Civil 
Enforcement Regime  
different circumstances 
Severity 
of 
Sanction 
 Sanctions are often very 
severe and attract great 
stigma.  
 However, where fines are 
imposed, the severity of 
criminal sanctions are 
significantly whittled 
down.  
 Sanctions available are not 
very severe due to their 
private nature.  
 Sanctions such as 
disqualification orders 
imposed under a public 
civil enforcement 
regime are very severe.  
 Pecuniary penalties 
imposed under the civil 
regime may be greater, 
and impose more costs, 
than fines levied in the 
criminal regime 
 Public enforcement 
actions attract more 
publicity and 
consequently greater 
moral condemnation 
and stigma than private 
actions.  
Certainty 
of 
Sanction 
 Stringent requirements 
imposed by criminal 
procedure laws, evidence 
 Statutory requirements 
which are imposed on 
private civil enforcement 
 Public civil 
enforcement actions do 
not face the same 
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 Criminal Enforcement 
Regime 
Private Civil 
Enforcement Regime  
Public Civil 
Enforcement Regime  
laws, and human rights 
laws on criminal 
proceedings reduces the 
chances of success. 
Consequently, the 
certainty of sanctions in 
criminal enforcement is 
low.  
actions (e.g. derivative 
actions) reduces the 
incidences of such actions.  
 Private parties also 
generally lack the 
incentive to commence 
private enforcement 
actions.  
 
restrictions imposed by 
statute on criminal 
enforcement and 
private civil 
enforcement actions.   
 The ease of proof and 
procedural flexibility 
also increases the 
likelihood that civil 
sanctions will be 
imposed. 
Celerity 
of 
Sanction 
 Procedural restrictions 
mentioned above may also 
occasion delay in disposal 
of cases.  
 General delays in 
resolution of court cases 
affects the speed with 
which sanctions are 
imposed.  
 
 Sanctions can be 
imposed without 
recourse to courts 
thereby eradicating 
inherent delays in the 
court system 
 Regulators have greater 
autonomy over the 
enforcement process 
and can ensure speedy 
disposal of cases.  
 
223 
 
 
7.3.2 Compensation 
In chapter 3, compensation was identified as one of the main purposes of enforcement 
in company law. Directors may in certain circumstances be required to pay 
compensation to persons who have suffered losses due to their misconduct. In that 
chapter, it was also noted that not all enforcement actions are capable of fulfilling a 
compensatory purpose. Nevertheless, in those circumstances where an enforcement 
action compensates in addition to deterring future breaches, it is highly beneficial 
particularly to the victims of the breach.
58
  
7.3.2.1 Comparison between compensation in the criminal enforcement and 
public civil enforcement regimes.   
As discussed in chapter 5,
59
 criminal enforcement actions are primarily targeted at 
punishing offenders and deterring future offenders. They are therefore not focused on 
compensating victims of the offence. Although the court may in certain 
circumstances order compensation for the victim of the crime, in addition to other 
sanctions, this is not always the case.
60
  Public civil enforcement regimes have an 
advantage over criminal enforcement in this regard as courts and regulators are often 
granted the power to award compensation to victims of the breach. Compared to 
criminal enforcement, public civil enforcement often focuses more directly on 
compensation rather than just punishing or deterring offenders.  Compensation orders 
in these circumstances are also sometimes imposed in addition to other sanctions 
thereby ensuring that the enforcement action fulfils both deterrence and compensatory 
                                                            
58 See section 3.7.1 of chapter 3. It is worth noting that a failure to meet a compensatory purpose does 
not imply that the enforcement action is ineffective. Certain enforcement actions, by design, can only 
fulfil a deterrence or indeed retributive purpose.  
59 See s5.5.2. 
60 For an example, see ACJA 2015, s319.  
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purposes.
61
 This availability of compensation orders under a public civil enforcement 
regime potentially increases its effectiveness compared to criminal enforcement as it 
not only deters further offences but also compensates the victims for losses suffered.  
7.3.2.2 Comparison between compensation in the private civil enforcement and 
public civil enforcement regimes.  
Private civil enforcement actions such as derivative actions are often aimed at 
redressing wrongs done to the company. Directors’ duties are owed to the company. 
Therefore, where there has been a breach, the company should be the beneficiary of 
the award and not individual shareholders.
62
 The implication of this is that victims, 
who are often the shareholders, are generally not compensated for losses suffered as a 
result of directors’ mismanagement or other misconduct. In light of this, Reisberg in 
his analysis of the purpose of derivative actions argues that the compensatory 
rationale cannot fully justify derivative actions.
63
 Shareholders do not actually enjoy 
compensatory benefits from bringing derivative actions. Hence, for him, the primary 
rationale or justification for derivative actions is its deterrent benefits and not 
compensation. 
In addition to this lack of direct compensation, private individuals also have to pay to 
bring private enforcement actions. Therefore, in addition to not getting direct 
compensation for losses suffered, they may also incur additional expenses for 
bringing the private action. This can be contrasted with public civil enforcement 
actions where the costs are borne by the regulator or the government.  Consequently, 
where breaches are enforced through public civil enforcement, the victims of the 
                                                            
61 The UK, for example, makes provision for compensation orders to be made in addition to 
disqualification orders or undertakings. See Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015, 
s110.  
62 See Foss v Harbottle (1843) 2 Hare 461. 
63 See A Reisberg, Derivative Actions and Corporate Governance: Theory and Operation (OUP 2007) 
60. 
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breach are generally better off financially than if either criminal or public 
enforcement actions are pursued.  
 
Table 7.2: Summary Table on Compensation  
Criminal Enforcement 
Regime 
Private Civil Enforcement 
Regime 
Public Civil Enforcement 
Regime  
 Criminal enforcement actions 
are primarily targeted at 
punishing and deterring 
offenders. They are therefore 
not generally focused on 
compensating victims of the 
offence.  
 Private civil enforcement 
actions are aimed at 
redressing wrongs done to the 
company.  
 However, individual 
shareholders do not often get 
direct compensation for 
losses suffered.  Private 
shareholders also incur 
litigation expenses. 
 Regulators are often 
granted explicit powers to 
award compensation to 
victims of the breach.   
 Victims of breach are also 
likely to be better off 
financially as enforcement 
costs are borne by the 
public enforcement 
agency.  
 
 
7.3.3 Cost Effectiveness 
As noted in chapter 3, the cost of enforcement remains a very important factor in the 
determination of its effectiveness.
64
 An optimal enforcement regime should therefore 
be cost effective for the potential enforcers.  Many public regulators often have 
                                                            
64 See s 3.7, Ch. 3. 
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insufficient resources as such they cannot detect, investigate and enforce every breach 
that occurs.
65
  They would therefore usually be required to exercise their discretion in 
determining which breach is worth formally enforcing.  Consequently, where the 
costs of an enforcement action are excessive or outweigh its benefits, regulators are 
unlikely to be incentivized to pursue that course of action.  
7.3.3.1 Comparison between the costs of criminal enforcement and public civil 
enforcement 
 In chapter 5, it was noted that criminal enforcement actions are often not a cost 
effective option as they involve several tangible and intangible costs.
66
 It is therefore 
worth considering how public civil enforcement measures in regards to the cost of 
enforcement.  
Public civil enforcement regimes are generally less financially costly than criminal 
enforcement.
67
 This is due to the fact that the different costs involved in investigating 
the offence, acquiring the required evidence to prove guilt, prosecuting the offence, 
and then perhaps imprisoning the offender do not arise in civil enforcement actions. 
Several reasons may be responsible for the higher tangible costs associated with 
criminal enforcement. These may include the requirements imposed by different laws 
on criminal proceedings. Regulators would generally need to incur several costs in 
order to satisfy the law’s requirements regarding mens rea, the burden and standard 
of proof, acceptable evidence, and witness testimony.  In addition to these costs, 
which must be incurred to increase the chances of obtaining a successful conviction, 
the requisite court fees, prosecutor’s fees and other legal fees still need to be paid. 
                                                            
65 M Welsh, ‘Realising the Public Potential of Corporate Law: Twenty Years of Civil Penalty 
Enforcement in Australia’ (2014) 42 Federal Law Review 217,232. 
66 See s5.5.3, Ch 5. 
67 Keay and Welsh (n 36)262. This section focuses on financial costs due to the fact that the extent of 
intangible costs cannot be easily calculated. 
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 Another factor that makes criminal enforcement actions more financially costly is the 
fact that offences that attract criminal penalties such as insider dealing are often 
committed using sophisticated means. Hence, regulators need to invest resources in 
acquiring the requisite skills, equipment and human resources needed to successfully 
detect them.
68
 With public civil sanctions however, these costs are often reduced. 
While the regulators still need to conduct some level of further investigation into 
allegations or suspicions of misconduct, these costs are likely to be lesser than would 
be required for criminal trials. Asides from the reduced cost of investigation, all the 
other tangible costs associated with successfully prosecuting a criminal case do not 
arise in public civil enforcement actions. As noted earlier, corporate regulators often 
have the power to impose civil sanctions without need for recourse to the courts. This 
effectively eradicates all the costs associated with the court and prosecution fees 
which are necessary for criminal trials.  
On the benefit side, however, in addition to the deterrent and compensatory benefits 
of public civil enforcement, the fines collected in a public civil enforcement regime 
are socially beneficial as they are a source of revenue. Although fines may also be 
imposed under a criminal regime, where the imprisonment sanction is chosen it 
imposes the costs of maintaining the prisoners on the society while yielding no social 
revenue.
69
 It is therefore argued that public civil enforcement regimes are a more cost 
effective option than criminal enforcement thereby making them more functional to 
regulators.     
                                                            
68 See s5.5.3, Ch. 5. 
69 R Posner, ‘Optimal Sentences for White Collar Criminals’ (1979-1980) 17 American Criminal Law 
Review 409,410. 
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7.3.3.2 Comparison between the costs of private civil enforcement and public 
civil enforcement.  
Although many of the costs involved in criminal trials do not apply to civil actions, 
nevertheless private civil enforcement actions impose other costs which are not 
present in public civil enforcement actions. Due to the fact that private civil 
enforcement actions make use of the court system, certain tangible costs inherently 
arise. Some of these costs would include the court fees, lawyer’s fees, deposition fees 
and cost of obtaining necessary evidence, including hiring an expert witness where 
necessary, to mention a few. These costs are inherent in any private enforcement 
action. However as Reisberg rightly notes litigation is expensive,
70
 it is therefore not 
always the most cost effective enforcement option. This problem is further 
exacerbated by the ‘loser pays’ rule which is common in many common law 
jurisdictions.
71
 Therefore, if the claimant loses she is liable for all her costs as well as 
the other party’s own. This makes litigation a particularly costly and risky 
enforcement option. Therefore, while it may be argued that private civil enforcement 
actions are not as costly as criminal enforcement actions, they nevertheless still 
impose substantial tangible costs on the person who institutes the action. Public civil 
enforcement actions on the other hand are more cost effective as sanctions can be 
imposed by the regulators without recourse to courts. This effectively saves the costs 
which would have been expended at the court.  
Table 7.3: Summary table on Cost Effectiveness  
Criminal Enforcement Private Civil Public Civil Enforcement 
                                                            
70 Reisberg, Derivative Actions (n 63) 222. 
71 For Nigeria’s application of ‘loser pays’ rule see Akinbobola v Plisson Fisko (1991) 1 NWLR (pt 
167) 270; NNPC V CLIFCO Nig. Ltd. (2011) 4 S.C (Pt 1) 108.  
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Regime Enforcement Regime Regime 
 Higher costs generally 
associated with criminal 
enforcement due to 
stringent requirements 
imposed by various laws. 
 Offences that attract 
criminal penalties often 
require immense resources 
for successful detection 
and proof. 
 The imprisonment 
sanction imposes costs on 
society without yielding 
any revenue.  
 Certain costs are inherent 
in private civil 
enforcement actions. 
These costs include court 
fees, lawyers’ fees, 
deposition fees and costs 
of acquiring sufficient 
evidence. 
  Litigation is also 
generally an expensive 
option.  
 Costs associated with the 
court system are avoided 
as regulators can impose 
sanctions without recourse 
to the court system.  
 Pecuniary penalties 
imposed under a public 
civil enforcement regime 
are a source of social 
revenue.   
 
The analysis in this section has revealed that the public civil enforcement regime 
offers several advantages over both the criminal and private civil enforcement regime. 
The public civil enforcement regime is cost effective, offers the greatest potential for 
effective deterrence, and compensation for victims. This thesis therefore crucially 
argues that the public civil enforcement regime offers the best potential for delivering 
effective enforcement of corporate law in Nigeria in comparison to the alternative 
regimes                                                                                                                                                                 
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7.4 The Nigerian Experience of Public Civil Enforcement 
As noted earlier on, an effective enforcement regime ought to fulfil certain criteria. It 
is therefore worth examining whether Nigeria’s civil enforcement regime currently 
meets the criteria for effective enforcement. This section therefore examines how 
Nigeria’s civil enforcement regime stands in relation to that criteria. It particularly 
examines the current enforcement situation in Nigeria and identifies whether 
corporate and securities regulators are pulling their weight in enforcement.  
As mentioned previously, Nigerian corporate and securities laws stipulates sanctions 
for various infractions. The sanctions that may be imposed for those breaches include 
pecuniary penalties (fines), compensation orders, injunctions, forfeiture orders, public 
censures, suspensions, specific performance, and disqualification orders.
72
 These 
sanctions clearly cover a good range therefore the Nigerian regulator, in theory, has a 
good variety of sanctions which can be used to redress instances of breach. Nigerian 
securities law also provides for severe civil sanctions. Some of the public civil 
sanctions which can be regarded as severe under Nigerian corporate and securities 
law include disqualification orders, fines, and compensation orders. SEC is therefore 
in a good position in terms of the variety and severity of sanctions in its arsenal.  
In spite of this good variety and severity of sanctions available under Nigerian 
corporate and securities laws, instances of actual enforcement actions are however 
very sparse. As noted in section 7.2, SEC has powers to enforce some breaches and 
impose sanctions on directors.  While the Nigerian Corporate Affairs Commission 
(CAC) also has oversight responsibilities with regards to incorporated companies, it 
has arguably failed in its compliance duties. CAC’s inadequacies with regards to its 
oversight responsibilities is the subject of further discussion in the next section. 
                                                            
72 See generally ISA, ss. 293 (1), 303, 305 (3) 2007.See CAMA, s254.  
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Similarly, while SEC is in a better position when compared to CAC, its enforcement 
activities in respect of directors’ misconducts are also very few and far between. 
There are therefore only very few cases where sanctions have been imposed by SEC 
for breach by directors. One of the well-publicised enforcement actions by SEC 
against company directors is the suspension and disqualification of the CEO and 
some other directors of Cadbury Nig. Plc for fraud and manipulation of its financial 
reports.
73
 Similarly in 2009 the Managing director of Afroil Plc, Mr I.O Sanni was 
disqualified from taking a directorship position in any public quoted company for five 
years and further referred to the EFCC for further investigation and prosecution. He 
was also ordered to refund the sum of N185, 224,660.22 (about £625,000) which he 
had fraudulently converted. Some other directors of the company were also ordered to 
pay a fine of N100, 000 (about £337) each for approving the filing of the annual 
report and accounts.
74
  
Another well-publicised case where public civil sanctions were imposed on a 
company executive is seen in the case of Mufutau Ajayi, the former finance and 
accounts manager of African Petroleum Plc (AP). In that case Ajayi, had in 
association with the company’s auditors prepared a fraudulent prospectus in respect 
of an offer for sale of shares. In 2001, Sadiq Petroleum, after subscribing to part of 
the shares found that AP Plc’s former management had been fraudulent as it failed to 
disclose debts worth N22.5 billion owed to different creditors. Consequently, Ajayi 
was charged with authorising a prospectus containing untrue statements contrary to 
                                                            
73 See T Osundolire, ‘SEC blacklists Oni, Akadiri over Cadbury’s Doctored Account’, 10th April 2008 
<http://www.thenationonlineng.net/archive2/tblnews_Detail.php?id=48570> accessed 2nd September 
2016. See also SEC, ‘SEC Annual report’ (2008) 56  
<http://www.sec.gov.ng/files/Annual%20reports/SEC%20ANNUAL%20REPORTS%20AND%20AC
COUNTS%202008_lite.pdf>, 56 accessed 13th November 2015. 
74 SEC, ‘SEC Annual report’ (2009)   
<http://www.sec.gov.ng/files/Annual%20reports/SEC%20ANNUAL%20REPORTS%20%20ACCOU
NTS%202009_lite.pdf>, 79-80 accessed 13th November 2015.  
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the provisions of ISA. The Administrative Proceedings Committee (APC) found that 
Ajayi had played a major role in concealing the said debts and disqualified him from 
being employed or participating in any capacity in the securities industry.
75
 
In spite of the aforementioned cases of enforcement, an examination of SEC Annual 
reports spanning over the past six years,
76
 reveals that such instances of enforcement 
action against company directors are very few. One must however not be quick to 
conclude that SEC has failed in regards to all its enforcement duties. There is clear 
evidence of enforcement activities by SEC in its Annual Reports. These enforcement 
actions are however in respect of other capital market operators such as stockbrokers, 
issuing houses and investment advisors, which are also regulated by SEC. A quick 
snapshot of SEC’s enforcement activities in its 2013 Annual Report revealed that 
seventeen capital market operators were suspended, thirty-one matters were referred 
to the police, fifty-eight cases were resolved, twenty-one illegal operators were shut 
down and seventy other cases were pending.
77
  None of the enforcement actions 
however related to directors of public listed companies, rather they were in respect of 
other securities issues such as unauthorised sale of clients’ shares, mismanagement of 
clients’ portfolio accounts, non-allotment of shares, non-execution of mandates, 
failure to remit proceeds of sale and illegal operation of fund managers.
78
 The same 
scenario is repeated in its previous annual reports.
79
  
                                                            
75 O. K Obayemi, ‘Protecting Nigerian Investors’ 23 August 2010  
  <http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/protecting-nigerian-investors/80380/> accessed 12th January 
2016. It is worth noting that Ajayi appealed the decision of the APC, his appeal was rejected at the 
Court of Appeal but is still pending at the Supreme Court. This also highlights the delay problem in the 
Nigerian court system. 
76 SEC, SEC Annual Reports, < http://www.sec.gov.ng/annual-reports.html> accessed 13th November 
2015. 
77 SEC, ‘SEC Annual report’ (2013)  
http://www.sec.gov.ng/files/Annual%20reports/2013%20Annual%20Report%20of%20SEC.pdf108 
accessed 13th November 2015.  
78 ibid 107. 
79 See SEC, ‘SEC Annual Reports’ (2011)   
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Table 7.4:  Statistics of SEC Enforcement Activities in 2013 
Suspended Operators 17 
Matters referred to the Police 31 
New cases received 34 
Resolved cases 
 
58 
Pending Cases 
 
70 
Illegal Operators Closed down 21 
 
 
Table 7.4: Snapshot of Enforcement Activities in 2013 (Sec Annual Reports 2013, 
<http://www.sec.gov.ng/files/Annual%20reports/2013%20Annual%20Report%20of%20SEC
.pdf>, 108 accessed 13
th
 November 2015.    
 
Table 7.5: Statistics of SEC Enforcement Activities in 2012 
Suspensions  12 
Cases referred to law enforcement 18 
                                                                                                                                                                         
<http://www.sec.gov.ng/files/Annual%20reports/SEC%20ANNUAL%20REPORTS%20%20ACCOU
NTS%202011.pdf> and ‘SEC Annual Report’ (2012)  
<http://www.sec.gov.ng/files/Annual%20reports/2012%20Annual%20Report%20of%20SEC.pdf > 
accessed 13th November 2015.  
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agencies (Police & SSS) 
Cases referred for enforcement action 31 
Resolved cases  12 
Withdrawals of Registration of CMOs 35 
Illegal Operators closed down  29 
 
Table 7.5: Statistics of Enforcement Activities in 2012 (SEC Annual Reports 2012, 
<http://www.sec.gov.ng/files/Annual%20reports/2012%20Annual%20Report%20of
%20SEC.pdf>, 94 accessed 13
th
 November 2015.  
The tables above reveal evidence of some enforcement activities by SEC; however, 
these enforcement activities are not in respect of directors’ misconduct. Indeed in an 
empirical study by Okpara, respondents to the survey noted that the existing securities 
laws and regulations in Nigeria are ineffective as there is very little enforcement.
80
 
Several reasons may be responsible for this state of affairs and this will be the subject 
of analysis next section. However, the implication of this limited use of public 
sanctions in Nigeria is that the certainty of sanctions with regards to the public civil 
enforcement regime in Nigeria is low. The limited number of public civil 
enforcement actions in Nigeria implies that the likelihood of a public civil sanction 
being imposed on a wrongdoing director is quite low. Therefore, while there is a good 
variety of sanctions as well as severity of sanctions imposed, these sanctions are not 
frequently used by public regulators thereby preventing the public civil enforcement 
regime from having a strong deterrent effect.  Similarly, while ISA makes provision 
                                                            
80 J. O Okpara, ‘Corporate Governance in a Developing Economy: Barriers, Issues and Implications 
for Firms’ (2011) 11(2) Corporate Governance: The International Journal of Business in Society 196.  
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for compensation orders, there is no evidence that compensation has been granted to 
those who have suffered loss as a result of directors’ breach.  
With regards to cost effectiveness, as discussed in section 7.3.3 above, the public civil 
enforcement regime is generally less costly than both the criminal and private civil 
enforcement regime. However, it is currently difficult to estimate the actual costs and 
consequent cost effectiveness of the current public civil enforcement regime in 
Nigeria. SEC Annual reports and accounts show no indication of the portion of its 
budget which is allocated to enforcement or how much it expends on enforcement 
annually. The exact financial costs of public civil enforcement in Nigeria is therefore 
unknown. In spite of this however, it is clear that the Nigerian public civil 
enforcement regime is in need of reforms in order to harness the potential of this 
enforcement regime. As discussed earlier, the main difficulty with the current public 
civil enforcement regime lies in its limited use. It is therefore currently unable to have 
a significant deterrent effect or to compensate victims who have suffered loss. The 
next section will therefore examine the issues and challenges which may be 
responsible for this lack of effective use of the public civil enforcement regime in 
Nigeria.  
7.5 Issues and Challenges Besetting Public Civil Enforcement in Nigeria 
Notwithstanding the theoretical superiority of public civil enforcement and the actual 
powers conferred on corporate and securities regulators in Nigeria to impose 
sanctions on directors, the reality is that these enforcement powers have rarely been 
used in Nigeria resulting in under enforcement. This section therefore examines why 
public civil enforcement in Nigeria has been under-used to date. It suggests that the 
factors that are primarily responsible for the lack of effective public enforcement in 
Nigeria include the shortcomings of the CAC, lack of powers to enforce breach of 
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directors’ duties, corruption, and difficulties experienced by regulators in obtaining 
relevant information about directors’ breach.   
7.5.1 CAC’s Shirking of its Oversight Responsibilities  
The CAC must bear a significant share of the blame for the lack of proper 
enforcement of corporate law in Nigeria.  In spite of the oversight and investigatory 
powers vested on the CAC,
81
 its enforcement activities have been very negligible to 
say the least. The CAC has mostly shirked its oversight responsibilities choosing 
instead to focus only on its role as a companies’ registry. While improvements have 
admittedly been made, over the years, in the manner with which it provides its 
services as a companies’ registry, nothing has been done to enhance its oversight 
function or to ensure that it actually ensures compliance with the provisions of 
CAMA.  
In the 2004 World Bank Report on Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC), it 
was reported that the CAC lacks the capacity to effectively monitor and enforce 
CAMA’s requirements regarding accounting and financial reporting.82  The report 
stated that ‘there are significant weaknesses in the enforcement mechanism which is 
accentuated by a degree of corruption and poor recordkeeping by the Corporate 
Affairs Commission’.83 The situation does not appear to have improved much since 
the publication of the 2004 ROSC. The 2011 Report on the Observance of Standards 
and Codes (ROSC) noted that while CAMA authorises the registrar of companies at 
the CAC to monitor compliance with financial reporting requirements, it fails to do 
                                                            
81 See 7.2.3 
82The World Bank’s Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes is a report which gives a 
summary of member countries’ compliance with some internationally recognised standards and codes 
which includes corporate governance. Reports are prepared and published at the instance of member 
countries. The published reports are regularly updated and fresh reports are produced every few years. 
See World Bank, ‘Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC) Nigeria 2004’ June 17 
2004, <https://www.worldbank.org/ifa/rosc_aa_nga.pdf >    accessed 18th December 2015. 
83  ibid 8 
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this effectively. It also reported that many companies fail to comply with CAMA’s 
requirements regarding financial statements and that in spite of the statutory penalties 
for noncompliance enforcement is weak.
84
  
Despite the damning ROSC 2004 country report, in a study conducted by Adegbite, a 
senior official of the CAC stated that ‘the Commission has been effective in 
satisfying its mandate and can comparatively compete with the company’s registry of 
other jurisdictions. I will rate the performance of the Commission 70 percent in the 
last ten years’.85 While one may agree that the CAC has been reasonably effective in 
its role as a companies’ registry, it falls far short in respect of its compliance and 
enforcement responsibilities. Aside from the two ROSC reports which reveal failings 
in CAC’s compliance activities, the lack of any evidence of CAC’s oversight 
activities shows that the Commission is in serious need of reform in this regard. The 
shortcomings of the CAC were accepted by a senior official of the CAC who noted 
that ‘the Commission’s capacity is constrained by myriad internal and environmental 
problems. Internal problems include corruption and the lack of human expertise. One 
of the environmental problems which also confronts the CAC is the lack of 
independence from the polity and politicians’.86 CAC therefore falls short in regards 
to ensuring compliance with corporate law requirements stipulated by CAMA.  
                                                            
84World Bank, ‘Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC) Nigeria’ (2011) June 6 
2011 <http://www.worldbank.org/ifa/rosc_aa_nigeria_2011.pdf>, 13 accessed 18th December 2015.  
85 E Adegbite, ‘The Determinants of Good Corporate Governance: The Case of Nigeria’ (PHD Thesis, 
Cass Business School 2010) 157.  
86 E Adegbite, ‘Corporate Governance Regulation in Nigeria’ (2012) 12(2) Corporate Governance 257, 
264. 
238 
 
7.5.2 Lack of Powers to Enforce Breach of Directors’ Duties  
As noted in chapter 4, CAMA generally makes provisions for directors’ duties. 
However as many scholars have rightly pointed out, these directors duties alone are 
unlikely to have any deterrent effect unless they are properly enforced.
87
  
Currently, Nigerian corporate law is silent on the subject of enforcement of directors’ 
duties; as such, no explicit powers are conferred on corporate or securities regulators 
to enforce breach of those duties. The question then is whether the existence of the 
power to enforce breach of directors’ duties may be implied. The simple answer to 
this question is presumably No. Nigeria’s common law origin and its reception of UK 
Companies law suggest that the intent of the legislature was to leave enforcement of 
directors’ duties within the private realm, as is the position in the UK. As noted by 
Jackson and Roe ‘the tool of public enforcement (as opposed to fiduciary-oriented 
private litigation before judges) has not usually been strongly associated with the 
common law’.88 Therefore, Nigeria, like its UK counterpart, has often relied on 
private enforcement actions such as derivative actions to enforce directors’ duties. In 
addition to this, there has been nothing in Nigerian case law over the years which can 
lead to an inference that regulators have implied powers to enforce directors’ duties. 
It can then be said that corporate and securities regulators in Nigeria lack powers to 
enforce breach of directors’ duties.  
Although SEC has the power to regulate the activities of public listed companies and 
their directors,
89
 it lacks explicit enforcement powers regarding breach of directors’ 
duties. Shareholders are therefore expected to enforce directors’ duties through their 
                                                            
87 See A Keay, ‘An Assessment of Private Enforcement Actions for Directors' Breaches of Duty’ 
(2014) 33(1) Civil Justice Quarterly 76. 
88 H. Jackson and M. Roe, ‘Public and Private Enforcement of Securities Laws: 
Resource-Based Evidence’ (2009) 93 Journal of Financial Economics 207,237. 
89 See Oni v APC (n 13). 
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control mechanisms and private enforcement actions. The question however is 
whether this approach is effective in securing enforcement of directors’ duties. The 
previous chapter has shown the shortcomings with complete reliance on derivative 
actions as an effective enforcement regime.
90
 The ineffectiveness of derivative 
actions as an enforcement mechanism has also been identified by many commentators 
and is not peculiar to Nigeria as noted by Keay in his analysis of the UK position.
91
 
The situation in Nigeria with regards to derivative actions is however considerably 
worse than the UK as there are hardly any reported cases on derivative actions in 
Nigeria. 
 Asides from the difficulties with the current Nigerian derivative action regime which 
are discussed in the previous chapter,
92
 there are several other problems in Nigeria 
which prevent effective use of this enforcement system. One of these is the problem 
with Nigerian courts. Private enforcement actions generally depend for their success 
on functioning and effective court systems in addition to other factors. As noted in 
chapter 5 however, the Nigerian judicial system is plagued with different issues 
including overburdened court systems, delay in the disposal of cases, corruption and 
infrastructural deficiencies.
93
 It is therefore not as effective as it ought to be. It 
therefore stands to reason that reliance on private enforcement actions, as a means of 
securing enforcement of directors’ duties, are likely to be ineffective.   
The general lack of public enforcement actions by corporate and securities regulators 
in Nigeria could therefore be partly attributed to the lack of powers to enforce breach 
of directors’ duties. A grant of explicit powers to SEC to enforce breach of directors’ 
                                                            
90 See chapter 6 for a proper analysis of derivative actions in Nigeria. 
91 See A Keay, ‘The Public Enforcement of Directors’ Duties’ (n 56). The difficulties with derivative 
actions as an effective enforcement mechanism even in the UK will be discussed in Chapter 10.   
92 See Ch. 6. 
93 See s5.4, chapter 5 for a full discussion of these issues. 
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duties where necessary is a more effective alternative to private enforcement. It 
would also provide the desired push and increase regulators’ incentive to actively 
pursue effective enforcement. In the absence of this type of explicit regulatory 
powers, regulators are unlikely to take any steps in redressing breach of directors’ 
duties. In light of the disincentives faced by shareholders in bringing private civil 
enforcement actions, it is necessary to rely on public civil enforcement of directors’ 
duties as a means of ensuring that company directors adhere to their statutory duties.  
7.5.3 Lack of Information by Regulators on Directors’ Misconducts  
One possible cause of a lack of public civil enforcement actions in Nigeria is the fact 
that such misconducts are rarely reported. Although regulators do not have the power 
to enforce breach of directors’ duties, they nevertheless have enforcement powers 
over directors in respect of some other forms of breach. SEC particularly has 
enforcement powers over company directors in respect of financial misconducts and 
breach of securities laws. It also has authority to examine the records and affairs of 
any entity covered by the ISA. In spite of this however, it is practically difficult and 
infeasible for SEC to conduct routine investigations into the activities of all 
companies. It must therefore rely on information obtained from shareholders, whistle-
blowers, misstatements and inconsistencies in the company annual reports or some 
other evidence of mismanagement or misconduct.
94
 Evidence obtained from SEC 
annual reports revealed that SEC carries out reviews of the annual reports, quarterly 
returns and accounts submitted to it.
95
  Hence, any inconsistencies or issues of 
concern should presumably be subject to some further investigation, which may result 
in enforcement actions. It must however be noted that financial statements and 
                                                            
94 SEC, SEC Rules and Regulations (2013) Rule 9. 
95 See SEC, ‘SEC Annual Reports’, <http://www.sec.gov.ng/annual-reports.html> accessed 1/12/2015. 
241 
 
accounts may sometimes fail to reflect misconducts by directors. Hence, regulators 
would have to rely on other sources of information such as reported breaches.  
While, judging from its Annual Reports, there is evidence that SEC commonly 
receives reports of misconduct and breach with respect to other capital market 
operators such as stockbrokers, issuing houses and investment advisers; there are few 
reported cases in respect of directors.
96
  Hence, there is some evidence that such 
breaches are not commonly reported. This could be due to ignorance by shareholders 
about directors’ misconducts as a result of information asymmetry. It could also be 
due to lack of proper laws to protect whistle-blowers from reprisals. Section 306 ISA 
provides that employees of capital market operators and public companies have a 
right to disclose information regarding the commission of a criminal offence or 
failure of any person in the workplace to comply with legal obligations to which he is 
subject. It also provides that where a disclosure has been made in that regard the 
employee is not to be subjected to any detriment by reason of the disclosure made and 
may make a complaint to SEC if he suffers any detriment.
97
 While this provision 
provides some protection for the whistle-blowers, it does not contain any 
inducements which may encourage disclosure of the information. Similarly, people 
who are likely to be in the position to make such disclosures are unlikely to be aware 
of the protection available to them under this section hidden in ISA. More publicity 
with regards to the existence of protection for whistle-blowers and preferably a 
separate legislation in this regard would therefore be useful in informing the public 
about the availability of this reporting channel.   
                                                            
96 One reported case of director misconduct was a complaint filed by the Onitsha Shareholders 
Association against the managing director of Okomu Oil Palm Plc for misappropriation and financial 
impropriety. See ‘SEC Annual Report 2010’   
<http://www.sec.gov.ng/files/Annual%20reports/SEC%20ANNUAL%20REPORTS%20&%20ACCO
UNTS%202010_lite.pdf>, 160 accessed 1/12/2015. Cases like this are however rare. 
97 See generally ISA, s306. 
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7.5.4 Corruption 
The issue of corruption as it affects the judiciary and public officials have been fully 
discussed in chapter 5. Although corruption is generally associated with the activities 
of public officials and is sometimes restrictively defined in that regard,
98
 its 
prevalence in Nigeria means that it also affects the actions and decisions of private 
parties. Within the context of corporate law enforcement, corruption is reportedly 
seen in the activities of shareholder associations.  CAMA is highly dependent on 
shareholder activism to enforce its provisions, shareholders in Nigeria are however 
commonly assumed to be ignorant. This nevertheless appears to be a wrong belief as 
Okike argues that this assumption is misguided. She opines that contrary to the 
general belief that shareholders in Nigeria are ignorant, the evidence of actions by 
shareholder associations shows that this is not entirely correct.
99
  
Nigeria has various shareholder associations such as the Independent Shareholders’ 
Association of Nigeria (ISAN), the Nigerian Shareholders’ Solidarity Association 
(NSSA), and the Association for the Advancement of the Rights of Nigerian 
Shareholders (AARNS).
100
 These shareholder associations are expected to protect the 
interests of shareholders in companies by ensuring accountability and enforcing 
breaches of directors’ duties and other requirements. Similarly, misconducts that 
require the attention of regulatory authorities also ought to be reported in order to 
ensure proper enforcement. A study carried out by Adegbite, Amaeshi and Amao on 
shareholder activism in Nigeria however reveals that shareholder associations in 
                                                            
98 For example, the World Bank defines corruption as ‘the abuse of public office for private gain’. See 
the World Bank, ‘Helping Countries Combat Corruption: The Role of the World Bank’ Sept 1997    
 <http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/anticorrupt/corruptn/coridx.htm> accessed 20th October 
2015. 
99 E. N.M Okike, ‘Corporate Governance in Nigeria: The Status Quo’ (2007) 15(2) Corporate 
Governance: An International Review 173,187. 
100 E Adegbite, K Amaeshi and O Amao, ‘The Politics of Shareholder Activism in Nigeria’ (2012) 105 
Journal of Business Ethics 389,392. 
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Nigeria engage in bullying and corruption similar to what operates in Nigerian 
politics. There have therefore been reports of unnecessary disruptions to Annual 
general meetings by executives of shareholder associations.
101
   
Executives of these shareholder associations also allegedly use their position for 
personal benefits by collecting bribes.
102
 One of the respondents in the study noted 
that ‘shareholder associations are not very effective because all their executives want 
is money. Once you give them some money, they shut up and things continue as 
usual’.103 There was therefore some evidence of corrupt collaborations between the 
executives of shareholders associations and company directors. In return for their 
silence, these shareholder association executives reportedly receive inducements such 
as share allotments, bribes and personal favours.  It was also reported that a president 
of one of the shareholder associations was even appointed as a director of the 
company.
104
 In light of these allegations of bribery and corruption among shareholder 
associations, one cannot then expect them to institute any private enforcement action 
or more importantly, report incidences of breach to the appropriate authorities. It is 
therefore easy to imagine instances where such misconduct is covered up and remain 
unreported to regulators 
7.6 The Public Civil Enforcement Regime Can Be Made to Work in 
Nigeria  
As discussed in section 7.3, the public civil enforcement regime has several potential 
advantages over both the criminal enforcement and the private civil enforcement 
regimes. It therefore offers the best potential for securing effective enforcement of 
                                                            
101 ibid 396. 
102 O Amao and K Amaeshi, ‘Galvanising Shareholder Activism: A Prerequisite for Effective 
Corporate Governance and Accountability in Nigeria’ (2008) 82 Journal of Business Ethics 119,122.  
103 Adegbite, Amaeshi and Amao (n 99) 397. 
104 Ibid 397. 
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corporate law in Nigeria. In spite of the many advantages of the public civil 
enforcement regime, these advantages would remain a ‘potential’ if Nigeria fails to 
develop its public civil enforcement regime. As mentioned earlier, Nigeria has a 
public civil enforcement regime, which has not been fully utilised. Therefore, while 
the public civil enforcement regime is the best option for securing effective 
enforcement of corporate law in Nigeria, the pertinent question is whether this 
proposed enforcement regime could be made to function effectively within the 
country. 
In the last two chapters, it was seen that the criminal enforcement and private civil 
enforcement regimes suffer from varying difficulties. While some of these difficulties 
are due to the nature of these enforcement regimes, others are due to peculiar social, 
political and cultural problems which exist in the Nigerian society. The key issue then 
is whether the public civil enforcement regime can successfully side step these 
difficulties in order to harness the potential benefits of this regime and attain effective 
enforcement of corporate law. This section will therefore examine some of these 
difficulties which have been discussed. It argues that the public civil enforcement 
regime avoids many of these issues and can therefore function effectively in Nigeria. 
7.6.1 Difficulties with the Nigerian Judicial System 
As discussed in chapter 5,
105
 the Nigerian judiciary is faced with a myriad of 
problems including corruption, lack of judicial independence, endemic delay, 
infrastructural defects and institutional difficulties. Many of these problems are only a 
reflection of the problems which assail the Nigerian society. They are deep-rooted 
and are unlikely to be easily resolved in the short term. An enforcement regime that 
fully relies on an efficient judiciary is therefore currently unworkable and therefore 
                                                            
105 See s5.4  
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not the best enforcement option for Nigeria’s corporate law at the moment. This is not 
to suggest that the difficulties confronting the Nigerian judiciary cannot be resolved, 
they are however likely to take a longer period.  In light of this, there is need to rely 
on an enforcement regime which can still be effective in the absence of a fully 
effective judiciary. The public civil enforcement regime offers this. While the public 
civil enforcement regime requires an active and functioning regulator to secure its 
effectiveness, it does not rely on a fully functioning court system. Therefore, with the 
public civil enforcement regime, effective enforcement can be achieved in Nigeria 
without recourse to courts. Within the Nigerian context, SEC can independently 
impose public civil sanctions on directors without the need for lengthy court 
proceedings. Similarly, as discussed in section 7.2 above, SEC has its own in-house 
quasi-judicial tribunal which has exclusive jurisdiction to hear cases arising out of 
ISA. This tribunal can therefore successfully and effectively impose public civil 
sanctions on directors. This effectively avoids the problems associated with the 
Nigerian judicial system while ensuring that breach of directors’ duties or other 
corporate law requirements are effectively enforced through the mechanism of public 
civil enforcement.  
7.6.2 Lack of Information or Difficulties with Detecting Breach 
Another problem which hinders effective use of both the criminal enforcement and 
public civil enforcement regimes is the lack of information by regulators and the 
difficulties experienced in detecting breach by directors. As mentioned in section 
7.5.3 above, there is some evidence to suggest that misconduct by directors are rarely 
reported. SEC therefore does not receive information which is required in order to 
enforce breach of directors’ duties. Similarly, while companies’ annual reports and 
accounts may reveal some information, it cannot be solely relied on to reveal 
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information about breach of duty. While this issue poses a problem for the public 
civil enforcement regime, this problem can be very easily resolved through the use of 
appropriate legislations which will improve reporting channels and ensure that 
breaches of duty can be successfully enforced. This will be the subject of further 
discussion in chapter 8 where proposals for reform of Nigeria’s public civil 
enforcement regime are made.  
7.6.3 The Incentive Problem 
As seen in Chapter 6, shareholders generally lack the motivation to bring private 
enforcement actions due to the several disincentives which they face.
106
 This 
incentive problem significantly undermines the private civil enforcement regime. 
This is however arguably not a problem for the public civil enforcement regime. 
Public officials generally have better incentives for pursuing enforcement actions. 
While it might be argued that public enforcers also have ‘mixed incentives’ for doing 
their job well, they nevertheless have greater incentives than private enforcers.
107
 For 
example, public officers may have their promotion tied to their output at work, 
thereby increasing their incentive to pursue enforcement actions where necessary. 
Similarly, as suggested by Keay, many officers gain their job satisfaction from 
achieving good results, they are therefore likely to draw motivation from the 
prospects of receiving commendation for achieving good results.
108
 In addition to 
this, public officers’ incentives may be enhanced by ensuring accountability at work 
and adequate monitoring of work output. Where public officers know that their 
enforcement output will be subject to periodic reviews, they are more likely to put in 
their best even if solely motivated by the desire to keep their jobs. Therefore, while 
                                                            
106 See s 6.4 for a discussion of the various disincentives.  
107 A. Keay, ‘The Public Enforcement of Directors’ Duties’ (n 56) 106. 
108 Ibid. 
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public officials may also have ‘mixed incentives’ to do their jobs well, they can be 
adequately motivated to carry out their enforcement duties effectively. 
7.6.4 Difficulties in Proving Breach 
One of the major impediments to the effectiveness of the criminal enforcement 
regime is the standard of proof required by the law for a successful conviction. The 
standard of proof required for a criminal conviction is proof beyond reasonable doubt. 
However, as discussed in Chapter 5, attaining this required standard of proof is very 
difficult particularly when prosecuting offences in corporate law. In addition to this, 
the prosecution is required to prove that the defendant had some sort of ‘guilty mind’ 
in relation to the offence committed.
 109
  All these make it difficult to successfully 
enforce corporate law using the mechanism of the criminal enforcement regime. 
These difficulties are easily avoided in the public civil enforcement regime, as a 
guilty mind is not required to impose sanctions under this regime. Similarly, the 
standard of proof required is generally based on the ‘balance of probability’.110 
Therefore, in addition to the other advantages of the public civil enforcement regime, 
it also lends itself to ease of proof thereby ensuring that effective enforcement can be 
more easily achieved. 
7.6.5 Corruption 
Corruption is a major problem which affects several aspects of the Nigerian society. 
Although the problem is pervasive in the Nigerian society, its effect on the public 
civil enforcement regime can be mitigated through the use of appropriate and 
effective enforcement agencies.  SEC particularly has proven itself to be an effective 
public regulator in light of its enforcement track record with capital market 
                                                            
109 See s5.4, Ch. 5. 
110 See Evidence Act 2011, Part IX for the standard of proof required in both civil and criminal cases. 
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operators.
111
 The corruption problem is also more amenable to control within the 
context of SEC than within the court or judicial system. SEC as a regulatory authority 
can be easily made accountable through checks and controls from the legislature. This 
sort of regulatory accountability can significantly mitigate any potential corruption 
issues. This can be contrasted with the judiciary which is an independent organ of the 
government and therefore cannot be easily controlled, at least in the short time. 
Similarly, as will be seen in the next chapter, SEC has already been the subject of 
significant successful reforms. It can therefore still deliver effective enforcement of 
corporate law if significant reforms are made within this enforcement agency. While 
it cannot be conclusively asserted that the public civil enforcement regime avoids the 
corruption problem, this problem can be significantly mitigated through effective 
monitoring of enforcement officers and ensuring accountability at SEC. This will be 
further discussed in the next chapter.  
7.7 Conclusion 
The public civil enforcement regime generally has several significant advantages over 
both the criminal enforcement and the private civil enforcement regime. These 
advantages lie in its deterrent effect, compensatory benefits and cost effectiveness. 
The analysis in this chapter has however shown that the public civil enforcement 
regime in Nigeria falls short in certain regards. The Nigerian public civil enforcement 
regime has a good range of public civil sanctions as well as the regulatory agency 
which can ensure that these sanctions are imposed on directors who have committed a 
breach, however there are still certain issues which hinder the effectiveness of the 
public civil enforcement regime. These have been discussed in the course of this 
chapter.  
                                                            
111 See Tables 7.4 & 7.5 above on SEC enforcement record.  
249 
 
Nevertheless, this chapter has argued that the public civil enforcement regime 
remains the most effective option for enforcing corporate law in Nigeria.  This is due 
to the several advantages it offers over both the criminal and private civil 
enforcement regimes. These have been discussed in this chapter. In addition to these 
advantages, the public civil enforcement regime avoids, or at least mitigates, many of 
the difficulties which plague the other enforcement regimes. It therefore offers the 
best potential for ensuring effective enforcement of Nigerian corporate law. Having 
said that however, there is still need for reform of the current public civil enforcement 
regime in Nigeria. The next chapter will therefore examine proposals for reform of 
the public civil enforcement regime in order to improve its effectiveness. It will also 
examine the feasibility of these proposed reforms.  
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CHAPTER 8:  PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 
8.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter analysed the potential theoretical advantages of public civil 
enforcement over both private civil enforcement and criminal enforcement in 
Nigeria. In that chapter, it was argued that public civil enforcement offers a better 
and potentially more effective enforcement mechanism in Nigeria in comparison to 
both criminal enforcement and private enforcement actions. Public civil enforcement 
better fulfils the criteria for effective enforcement in terms of its deterrent effect, 
compensatory benefits and cost effectiveness. It also, as we saw, avoids many of the 
difficulties and shortcomings which undermine the criminal enforcement and private 
civil enforcement regimes. Therefore, it offers the best prospects for achieving 
effective enforcement of corporate law in Nigeria.   
Consequently, this chapter makes proposals for the reform of the public civil 
enforcement regime in Nigeria in order to obtain the potential ‘theoretical’ benefits 
of the regime. The focus here is on the public civil enforcement regime because, as 
discussed in the previous chapter, it offers significant advantages over its alternatives 
and is able to secure an overall more effective enforcement regime. It should 
therefore be offered a more dominant enforcement role. It is however key to note 
here that the arguments in favour of a larger role for the public civil enforcement 
regime and the recommendations for reform of this regime, do not suggest that 
improvements cannot, or should not, be made to the other enforcement regimes. 
Indeed, these other enforcement regimes can complement the public civil 
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enforcement regime and therefore have a part to play in the overall enforcement 
regime. However, reforms to these other enforcement regimes are less of an 
immediate priority because, as seen in previous chapters, they are unlikely to yield 
fewer increases to the overall effectiveness of Nigeria’s corporate law enforcement 
regime. Accordingly, this thesis focuses on reforms to the public civil enforcement 
regime, as this is the priority for ensuring overall effective enforcement of corporate 
law in Nigeria.  
This chapter starts in section 8.2 by identifying the reforms which need to be made in 
order to improve public civil enforcement. These include identification of an 
effective enforcement agency, conferment of power to enforce breach of directors’ 
duties on the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), clear whistleblowing laws 
and reporting channels, increase in regulatory oversight, overhaul of the Companies 
and Allied Matters Act (CAMA), regulatory accountability (i.e. accountability of the 
regulator itself), and adequate funding for public regulators. It then examines in 
section 8.3 whether these reforms are possible within the context of the Nigerian 
society. In doing this, it examines examples of other successful reforms in Nigeria 
and argues that the suggested reforms are indeed achievable in Nigeria. Section 8.4 
provides some concluding remarks.  
8.2 Reform Proposals 
8.2.1 Identification of an Effective Enforcement Body 
In order to attain the potential benefits of the public civil enforcement regime, as 
seen in chapter 7, it is essential to have a functioning and effective public civil 
enforcement agency. The first essential reform to the Nigerian public civil 
enforcement regime is therefore a clear identification of a regulatory agency in 
charge of administering the public civil enforcement regime.  
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As discussed in chapter 4, the public regulatory agencies in charge of companies in 
Nigeria are the Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC) and the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC).
1
 As seen in chapter 7, the CAC has failed to 
effectively monitor and enforce CAMA’s requirements regarding accounting and 
financial reporting.
2
 There is therefore no evidence that the CAC can undertake this 
huge task of securing public civil enforcement of corporate law. The situation with 
SEC is however different as it has shown greater potential as an enforcement agency. 
As noted in chapter 7,
3
 SEC Annual reports and even newspaper articles
4
 reveal 
evidence of good enforcement activity in respect of capital market operators. 
Therefore, with the right reforms, SEC can build on this enforcement success which 
it has achieved with capital market operators in ensuring effective enforcement of 
directors’ duties.  
In addition to its relative success as an enforcement agency, SEC has generally 
proven itself a better and more proactive regulator than the CAC. This is evidenced 
by the fact that it has a greater presence in Nigeria. It regularly engages in activities 
targeted at developing the capital market, educating the members of the public about 
the capital market and encouraging active investor participation. This takes the form 
of media campaigns, press releases and public warnings.  An example of its proactive 
approach is seen in the fact that it recently issued a warning about a Ponzi scheme, 
which was making the rounds in Nigeria and was primarily targeted at members of 
                                                            
1 See s4.6 Ch. 4. 
2 See s7.5.1 Ch. 7. 
3 See s7.4 Ch. 7. 
4 See N Nnorom, ‘SEC revokes licences of 84 inactive capital market operators’ December 21st 2015 
<http://www.vanguardngr.com/2015/12/sec-revokes-licences-of-84-inactive-capital-market-
operators/> accessed 11th January 2016. See also SEC, ‘SEC Annual Report 2013’, 
<http://www.sec.gov.ng/files/Annual%20reports/2013%20Annual%20Report%20of%20SEC.pdf> 
accessed 11th January 2016.  
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the public.
5
 In addition to this, SEC regularly issues new rules and makes 
amendments to existing rules in order to keep up to date.
6
  There is therefore a strong 
case for appointing SEC as the enforcement agency in charge of administering the 
public civil enforcement regime. It is therefore argued that SEC is the preferred 
regulatory agency for effectively administering Nigeria’s public civil enforcement 
regime. 
8.2.2 Grant of Enforcement Powers to SEC in Relation to Breach of Directors’ 
Duties  
An essential, and perhaps the most important, reform, which is needed in order for 
Nigeria to properly capture the benefits of public civil enforcement, is a conferment 
of the power to enforce breach of directors’ duties on SEC. The previous section has 
identified SEC as the preferred regulatory agency for administering the Nigerian 
public civil enforcement regime. However, there is still a difficulty here as SEC 
currently lacks the power to enforce directors’ duties. As discussed in section 7.5.2, 
this is a significant problem and represents one of the major challenges undermining 
the effectiveness of the Nigerian public civil enforcement regime. There is therefore 
a need to reform the Investments and Securities Act 2007 (ISA) in order to include 
clear provisions regarding public civil enforcement of directors’ duties. The 
amendment to ISA should include a clear grant of power to enforce breach of 
directors’ duties on SEC. Additionally the ISA should make clear provisions for the 
sanctions which may be imposed by SEC on directors for breach.   
                                                            
5 SEC, ‘Public alert on the activities of the “MMM Federal Republic of Nigeria” (Nigeria.mmm.net)’ 
30th August 2016   <http://sec.gov.ng/the-attention-of-the-securities-and-exchange-commission-
nigeria-sec-has-been-drawn-to-the-activities-of-an-online-investment-scheme-tagged-mmm-federal-
republic-of-nigeria/> accessed 28th October 2016.  
6 See SEC, ‘SEC exposes new rule and sundry amendments to the rules and regulations of the 
commission’ 21st October 2016 <http://sec.gov.ng/sec-exposes-new-rule-and-sundry-amendments-to-
the-rules-and-regulations-of-the-commission/> accessed 21st October 2016. 
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In conferring the power to enforce breach of directors’ duties on SEC, certain other 
ancillary powers must also be granted to SEC with regards to company directors. The 
first power, which must be granted to SEC in this regard, is the power to gather 
information. Information gathering powers are necessary in order for SEC to obtain 
information which is needed to make its enforcement decisions. Clear information 
gathering powers will enable SEC to obtain any information which is needed for its 
judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings. It is important to stress that this information 
gathering powers must be made ‘compulsory’. Therefore, SEC should be able to 
require production of necessary information or documents. This power is necessary 
as individuals and companies may be generally unwilling to voluntarily supply 
relevant information or document to SEC. Therefore, SEC should be able to require 
persons or entities to provide it with necessary information and documents or to 
disclose certain relevant information. In addition to this, SEC should be given the 
power to apply for search warrants in order to enable it to search premises for 
relevant information or document.
7
  
Another ancillary power which should be granted to SEC in relation to enforcement 
of directors’ duties is the power to impose sanctions on directors without recourse to 
courts. This is an essential power in order to ensure that Nigeria reaps the potential 
benefits of the public civil enforcement regime. Indeed, one of the major advantages 
offered by the public civil enforcement regime lies in the fact that sanctions can be 
imposed by the regulators thereby avoiding all the problems traditionally associated 
with court proceedings.
8
 As discussed in chapter 7, SEC carries out its enforcement 
activity through its Administrative Proceedings Committee (APC) and the 
                                                            
7 For an example of a public civil enforcement agency with comprehensive information gathering 
powers see the Australian securities and investments commission. ASIC, ‘ASIC’s compulsory 
information gathering powers’ <http://asic.gov.au/about-asic/asic-investigations-and-enforcement/asic-
s-compulsory-information-gathering-powers/> accessed 26th October 2016. 
8 For a further discussion of this, see Chapter 7.  
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Investments and Securities Tribunal (IST).
9
 There is therefore a need to grant 
specific powers to the APC or the IST to hear matters concerning breach of directors’ 
duties and to impose sanctions as appropriate.  
8.2.3 Clear Whistle Blowing Laws and Reporting Channels 
Another measure which would improve public civil enforcement in Nigeria is the 
enactment of a proper whistleblowing law and creation of clear reporting channels 
for whistle-blowers.  As mentioned in section 7.6.2, lack of information on directors’ 
misconduct is a possible reason for inadequate public civil enforcement in Nigeria. 
This is however a crucial determinant of effective enforcement. In order for any sort 
of enforcement to take place, the enforcer must first obtain information about the 
said breach. Therefore, where there is a lack of information or absence of appropriate 
reporting channels, effective enforcement is inherently impossible. A comprehensive 
whistleblowing law together with appropriate reporting channels can resolve the 
problem of lack of information.  The importance of proper whistleblowing laws 
cannot therefore be overemphasised.  As noted by the US Securities and Exchange 
Commission that ‘Assistance and information from a whistleblower who knows of 
possible securities law violations can be among the most powerful weapons in the 
law enforcement arsenal...’10 This is true of any corporate regulator engaged in 
public civil enforcement.  It is therefore essential to develop proper avenues for 
reporting suspected breaches.  
The current situation where Nigeria’s provision on whistleblowing is contained in an 
isolated section of ISA is highly inadequate.
11
 The average person is unlikely to be 
                                                            
9 See s7.2.3 
10 US Securities and Exchange Commission Office of the Whistle blower, ‘Welcome to the Office of 
the Whistle blower’ <https://www.sec.gov/whistleblower> accessed 11th January 2016.   
11 Note that the private sector code, s18.3 also contains a provision requiring companies to have a 
whistle blowing policy which should be known to employees and other stakeholders.  
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aware of this provision. An explicit and well-publicised whistleblowing law is 
therefore essential in bridging the information gap. In addition to this, the proposed 
whistleblowing law should offer substantial protection and inducement to whistle-
blowers. This will increase the incentive for employees, shareholders and other third 
parties who obtain information regarding a breach to report suspected incidences. 
This is especially so in a country like Nigeria where employees lack labour 
protection. While Nigeria is a member of the International Labour Organisation 
(ILO), and has ratified several of its conventions, available evidence suggests that 
employees in Nigeria remain vulnerable. An empirical study carried out by Adewumi 
and Adenugba, on the state of workers’ rights and labour standards in Nigeria reveals 
that the level of compliance by employers in Nigeria with labour laws is low.
12
 
Indeed, there is evidence which suggests that employers deliberately avoid 
compliance and take advantage of the vulnerability of workers amidst the current 
unstable economic conditions.
13
 With an unemployment rate of 13.3%,
14
 
unemployment and job insecurity is rife in Nigeria. In light of this, it is difficult to 
expect employees to report suspected breach by directors thereby putting their jobs at 
risk in an economy suffering from significant unemployment.  
Proper development of whistleblowing channels and protection including full 
anonymity for whistle blowers would therefore encourage reporting. Reward where 
the information leads to an enforcement action could also be offered in order to 
enhance the incentive to report incidences of breach. Implementation of this reform 
would ensure that an open line of communication is maintained between the 
regulators and potential whistle-blowers. This would consequently provide public 
                                                            
12 F Adewumi and A. Adenugba, The State of Workers’ Rights in Nigeria: An Examination of the 
Banking, Oil and Gas and Telecommunication Sectors (Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung 2010).  
13 Ibid 71 
14National Bureau of Statistics, ‘Unemployment/Underemployment Report Q2 2016’ 
<http://www.nigerianstat.gov.ng/report/426> accessed 26th October 2016.   
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regulators with the necessary information for commencing action against the erring 
directors.  
8.2.4 Increasing Regulatory Oversight  
In addition to introducing clear whistleblowing laws and other channels for reporting 
misconducts to regulators, there is need for increased regulatory oversight by 
corporate and securities regulators. Regulatory oversight here does not just connote 
that regulators provide constant monitoring and inspection of companies. While it is 
necessary for regulators to provide some monitoring and surveillance, it cannot 
effectively monitor all companies because this is unlikely to be cost effective for the 
regulator. As discussed in previous chapters, cost effectiveness is an important 
determinant of effective enforcement. Where an enforcement action is not cost 
effective, it remains a wholly unattractive option for the potential enforcer. 
Regulatory oversight in this context therefore requires that regulators pay closer 
attention to the content of statutory reports submitted by directors, auditors and 
insolvency practitioners. There is need for proper monitoring and surveillance in 
order to ensure that financial reports and accounts comply with the standards 
required by CAMA and give a true and accurate view of companies’ state of affairs.  
The CAC has oversight responsibilities in respect of companies’ financial statements 
and accounting records which are submitted to them. However, as discussed in the 
previous chapter, there is no evidence that the CAC takes this duty seriously.
15
 There 
is therefore a fundamental need for the CAC to take up its oversight responsibilities 
in order to ensure that misstatements or inaccuracies in the financial statements or 
accounting records can be spotted. While there is evidence that SEC carries out 
reviews of annual returns and reports submitted to this, there is still room for 
                                                            
15 See s7.5.1 
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improvement in this regard.  Hence, it is not enough to simply accept companies’ 
financial reports and accounts as a box ticking exercise, rather there is need to carry 
out a proper review of the accounts submitted in order to potentially identify 
inconsistencies or misstatements which may be evidence of some misconduct or 
breach by directors. While whistleblowing and other reporting channels are 
important sources of information regarding breach, there is need for corporate and 
securities regulators in Nigeria to improve their oversight in order to complement 
these other sources of information. 
 8.2.5 Overhaul of CAMA 
Any reform of the public civil enforcement regime in Nigeria will be incomplete 
without an overhaul of the current company law – CAMA.  This overhaul is 
necessary for two major reasons. The first is the ‘legal transplant effect’, which is 
arguably present in Nigerian corporate law. Legal transplants refer to the ‘moving of 
a rule or system of law from one country to another or from one people to another’.16 
The legal transplant debate will be further discussed in the next chapter. This 
problem arises specifically in relation to Nigerian corporate law. Nigeria’s 
companies’ legislation including the current Companies and Allied Matters Act 1990 
(CAMA) have been closely patterned after UK companies law. This however raises 
the question of its suitability to Nigeria’s corporate landscape.  
As noted in previous chapters, Nigeria faces different issues and challenges which 
impacts on the enforceability of its laws. Issues such as corruption, institutional 
problems, regulatory weaknesses, and infrastructural deficiencies which are 
prevalent in Nigeria are not problems which developed countries like the UK 
                                                            
16 A Watson, Legal Transplants: An Approach to Comparative Law (2nd edn. University of Georgia 
Press 1993) 21. 
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commonly face.  It is therefore not surprising that company laws intended for the UK 
do not function effectively in Nigeria. Okike in noting the difficulty with the 
transplant of UK company law into Nigeria opined that  ‘…this mimicking of UK’s 
Companies Act meant that company legislation in Nigeria failed to deal with 
company law problems that were peculiar to Nigeria’s socio-cultural and political 
environment’.17   
In order for a country’s corporate laws to be effective and well enforced, it must 
address the social, political, infrastructural and institutional problems that the country 
faces.  As Black and Kraakman opine ‘effective corporate law is context-specific, 
even if the problems it must address are universal. The law that works for a 
developed economy, when transplanted to an emerging economy, will not achieve a 
sensible balance…’18 Corporate laws in developed countries are often a reflection of 
the peculiarities of that country and are therefore unlikely to be efficient when 
transplanted to another country.
19
 A developing country’s corporate law should 
therefore be designed to work and function within the context of the country’s 
available infrastructure and institutions. The UK, for example, relies heavily on 
private enforcement of corporate law through derivative actions.
20
 This preference 
for private enforcement has been transplanted into Nigerian corporate law. It is 
however arguable that this mode of enforcement is more workable for countries with 
better value systems as well as well-developed and effective courts. For a country 
like Nigeria, which still faces institutional and infrastructural difficulties in its court 
system, reliance on private enforcement makes it difficult to achieve effective 
                                                            
17 E.N.M Okike, ‘Corporate Governance in Nigeria: The Status Quo’ (2007) 15(2) Corporate 
Governance: An International Review 173,175. 
18 B Black and R Kraakman, ‘A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law’ (1996) (109) 8 Harvard Law 
Review 1911, 1914.  
19 ibid 1913. 
20 See A Keay, ‘The Public Enforcement of Directors’ Duties: A Normative Enquiry’ (2014) 43 
Common Law World Review 89, 90. 
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enforcement. There is therefore need for an overhaul of this transplanted law in order 
to bring it in tune with prevailing social and economic realities.   
The second reason why an overhaul of CAMA is necessary is due to the fact that the 
legislation is seriously outdated. Although the Act was enacted in 1990, more than 
two decades later it is yet to undergo any form of extensive review.  It will therefore 
be obvious to even a casual observer that it would be unable to tackle contemporary 
company law issues. While CAMA contains some fines for breach of its provisions, 
these fines are extremely low. This is due to the fact that CAMA itself is outdated; 
therefore the penalties imposed under it are inherently obsolete. Hence, for example, 
the penalty for the failure of an officer of the company to comply with CAMA’s 
requirements regarding the companies’ accounting records is imprisonment for a 
term not exceeding 6 months or a fine of N500(£1.7).
21
  Similarly, if the financial 
statements do not comply with CAMA’s requirement, the penalty for the director of 
the company is a fine of N100 (33 pence). In the case of a group financial statement, 
the penalty for the directors is N250. (83 pence).
22
 Some fines imposed under CAMA 
are even as low as N10 (about 3 pence).
23
 It therefore makes it difficult for the fines 
and penalties it contains to have any deterrent effect, as they are very low.  
It is important to note here that Nigeria has very recently taken steps to redress some 
of the issues identified above. Consequently, the Corporate Affairs Commission is in 
the process of repealing and replacing CAMA 1990. The bill for an act to repeal 
CAMA significantly increases the fines currently imposed for breach of its 
                                                            
21 CAMA, s333. 
22 CAMA, s348. 
23 CAMA, s339 
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provisions.
24
 This is a welcome development and definitely represents a step in the 
right direction in ensuring effective enforcement of corporate law in Nigeria.  
8.2.6 Regulatory Accountability 
A key element that many successful public regulators or agencies possess is 
regulatory accountability.
25
 Regulatory accountability here connotes that the 
regulators themselves are made accountable and subject to some higher authority. In 
light of the substantial power which SEC possesses, and will possess, there is a need 
to ensure that they are monitored and made accountable in order to mitigate 
corruption and ensure that the interests of justice are met.  The need for regulatory 
accountability cannot therefore be overemphasised. The importance of accountability 
has been noted by the UK House of Lords in its report on regulatory accountability 
where it stated that ‘accountability is a control mechanism through which effective 
regulation is maintained (and endorsed), and failing or ineffective regulation is 
identified and exposed’.26 This statement captures the essence of regulatory 
accountability. There is need to ensure that regulators are monitored and made 
accountable to a superior authority. The elements of accountability have been 
summarised by the House of Lords as the duty to explain, exposure to scrutiny and 
                                                            
24 For specific details of the changes made to CAMA, See CAC, ‘A bill for an Act to repeal the 
Companies and Allied Matters Act 1990 and enact the Companies and Allied Matters Act 2016 to 
provide for incorporation of companies, registration of business names together with incorporation of 
trustees of certain communities, bodies, associations and incidental matters’ 
<http://new.cac.gov.ng/home/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Draft-Bill-for-the-Repeal-of-CAMA-and-
Enactment-of-New-Act.pdf> accessed 19th January 2017.  
25 For example, the FCA reports to the treasury and parliament. See FCA, ‘Reporting to Treasury and 
Parliament’ <https://www.fca.org.uk/about/reporting-treasury-parliament> accessed 31st October 2016. 
Similarly, the Australian Securities and Investment Commission is also accountable to the parliament. 
See ASIC, ‘Annual Report 2014-2015, about ASIC’ 
<http://download.asic.gov.au/media/3438469/asic-annual-report-2014-15-section-1-30-10.pdf> 
accessed 17th October 2016.  
26 See Select Committee on the Constitution, The Regulatory State: Ensuring Its Accountability - 
Volume 1 Report (2003-04 HL 68-1) Para 53.    
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the possibility of independent review.
27
 All three have to be effective in order to 
ensure regulatory accountability.  
SEC currently operates under the general supervision of the Ministry of Finance; 
however, there is need for SEC to be made specifically accountable to a higher body. 
This higher body may be the legislature or a special legislative committee to which it 
would directly report. This ensures that there is an effective system of control 
thereby preventing arbitrary exercise of power, and corruption, potentially leading to 
a loss of confidence in the regulator. More specifically, a duty should be imposed on 
SEC to periodically explain its activities to this higher authority. It could also be 
required to explain the basis for its enforcement actions when required to do so. The 
possibility of an independent review of SEC’s activities should also be left open 
thereby ensuring that SEC is kept ‘on its toes’. In addition to this, information about 
its surveillance activity and enforcement outcomes, including reasons for its 
decisions, should be made publicly available in its published annual reports. This 
will ensure a good degree of openness, accountability and transparency. It will also 
crucially ensure a high level of public confidence in its regulatory and enforcement 
activities which is necessary in order for members of the public to make reports of 
suspected breach. 
8.2.7 Adequate Funding 
In order to operate effectively, a public regular must be appropriately funded. 
Therefore, the final, but certainly not least important, reform which must take place 
in order for Nigeria to obtain the benefits of the public civil enforcement regime is 
that SEC must be adequately funded. In order for any form of effective public civil 
enforcement to take place, the public regulator must have sufficient finances to 
                                                            
27 Ibid Para 75.  
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undertake enforcement actions. In the absence of adequate funding for SEC, all the 
other proposed reforms mentioned earlier would only amount to a ‘waste of time’.28 
As noted by Keay that ‘…any form of public enforcement will be of little value as 
far as effectiveness is concerned if the budget is minuscule and as a result the staffing 
is thin’.29  Lack of adequate resources is a problem which many regulators repeatedly 
grapple with. Adequate funding is however necessary in order for regulators to hire 
qualified staff, undertake surveillance or investigation, and carry out enforcement 
actions. In the absence of adequate resources, all these are impossible.   
While there is currently no evidence on the amount of funding which SEC receives 
from the federal government,
30
 the current state of affairs in Nigeria with regards to 
public agencies implies that SEC may be in need of better funding. Currently in 
Nigeria, several public agencies and sectors lack adequate funding. These include 
vital sectors such as the public healthcare system,
31
 public education sector,
32
 and the 
judicial system.
33
 It is therefore necessary to emphasise that SEC needs to be 
adequately funded in order for Nigeria to reap the benefits associated with the public 
civil enforcement regime.  
In order to ensure adequate funding, there is an essential need for SEC to become 
creative in generating resources. It is important for SEC not to rely on the Nigerian 
government for all its funding. Full reliance on the Federal Government for adequate 
funding of SEC may lead to a situation where it continues to fall short of its 
                                                            
28 See Keay (n 20) 101.  
29 Ibid 102. 
30 A search of SEC’s annual reports and accounts does not reveal how much funding it receives from 
the federal governments  
31 See S Hargreaves, ‘Time to Right the Wrongs: Improving Basic Health Care in Nigeria’ (2002) 
359(9322) the Lancet 2013. 
32 See L.O Odia &S. I Omofonmiwan, ‘Educational System in Nigeria: Problems and Prospects’ 
(2007) 14(1) Journal of Social Sciences 81-86. 
33 For a further discussion of this, see s5.4.3. 
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enforcement responsibilities due to inadequate resources. This is in light of the fact 
that, as seen above, even crucial sectors in Nigeria lack sufficient public funding. 
Hence, it would be presumptuous to assume that SEC would receive a windfall of 
funding from the Nigerian government in order to discharge its enforcement 
responsibilities. There is therefore a need for SEC to get creative in securing 
alternative sources of finance. SEC may be able to raise significant internally 
generated funds through pecuniary penalties imposed on offenders as well as by 
imposing levies on companies and other entities which it regulates. Examples abound 
of regulators who either generate a significant portion of their funding from firms 
they regulate or are entirely funded by these firms. A key example is the UK’s 
Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) which is an independent public body which is 
entirely funded by the fees charged to the firms it regulates.
34
 Similarly, between 
2015 and 2016, the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) raised 
approximately $876 million in fees and charges.
35
 It therefore raised a significant 
portion of its funding internally.  It is therefore highly plausible for SEC to raise a 
significant amount of its funds from fees, levies and charges. This will ensure that it 
does not totally rely on the federal government for its funding as this may lead to an 
inability to fulfil its enforcement functions due to inadequate funding. 
It is important to note here that it is highly unlikely that any regulator would have 
infinite resources to use for enforcement purposes. Regulators often have insufficient 
resources with which to investigate and enforce all breaches. The same will be true 
for SEC. Hence, the call for adequate funding of SEC does not imply that it should 
formally investigate every matter reported to it or formally enforce every breach. 
                                                            
34 FCA, ‘About the FCA’ 04/09/2016 <https://www.fca.org.uk/about/the-fca> accessed 31st October 
2016.  
35 ASIC, ‘Annual Report 2015-2016 –About ASIC’ <http://download.asic.gov.au/media/4058638/asic-
annual-report-2015-2016-section-1.pdf> accessed 31st October 2016.  
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This would be practically impossible and definitely cost ineffective. As discussed in 
Chapter 3, cost effectiveness is a crucial element of an effective enforcement 
regime.
36
 There is therefore need for some balance in ensuring that SEC carries out 
its oversight and enforcement responsibilities in a cost effective manner while 
ensuring that the key purposes of enforcement are met.  
8.3 Feasibility of Proposed Reforms 
One question, which would be in the minds of many readers at this point, is whether 
these reforms are truly achievable in Nigeria. Reforms which are infeasible are 
incapable of achieving any change in the status quo. This thesis argues that these 
reforms are very feasible and achievable in Nigeria. There is nothing inherent in 
Nigeria which makes it impossible for it to capture the benefits of public civil 
enforcement. As reiterated severally in the previous chapter, the public civil 
enforcement regime, unlike the other two enforcement regimes, does not depend on 
an efficient court system for its success. Any reform of an enforcement regime in 
Nigeria that depends for its success on a reform of the judicial system is likely to end 
up being a long and convoluted process in light of the inherent and deep-seated 
problems faced by the Nigerian judicial system.  This is therefore a clear advantage 
for the public civil enforcement regime. Also the reforms suggested are not radical 
and do not suggest a change in the entire Nigerian polity, rather it suggests a shift in 
enforcement focus in order to give way to a more viable option. These reforms are 
therefore achievable. A comparison with similar past reforms in Nigeria also 
suggests that a successful reform is not a farfetched ideal.  
An example of a similar reform in the Nigerian private sector which has achieved the 
desired effect is seen in the banking sector reforms by the former central bank 
                                                            
36 See s3.7, Ch. 3.  
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governor Sanusi Lamido Sanusi. Between 2008 and 2009, Nigeria experienced a 
banking crisis which resulted in the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) having to rescue 
the financial system by injecting N620 billion of liquidity into the banking sector and 
removing the top executives of some of the banks. An investigation into what went 
wrong revealed macroeconomic instability caused by several factors including major 
failings in corporate governance at banks, major gaps in the regulations and 
regulatory framework, and uneven supervision and enforcement. 
37
  
Following this, the banking regulatory authorities embarked on a series of 
fundamental reforms in the banking industry aimed at stabilising the financial system 
and restoring confidence back.  The reforms yielded a number of positive results 
including improved corporate governance and risk management at banks as well as 
significant improvements in transparency and disclosure. It also greatly improved the 
international standing of Nigerian banks as they are now among the main players in 
the global financial market and many of them are among the top 20 banks in Africa 
and top 1000 banks in the world.
38
 The reforms also greatly enhanced confidence in 
the country’s banking system. According to the former CBN governor, Sanusi, the 
success recorded by these reforms can be credited to ‘greater collaboration and 
commitment of purpose among key stakeholders’.39 This demonstrates that even 
drastic reforms are possible and achievable in Nigeria. The most important factor, 
which will determine the success or failure of those reforms, is the commitment and 
the political will to follow through with them. 
                                                            
37 S L Sanusi, ’Banking Reforms and its Impact on the Nigerian Economy’ lecture delivered at the 
university of Warwick economic summit, UK 17th February 2012, 116   
<http://www.recruitment.cbn.gov.ng/Out/2012/CCD/CBN%20JAS%20Vol%202%20No%202_Docu
ment%20Two.pdf > accessed 18th February 2016. 
38 ibid 120-121. 
39 ibid 122. 
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More closely related to the subject of our study, SEC has also undergone some 
reforms in the past.  These reforms have included strengthening the SEC’s 
Administrative Proceedings Committee in order to enhance enforcement. SEC also 
collaborated with other government enforcement agencies such as the Nigerian 
police force and the Attorney general of the Federation’s office in order to improve 
enforcement.
40
 These reforms have led to an increase in the number of enforcement 
actions taken against capital market operators.
41
 It can therefore be argued that 
similar reforms aimed at enhancing public civil enforcement of corporate law are not 
farfetched as long as there is the political will to do so. Strengthening the public civil 
enforcement regime has the potential to dramatically improve accountability by 
directors. It will also significantly improve deterrence thereby reducing incidences of 
breach by directors.  
The stock market crash and banking crisis in Nigeria, which almost caused a collapse 
of the entire financial system, was a wakeup call to the regulators that drastic reforms 
were necessary in order to restore confidence and stability to the banking system. 
Similar reforms have however not been done in respect of ensuring accountability, 
compliance and enforcement in public listed companies. Corporate governance 
failings and lack of enforcement of corporate law however have very great potential 
to cause severe damage to any nation’s economy and financial system. They erode 
confidence in the country’s financial markets thereby preventing both domestic and 
foreign investors from investing in the economy. This is evidenced from the last 
                                                            
40 A Oteh, ‘The Nigerian Capital Market: Preserving our Success and Enabling our Potential through 
Managing Emerging Risks’ keynote address by Arunma Oteh, Director General, Securities and 
Exchange Commission, Nigeria at Standard Chartered Banks’ Capital Market Forum 8th October 2013  
<http://sec.gov.ng/files/Speech_THE%20ROLE%20OF%20THE%20SEC%20IN%20MANAGING%
20RISK%20%20IN%20THE%20NIGERIAN%20CAPITAL%20MARKET_SECNigeriaOct2013.pdf
> accessed 18th February 2016.  
41 This day Live, X-raying SEC’s Capital Market Reforms’ 10th December 2014. 
<http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/x-raying-sec-s-capital-market-reforms/196261/> accessed 18th 
February 2016. 
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stock market crash, which led to a general loss of investors’ confidence in Nigeria’s 
financial markets. Domestic investors are yet to fully regain this confidence.
42
 There 
is therefore a significant need for effective reform of the current enforcement system.  
It is important to note that all the reforms cannot be achieved in one go, there is 
however a need to take a step in the right direction by kick starting the reform 
process.   
8.4 Conclusion  
The previous chapters have critically examined the criminal enforcement, private 
civil enforcement and public civil enforcement regimes. The public civil enforcement 
regime has been found to be the most effective option for enforcing breach of 
corporate law in Nigeria.  However, in order for the Nigerian public civil 
enforcement regime to attain this effective enforcement, it needs to be substantially 
reformed and improved. Seven specific reforms have been identified and explained 
in the course of this chapter. These reforms, if implemented, have the potential to 
significantly enhance the public civil enforcement regime and ensure that it works 
effectively in the enforcement of corporate law in Nigeria. Similarly, as seen in this 
chapter, these reforms are feasible and achievable in Nigeria, given the political will 
and desire to secure them.  
 
                                                            
42 K Ighomwenghian, ‘Nigeria’s Stock Market needs more Domestic Investors- Afolayan’ 1st March 
2015 <http://allafrica.com/stories/201503020716.html>   accessed 25th February 2016.  
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PART 3 - LESSONS FROM OTHER JURISDICTIONS 
CHAPTER 9:  LEARNING FROM OTHER 
JURISDICTIONS – THE LEGAL TRANSPLANT 
DEBATE 
9.1 Introduction 
Part 2 of this thesis critically analysed the various enforcement regimes in Nigerian 
corporate law. It crucially argued that the public civil enforcement regime offers the 
greatest potential for ensuring effective enforcement of corporate law in Nigeria. This 
argument was made based on the significant advantages it offers over its alternatives 
in terms of increased enforcement effectiveness.
1
 A number of proposals were also 
made for reforms of the current public civil enforcement regime in Nigeria in order 
fully to realise the potential benefits which public civil enforcement offers.
2
 
The arguments made, so far, for the superiority of the public civil enforcement regime 
have been largely ‘theoretical’, in the following sense. They have been based on 
logical arguments about how the essential characteristics of a public civil 
enforcement regime ought to deliver superior deterrence and compensation, and in a 
cost effective way, than can alternative mechanisms. The use of empirical evidence, 
so far, has been limited to describing the current enforcement situation in Nigeria, and 
                                                            
1 See generally Ch. 7. 
2 See Ch. 8 
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showing what ‘empirical realities’ (in terms of institutional problems, corruption, 
funding problems, and the like) reform to this situation therefore confronts.
3
    
Part 3 of this thesis now intends to use some (admittedly limited) empirical evidence 
in a rather different way, namely to help to prove – or at least, to make more 
persuasive – the theoretical claim about the greater enforcement potential of civil 
public enforcement.  More specifically, this part of the thesis seeks to draw on 
empirical evidence in the form of three cases studies, two from the UK, one from 
Australia, each of which, it argues, demonstrates the superiority of public civil 
enforcement.  
The case studies themselves are presented in chapter 10.  However, this chapter 
addresses a number of questions or ‘concerns’ that are often raised when comparative 
work – such as the comparative case studies employed here – is relied upon. Such 
concerns are usually subsumed under the heading of the ‘legal transplants debate’.  
To simplify a little at this stage, the core question or concern is this: can one country 
really borrow legal rules, processes or institutions from another?  Now, it should be 
made clear that, in one sense at least, this thesis does not in fact propose any such 
borrowing or transplant.  It does not advocate a transplant of any enforcement regime 
– say that now found in the UK, or in Australia – to Nigeria. Indeed, it very clearly 
proposes ‘home grown’ reforms.4  Instead, the goal in using comparative insights 
here is much more modest.  It seek only to show that the enforcement experiences of 
the UK and Australia provide compelling evidence that public civil enforcement 
offers greater potential as an effective enforcement regime. It does this to support this 
thesis’ argument that much of Nigeria’s immediate reform efforts should be targeted 
at the public civil enforcement regime.  
                                                            
3 See generally chapters 5, 6 & 7.  
4 See Ch. 8.  
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Nevertheless, although this exercise in drawing comparative empirical evidence is 
indeed distinguishable from a true exercise in effecting legal transplants, what chapter 
10 seeks to do does, admittedly, raise at least some of the same issues which typically 
arise in the legal transplant debate. For that reason, it is appropriate to begin this 
comparative part of the thesis by addressing the legal transplants debate.    
Part of the purpose in doing so is ‘exegetical’ – to explain to the reader more clearly 
what this transplant debate is about, and how the concerns it raises may be seen as 
threatening to this comparative analysis.  However, part of the purpose is also 
defensive – to show that many of the criticisms levelled against legal transplants do 
not apply to this thesis’ attempt to learn lessons, and draw empirical evidence, from 
the UK and Australia.  
The chapter starts by examining the nature of legal transplants in section 9.2.  It then 
moves on to examine Miller’s typology of legal transplants in section 9.3, whilst 
section 9.4 examines the pertinent debate regarding whether legal transplants are 
possible. It argues that legal transplants are possible therefore; the attempt to learn 
from the enforcement experience of the UK and Australia in the next chapter raises 
no concern in this regard. Having argued that legal transplants, and indeed any form 
of learning from abroad, are possible, section 9.5 examines whether legal transplants 
can be successful. It provides a definition of a successful transplant, section 9.6 then 
goes on to examine the factors that influence the success of a legal transplant. These 
factors are similarities in culture and norms between transplant and recipient 
countries, adaptation of transplant to suit local conditions and availability of 
necessary institutions and infrastructure. It notes that the Nigerian legal system shares 
several similarities with that of UK and Australia. Consequently, Nigeria can learn 
very useful lessons from the enforcement experience of these countries. Similarly, it 
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argues that the ‘adaptability’ factor does not apply to the reforms proposed in this 
thesis, as these reforms have not been transplanted from abroad. There is therefore no 
fear that they would be unsuited for Nigeria. Finally, it notes that the proposed 
reforms of the Nigerian public civil enforcement regime include improvements aimed 
at ensuring that the institutions and infrastructure needed for effective enforcement 
are in place. Consequently, there are no reasons why Nigeria cannot successfully 
learn from the enforcement experiences of the UK and Australia.  Section 9.7 ends 
with some concluding remarks.  
9.2 The Nature of Legal Transplants  
According to Alan Watson, legal transplants refer to the ‘moving of a rule or system 
of law from one country to another or from one people to another’.5 Legal transplants 
may come in different forms and may take place at different levels. Legal transplants 
may occur between states in the same country, or between different countries. 
International conventions or laws may also be transplanted and become part of a 
nation’s laws. In addition to this, national or international laws could also be drawn 
from different sources and influenced by different municipal laws.
6
  
 Legal transplants may take place formally (e.g. by adoption of a statute) or 
informally (e.g. through a judicial decision, or receipt of legal ideas from informal 
agents). The object of transplant therefore need not be only legal rules  or legal 
institutions, other less formal things may be transplanted such as ideologies, 
principles, or styles of drafting to mention a few.
7
  A country may also informally 
                                                            
5 A Watson, Legal Transplants: An Approach to Comparative Law (2nd edn, University of Georgia 
Press 1993) 21. 
6 W Twinning, ‘Diffusion of Law:  A Global Perspective’ (2004) 49(36) Journal of Legal Pluralism 1, 
13. 
7 ibid 20 & 21. See also A Watson, ‘Legal Transplants and European Private Law’ in J Smits (ed) the 
Contribution of Mixed Legal Systems to European Private Law (Intersentia Publishers 2001). 
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transplant certain ideas or standards from another country or international body 
without necessarily changing its laws. In this instance, it may be said that a legal 
transplant has implicitly taken place.   
There have been several disagreements about the use of the term ‘legal transplants’. 
Teubner  for example argues that the term ‘legal transplants’ is a ‘misleading 
metaphor’ and opines instead that the term ‘legal irritant’ is a better alternative.8  In 
the same vein many other authors have tried to replace the term ‘legal transplants’ 
with other supposedly more suited terms such as ‘legal transposition’,9 ‘legal transfer, 
‘legal reception’, ‘cross fertilization’, ‘influence’, inspiration 10, ‘diffusion’,11 to 
mention a few. This work is however not overtly concerned with this semantic 
debate.  For the purpose of this chapter, to ensure clarity and uniformity, the term 
‘legal transplants’ and borrowing will be used.  
There are different forms of transplants and different reasons why a country may 
borrow elements of a foreign system. Transplants could happen due to certain 
historical and political factors. For example, Watson opines that Roman law 
influenced much of Scots law due to the fact that the war between England and 
Scotland prevented England’s influence on Scots law, thereby causing the Scots to 
turn to Roman law.
12
 Laws may also be transplanted due to colonisation, conquest, or 
military operations.
13
  For example, the British common law spread widely due to 
colonization such that laws of former British colonies still have very distinct common 
                                                            
8 G Teubner, ‘Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law or How Unifying Law ends up in New 
Divergences’ (1998) 61(1) The Modern Law Review 11,12. 
9 E Orucu, ‘Law as Transposition’ (2002) 51(2) The International and Comparative Law Quarterly 
205, 207.  
10 M Graziadei, ‘Comparative Law as the Study of Transplants and Receptions’ in M Reimann and R 
Zimmermann (eds), Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law (OUP 2006) 443-444. 
11 See W Twinning, ‘Diffusion of Law: A Global Perspective’ (2004) 36(49) Journal of Legal 
Pluralism where the term diffusion was used. 
12 Watson, ‘Legal Transplants’ (n 5) 51. 
13 M Graziadei, ‘Comparative Law as the Study of Transplants and Receptions’ (n 10) 456-457. 
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features.
14
 Similarly, many African countries have a common law or civil law system 
based on whether they were colonised by the British or French.  
9.3 Miller’s Typology of Legal Transplants  
Miller classifies legal transplants into four parts based on the motivations for their 
introduction.  These are the cost-saving transplant, the externally-dictated transplant, 
the entrepreneurial transplant and the legitimacy-generating transplant.
15
   
9.3.1   The Cost–Saving Transplant  
A country may choose to borrow the laws of a foreign system to save the time and 
cost involved in creating and experimenting with one’s own developed legal rules.16 
Indeed, Watson opines  that most borrowing is as a result of practical utility because 
it is more economically efficient to borrow a law.
17
 However, it seems implausible 
that a country would transplant a law solely to save costs. Similarly, if there are many 
alternatives from which to borrow, there must be some other positive reason, other 
than saving money, why a country would decide to borrow from country x and not 
from country y. Therefore, while cost saving may be a factor which influences 
transplants, it is unlikely to be the primary reason.  
9.3.2   Externally–Dictated Transplants 
A country may borrow foreign laws due to external factors such as a desire to please 
a foreign government or entity. An example of this would be where a foreign body or 
government dictates the adoption of a foreign model to another country as a condition 
                                                            
14 ibid 452. 
15 J. A Miller, ‘A Typology of Legal Transplants: Using Sociology, Legal History and Argentine 
Examples to Explain the Transplant Process’ (2003) 51(4) The American Journal of Comparative Law 
839-885. 
16 ibid 845. 
17 A Watson, ‘Aspects of Reception of Law’ (1996) 44(2) American Society of Comparative Law 335. 
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for doing business with them.
18
  A developed country or international institution may 
also decide to grant aid to a developing country on the condition that it transplants 
certain rules which may benefit the interests of investors from the developed 
country.
19
 Consequently, many countries have adopted or borrowed foreign financial 
laws given by the IMF or World Bank as prerequisite for giving loans.  
Some legislation may also be adopted due to threat of trade sanctions. For example, 
developing countries have adopted WTO’s standards on intellectual property due to 
threat of sanctions from the United States.
20
 Any transplant which is motivated by 
some external economic, social or political advantage offered by a foreign country or 
entity may therefore be described as an externally dictated transplant.  
9.3.3 The Entrepreneurial Transplant 
A transplant may also be motivated by certain individuals in the recipient country 
who have interest in the country adopting certain foreign rules.  This may be because 
they can gain some economic or political benefits. These individuals are therefore 
willing to invest in the transplanted legal rule due to the future benefits they may get.  
9.3.4 The Legitimacy –Generating Transplant 
Transplants may also happen due to the prestige associated with a particular legal 
institution or legal system.
21
 That prestige may be because of the perceived efficiency 
and success of that system. Countries usually desire to achieve legitimacy and copy 
the success stories of other countries.
22
 The prestige associated with a foreign model 
                                                            
18 M Siems, Comparative Law (Cambridge University Press 2014) 847. 
19 ibid 193. 
20 Miller (n 15) 847. 
21 ibid 854. 
22 M Crouch, ‘Asian Legal Transplants and Rule of Law Reform: National Human Rights Commission 
in Myanmar and Indonesia’ (2013) 5 Hague Journal on the Rule of Law 146,151. 
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may therefore provide the authority needed to give the new law legitimacy in the 
receiving system.  
While Miller’s typology for legal transplants is useful in understanding the different 
motivations for legal transplants, they are however not directly relevant to what is 
being proposed in this thesis. As discussed earlier,
23
 this thesis does not propose 
transplants of any enforcement regime or system to Nigeria. It however evaluates the 
experience of other countries - the UK and Australia - to see if their approach to 
enforcement provides evidence about the comparative effectiveness of private civil 
enforcement and public civil enforcement. That said, there is also admittedly, a cost 
saving element to this thesis ‘proposals. Learning lessons from countries that have 
successfully implemented and used certain enforcement regimes would save Nigeria 
the costs which are otherwise inherent in experimenting with different enforcement 
regimes. It would also help to avoid the pitfalls which other countries have 
experienced in their quest for a suitable enforcement regime thereby saving 
regulatory costs.  
9.4 Legal Transplants: The Impossibility Debate  
One issue which has been the subject of debate, and which is worth considering, is 
whether legal transplants are possible. Watson, the main proponent of the legal 
transplantation thesis makes use of history to support his claims that legal transplants 
are possible. According to him, transplantation of rules or legal systems have been a 
very common phenomenon and are indeed an important means of development. 
24
 He 
argues that ‘in most places at most times borrowing is the most fruitful source of legal 
                                                            
23 See s9.1 
24 Watson ‘Legal Transplants’ (n 5) 95. 
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change’.25 Changes in most legal systems have therefore been as a result of 
borrowing.
26
 Watson in his work cites several historical examples of legal transplants 
to show that transplants are possible and indeed very frequent.  According to him, 
most of the private law of the western world and some non- western countries have 
been derived from either Roman civil law or English common law.
27
 In further 
support of his transplantation thesis, Watson cites the example of the reception of 
English common law in countries like Canada, United States, Australia, New 
Zealand, India and even much of Africa.
28
 Other examples include the influence of 
the French civil code on other civil law countries and also the manner in which the 
laws of different states in the United States influence each other.
29
  
Watson notes that the concept of transplantation is not a recent phenomenon as an 
examination of some ancient rules of different provinces reveals similarities in the 
substance and style of those rules.
30
 The extent of the similarities in substance and 
style of these rules is such that there is a high likelihood that they all emanated from 
the same source. He further opines that legal borrowing can successfully take place 
even between countries that have different legal systems and are at different levels of 
development and political orientation.
31
 He therefore invariably argues against certain 
group of theories which may be described as ‘mirror theories of law’.32  
                                                            
25 Watson, ‘Aspects of Reception of Law’ (n 17) 335. 
26 A Watson, ‘Legal Change: Sources of Law and Legal Culture’ (1983) 131(5) University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review 1121, 1125; Watson ‘Legal Transplants’ (n 5) 95. 
27 Watson, ‘Legal Transplants’ (n 5) 22. 
28 A Watson, ‘Comparative Law and Legal Change’ (1978) 37(2) Cambridge Law Journal 313-314. 
29 A Watson, ‘Legal Change: Sources of Law and Legal Culture’ (1983) 131(5) University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review 1121, 1125. 
30 Examples of these ancient rules are code of Eshnunna, Hammurabi and Exodus on death caused by a 
goring ox where the owner had been previously warned. See Watson, ‘Legal Transplants’ (n 5)22-23. 
31 A Watson, ‘Legal Transplants and Law Reform’ (1976) 92 the Law Quarterly Review 79. 
32 W Ewald, ‘Comparative Jurisprudence (II): The Logic of Legal Transplants’ (1995) (43) 4 the 
American Journal of Comparative Law 489, 492. 
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The mirror theories of law view law not as an autonomous entity but as a ‘mirror of 
the society’.33 The law is seen as a reflection of the society, therefore every aspect of 
the law is determined by the society within which it operates. This ‘law and society’ 
debate and mirror theory of law dates back to Montesquieu who in his seminal work 
‘The Spirit of Laws’, published in 1748, concluded that the laws of each nation 
should be ‘so closely tailored to the people for whom they are made, that it would be 
pure chance if the laws of one nation could meet the needs of another’.34  Watson, 
contrary to the mirror theories of law, however opines that law cannot be said to be a 
reflection of its people
35
 because it may have been borrowed from a different place 
and still survived in new and different economic, social, and political conditions.
36
  
Legrand, one of the strong supporters of Montesquieu’s view, however takes issue 
with Watson’s legal transplant thesis.  For him, a rule is more than the mere words or 
statements and includes the meaning it receives from the particular culture. He argues 
that there can only be a true legal transplant when both the words of the rule and the 
meaning given to it by culture are moved from one culture to another.
37
 It is however 
almost impossible for this to happen because when the words are transferred to 
another culture, they take on a meaning within that culture which is different from the 
original meaning. There is therefore no transplant because a key part of the rule 
which is its meaning stays behind.
38
  
                                                            
33 L M Friedman, A History of American Law (2nd edn, Simon &Schuster, inc 1985) 12.  
34 C Montesquieu, ‘The Spirit of the Laws’ (Hafner Press 1949). 
35 Watson, ‘Legal Transplants’ (n 5)24. 
36  ibid 107. 
37 P Legrand, ‘The Impossibility of Legal Transplants’ (1997) 4 Maastricht Journal of European and 
Comparative Law 111, 117. See also P Legrand, ‘What “Legal Transplants”?’  In D Nelken & J Feest, 
Adapting Legal Cultures (1st edn Hart Publishing 2001). 
38 Legrand, ‘The Impossibility of Legal Transplants’ (n 37)118. 
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Legrand further disagrees with Watson’s illustration of legal transplants using the 
rules on transfer of ownership and risk existing in Roman laws, French and German.
39
 
He argues that these rules are not the same because any similarity is merely in the 
words itself. The only thing that can be transplanted from one system to another is a 
‘meaningless form of words’.40 Thus, legal transplants cannot happen because as the 
rule crosses boundaries it takes on a different meaning that affects the rule. He further 
argues that even where particular words have been borrowed from one jurisdiction 
there is still no legal transplant at the level of the words alone. To him, all that has 
happened is that law reformers found it easy to use some existing words from another 
jurisdiction the same way writers sometimes quote words from other authors 
including foreign ones.  
While the disagreement between Watson and Legrand is definitely an interesting one, 
it seems however to be one based more on meaning rather than substance. Watson 
agrees that when a law is transplanted it usually undergoes some changes and takes 
on some characteristics from the recipient country.
41
 In a later work, Watson further 
reiterated his view that a transplanted rule is not the same as it was in the original 
system.  However, what is being transplanted is the rules and not the ‘spirit of the 
legal system’.42  Hence, Watson seems to be satisfied with a transplant at the level of 
words alone, something which Legrand refers to as a ‘meaningless form of words’.43 
The disagreement between Watson and Legrand on legal transplants is therefore 
arguably a semantic misunderstanding based on whether legal transplants may be 
regarded as transplant of just the wordings of the law alone or whether a transplant 
                                                            
39 ibid 119. See Watson, ‘Legal Transplants’ (n 5) 82-83. 
40 Legrand, ‘The Impossibility of Legal Transplants’ (n 37)120. 
41 Watson, ‘Legal Transplants’ (n 5)31. 
42 A Watson, ‘Legal Transplants and European Private Law’ in J Smits (ed) the Contribution of Mixed 
Legal Systems to European Private Law (Intersentia Publishers 2001) 16. 
43 See Legrand, Impossibility of Legal Transplants (n 37) 120. 
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must include both the words of the law and the interpretation or meaning given to it. 
The view that Watson and Legrand’s argument may be regarded as a semantic one is 
further supported by Siems who also questioned whether the disagreement between 
Watson and Legrand is not merely a ‘terminological disagreement’.44  Both of them 
agree that lawmakers sometimes copy texts of the law from foreign countries, 
whether or not one decides to name this a legal transplant.  
Arguing that legal transplants within Watson’s conception are inherently impossible 
is hardly realistic as several examples of legal transplants abound.
45
 Legal transplants 
have been a common phenomenon for many centuries and especially in the 
nineteenth and early twentieth century there occurred large scale legal transplantation. 
As Levy puts it that ‘the reception of legal ideas of one people by another is a 
universal phenomenon in world history’.46 Several similarities also exist between 
different countries in certain aspects of laws that can usually only be explained by 
legal transplantation.
47
 It can be said therefore that the view that legal transplants is 
impossible is clearly contradicted by several empirical evidence of legal transplants.
48
  
It is in light of this that Cruz argues that despite differences in interpretation and use 
of terminology, legal transplantation in some form has been a frequent occurrence 
                                                            
44 Siems, Comparative Law (n 18) 196. 
45 A good example of a legal transplant is the ‘best interest of the child’ test or ‘welfare principle’ 
which is usually used to determine the custody of a child. This test is used in several countries around 
the world. See P Cruz, ‘Legal Transplants: Principles and Pragmatism in Comparative Family Law’ in 
A Harding and E Orucu (eds) Comparative Law in the 21st Century (Kluwer Law International 2002) 
109-115. 
46 E Levy, ‘The Reception of Highly Developed Legal Systems by Peoples of Different Cultures’ 
(1950) 25 Washington Law Review and State Bar Journal 233. 
47 See E Orucu, Critical Comparative Law: Considering Paradoxes for Legal Systems in Transition 
(Kluwer 1999) 80-81 which draws on the Turkish legal system as an example of legal transplants.  
48 H Kanda and C J Milhaupt, ‘Re-Examining Legal Transplants: The Director’s Fiduciary Duty in 
Japanese Corporate Law’ (2003) 51(4) The American Journal of Comparative Law 887,890. 
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between jurisdictions and will continue to be so.
49
 Legal transplants are therefore 
possible.  
Teubner’s opinion takes a middle ground between the two extremes. He postulates 
that law’s ties to society vary; some areas are closely tied to society while others are 
loosely tied. Therefore, law is no longer connected to all aspects of the society rather 
it is connected to different ‘fragments of society’.50 Total rejection of transplants is 
therefore unnecessary, as there is a need for countries to learn and gain ideas from 
each other. As Siems has noted that ‘in today’s world there are no pure legal systems; 
rather all legal systems have managed to incorporate ideas from various parts of the 
world’.51 Borrowing is a common occurrence and exists in all aspects of social life, 
not just law.
52
 Hence, a general categorization of transplants as impossible is 
erroneous. Consequently, Nigeria can indeed learn lessons, and draw empirical 
evidence, from other jurisdictions. Therefore, while this thesis does not advocate a 
transplant, Nigeria can nevertheless be guided by the enforcement experience of other 
countries.   
9.5 Are Legal Transplants Successful? 
Having said that legal transplants are possible, it seems that the right question to 
focus on is whether legal transplants can be successful and what factors influence the 
success or failure of a legal transplant. Just as a medical transplant or a transplant of a 
crop from its native soil to another soil, the more important issue is whether that 
transplant succeeds or fails. The question about whether legal transplants are 
                                                            
49 P Cruz, ‘Legal transplants: Principles and Pragmatism in Comparative Family Law’ (n 45) 106. 
50 G Teubner, ‘Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law or How Unifying Law ends up in New 
Divergences’ (1998) 61(1) The Modern Law Review 11,12. 
51 Siems, ‘Comparative Law’ (n 18) 197. 
52 E M Wise, ‘The Transplant of Legal Patterns’ (1990) 38 the American Journal of Comparative Law 
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successful has been the source of much scholarly attention and is therefore the central 
debate on legal transplants. This debate is important here because, while this thesis 
does not recommend a transplant, a critic may still conversely argue that the 
enforcement experience of one country cannot be used as a case study to support the 
validity of another country’s proposed reforms. This section would however reveal 
that this argument does not apply to this thesis’ arguments, as legal transplants can 
indeed be successful. Consequently, the attempt to learn from the enforcement 
experience of other countries does not pose any problem. Similarly, insofar as this 
thesis does not advocate any form of wholesale legal transplants of enforcement 
regimes, these concerns associated with legal transplants do not apply here. It is 
therefore safe to draw lessons for Nigeria from the experiences of Australia and the 
UK.  
Before going further to consider those factors that may influence the success or 
failure of a transplant, it is apt to try and gain an understanding of what ‘success’ 
means within the context of transplants. Different standards have been used by 
different commentators to judge the success or otherwise of a transplant thereby 
causing difficulty in finding the appropriate measurement criteria.
53
 The question then 
is how do we determine whether a transplant has been successful. Similarly, should 
the success of a transplant be determined from the perspective of those making, or 
receiving, the transplant.
54
  
Smits opines that a legal transplant is successful if it leads to some degree of 
uniformity between the laws of the importing and exporting country and unsuccessful 
if it does not lead to any uniformity or worse still threatens the consistency of the 
                                                            
53 J Gillespie, ‘Towards a Discursive Analysis of Legal Transfers into Developing East Asia’ (2008) 40 
NYU Journal of International Law and Politics 657, 688. 
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importing system.
55
 However, it must be noted that, the essence of legal transplants is 
not necessarily to ensure uniform laws between countries. A country may borrow 
another country’s laws in order to redress certain problems it faces. In doing this, the 
recipient country may choose to borrow bits and pieces from different countries and 
then adapt it to fit its unique circumstances. In such circumstances, the result of the 
received law is unlikely to have any degree of uniformity with the laws of the foreign 
countries. It cannot however be said that the transplant has failed because the 
recipient country has been able to transplant laws and amend them to suit itself. 
Indeed, the ability of countries to borrow laws and amend them to suit their particular 
society is considered one of the important factors influencing success; this issue 
would however be discussed later on in this chapter.  
 According to Kanda and Milhaupt, a transplant is successful where the imported 
legal rule is used in the same way it was used in its origin country subject to 
adaptations.
56
 This definition of success is however quite problematic and somewhat 
contrary to the way transplants actually function.  A transplanted rule need not be 
used in the same way as it was in the origin country to be successful. Both countries 
may seek to achieve different ends; therefore, the rule may be used in different ways. 
The important factor is that it achieves the result intended by the importing country. 
As Gal has also noted that a law may be used in a different way in the transplanting 
jurisdiction and still promote social welfare.
57
 Consequently, once a law is 
transplanted; it may take on a new meaning in the recipient country and be applied 
and used in a different way from the home country.   
                                                            
55 J Smits, ‘On Successful Legal Transplants in a Future Ius Commune Europaeum’ in A Harding and 
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Gal, himself, defines success as the ‘ability of the transplanted law to achieve its goal 
in the transplanting country’.58 This definition is quite apt as a law is usually intended 
to meet certain goals or ends. However even this ‘goal’ parameter proposed by Gal 
raises certain issues. As Nelken notes that it cannot be assumed that a transplanted 
law has just one goal or that it even has a distinct and attainable goal.
59
  Therefore, it 
may be difficult in certain situations to ascertain with precision the goal of a 
transplanted law. If there are difficulties in identifying the exact goal of the 
transplanted law, then using this criterion, it becomes near impossible to judge its 
success or failure.  
Gillespie, on his part, opines that one important factor in measuring the success of a 
transplant is that it must in some way lead to a change in legal behaviour in the 
recipient country. Otherwise, where there is no change in legal behaviour, all that has 
happened is a superficial replacement of indigenous laws or institutions with foreign 
ones.
60
 Therefore, for him, a transplant is successful where it is able to lead to some 
change in behaviour. This definition is fitting as the ability of a transplanted law or 
system to lead to a change in behaviour determines whether or not it may be 
considered to be a successful transplant. Consequently, a transplanted law, or in this 
case enforcement regime, would be considered successful if it is able to lead to some 
change in behaviour. Hence where a legal transplant is able to secure compliance with 
the law, rules or standards by the persons to whom it applies, it will be regarded as 
successful.  
                                                            
58 ibid. 
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9.6   Factors That Influence the Success of Legal Transplants  
A legal transplant may succeed or fail based on different factors. These factors 
include similarity between transplant and recipient system, adaptation of transplants 
to fit local conditions and availability of necessary infrastructure and institutions. 
These are discussed in turns in this section.  
9.6.1 Similarity in Culture, Values and Norms of Transplant and Recipient 
System  
One factor which has been severally identified by many commentators to influence 
the success of legal transplants is the degree of similarity in values, norms and 
cultures of both the transplant and recipient systems.  The more compatible a received 
law or institution is with the pre-existing norms, values, customs and conventions of 
the recipient society, the more successful it is likely to be.
61
  Law reforms that are 
inconsistent with the belief and practices of the people may be rejected.
62
 Familiarity 
of the receiving system with the original system therefore increases the likelihood of 
success of a legal transplant.
63
  
A classic example of an unsuccessful transplant is the failed attempt to export the 
British parliamentary system into countries that have a different history, social 
structure and political system.
64
  These attempts failed because the British 
parliamentary system did not fit into those country’s customs. Similarly, attempts to 
introduce the English jury system into some other countries have failed because it 
was contrary to the customs on distribution of power between the Bar and the Bench 
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and was unacceptable to the legal profession in those countries. 
65
  Consequently, if a 
rule or system is transplanted which is contrary to the informal system and the culture 
of the people, it is likely to be unsuccessful.  Hence, Watson’s postulation that legal 
transplants can be successful even where the recipient society has fundamental 
differences from the donor country is not entirely correct.
66
  
 As will be seen in the next chapter, enforcement case studies are drawn from the UK 
and Australia to further support this thesis’ claim for a more significant role for the 
Nigerian public civil enforcement regime. The choice of these two jurisdictions is 
based on several similarities they share with the Nigerian legal system. Nigeria is 
predominantly an English common law jurisdiction as are the UK and Australia.
67
 Its 
legal system and laws are therefore largely based on UK law.
68
  More particularly, its 
corporate law over the years have closely reflected UK corporate laws. Similarly, 
Australian corporate law is derived from UK law and its developments in this regard 
closely reflect that of the UK.
69
  Directors’ duties, for example, in both Australia and 
Nigeria are very similar to that of the UK.
70
 Their private civil enforcement regimes 
also share certain similarities.
71
  There are therefore very close similarities between 
the legal systems of these countries which denotes that Nigeria can successfully learn 
from the enforcement regimes of the UK and Australia.   
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9.6.2 Adaptation of Transplant to Fit Local Conditions  
Closely linked to the first issue, another factor that may affect the success of a 
transplant is the degree of adaptation of the transplant to suit local conditions. 
Berkowitz, Pistor and Richard argue that in order for a legal transplant to be effective, 
it must be adapted to local conditions or there must be some degree of familiarity 
with the basic principle of the transplanted law.
72
 Adaptability to suit local conditions 
means the transplanted law or system is amended and tuned to suit the recipient 
society. Where it is not amended to suit local condition or is imposed by colonization, 
and the recipient society is not familiar with the transplanted law or institution, it is 
unlikely to be well received or function effectively in that system. The country may 
then be said to be experiencing the ‘transplant effect’ because the law does not 
function effectively within the local system.  
The ‘transplant’ effect may be described as the disparity between the recipient 
system’s existing structures and institutions, and the transplanted law which reduces 
the efficiency of the transplanted rules or system.
73
 It arises because of the 
relationship between the formal written law and the unwritten cultures, norms and 
practices existing in the legal system.
74
  A law or institution that originates from a 
foreign system is unlikely to fit into a different system unless it is amended to fit that 
system. There must therefore be some fit between a country’s formal laws and its 
more informal cultures, norms and values.  
Berkowitz, Pistor and Richard also distinguish between receptive and unreceptive 
transplants. Receptivity here implies the country’s incentive to adapt the transplanted 
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laws to its local conditions.
75
  A transplant is receptive where the transplanted law or 
system is very similar to the recipient country’s legal system or is adapted to suit 
local conditions. Countries that have unreceptive transplants therefore usually suffer 
from the transplant effect.
76
 ‘Adaptation’ here does not necessarily mean the 
transplanted law or system is changed substantially, rather that the law is transplanted 
based on an informed decision and understanding of alternative rules.
77
  Legal 
transplants are therefore more likely to be successful where they are adapted to suit 
the local system. From Berkowitz, Pistor and Richard’s empirical analysis, countries 
that adapted foreign laws to suit the recipient country and/or were familiar with the 
received foreign law experienced receptive transplant.
78
 Where there was neither 
adaptation nor familiarity, such transplants were unreceptive.   
An example of a situation where transplants were successful as a result of selective 
borrowing and adaptation is the case of Turkey. Turkey borrowed the foreign law of 
different countries; however these different models were amended and adjusted to 
suit the peculiar ‘social and legal problems’ of turkey.79 Suitable adjustments were 
made to the imported law by both the Legislature and Judiciary especially in relation 
to personal areas like family law in order to bring the law in line with the culture and 
practices of the people. Consequently, wholesale transplants of laws or systems 
without adapting them to the recipient country should be generally avoided as these 
are likely to lead to unsuccessful or ‘unreceptive’ transplants. 
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As noted in the previous section Nigeria shares several similarities with the countries 
from which it seeks to learn lessons consequently the ‘familiarity’ condition is met. 
Similarly, it must be noted that the ‘adaptation’ factor does not directly apply to this 
thesis, as the reforms proposed in this thesis are home-grown.
80
  The proposed 
reforms to the Nigerian public civil enforcement regime are based on an observation 
of those areas where the regime currently fall short, and improvements to these areas. 
They are therefore not primarily borrowed from, or based on, the reforms which have 
been adopted in the UK or Australia. Consequently, the concerns which arise in 
adapting a transplanted regime are not directly applicable here as what is being 
advocated in this thesis is ‘reflective learning from abroad’.81 
9.6.3 Availability of Necessary Institutions and Infrastructures and 
Compatibility with Existing Ones 
Another factor that influences the success of transplants is the availability of 
institutions and infrastructures to put the law or system into effect, as well as the 
compatibility of the transplant with existing institutions and infrastructures. A 
transplanted law or system may have been well adapted to suit the culture and values 
of the recipient society, however in the absence of necessary institutions and 
infrastructures to effectuate it, the transplant may still be unsuccessful. For example, a 
country seeking to curb corruption may import certain good anti-corruption laws; 
however, this transplant will still fail in the absence of effective enforcement 
institutions. This factor has been recognised by some commentators as important in 
determining the success of transplants.  
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According to Kanda and Milhaupt, in order for an imported rule to be successful it 
has to fit the recipient environment. 
82
 ‘Fit’ here has two components which are 
macro and micro fit. ‘Micro-fit’ refers to how the imported rule complements already 
existing legal infrastructure in the recipient country while ‘macro –fit’ deals with how 
the imported rule complements the existing institutions of the political economy in 
the recipient country.
83
  It is not sufficient to simply transplant laws or institutions as 
the new system might lack the ability to put this to effective use. Indeed, 
comprehensive legal protection contained in statutes does not necessarily affect the 
effectiveness of institutions needed to implement the statutes.
84
 Hence, while Russia 
has a well-developed corporate law, there are still widespread breaches of shareholder 
rights.  This is because Russia lacks an effective judiciary and trustworthy public 
institutions.
85
 
Similarly, another instance of a failed transplant due to this factor is the 
transplantation of French takeover laws into Egypt.  This transplant failed partly due 
to ‘institutional incompetence’. The Egyptian Financial Supervisory Authority 
(EFSA), which was the main regulator and supervisor of all non-banking financial 
markets, was not independent and needed to obtain the approval of the minister for 
investment for some decisions.
86
  Therefore compared to similar bodies in France and 
the USA, the EFSA was not truly competent. The Judiciary also faced its own 
problems such as lack of quality judges to interpret and implement the law, as well as 
jurisdictional conflict between different courts on takeover disputes.
87
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The Egyptian case demonstrates the importance of legal and institutional 
infrastructures to the success of legal transplants. There is therefore need for 
competent and effective regulatory and enforcement institutions in order for a legal 
transplant to have a chance at succeeding. In light of the importance of this factor, the 
suggested reforms in this thesis have been primarily targeted at enhancing the 
effectiveness of the regulatory agency in charge of enforcing corporate law in 
Nigeria.
88
 Consequently, the concern that Nigeria would lack the necessary 
institutions or infrastructure to ensure effective use of the public civil enforcement 
regime, even though these have worked in the UK and Australia, does not arise here. 
It is therefore safe for Nigeria to draw lessons from the enforcement experience of 
these other countries.   
9.7 Conclusion 
Legal transplants are inevitable and have been a major source of legal change in many 
countries around the world. Countries often borrow laws, ideas, policies, and 
institutions from other countries for varied reasons. Indeed, borrowing is a general 
phenomenon which occurs in all spheres of social life, not only in law. Every society 
is influenced in one way or another by external influence and some parts of a 
society’s cultures evolve by borrowing from others.89 Legal transplants are therefore 
certainly possible.  However, whether those transplants are successful in the long run 
is the key issue. Just like a human organ transplant, the organ is moved from one 
body to another and once this has happened there is a transplant, whether the 
transplant is successful in the new body is then another issue to be considered. 
Consequently, this chapter has examined the factors that influence the success of 
legal transplants.  
                                                            
88 See Ch. 8. 
89 E Wise (n 52) 16. 
292 
 
While it has been reiterated throughout this chapter that this thesis does not advocate 
legal transplants, to the extent that it uses case studies from other countries to provide 
empirical evidence of the effectiveness of public civil enforcement, this chapter has 
argued that the concerns surrounding unsuccessful legal transplants do not arise here. 
Nigeria shares several similarities with the countries from which this thesis seeks to 
draw empirical evidence. Similarly, the reforms proposed in the previous chapter are 
home grown and have taken into consideration the need for efficient and accountable 
regulatory agencies in order to ensure effective use of the public civil enforcement 
regime. Consequently, Nigeria can indeed gather empirical evidence, and learn, from 
the enforcement experience of these countries. The next chapter will therefore 
examine enforcement case studies drawn from the UK and Australia.  
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CHAPTER 10:  ENFORCEMENT: THREE CASE 
STUDIES 
10.1 Introduction  
In order to reinforce the case for public enforcement, this chapter examines the 
enforcement experience in other jurisdictions using case studies from the United 
Kingdom and Australia. As noted in the previous chapter, the choice of these two 
jurisdictions is based on several similarities they share with the Nigerian legal 
system.
1
 There is therefore very good basis for drawing on the Australian and UK 
experiences in any analysis of Nigeria’s regulatory regime. 
It is very important to note at this point that the analysis in this chapter is not intended 
to be a ‘full’ comparative study of the enforcement regime in these jurisdictions. 
Rather this chapter makes use of three specific enforcement case studies from the UK 
and Australia in order to draw valuable lessons. It is concerned only with examining 
the apparent effectiveness of these enforcement mechanisms in these two countries to 
see how well (or badly) they have worked in practice, and whether this experience 
supports, or undermines, the theoretical arguments developed in respect of Nigeria in 
part 2 of this thesis.  
Consequently, this chapter is divided into three sections. Section 10.2 commences by 
examining the first case study which is the UK derivative claims regime. The 
development of the UK derivative claims regime supports the scepticism, expressed 
in chapter 6, that derivative actions can be made to work effectively in Nigeria. While 
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the UK derivative claims regime has been through a significant reform process in 
order to increase access for shareholders, the pertinent question is whether these 
reforms have achieved their desired effect. The discussion below will answer that 
question negatively. It therefore supports the claim made in chapter 6 that the private 
civil enforcement regime is fraught with inherent difficulties which can hardly be 
resolved even by amending the law on private civil enforcement actions in order to 
make it more accessible.  
The second case study is the UK directors’ disqualification regime. This case study 
supports this thesis’ argument about the potential effectiveness and superiority of 
public civil enforcement. It starts by briefly examining the features of the UK 
disqualification regime before going on to analyse its practical effectiveness as an 
enforcement mechanism. It makes use of empirical data on the incidences of 
directors’ disqualification derived from the UK insolvency services.  It shows that the 
UK disqualification regime has been very effective in terms of actively disqualifying 
directors of insolvent companies.  
Admittedly, that effectiveness is somewhat limited by the fact that the regime tends to 
concentrate on disqualifying directors of insolvent companies. The UK 
disqualification regime is therefore less impactful where the company is still solvent. 
Consequently, this chapter examines the third case study. The Australian civil penalty 
regime, which addresses that weakness.  It examines the effectiveness of that regime 
in terms of the number of successful enforcement actions taken by the regulator and 
its likely deterrent effect.  It suggests that the regime has indeed enjoyed considerable 
success as an enforcement mechanism.  
These three case studies do not, of course, demonstrate unequivocally that public civil 
enforcement must always outperform a private civil enforcement or criminal 
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enforcement regime, in terms of delivering the most effective enforcement of 
corporate regulation either generally, or in Nigeria specifically. However, they do at 
least add some persuasive empirical support to the theoretical argument developed in 
part 2.  
It therefore argues that there is overwhelmingly positive evidence in favour of public 
civil enforcement drawn from both the UK and Australian jurisdictions.  
 
10.2 Case Study 1: The UK Derivative Claims Regime  
The UK makes comprehensive provision for directors’ duties under the Companies 
Act 2006. It is however well recognised that these duties are unlikely to perform any 
deterrent function or be of any use in corporate governance unless they are well 
enforced.
2
  In order to enforce these duties, the UK relies heavily on private 
enforcement actions. One key strand of the UK’s private enforcement regime is 
derivative proceedings and this enforcement mechanism will be the subject of our 
analysis.  
10.2.1 Background  
Derivative proceedings have long been a part of the UK’s private civil enforcement 
regime. They were developed by the common law courts as exceptions to the rule in 
Foss v Harbottle
3
 and were permitted where 
1. The wrong done amounted to ‘fraud on the minority’; and  
2. The wrongdoers are in control of the company and as such are unlikely to 
pursue a claim to redress the wrong done.4  
                                                            
2 A Keay, ‘An Assessment of Private Enforcement Actions for Directors Breaches of Duty’ (2014) 
33(1) Civil Justice Quarterly 76, 77. 
3 (1843) 2 Hare 461 
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Derivative proceedings under the common law regime were however severely 
criticised and considered wholly inadequate. The type of wrongs that fell within the 
‘fraud on the minority’ exception was generally unclear under the common law.5  
Furthermore, it was difficult to prove wrongdoer control especially in public listed 
companies with several shareholders.
6
 
 
It was therefore commonly argued that the law 
regarding shareholder’s ability to bring derivative proceedings was obscure and 
complex making it difficult for shareholders to build a strong claim. 
7
  
Data obtained on derivative proceedings under the common law regime also revealed 
the difficulties with this enforcement mechanism as claims under the common law 
regime were very rarely successful. This problem was more acute with regards to 
listed companies as shown by Armour’s empirical study on decisions obtained in UK 
minority shareholder enforcement actions between 1990 and 2006.  
Table 10.1 Decisions on Derivative Actions in the UK between 1990 and 2006. 
Year  All Companies  Listed Companies  
1990 0 0 
1991 0 0 
1992 0.5* 0 
1993 0 0 
1994 1 0 
                                                                                                                                                                         
4 Edwards v Halliwell [1950] 2 All E.R 1064, Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Newman Industries Ltd 
(No 2) [1982] Ch. 204. 
5 D Kershaw, Company Law in Context: Text and Materials (2nd edn, OUP 2012) 604.  
6 A Reisberg, Derivative Actions and Corporate Governance (OUP 2007)) 92.  
7 Law Commission, Shareholder Remedies (LC 246, 1997) para 1.4; Julia Tang, ‘Shareholder 
Remedies: Demise of the Derivative Claim’ (2012) 1(2) UCL Journal of Law & Jurisprudence 
178,181.  
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Year  All Companies  Listed Companies  
1995 1 0 
1996 0 0 
1997 1 0 
1998 1 0 
1999 2 0 
2000 0 0 
2001 2 0 
2002 3.5* 0 
2003 4.5* 0 
2004 1 0 
2005 5.5* 0 
2006 2 0 
Mean  1.5 0.0 
 
*scores of 0.5 indicate actions framed as both derivative action and petition for relief 
from unfair prejudice  
Table 10.1: Data on derivative actions in the UK between 1990 and 2006 was taken 
and adapted from J. Armour, ‘Enforcement Strategies in UK Corporate governance: 
A Roadmap and Empirical Assessment’ in J Armour & J Payne, Rationality in 
Company Law: Essays in Honour of DD Prentice (Hart Publishing 2009) 83.   
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The table above shows that successful derivative actions under the common law 
regime were a rare occurrence. This was especially so for public listed companies as 
Armour’s study shows that there was no successful derivative action in a listed 
company during the period under review.   It was therefore generally conceded that 
the common law requirements governing derivative proceedings represented a major 
difficulty. As a result of this, several calls were made for a statutory derivative claims 
regime as it was thought that this would resolve the difficulties which plagued 
common law derivative proceedings.
8
 These difficulties with the common law 
requirements were also recognised by the Law Commission which opined that 
derivative proceedings under the common law were ‘rigid, old fashioned and 
unclear’.9  
In response to the inadequacies of the common law regime, the Law Commission 
recommended that there should be a new derivative procedure with ‘more modern, 
flexible and accessible criteria’ for determining when shareholders should be able to 
bring derivative actions.
10
 The Law Commission’s recommendations regarding a 
statutory derivative claim were subsequently considered and adopted by the Company 
Law Reform Steering Group (CLRSG) which published its final report in July 2001.
11
   
The government’s response to this final report are covered in a white paper, 
‘modernising company law’, published in 2012 where most of the recommendations 
in the final report where accepted.
12
 The recommendations for a new statutory 
derivative claims regime are now set out in Pt. 11 of the Companies Act 2006.  
                                                            
8 See S Watkins, ‘The Common Law Derivative Action: An Outmoded Relic?’ (1999) 30 Cambrian 
Law Review 40. 
9 Law Commission, Shareholder Remedies (LC 246, 1997) para 1.4. 
10 Ibid para 1.23V 
11 See the Company Law Review Steering Group, ‘Modern Company Law for a Competitive 
Economy: Final Report: Vols. I and II’ (London: DTI, 2001) 
12 Cm 5553 – I and II. Note however that the white paper is silent on the final report’s 
recommendations to introduce a statutory derivative actions regime. For a full discussion of the 
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10.2.2 The UK Statutory Derivative Claims Regime 
As mentioned above, the UK statutory derivative claims regime is contained in Pt. 11 
of the Companies Act 2006 (CA). Section 260(3) of the CA provides for the grounds 
on which derivative claims may be brought. Derivative claims in the UK may be 
brought in respect of a breach of duty, breach of trust and even negligence. The term 
‘director’ is also defined to include former directors and shadow directors.13  Claims 
under the statutory derivative claims regime have therefore been made significantly 
wider than the previous common law position.  The instances in which a director may 
be held liable is also no longer limited to cases where there has been ‘fraud’ and 
‘wrongdoer control’.14 A derivative claim can therefore still be brought where the 
director acted in good faith and has not benefitted personally.
15
  
The Act provides for a ‘two stage procedure’ for members who wish to bring a 
derivative claim. The two-stage process was introduced in order to enable frivolous 
claims to be dismissed at an early stage thereby preventing a misuse of the derivative 
claims procedure while still ensuring that minority shareholders have a remedy in 
appropriate cases.
16
 At the first stage, after the derivative claim has been filed, the 
applicant must apply for permission to continue the action. At this stage, the court 
must decide whether the application and the evidence filed by the applicant disclose a 
prima facie case.
17
 The applicant has the burden to prove that he has a prima facie 
case and where he fails to do so the application will be dismissed and the court may 
                                                                                                                                                                         
government’s ‘white paper’ see R.J Goddard, ‘Modernising Company Law”: The Government’s White 
Paper’ (2003) 66(3) Modern Law Review 402-424.  
13 s.260 (5) Companies Act 2006. 
14 Under the common law regime, a shareholder seeking to bring a derivative action was required to 
prove ‘fraud on the minority’ and ‘wrongdoer control’. See Edwards v Halliwell (n 4), Prudential 
Assurance Co Ltd (n 4). 
15 A Dignam and J Lowry, Company Law (9th edn, OUP 2016) 189. 
16 HC Deb June 6 2006, vol. 447, col 131.  
17 Companies Act 2006, s.261 (2). 
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make any consequential order it considers necessary.
18
 At this stage, the court would 
consider the issue based on the applicants evidence alone and the defendant is not 
required to file any evidence at this stage.
19
  
At the second stage, the company will be required to file evidence and the court will 
determine whether to grant permission to continue the claim.
20
 Permission must be 
refused if the court is satisfied that a person acting in accordance with s.172 of the 
Act would not seek to continue the action. Permission must also be refused where the 
course of action has been authorised or ratified by the company either before or after 
occurrence.
21
 Where any of these factors are present, the court is mandated to refuse 
permission. Section 263 (3 & 4) further sets out certain discretionary factors which 
the court should consider in granting permission. It is worth noting that these 
discretionary factors apply only where none of the mandatory bars in s263(2) apply. 
The discretionary factors to be considered by the court are  
 whether the member is acting in good faith in seeking to continue the claim 
  the importance that a person acting in accordance with section 172 would 
attach to continuing the claim 
  whether the act or omission that resulted in the cause of action has been 
authorised before it occurred or ratified after it occurs 
 whether the company has decided not to pursue the claim 
  whether the act or omission in respect of which the claim is brought gives rise 
to a cause of action that the member could pursue in his own right rather than 
                                                            
18 ibid 
19 Explanatory notes to the Companies Act 2006, para 492. 
20 Civil Procedure Rules 1998/3132, rule 19.9a. 
21 Companies Act 2006, s263 (2). 
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on behalf of the company and the views of independent members of the 
company.22  
It is worth noting that this list is not exhaustive and the court may consider other 
factors in determining whether to grant permission to continue the claim.  
The provisions of the statutory derivative claims regime represent a vast improvement 
on the common law regime; the key question however is whether this has led to a 
significant improvement in its effectiveness as an enforcement mechanism.  It is 
important to note that the UK derivative claims regime has been criticised for its 
substantive content as well as its practical effectiveness. The substantive content of 
the UK statutory derivative claims regime has been criticised on different grounds. 
One of its key criticisms is that the two stage procedure for bringing derivative claims 
under the Companies Act makes derivative claims unnecessarily ‘time consuming 
and arduous’23 thereby potentially deterring prospective litigants. Other criticisms of 
the UK statutory derivative claims regime includes the ‘hypothetical directors’ test’ 
contained in s263(2)a and the confusion regarding ratification under the Companies 
Act 2006.
24
 This chapter is however more concerned with the practical effectiveness 
of the statutory derivative claims regime in terms of its actual use rather than the 
inherent deficiencies in the substantive provisions of the law. It would therefore 
examine, in the next section, how practically effective the UK statutory derivative 
claims regime has been as an enforcement mechanism since its inception in 2007.   
                                                            
22 Companies Act, s 263 (3 & 4).  
23 S Griffin, ‘Alternative Shareholder Remedies following Corporate Mismanagement- Which Remedy 
to Pursue’ (2010) 28(1) Company Law Newsletter 1,3 
24 See C.A Riley, ‘Derivative Claims and Ratification: Time to Ditch Some Baggage’ (2014) 34(4) 
Legal Studies 582 for an analysis of the problems occasioned by the current position of the UK 
Companies Act on ratification. 
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10.2.3 Practical Effectiveness of the UK Statutory Derivative Claims Regime 
While the UK statutory derivative claims regime broadens the circumstances in which 
derivative claims may be brought making it more flexible than the common law 
regime, this has not substantially increased derivative claims in the UK. The evidence 
suggests little increase in derivative claims since the Companies Act came into 
effect.
25
 This specifically includes public listed companies, the type of company 
which this thesis is concerned about. The statutory derivative claims regime began 
operation on the 1
st
 of October 2007. Table 10.2 shows the relevant data. The 
‘headline’ point is that there has been no significant increase in the use of derivative 
claims under the statutory regime in comparison to the situation under the common 
law. The fact that only few cases have been successfully brought under the statutory 
regime leads to an inference that it has not truly increased access to courts for 
minority shareholders.
26
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 10.2 Reported UK Derivative Claims since 2008 
                                                            
25 D Ahern, ‘Directors’ Duties: Broadening the Focus Beyond Content to Examine the Accountability 
Spectrum’ 2011 (33) Dublin University Law Journal 116,134 
26 A Keay, ‘An Assessment of Private Enforcement Actions for Directors Breaches of Duty’ (n 2) 84. 
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PERIOD TOTAL  PRIVATE 
LIMITED 
LIABILITY 
COMPANIES 
PUBLIC 
LIMITED 
LIABILITY 
COMPANIES 
(LISTED 
COMPANIES) 
PERMISSION 
GRANTED 
PERMISSION 
REFUSED 
2008 3 2 0* 0 2** 
2009 3 3 0 1 1^ 
2010 3 3 0 2 1 
2011 3 3 0 1 2 
2012 3 3 0 2 1 
2013 2 2 0 1 1 
2014 2 2 0 1 1 
2015 3 2 1 2 1 
2016 2 2 0 0 2 
Total 24 22 1 10 12 
 
* One of the three cases listed for 2008 relates to a public limited company which 
was not recorded as a listed company.
27
  
** Decision in one case was adjourned pending determination of some other related 
claim.  
                                                            
27 See Mission Capital Plc v Sinclair [2008] EWHC 1339.  
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^ Decision in the third case was adjourned pending board’s decision.   Note that one 
of the three cases listed for 2009 relates to a landlord association.
28
  
Table 10.2: Data on derivative claims in the UK where permission to continue claim 
under s263 of the Companies Act 2006 was sought. Data were derived from Westlaw 
database of cases.  
Table 10.2 shows that since the 1
st
 of October 2007, permission to continue derivative 
claims under Section 261 of the Companies Act 2006 has only been sought in 24 
cases. This is indeed a very small number and shows that in spite of the reforms of 
the derivative claims regime in the UK, it has not resulted in a substantial increase in 
the use of this enforcement mechanism when compared to the previous common law 
position.
29
     
The situation is made bleaker by the fact that out of those 24 cases where permission 
has been sought, only 2 out of those cases relates to a public limited company. Of the 
two public limited companies where permission to continue derivative claims has 
been sought, only one of the companies was a listed company.
30
 This means that 
more than 85 percent of derivative claims brought in the UK were in respect of 
private limited liability companies. The implication of this is that breach of directors’ 
duties in public listed companies are not being enforced by derivative claims in the 
UK. Consequently, in the absence of alternative enforcement mechanisms, directors’ 
breach in those companies are likely to go ‘unredressed’. The data obtained here also 
corroborate the prior empirical study, conducted by Armour et al, which found that 
the likelihood that a director of a public listed company in the UK will be sued under 
                                                            
28 See Stimpson v Southern Landlord Association [2009] EWHC 2072 (ch).       
29 see Table 10.1 
30 See Bridge v Daley [2015] EWHC 2121 (Ch.). The company was listed on the Alternative 
Investment Market (AIM) of the Stock Exchange. 
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UK companies’ legislation is almost none.31 Private enforcement actions against 
directors of public listed companies in the UK were simply not filed.  They therefore 
argued that directors of publicly listed companies in the UK face very little risk of 
being sued in an English court under UK company law.
32
  
Therefore, in spite of the significant reforms made in the Companies Act 2006, 
intended to increase access to derivative proceedings for minority shareholders and 
ensure effective enforcement, the results in terms of actual increase in the use of 
derivative proceedings have been quite disappointing. This is particularly more so 
with regards to enforcement of breaches in public listed companies.  These results 
corroborate our earlier claim in chapter 6 that derivative claims are fraught with 
inherent difficulties which hinders their effectiveness as an enforcement action in 
corporate law. Recall that these inherent difficulties discussed in chapter 6 include 
lack of incentive to bring claims, information asymmetries and the cost problem.
33
 
These difficulties undermine the effectiveness of derivative proceedings as an 
enforcement mechanism. Precisely because they are inherent in the very nature of 
derivative proceedings specifically and, to some extent, the nature of private civil 
proceedings more generally.  
Consequently, while changes in the law and procedural requirements for bringing 
derivative proceedings may slightly improve the use of this enforcement action, they 
are unlikely to lead to any substantial increase as seen by the UK experience. Even if 
Nigeria were to reform its current derivative action regime, the UK experience 
suggests that this would likely make little difference to the number of derivative 
                                                            
31 J Armour, B Black, B Cheffins & Richard Nolan, ‘Private Enforcement of Corporate Law: An 
Empirical Comparison of the United Kingdom and the United States. (2009) 6(4) Journal of Empirical 
Legal Studies 687,699. 
32 ibid 700. 
33 For a further discussion of these difficulties see s6.4.  
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actions. This is not to say that private enforcement actions do not play any role in 
enforcement of corporate law. Rather the argument is that their number will always 
be modest at best, and efforts to improve the effectiveness of enforcement of 
corporate law in Nigeria must be sought elsewhere. Public civil enforcement offers a 
potentially more effective enforcement regime, and more fruitful terrain for our 
reforming energies. In light of this, the next section will examine the UK 
disqualification regime.  
 
10.3 Case Study 2:  The UK Disqualification Regime 
The UK disqualification regime has its origin in the 1982 report of the Cork 
Committee.
34
 The concern of the Cork Committee was the ease with which a director 
could potentially mismanage a company resulting in insolvency and then just move 
on to form a new company carrying on business as usual while leaving  behind 
unpaid creditors.
35
 As a result of the Cork Committee recommendations, the 
disqualification provisions previously contained in the Companies Act 1985 and the 
Insolvency Act 1985 were strengthened and consolidated in the Company Directors 
Disqualification Act 1986 (CDDA).
36
  The principle behind the director 
disqualification regime in the UK is that persons who have abused their position in 
the company should be deprived of access to a similar position for a period of time. 
Hence, in Re Blackspur Group Plc,
37
 it was held that the purpose of the Company 
Directors Disqualification Act of 1986 is to protect the public by deterring further 
                                                            
34 See Report of the Review Committee on Insolvency Law and Practice (The Cork Committee) Cmnd 
8558, para 1813. 
35 Dignam and Lowry (n 15) 294.  
36 Note that the UK disqualification regime has been further extended and strengthened by the 
Insolvency Act 2000 as well as the Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015. See below 
for a further discussion. 
37 [1998] 1 WLR 422,426. 
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misconduct and encouraging higher standards of honesty and diligence in corporate 
management.
 
It does this in two ways. First, it takes out of circulation those who have 
behaved badly, and are consequently unfit to take part in the management of a 
corporation.
38
 Second, it deters further misconduct by incumbent directors under the 
threat of being disqualified.  
Dignam and Lowry have classified the grounds for disqualification orders in the UK 
into two; these are discretionary orders and mandatory orders for unfitness.
39
 A 
discretionary basis for which the court may issue a disqualification order is where a 
person has been convicted of an indictable offence in connection with the promotion, 
formation, management, liquidation, or striking off a company, and receivership of a 
company’s property.40 The offence therefore need not directly relate to the 
management of the company as long as it was committed ‘in connection’ with its 
management.
41
 The maximum disqualification period is 5 years where the order is 
made by a court of summary jurisdiction and 15 years in any other case.
42
 The court 
may also disqualify a person who appears to have persistently been in default of the 
companies’ legislation regarding filing of certain documents with the registrar of 
companies.
43
 The maximum disqualification period for this breach is 5 years.
44
  A 
disqualification order may also be made against a person where, in the course of 
winding up, it appears that he is guilty of an offence of fraudulent trading, or is 
otherwise guilty of fraud or breach of duty while he was an officer, liquidator, 
receiver or manager of the company.
45
 The maximum disqualification period for this 
                                                            
38 See Re Stanford Services Ltd & ors (1987) 3 BCC 326, 336. 
39 Dignam and Lowry (n 15) 296-305. 
40 CDDA 1986, s 2. 
41 Dignam and Lowry (n 15) 296. 
42 CDDA 1986, s 2(3). 
43 CDDA 1986, s 3. 
44 CDDA 1986, s3 (5). 
45 CDDA 1986, s4. 
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offence is 15 years.
46
 Finally, the court may also make a disqualification order for a 
maximum of 15 years if, after investigation, it appears to the secretary of state that a 
disqualification order ought to be made in the public’s interests.47 
The mandatory ground for disqualification orders is based on the ground of 
‘unfitness’. Section 6(1) of the CDDA provides that the court shall make a 
disqualification order against a director of an insolvent company where the director’s 
conduct at that company makes him unfit to be concerned in the management of a 
company. The court must therefore disqualify a director if it is shown that his conduct 
in relation to a company which is now insolvent makes him unfit. The minimum 
period of disqualification under this ground is 2 years and the maximum period is 15 
years.
48
 It is important to note that in contrast to the other disqualification grounds, 
disqualification under section 6 is restricted to directors or shadow directors.
49
 An 
application under section 6 must also be brought by the Secretary of State or by the 
official receiver if the company is in compulsory liquidation.
50
  
An important development in the UK’s disqualification regime relates to the 
introduction of disqualification undertakings. The Insolvency Act 2000 introduced a 
procedure whereby in certain circumstances which are set out in sections 7 and 8 of 
the CDDA, the Secretary of State may accept a disqualification undertaking. This is 
an undertaking by a person that for a period specified in the undertaking, he will not 
in any way be a director of a company, act as a receiver of a company’s property or 
‘directly or indirectly’ take part in the promotion, formation or management of a 
                                                            
46 CDDA 1986, s4 (3). 
47 CDDA 1986, s8. 
48 CDDA 1986, s6 (4). 
49 CDDA 1986, s6(3c) 
50 CDDA 1986, s7 (1). 
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company unless he has the leave of the court to do so.
51
  If the Secretary of State 
believes that the conditions set out in section 6(1) CDDA have been satisfied and it 
appears to be in the public’s interest to do so, he will accept the disqualification 
undertaking.
52
  
The basis for the introduction of disqualification undertakings was to avoid the 
necessity of having court hearings where the insolvency service and director could 
easily reach an agreement on the terms of the disqualification.
53
 This therefore saves 
court time and costs. However, a court hearing can still take place at the director’s 
costs if he refuses to accept the terms of the undertaking.  A director who has 
accepted an undertaking may also later apply to court for the period of the 
disqualification to be reduced or for the disqualification undertaking to be 
cancelled.
54
 The introduction of disqualification undertakings significantly reduced 
the caseload for disqualification court orders. It has therefore resulted in a marked 
decrease in the number of disqualification orders.
55
  
The effect of a disqualification order or undertaking is that a person shall not, without 
the leave of the court, act as a director, insolvency practitioner, receiver of a 
company’s property or take part in the ‘promotion, formation or management of a 
company…’56 It in effect takes the director out of circulation in relation to a 
company’s management. Therefore, the director is not only disqualified from being a 
director, but also disqualified from taking part in any form of management activity 
whatsoever in relation to companies.                                             
                                                            
51 See Insolvency Act 2000, s6 (2); CDDA 1986, s1A. 
52 CDDA 1986, s7 (2A). 
53 P.L Davies and S Worthington, Gower’s Principles of Modern Company Law (10th edn, Sweet & 
Maxwell 2016) 10-2. 
54 ibid 10-2. 
55 See below table 10.3 for data on disqualification orders and undertakings in the UK.  
56 See CDDA 1986, s1 (1) &1A (1). 
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The Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015 (SBEEA) has made some 
recent important reforms to the disqualification regime. Section 104 SBEEA provides 
that the court may now disqualify a person who has been convicted of certain 
company related offences abroad.
57
 In addition to this, those who instructed or 
exercised influence over a disqualified director can also be disqualified.
58
 
Furthermore, in determining a person’s unfitness for the purpose of disqualification, 
reference may now be made to the person’s conduct as a director of other companies 
including overseas companies.
59
 The period for applying for disqualification orders 
against unfit directors of insolvent companies is also now extended from 2 years to 3 
years.
60
  
A further significant reform of the disqualification regime is in respect of 
compensation orders and undertakings. Section 110 of the SBEEA
61
 introduced the 
ability of the Secretary of State to apply for compensation orders to be made against, 
and to accept compensation undertakings from, disqualified directors under s.15A of 
the CDDA.
62
  In order to obtain a compensation order, two conditions must be met. 
First, the person must be subject to a disqualification order or undertaking. Second, 
the conduct for which the person is subject to the disqualification order or 
                                                            
57 The offence committed must also be an indictable offence under the laws of England, Wales or 
Scotland. The maximum disqualification period under this section is 15 years.  See further SBEEA, 
s104.  
58 SBEEA, s105. 
59 SBEEA, s106. 
60 SBEEA, s108.  
61 Note that s110 SBEEA inserted ss.15a-15c into the CDDA. This provision took effect on the 1st of 
October 2015. See further P Bailey, ‘October Changes to Company Law and Corporate Insolvency 
Law Summarised’ (2015) 376 Company Law Newsletter 1-4.  
62 The right to apply for variation or revocation of compensation undertakings was similarly provided 
by inserting s.15C into the CDDA from the same date. 
See also the Compensation Orders (Disqualified Directors) Proceedings (England and Wales) Rules 
2016 (SI 2016/890) which were issued on 13 September and came into force on 1 October 2016. The 
rules make provision in England and Wales for the procedure for bringing applications by the 
Secretary of State for compensation orders against disqualified directors and applications for the 
variation and revocation of compensation undertakings.  
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undertaking must have caused loss to one or more creditors of an insolvent company 
where the person was once a director.
63
 Hence, the compensation order is intended for 
the benefit of creditors who have suffered loss as a result of a company’s insolvency.  
The introduction of the compensation order and undertaking has the potential to 
significantly strengthen the UK disqualification regime. Therefore, the UK 
disqualification regime not only has a deterrent effect, but also, potentially, provides a 
compensatory benefit. This is highly commendable as it enhances the overall 
effectiveness of the disqualification regime as an enforcement mechanism.
64
   
 
10.3.1 Practical Effectiveness of the UK disqualification regime 
Data derived from the Insolvency Service show that the disqualification regime has 
been effectively used to disqualify unfit directors. 
Table 10.3 
Director Disqualification Orders and Undertakings (Great Britain) 
                                                            
63 See CDDA 1986, s15(a) 3.  
64 As discussed in chapter 3, an enforcement regime should be evaluated by reference to its ability to 
meet deterrence and compensatory purposes. For a further discussion and critique of the newly 
introduced compensatory provision, see R Williams, ‘Civil Recovery from Delinquent Directors’ 
(2015) 15(2) Journal of Corporate Law Studies 311-339.  
 
PERIOD  TOTAL  ORDERS UNDERTAKINGS 
2009 1,365 286 1,079 
2010 1,509 286 1,223 
2011 1,185 251 934 
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Table 10.3:  Insolvency Services, ‘Directors Disqualification Orders and 
Undertakings’ in ‘Insolvency Services Enforcement Outcomes – October to 
December 2015 – Tables (11th February 2016) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/insolvency-service-enforcement-outcomes-
experimental-statistics-october-to-december-2015> accessed 4
th
 April 2016. 
 
Table 10.4: Length of Directors Disqualification Orders and Undertakings 
  Average 
Length 
of Order 
Length of Disqualification 
Order 
  Average 
Length of 
Undertaking 
Length of 
Disqualification 
Undertaking 
Period 2 to 5 
years 
Over 5 
to 10 
years 
Over 
10 to 
15 
years 
  2 to 5 
years 
Over 5 
to 10 
years 
Over 
10 to 
15 
years 
                  
2009  7.7  99  120  67   5.8  585  377  117  
2012 1,011 184 827 
2013 1,245 227 1,018 
2014 1,300 237 1,063 
2015 1,060 207 853 
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  Average 
Length 
of Order 
Length of Disqualification 
Order 
  Average 
Length of 
Undertaking 
Length of 
Disqualification 
Undertaking 
Period 2 to 5 
years 
Over 5 
to 10 
years 
Over 
10 to 
15 
years 
  2 to 5 
years 
Over 5 
to 10 
years 
Over 
10 to 
15 
years 
2010  7.8  81  135  70   5.8  670  448  105  
2011  6.8  100  125  26   5.6  566  292  76  
2012  7.1  72  78  34   5.4  531  232  64  
2013  7.3  94  80  53   5.4  666  266  86  
2014  7.5  88  92  57   5.2  718  273  72  
2015  7.2  77  95  35   5.6  507  272  74  
 
Table 10.4: Insolvency Services, ‘Length of Directors Disqualification Orders and 
Undertakings’ in ‘Insolvency Services Enforcement Outcomes – October to 
December 2015 – Tables (11th February 2016)  
<https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/insolvency-service-enforcement-outcomes-
experimental-statistics-october-to-december-2015>   accessed 4th April 2016. 
From the data above, it is apparent that the director disqualification regime has been 
actively used as an enforcement mechanism in the UK. Table 10.3 shows that in 2015 
alone, the total number of disqualification orders and undertakings was 1060. Many 
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would agree that this is by any standard a very good level of enforcement activity.  
The data in Table 10.3 also shows that in every year there has been a higher number 
of disqualification undertakings than disqualification orders. This shows that 
disqualification undertakings are actually being put to good use consequently saving 
valuable court time and resources.  
In addition to this, Table 10.4 reveals that the average length of disqualification 
orders over the past seven years have been 7.3 years while the average length of 
disqualification undertakings have been 5.5 years. Therefore, on average, the duration 
of disqualification orders and undertakings have been reasonable lengthy. The length 
of the disqualification orders and undertakings is therefore severe enough to ensure 
effective deterrence.  
A prime example of the UK’s use of its disqualification regime is seen in the 
disqualification of some directors of Barings banking group.
65
 The Barings banking 
group collapsed in February 1995 as a result of the unauthorised activities of Nick 
Leeson, a ‘rogue trader’, who had made trading losses of about £827 million.  The 
main Barings companies in the UK also went into administration as a result of this. 
Following this, the secretary of state for trade and industry instituted director 
disqualification proceedings against ten directors of Barings companies, for their 
failure to supervise Leeson’s activities. The case against three directors went to trial. 
                                                            
65 See Baker V Secretary of State for Trade and Industry [2001] B.C.C 273. Note that one of the 
directors unsuccessfully appealed the finding of unfitness and disqualification order. Other recent 
examples of director disqualification are the case of Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and 
Skills v Adedapo [2015] CSOH 152 where a five-year disqualification order was granted under s6 of 
the CDDA 1986 in respect of the sole director of an insolvent company who had deliberately acted in a 
way that was detrimental to the company’s creditors. See also Secretary of State for Business, 
Innovation and Skills v Russell [2015] CSOH 128, where a six-year disqualification order was granted 
under s6 of CDDA 1986. See also FG Hawkes (western) Ltd Re [2015] EWHC 1585 where two 
company directors were disqualified under s6 of the CDDA 1986 for being unfit to manage a 
company.  
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At the trial, the judge found the directors to be unfit and ordered that they should be 
disqualified.  
In addition to the UK’s general disqualification regime, there have also been 
prohibitions or bans imposed by UK financial services regulators on directors 
operating in the financial services industry from taking up further roles in that 
industry.
66
 A key example is seen in the ban of Peter Cummings, one of the 
executives of Halifax Bank of Scotland, from performing any ‘significant influence’ 
function in a financial services firm by the former Financial Services Authority in the 
wake of the bank’s near collapse.67 Similarly, more recently, the former chief 
executive officer of the Cooperative Bank, Barry Tootell, and a former managing 
director, Keith Alderson, were both banned as a result of the near collapse of that 
bank in 2013.
68
   
In spite of these commendable enforcement activities, it is argued that the UK’s 
general disqualification regime is not fully efficient. Almost all the attention of the 
UK disqualification regime is placed on directors of insolvent companies. Hence, 
most of the disqualification orders and undertakings issued are in respect of section 6 
of the CDDA Act 1986 which relates to directors of insolvent companies. This is 
evident from the insolvency services own data reproduced in table 10.5.  
Table 10.5 
                                                            
66 This bans are made pursuant to s56 (2) of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA) 
which provides that an order may be made prohibiting an individual from performing a specified 
function.  
67 FSA, ‘Final notice’, <http://www.fsa.gov.uk/static/pubs/final/peter-cummings.pdf>   accessed 
04/04/16.  See also Jill Treanor, ‘Ex-HBOS Banker Cummings Banned for Life and Fined £500,000’ 
The Guardian (12th September 2012) <http://www.theguardian.com/business/2012/sep/12/hbos-
banker-peter-cummings-banned-fined-fsa>   accessed 04/04/16. 
68 See BBC, ‘Former Co-Op Bank Executives Banned from Senior Financial Roles’ BBC (15 January 
2016) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-35324438> accessed 04/04/16. 
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Director Disqualification Orders and Undertakings by Section  
PERIOD TOTAL SECTION 2 SECTION 6 SECTION 8 
2009 1,365 56 1,289 20 
2010 1,509 48 1,451 10 
2011 1,185 48 1,122 15 
2012 1,011 50 957 4 
2013 1,245 61 1,179 5 
2014 1,300 73 1,227 0 
2015 1,060 39 1,018 3 
 
Table 10.5: Insolvency Services, ‘Director Disqualification Orders and Undertakings 
by Section’ in ‘Insolvency Services Enforcement Outcomes – October to December 
2015 – Tables’ (11th February 2016)  
<https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/insolvency-service-enforcement-
outcomes-experimental-statistics-october-to-december-2015> accessed 04/04/16. 
The above data reveal that more than 80% of disqualification orders and undertakings 
under the UK disqualification regime are issued under section 6 of the CDDA. 
Therefore, most of the disqualification orders and undertakings in the UK are in 
respect of insolvent companies. This has led to concerns about the effectiveness of 
the UK disqualification regime as unfit directors are usually exposed only after the 
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company has fallen into difficulties.
69
   This begs the question of what happens to 
directors of solvent companies who are unfit and should be the subject of 
enforcement action due to misconduct.  
While it is important to disqualify directors of insolvent companies, there is need for 
some enforcement action to be taken against directors of solvent companies who have 
breached their duties or other corporate law requirements. This will ensure that the 
enforcement regime properly imposes a deterrent effect on company directors 
generally, including those whose companies are perhaps not at risk of insolvency. 
The current UK director disqualification regime is however unable to achieve this 
effective deterrence as it is focused almost exclusively on disqualifying directors of 
insolvent companies.  
In addition to this, the UK’s public civil enforcement regime is restricted to directors’ 
disqualification. It therefore makes no provision for imposition of other forms of 
sanctions on directors. It can therefore be argued that the UK’s public civil 
enforcement regime is incomplete.  As discussed in chapter 7,
70
 it is essential for a 
regulator to possess a wide variety of sanctions in its enforcement arsenal. This will 
ensure that it is able to employ the right sanction for individual circumstances. The 
UK’s public civil enforcement regime is however lacking in this respect, as it is 
unable to deal with other infractions which do not necessitate a sanction as severe as 
director disqualification. This problem is further coupled by the fact that its 
disqualification regime is unduly focused on insolvent companies. Therefore, while 
the UK disqualification regime has certain commendable features, and has been 
effective in certain respects, it nevertheless falls short in some other regard. 
                                                            
69 D Arsalidou, ‘The Banking Crisis: Rethinking and Refining the Accountability of Bank Directors’ 
(2010) 4 Journal of Business Law 284,294. 
70 See s7.3.1.1 
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In summary, some of the positive features of the UK disqualification regime which 
can be emulated by Nigeria are:  
 Certainty of Sanctions: The number of successful disqualification orders and 
undertakings obtained each year demonstrates effective use of the disqualification 
regime.  
 Speedy Disposition of Cases (Celerity of Sanctions):  The Insolvency Service is the 
body responsible for administering the disqualification regime. Its efficiency is 
demonstrated not only by the number of disqualification order and undertakings 
obtained, but also by its speedy disposition of disqualification proceedings. 
According to the Insolvency Service Annual Reports and Accounts, it has instigated 
disqualification proceedings within 23 months in 98% of cases brought before it.
71
 
Disqualification proceedings are therefore quickly instituted by the Insolvency 
Service thereby ensuring that sanctions are swiftly applied.  
 Cost effectiveness: The use of disqualification undertakings has significantly reduced 
the court’s caseload with regards to disqualification proceedings. It has also 
eliminated the costs associated with court proceedings. Disqualification undertakings 
therefore offer a quicker and essentially cheaper means of disqualifying directors.  
The UK disqualification regime is also cost effective as each disqualified director has 
a net benefit of £100,000 pounds for the economy.
72
  
 Severity of sanctions obtained: The lengthy nature of the disqualification orders and 
undertakings obtained is commendable.  The average length of disqualification 
orders and undertakings secured against directors is 6 years. Similarly about 12% of 
                                                            
71 The Insolvency Service, ‘Annual Reports and Accounts’ 2014-2015  
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/460523/annual-report-
14-15.pdf>, 12 accessed 28th April 2016. 
72 The Insolvency Service, ‘The Insolvency Service Annual Plan 2015-2016’  
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/448443/Insolvency_Se
rvice_Plan_2015-16.pdf>, 2 accessed 28/04/2016. 
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directors are disqualified for more than 10 years while about 49% are disqualified for 
five years or longer.
73
   
 Regulatory accountability - The Insolvency Service is an agency of the Department 
for Business, Innovation and Skills. (BIS), it is therefore fully accountable to 
parliament through ministers. This ensures that the agency meets up with its 
performance targets with regards to director disqualification. Failure to do this would 
make it the subject of parliamentary inquiries. 
On the other side, some weaknesses of the UK disqualification regime are:  
 Its undue focus on directors of insolvent companies thereby preventing redress where 
a breach has been committed by directors of solvent companies.  
 Its lack of explicit mechanisms for detecting directors who breach the 
disqualification order or undertaking imposed. This is important because there is 
always the risk that a disqualified director may potentially act as a shadow or defacto 
director while claiming to be a mere employee.
74
 
In light of the shortcomings of the UK disqualification regime, the next section will 
analyse the Australian civil penalty regime as an example of a jurisdiction which 
offers a more robust public civil enforcement regime and has successfully used it in 
enforcing breach by directors.  
 
 
 
                                                            
73 The Insolvency Service, ‘Annual Reports and Accounts’ (n 71) 14.  
74 D Arsalidou, Rethinking Corporate Governance in Financial Institutions (Routledge 2016) 47. 
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10.4 Case Study 3: The Australian Civil Penalty Regime  
The Australian civil penalty regime which is contained in part 9.4B of the 
Corporations Act 2001 came into operation on the 1
st
 February 1993 based on the 
recommendation of the Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional 
Affairs (‘Cooney Committee’). The civil penalty regime for enforcement of director’s 
duties was introduced in order to limit the place of criminal sanctions to only the most 
serious breaches.
75
  Prior to the commencement of the civil penalty regime, directors’ 
duties were enforceable by criminal sanctions.
76
 However, difficulties with criminal 
proceedings such as the standard of proof and criminal rules of evidence prevented 
the criminal regime from being an effective enforcement system thereby necessitating 
the civil penalty regime. 
The Australian civil penalty regime allows the Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission (ASIC) to commence court-based proceedings against directors who are 
suspected of breaching their statutory duties. The orders that can be sought by ASIC 
are:  
 Declaration of contravention 
  Pecuniary penalties (fines) up to $200,000 
 Compensation orders 
 Disqualification orders.77  
These orders serve varying purposes. The primary purpose of the pecuniary penalty 
order is to punish offenders and provide specific and general deterrent.78 The 
                                                            
75 V Comino, ‘Effective Regulation by the Australian Securities and Investments Commission: The 
Civil Penalty Problem’ (2009) 33 Melbourne University Law Review 803,804  
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1686927> accessed 06/04/2016. 
76 ibid 805. 
77 See Corporations Act 2001, ss 1317J, 1317G, 1317H, & 206C. 
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disqualification order, on its own, is intended to protect the public against abuse of 
the corporate structure by unfit directors. It also has a punitive effect in addition to 
providing specific and general deterrence. The length of the disqualification order is 
at the court’s discretion and there is no limit on the length of the disqualification 
order that may be imposed.
79
 The compensation orders are generally intended to 
compensate the company for the loss suffered as a result of the director’s breach.80 To 
order payment of compensation, the court must be satisfied that there has been a 
breach of duty and that the corporation has suffered damage as a result of that 
breach.
81
 The Australian civil penalty regime therefore attempts to ensure effective 
enforcement by providing deterrence, compensation and punishing offenders. It is 
also important to note that proceedings for a declaration of contravention or 
pecuniary penalty orders are treated as civil proceedings as such civil evidence rules 
and procedure are applied.
82
 
In addition to the court based proceedings which ASIC can institute against directors 
who have breached their duties, ASIC also has the power to commence protective 
actions for breach. These are known as ‘administrative actions’.83   Hence, in addition 
to the power which ASIC has to seek disqualification orders from the court; ASIC 
also has the administrative power to disqualify a person from managing a corporation 
without recourse to the courts. In addition to this, ASIC may also publish public 
warning notices. Appeals from administrative actions taken by ASIC go to the 
Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT).  
                                                                                                                                                                         
78 M Welsh, ‘Realising the Public Potential of Corporate Law: Twenty Years of Civil Penalty 
Enforcement in Australia’ (2014) 42 Federal Law Review 217,237. 
79 Corporations Act 2001, s206c (1) 
80 Welsh, Realising the Public Potential of Corporate Law (n 78) 237 
81 See Corporations Act 2001, ss1317H, 1317HA (1). 
82 Corporations Act 2001, s1317L. 
83 ASIC, ‘ASIC’s Approach to Enforcement, Information Sheet 151’   
<http://download.asic.gov.au/media/1339118/INFO_151_ASIC_approach_to_enforcement_20130916.
pdf> accessed 17th October 2016.  
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10.4.1 Effectiveness of the Australian Civil Penalty Regime 
An examination of ASIC’s use of the civil penalty regime shows that it has achieved 
a good degree of success.
84
 Success here is defined by the fact that this enforcement 
regime is frequently used by ASIC and it (ASIC) has obtained a declaration of 
contravention against at least one named defendant in its civil penalty applications in 
addition to obtaining other civil penalty orders.
85
 While the civil penalty regime was 
not frequently used between 1993 and 1999, the story has now changed as since 2000 
the regime has been used more effectively.
86
 
 Welsh’s analysis of ASIC’s civil penalty regime reveals that it has been an effective 
enforcement mechanism for breach of director’s duties, insolvent trading, insider 
trading and continuous disclosure provisions.
87
 In the early days of the civil penalty 
regime, most of the civil penalty applications were in respect of directors of 
proprietary (private) companies, however in recent years this trend has been reversed 
as more applications are now been made against directors of public companies.
88
  
Between February 1993 and June 2013, ASIC commenced civil penalty proceedings 
based on allegation of breach of directors statutory duties on 38 occasions. The result 
of 3 out of those 38 cases is unknown. With the remaining cases where the outcome is 
known, ASIC has achieved a very good degree of success as it obtained declaration of 
contraventions and civil penalty orders against at least one of the named defendants in 
a total of 29 cases.
89
 
                                                            
84 M Welsh, ‘The Use of Civil Sanctions for Breaches of Corporate Law’ (Submission to the 
Department of Treasury’s Review of Sanctions in Corporate Law) Department of Business Law and 
Taxation: Corporate Law and Accountability Research Group Working Paper No 7 (2007)  
< http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1029846>, 2 accessed 10th February 2016.  
85 ibid 17.  
86 ibid 2. 
87 ibid. 
88 M Welsh, ‘Realising the Public Potential of Corporate Law (n 78) 234. 
89 Ibid. 
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Table 10.6 
Orders Sought by ASIC 
Orders sought  No of Cases 
Declaration of contravention (no other 
orders) 
1 
Pecuniary penalty orders alone 1 
Disqualification orders alone 7 
Compensation orders alone 0 
Pecuniary penalty and disqualification 
orders 
16 
Disqualification and compensation orders 2 
Pecuniary penalty and compensation 
orders 
2 
Pecuniary penalty, disqualification and 
compensation orders 
7 
Unknown 2 
Total number of cases seeking 
disqualification orders 
32 
Total number of cases seeking pecuniary 
penalty orders 
26 
Total number of cases seeking 11 
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Orders sought  No of Cases 
compensation orders 
  
Table 10.6: Data directly obtained from M Welsh, ‘Realising the Public Potential of 
Corporate Law: Twenty Years of Civil Penalty Enforcement in Australia’ (2014) 42 
Fed. L. Rev 217,237 
In addition to the data above, additional information obtained directly from ASIC also 
reveal that the regulator makes regular use of its public civil enforcement regime. 
Table 10.7 
ASIC Enforcement Outcomes in Respect of Action against Directors
90
 
 Civil Actions* Administrative Actions^ 
1
st
 July 2011 – 31st 
December  2011 
10 - 
1
st
 January 2012 – June 
2012 
2 - 
1
ST
 July 2012 -31
st
 
December 2012 
2 2 
1 January 2013 – 31st 
December 2014 
5 - 
                                                            
90 Enforcement outcomes generally refer to formal actions taken to secure compliance about which 
ASIC has made a formal announcement.  See ASIC, ASIC Enforcement Outcomes, < 
http://asic.gov.au/about-asic/asic-investigations-and-enforcement/asic-enforcement-outcomes/> 
accessed 7th October 2016.  
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 Civil Actions* Administrative Actions^ 
1
st
 January 2015 – 30th 
June 2015  
2 5 
1
st
 July 2015 – 31st 
December 2015  
4 4 
 
*Civil actions here refer solely to court ordered penalties. Therefore, the enforcement 
outcomes above do not include the less formal actions taken by ASIC to secure 
compliance where breach has occurred.  
^Administrative actions refer to sanctions that are imposed by ASIC without recourse 
to the courts.
91
  
Table 10.7: Data derived from ASIC, ‘ASIC Enforcement Outcomes’,  
< http://asic.gov.au/about-asic/asic-investigations-and-enforcement/asic-enforcement-
outcomes/> accessed 7
th
 October 2016.  
 
 
Table 10.8 
Number of Directors Disqualified or Removed from Managing Corporations  
Year Number of Directors Disqualified  
                                                            
91 ASIC, ‘ASIC’s Approach to Enforcement, Information Sheet 151’  
<http://download.asic.gov.au/media/1339118/INFO_151_ASIC_approach_to_enforcement_20130916.
pdf>, 6 accessed 7th October 2016.  
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2014-2015 40 
2012-2013 72 
2011-2012 84 
 
Table 10.8: Data derived from ASIC, ‘Outcomes in Detail, Annual Report 2014-
2015’ < http://download.asic.gov.au/media/3437963/asic-annual-report-2014-15-section-
2.pdf>, 61 accessed 6
th
 October 2016. 
Table 10.8 shows that ASIC has made effective use of its civil penalty regime in 
disqualifying a good number of directors. In view of this, Welsh argues that the 
prevailing evidence suggests that ASIC sees its role to be one of protecting the 
market by removing unfit directors and sending a ‘strong deterrent message’ to the 
market by targeting high profile defendants and pursuing punitive orders.
92
 While the 
data in table 10.6 show that a compensation order was sought in 11 cases, it was 
never the only order sought.
93
 This demonstrates the primacy given to deterrence and 
the need to punish offenders by ASIC.  
Many of the Australian civil penalty applications have been made against high profile 
defendants which further supports the view that the regulators intend to pass a strong 
deterrent message to others. One of such cases is the James Hardie case.
 94
  In 2007, 
ASIC commenced civil penalty applications against the directors of James Hardie 
Industries Ltd (JHIL) a public listed company. JHIL in view of its exposure to 
compensate victims of asbestos disease due to its subsidiaries’ manufacture of 
asbestos had set up a foundation, the Medical Research and Compensation 
                                                            
92 M Welsh, ‘Realising the Public Potential of Corporate Law (n 78) 239. 
93 ibid 238. 
94 See ASIC v Macdonald (no 11) [2009] NSWSC 287, ASIC v Hellicar (2012) 247 CLR 345. 
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Foundation Ltd (MRCF), to handle its asbestos claims. As required under the 
Australian continuous disclosure requirements, JHIL made an announcement to the 
Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) and also issued press releases about the 
arrangement. The announcement was to the effect that the foundation would have 
sufficient funds to meet all legitimate asbestos claims and would be fully funded. It 
however later became clear that the foundation was significantly underfunded to a 
sum up to an excess of $1 billion. It was therefore alleged that the announcements 
made by the JHIL gave a false and misleading impression that the MRCF would have 
sufficient funds to meet all current and future asbestos claims. ASIC’s civil penalty 
proceedings therefore alleged the defendants had breached their statutory duty of 
care.  
The somewhat difficult litigation, which involved two appeals to the Australian High 
Court, led to an ultimate decision that the defendants had breached the Corporations 
Act 2001 by making misleading or deceptive statement in relation to the adequacy of 
the foundation’s funding and had failed to comply with their continuous disclosure 
obligations. Consequently, JHIL’s chief executive officer, Peter Macdonald, its chief 
financial officer Philip Morley, its company secretary and general counsel, Peter 
Shafron, and all the seven non-executive directors were found to have breached their 
statutory duty of care by failing to take reasonable care when they approved the said 
announcement. The court was of the view that they approved the announcement even 
though they knew that it contained misleading statements. The defendants were 
therefore disqualified from managing corporations for varying lengths of time and 
ordered to pay pecuniary penalties of different amounts.  
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Another high profile case under Australia’s civil penalty regime was the case against 
directors of Centro properties group.
 95
  ASIC brought civil penalty applications under 
ss1317E, 1317G and 206C of the Corporations Act 2001 for declaration of 
contravention, pecuniary penalties and disqualification orders against the directors of 
Centro properties group.  The allegations concerned approval of the consolidated 
financial statements at a board meeting attended by the defendant directors. It was 
alleged that the annual reports of Centro Properties Group (CNP) and Centro Retail 
Group (CRP) failed to disclose significant matters. In the case of CNP, the annual 
report failed to disclose $1.5 billion of short-term liabilities by classifying them as 
non-current liabilities while in CRP, the annual reports failed to disclose about $500 
million of short-term liabilities.  
The court found that the directors failed to comply with their statutory duty of care 
when they approved the 2007 financial reports of the CNP and CRP which contained 
significant omissions. They breached their duty by not taking the reasonable steps to 
ensure the accounts were accurate. They relied solely on management and external 
advisors rather than taking care to read and understand the financial accounts. Hence, 
they failed to exercise the required degree of care and diligence required. The court 
made declaration of contraventions against all the directors. One of the directors was 
ordered to pay a penalty of $30,000 and the former CFO was also disqualified for two 
years.  
 Other examples of high profile defendants against whom civil penalty applications 
have been issued are directors of the HIH Group of Companies, the Australian Wheat 
Board Ltd, GIO Australia Holdings Ltd, and One. Tel Ltd. According to Keay and 
Welsh, in half of the applications issued since 2000, ASIC alleged not only a breach 
                                                            
95See ASIC v Healey [2011] FCA 717. 
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of directors’ duties but also breach of other provisions of the Corporations Act.96 
Examples of these include provisions dealing with financial benefits to related parties 
of public companies, insider trading provisions, continuous disclosure requirements, 
financial reporting requirements, and misleading conduct in relation to shares and 
financial product.
97
  
It is also important to note that civil penalty applications in Australia have been 
issued against directors of solvent companies as well as insolvent companies. ASIC’s 
civil penalty regime is therefore not restricted to insolvent companies. Examples of 
allegations issued against directors of solvent companies include failure to comply 
with required continuous disclosure requirement, failure to exercise necessary care 
and diligence in approving financial reports, deceptive conduct and misuse of 
information.
98
 This is a vast improvement from the UK disqualification regime which 
is mostly focused on directors of insolvent companies.  
It is evident that ASIC has achieved a good degree of success with its civil penalty 
regime. This has the potential of sending a strong deterrent message to other directors 
that the cost of noncompliance is high.
99
  It also helps to reinforce the fact that a high 
standard of behaviour is expected of directors. While there is no accurate means of 
measuring the impact of the civil penalty regime on compliance, commentators agree 
that it is likely to have had an impact on compliance.
100
  It is important to note that 
empirical data on individual’s regulatory compliance is very scarce as noted by 
                                                            
96 A Keay and M Welsh, ‘Enforcing Breaches of Directors Duties by a Public Body and Antipodean 
Experiences’ (2015) 15 (2) Journal of Corporate Law Studies 255, 270. 
97 Ibid 270. 
98 Ibid 271. 
99 R Jones and M Welsh, ‘Towards A Public Enforcement Model for Directors’ Duty of Oversight’ 
(2012) 45(2) Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 343,387. 
100 ibid 388. 
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Elffers et al.
101
  It is difficult to create an empirical study which effectively measures 
the effect of deterrence. People who decide not to break a law, perhaps due to 
potential sanctions, do not normally publicise that decision, hence it is challenging to 
gather evidence of successful deterrence.
102
  
In spite of this difficulty with obtaining clear empirical data on the level of deterrence 
occasioned by enforcement action, many would agree that the Australian civil penalty 
regime has been very effective. Indeed Welsh in her empirical study suggests that 
enforcement activities by ASIC was an important factor in encouraging companies 
compliance and may act as a deterrent for potential offenders.
103
 Similarly, 
enforcement activities by the regulator encourage corporate officers to ensure that 
their policies and procedures are compliant.
104
 The interviews conducted by Welsh 
also revealed that the James Hardie case had a considerable impact on compliance as 
some of the interviewees stated that it encouraged them to review their compliance 
policies.
105
 There is therefore very good evidence to suggest that the Australian civil 
penalty regime has had an effective deterrent effect.  
It must be clearly pointed out that this chapter does not intend to portray the 
Australian civil penalty regime as the perfect enforcement regime. The Australian 
civil penalty regime has its flaws and indeed has been subject to some criticisms. One 
key criticism of the Australian civil penalty regime is the manner in which the courts 
have been interpreting the civil penalty provisions by applying certain procedural 
                                                            
101 See H Elffers, P. Van Der Heijden and M. Hezemans, ‘Explaining Regulatory Non Compliance: A 
Survey Study of Rule Transgression for two Dutch Instrumental Laws, Applying the Randomized 
Response Method’ (2003) 19 Journal of Quantitative Criminology 409, 410. 
102 See M. K Ramirez, ‘Just in Crime: Guiding Economic Crime Reform after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
of 2002’ (2003)34 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal 414-415. 
103 M Welsh, ‘New Sanctions and Increased Enforcement Activity in Australian Corporate Law: 
Impact and Implications’ (2012) 14 Common Law World Review 134-166. 
104 ibid 136. 
105 ibid 161. 
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protections which is similar to that which is granted to defendants in criminal trials.
106
  
In spite of some of these shortcomings of the civil penalty regime however, it 
nevertheless paints an overall positive picture of its effectiveness as an enforcement 
mechanism. This provides further empirical support for this thesis’ arguments for a 
greater role for public civil enforcement in Nigeria. As noted earlier, difficulties with 
the effective use of criminal proceedings as an enforcement mechanism necessitated 
Australia’s introduction of the civil penalty regime. Empirical data, examined above, 
suggest that this has enhanced the enforcement of corporate law in Australia. Nigeria 
can therefore draw lessons from this enforcement success by reforming, and 
providing an enhanced role for, its public civil enforcement regime.  
In summary, the positive features of the Australian civil penalty regime which are 
responsible for its effectiveness are: 
 Its wide variety and severity of penalties - The Australian public civil 
enforcement regime offers a wide variety of sanctions which range in their 
severity. This ensures that the regulator can use the appropriate sanction for each 
individual case. 
 Proactive approach to enforcement – The Australian civil penalty regime offers a 
proactive approach to its enforcement activities as it focuses on both solvent and 
insolvent companies. It therefore does not wait until the company has gone 
insolvent before commencing enforcement action. 
 Regulatory Accountability – ASIC, just like the UK Insolvency Services, is 
accountable to parliament. The parliamentary joint committee on corporations and 
                                                            
106 See generally V Comino, ‘Effective Regulation by the Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission (n 75), see also V Comino, ‘James Hardie and the Problems of the Australian Civil 
Penalties Regime’ (2014) 37(1) University of New South Wales Law Journal 195-230. 
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financial services provides parliamentary oversight of ASIC. ASIC also appears 
before various parliamentary committees and inquiries as necessary.
107
  
 Budgetary allocation –ASIC receives its funding from the parliament. It however 
prioritises enforcement and therefore allocates a significant part of its resources to 
its enforcement and surveillance activities. In 2014-2015, ASIC allocated 38% of 
its resources to enforcement and 20% to its surveillance activities.
108
 This 
reiterates the fact that availability of adequate resources is a crucial part of 
securing effective enforcement. 
 Timeliness of enforcement actions (celerity of sanctions) – ASIC recognises the 
effect that timely enforcement outcomes can have on deterring wrongdoing and 
promoting confidence in the financial market. It therefore aims to complete its 
enforcement actions promptly. Over a four-year period, between 2011 and 2015, 
the average time that ASIC has taken to complete its investigation in civil actions 
is 19 months. The average time taken to complete civil court actions is 40 
months.
109
 This reveals that the agency prioritises speedy disposal of cases 
thereby ensuring effectiveness of its public civil enforcement regime.  
As mentioned earlier, the Australian civil penalty regime has its flaws. In spite of this, 
it has attained a good and commendable level of enforcement. One caveat, which 
must be pointed out here, is that this thesis does not advocate public civil enforcement 
action for every misconduct by directors. Regulators are generally faced with 
financial constraints and limited resources. It is therefore impossible to detect, 
investigate and enforce every breach that occurs. Hence, advocating an improved 
                                                            
107 See ASIC, ‘Annual Report 2014-2015, about ASIC’  
<http://download.asic.gov.au/media/3438469/asic-annual-report-2014-15-section-1-30-10.pdf> 
accessed 17th October 2016.  
108 ASIC, ‘Annual report 2014-2015, key outcomes’ 
<http://download.asic.gov.au/media/3437951/asic-annual-report-2014-15-prelims.pdf> accessed 17th 
October 2016.  
109 ibid.  
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public civil enforcement regime for Nigeria does not connote that all breaches should 
be enforced by the regulators. However, in order to ensure compliance, there is need 
for an enhanced role for public civil enforcement. A regulator should therefore be 
able to enforce a good number of violations, which will be sufficient to send a strong 
deterrent message to the market thereby securing compliance with the law. This is the 
ultimate goal of enforcement. 
10.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has examined three major enforcement case studies in the UK and 
Australia. It has shown that the UK statutory derivative claims regime has been 
unable to secure effective enforcement of corporate law due to its inherent 
difficulties. This chapter also examined the UK disqualification regime and the 
Australian civil penalty regime. The examination of these two regimes have shown 
their effectiveness as an enforcement regime in corporate law  
As mentioned in chapter 7, certainty of sanction is regarded as the most important 
factor that determines deterrence.
110
 In order to have any chance at deterring potential 
misconducts, there must be a good likelihood that sanctions will actually be imposed 
when a breach is committed. This is the major defect of the UK derivative claims 
regime as the low incidence of claims means the certainty of sanctions is low thereby 
preventing the enforcement action from having a deterrent effect. Empirical data 
derived from the UK disqualification regime and the Australian civil penalty regime 
however provides strong evidence of the effectiveness of public civil enforcement 
regime. It therefore supports the argument made in part 2 of this thesis that the public 
civil enforcement regime offers the best option for achieving effective enforcement of 
corporate law in Nigeria in the short term. Consequently, Nigeria should focus its 
                                                            
110 See section 7.3.1.3. 
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immediate reform efforts on improving its public civil enforcement regime, and 
providing an enhanced role for this enforcement regime.  
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CHAPTER 11:  CONCLUSIONS 
 
11.1 Brief Overview of Thesis 
This thesis examined the enforcement of corporate law in Nigeria drawing lessons 
from the UK and Australia. In the course of this thesis, it was established that 
enforcement is essential for securing compliance. This is based on the premise that 
human beings are self-interested and rational creatures who consider the 
consequences of their actions and are influenced by these in their decisions.
 1
 
Therefore, in order to ensure that people comply with the law or refrain from 
breaking the law, there is need for effective enforcement. This logic applies to human 
beings generally, which despite some views to the contrary, includes directors. It is 
therefore simply insufficient to develop rules and standards of conduct for directors 
without developing appropriate and effective enforcement regimes to deal with 
instances of breach. This argument was developed in this thesis and has influenced its 
analysis of the various enforcement regimes in Nigerian corporate law.   
In carrying out its analysis, this thesis examined three major enforcement regimes in 
Nigeria. These are the criminal enforcement regime, the private civil enforcement 
regime and the public civil enforcement regime. The effectiveness of these 
enforcement regimes are critically examined using the criteria for determining 
effective enforcement which were developed in the course of this thesis. These 
criteria are deterrence, compensation and cost effectiveness.
2
  Following this 
                                                            
1 R Paternoster, ‘How much do we Really Know about Criminal Deterrence?’ (2010) 100(3) Journal of 
Criminal Law and Criminology 765, 782. 
2 See Chapter 3.  
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examination, it was revealed that the Nigerian criminal enforcement regime falls 
significantly short as an effective enforcement regime in corporate law. This is due to 
the fact that it is faced with several challenges which prevents it from having effective 
deterrence or compensatory benefits. It is also not a cost effective option. The 
criminal enforcement regime therefore cannot deliver effective enforcement of 
corporate law in Nigeria.  
The second enforcement regime examined was the private civil enforcement regime. 
In the analysis of this enforcement regime, we saw that the derivative actions regime 
suffers from certain inherent difficulties which hinders its effectiveness as an 
enforcement regime. Therefore, while the statutory provisions of Nigeria’s derivative 
actions regime are definitely in need of significant reform, this alone cannot resolve 
the difficulty with this enforcement regime. The private civil enforcement regime 
therefore suffers from significant weaknesses which go beyond the proper content of 
the law. Consequently, it cannot offer significant increase in the overall enforcement 
of corporate law in Nigeria.  
In light of this, the final enforcement regime, which was examined in this thesis, is 
the public civil enforcement regime. This enforcement regime was analysed against 
the criteria for effective enforcement. We saw that in comparison to the other 
enforcement regimes mentioned earlier, public civil enforcement better fulfils the 
criteria for effective enforcement. Public civil enforcement offers a stronger deterrent 
effect than both the criminal and private civil enforcement regime. In addition to this, 
it also better provides compensation for those who have suffered a loss as a result of 
directors’ misconduct. Finally, it was argued that public civil enforcement offers 
significant advantages in terms of its cost effectiveness. This is particularly so in light 
of the fact that sanctions under this regime can be imposed without recourse to courts. 
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The public civil enforcement regime therefore offers clear advantages in terms of all 
the criteria for effective enforcement over both the criminal and private civil 
enforcement regime. Hence, it offers the best potential for enhancing the 
effectiveness of Nigeria’s corporate law enforcement. Consequently, this thesis 
argued that the public civil enforcement regime offers the greatest potential for 
securing effective enforcement of corporate law in Nigeria. Therefore, in order for 
Nigeria to attain effective enforcement of corporate law, there is need for it to fully 
develop, and reform, its public civil enforcement regime in line with the 
recommendations put forward in this thesis.  
11.2 Summary of Thesis 
In developing its argument, this thesis starts in Chapter 2 by examining the agency 
problem in corporate law. In that chapter, it was argued that the agency problem is the 
central problem of corporate law and corporate governance.  It is therefore necessary 
to put in place legal strategies for reducing the agency problem. These legal strategies 
include both regulatory strategies and governance strategies. The legal strategies 
identified in this chapter form the basis for this thesis’ subsequent categorisation of 
enforcement strategies in corporate law.  
Chapter 3 critically examined the idea of enforcement in corporate law. It 
conceptualised enforcement and identified the goal and purpose of enforcement. It 
argued that the central purpose of enforcement in corporate law is deterrence and 
compensation. It crucially noted that while the idea of retribution may sometimes be 
applicable in corporate law, it does not occupy a prime place. Focus is therefore 
placed on deterrence and compensation.  
In justifying the need for enforcement in corporate law, this chapter drew on the 
deterrence theory which is often used within the field of criminology. It argued that 
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enforcement is necessary in order to deter future offenders. It noted the empirical 
evidence in support of the deterrence theory. It therefore argued that in order to 
secure compliance and prevent directors from breach, enforcement is necessary. 
Enforcement ensures that the costs of non-compliance outweighs its benefits thereby 
making sure that compliance becomes a more attractive option than breach. It 
therefore argued that in order to deter directors from breach, enforcement is essential.  
In addition to this, this chapter developed and defended certain criteria which can be 
used to judge or determine an effective enforcement regime in corporate law. The 
first criterion is that the enforcement regime must fulfil an enforcement purpose viz 
deterrence and/or compensation. The second criterion, which should be used to judge 
an effective enforcement regime, is its cost effectiveness. Therefore, in determining 
the effectiveness of an enforcement regime, focus must be placed on its ability to 
meet an enforcement purpose and its cost effectiveness. The criteria for determining 
effective enforcement developed in this chapter has important implications for other 
chapters in this thesis as it is the standard used to determine the effectiveness of the 
different enforcement regimes in Nigerian corporate law. Finally, the chapter created 
a typology of the various enforcement regimes in corporate law noting importantly 
the ones which are focused on in this thesis.  
Chapter 4 examined the Nigerian corporate landscape in order to give the reader an 
overview of the Nigerian corporate law regime. It commenced by exploring the 
history of commercial development in Nigeria before moving on to focus on the 
regulatory framework governing companies in Nigeria. In doing this, the provisions 
of the different laws governing directors in Nigeria were examined. The chapter also 
examined the regulatory agencies which govern and monitor companies. In this 
chapter, it was revealed that Nigeria has a reasonably sufficient network of laws, 
339 
 
codes and regulatory agencies intended to secure compliance by directors. The 
pertinent issue however is whether these laws are effectively enforced.  
Chapter 5 critically analysed the Nigerian criminal enforcement regime. It examined 
the offences for which sanctions are imposed on directors in Nigeria. It however 
noted that in spite of these laws which impose criminal sanctions on directors, there 
have been only very few cases where directors have been successfully prosecuted for 
their offences. This is so in spite of the fact that directors in Nigeria have been 
indicted for various offences ranging from fraud to gross misconduct. In light of this 
obvious deficiency in the Nigerian criminal enforcement regime with regards to 
directors’ breach, this chapter examined the issues and challenges besetting criminal 
enforcement in Nigeria. It showed that the Nigerian criminal enforcement regime is 
fraught with several challenges which include corruption and lack of judicial 
independence, infrastructural and institutional problems in the Nigerian judiciary, 
difficulty with detecting offences which are liable to criminal sanctions, ineffective 
prosecution and finally general procedural difficulties with the criminal enforcement 
mechanism itself.  
In light of various problems with the Nigerian criminal enforcement regime, this 
chapter proceeded to measure the success or failure of the Nigerian criminal 
enforcement regime against the specific criteria for determining effective 
enforcement which was developed in chapter 3. It found that the Nigerian criminal 
enforcement regime falls short with respect to its deterrent effect, compensatory 
potential and cost effectiveness. It was argued, in that chapter, that the Nigerian 
criminal enforcement regime is unable to provide effective deterrence to directors. 
This is due to the fact that it faces immense difficulty in successfully detecting, 
prosecuting and convicting company directors for offences committed in the course 
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of duty. This difficulty is attributed to the several challenges faced by the criminal 
enforcement regime. It was also argued in that chapter that the situation is unlikely to 
change in the short term as many of the problems preventing the criminal 
enforcement regime from having a deterrent effect are deep seated. They are therefore 
unlikely to be resolved in the short term.  
With regards to the regime’s potential for delivering compensation, it was noted that 
the recently enacted Administration of Criminal Justice Act 2015 (ACJA) allows the 
court to award compensation orders to victims of an offence. It was however argued 
that payment of compensation to victims is dependent on successful prosecution of an 
offence. The difficulty with successfully prosecuting directors in Nigeria however has 
a knock on effect on payment of compensation to victims of the offence. The current 
criminal enforcement regime is therefore also unable to secure compensation for 
victims of directors’ breach.  
With regards to the third criteria, cost effectiveness, it was argued that the criminal 
enforcement regime is inherently expensive and therefore not a cost effective 
enforcement mechanism. Successful use of the criminal enforcement regime requires 
investment of significant resources in order to successfully detect and prosecute 
offences. This is coupled with the fact that Nigeria currently grapples with other 
debatably more serious crimes such as kidnapping, terrorism and oil bunkering. The 
criminal enforcement regime is therefore unlikely to receive the significant resources 
required for successful prosecution and conviction of directors. In light of this, the 
chapter argued that the Nigerian criminal enforcement regime is ineffective. It lacks a 
deterrent effect, is unable to secure compensation for victims and is costly to procure. 
It cannot therefore deliver effective enforcement of corporate law in Nigeria.  
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In light of the significant failings of the Nigerian criminal enforcement regime, 
Chapter 6 went on to examine the Nigerian private civil enforcement regime. It 
examined the four major private enforcement actions viz-corporate actions, action by 
administrators and liquidators, personal actions and derivative actions. Focus is then 
placed on derivative actions in light of the fact that many countries seem to place 
significant reliance on them as a private enforcement action. An analysis of the 
Nigerian statutory derivative actions regime revealed that the criteria for leave to 
bring derivative actions under the statutory regime is fraught with several difficulties 
and imposes an undue burden on potential applicants. It is also highly ambiguous 
leaving room for judicial arbitrariness and corruption. It therefore does not currently 
provide effective enforcement of corporate law.  
The chapter then turned on questioning whether the difficulties with the Nigerian 
derivative actions regime are limited to the substantive provisions of the law. This 
would mean that the problem could easily be resolved by statutory reforms. This 
question is answered negatively. It is argued that the derivative actions regime has 
certain inherent difficulties which deter potential applicants from bringing derivative 
actions. These problems include lack of incentive to bring derivative actions, 
information asymmetries and the cost problem. These issues deter shareholders from 
bringing derivative actions and exist irrespective of the substantive provisions of the 
law governing derivative actions. The general reluctance of shareholders to bring 
private enforcement actions due to the difficulties faced therefore hinder the 
effectiveness of the private enforcement regime.  
 In light of these inherent problems, the chapter argued that the private enforcement 
regime is unable to secure either effective deterrence or compensation for victims. In 
addition to this, litigation is generally expensive thereby making private enforcement 
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actions a cost ineffective option. The chapter therefore argued that the private 
enforcement regime cannot, on its own, secure any significant increase in the overall 
enforcement of corporate law in Nigeria.  
Chapter 7 examined the Nigerian public civil enforcement regime. It argued that the 
public civil enforcement regime offers the best option for enforcement of corporate 
law in Nigeria. In reaching this conclusion, the chapter critically analysed the 
theoretical benefits of public civil enforcement using the criteria for determining 
effective enforcement developed in chapter 3. In doing this, the deterrent effect, 
compensatory benefit and cost effectiveness of public civil enforcement was 
examined in comparison to the other enforcement regimes – criminal enforcement 
and private civil enforcement regimes. It was argued that the public civil enforcement 
regime offers a greater deterrent effect than both the criminal enforcement and private 
civil enforcement regimes. This is in light of the fact that it provides greater variety, 
severity, certainty and celerity of sanctions which are determinants of effective 
deterrence. It was also argued that the public civil enforcement regime offers greater 
compensatory potential than both the criminal enforcement and private civil 
enforcement regimes.  With regards to the cost effectiveness of the public civil 
enforcement regime, it was argued that the regime is more cost effective as sanctions 
can be imposed without recourse to courts thereby effectively avoiding all the costs 
associated with the court process.  
The chapter then examined the Nigerian experience of public civil enforcement 
noting that in practice, Nigeria fails to harness the immense benefits offered by this 
enforcement regime. In light of this state of affairs, the chapter went on to discuss 
possible reasons for this ineffective use of the public civil enforcement regime. The 
reasons identified include lack of enforcement powers by regulators, lack of 
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information by regulators, lack of adequate oversight, and corruption. In spite of these 
difficulties, this chapter went on to assert that a reformed public civil enforcement 
regime still offers the best option for enforcement of corporate law in Nigeria. This 
assertion is made based on the fact the public civil enforcement regime offers the 
greatest potential for securing effective enforcement of corporate law. This is further 
coupled by the fact that this enforcement regime can effectively sidestep many of the 
difficulties which plague the enforcement regimes in Nigeria. It was also argued in 
that chapter that the deep-seated problems with the Nigerian judicial system do not 
affect this enforcement regime as enforcement can be effectively secured by public 
regulators without recourse to the courts. The incentive problem, which affects the 
private civil enforcement regime, is also avoided here. Similarly, many of the other 
difficulties are significantly alleviated. The chapter therefore argued that the public 
civil enforcement regime offers the best potential for achieving significant 
improvement in the overall enforcement of corporate law in Nigeria. 
Fundamental reforms, which are necessary in order for Nigeria to harness the benefits 
of the public civil enforcement regime, were examined in Chapter 8. The proposed 
reforms include identification of an effective public enforcement agency, conferment 
of power to enforce breach of directors’ duties to the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC), clear whistleblowing laws and reporting channels, increase in 
regulatory oversight, complete overhaul of the Companies and Allied Matters Act 
(CAMA), regulatory accountability and adequate funding for public regulators. It was 
argued that these reforms are feasible in Nigeria as the country has some history of 
attaining successful reforms. The proposed reforms are therefore not an unrealistic 
ideal.  
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Part 3 of the thesis drew lessons from other jurisdictions. It commenced in chapter 9 
by examining the legal transplants debate. The discussion on legal transplants was 
considered necessary in light of the fact that the subsequent chapter draws empirical 
evidence from the enforcement experiences of the UK and Australia. It aims to use 
these enforcement case studies as empirical support for the superiority of public civil 
enforcement. In light of the ‘comparative’ element of this study, this chapter 
addressed the legal transplants debate in order to demonstrate that the concerns raised 
by this debate do not affect this thesis’ attempts to draw empirical evidence from the 
UK and Australia. It commenced by examining the nature of legal transplants and the 
various types of legal transplants.  It further examined the impossibility of legal 
transplants debate. It argued that legal transplants are indeed possible, consequently 
Nigeria can learn from the enforcement experience of other countries. It further 
examined whether legal transplants can be successful and the factors that influence 
this success. It argued that legal transplants could indeed be successful. It further 
argued that while this thesis does not advocate transplant of the UK or Australian 
enforcement regime, the attempt to learn from the enforcement experience of these 
countries does not raise any of the concerns surrounding unsuccessful transplants. 
Consequently, Nigeria can gather empirical evidence from the enforcement 
experience of the UK and Australia.   
In order to reinforce the case for public civil enforcement, the case study of three 
enforcement regimes, the UK statutory derivative claims regime, the UK 
disqualification regime and the Australian civil penalty regime, were examined in 
chapter 10. An examination of the UK statutory derivative claims regime revealed 
that in spite of the significant reforms carried out in order to increase access to 
shareholders, the regime has been unable to achieve effective enforcement. This is 
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attributed to the fact that the problems with the derivative actions regime goes beyond 
its statutory provisions, it is therefore unable to secure effective enforcement. This 
further reinforces the argument put forward in chapter 6 that the difficulties with the 
private enforcement regime go beyond the content of the law rather they are inherent 
problems which are difficult to surmount.  
The second case study examined is the UK disqualification regime. It was argued that 
the UK disqualification regime has been very successful in disqualifying several 
directors over the past years. The UK disqualification regime therefore provides an 
example of an effective public civil enforcement regime. Having said that however, 
this chapter noted that the effectiveness of the UK disqualification regime is 
somewhat limited by the fact that it is focused on directors of insolvent companies. 
There is therefore a need to examine yet another public civil enforcement regime 
which avoids this difficulty.  
Consequently, the last case study examined is the Australian civil penalty regime. It is 
argued that this public civil enforcement regime has been successful in effectively 
enforcing breach of directors’ duties in Australia. Its success is attributed to several 
factors which include the wide range of sanctions available, its proactive approach to 
enforcement and its accountability. This chapter therefore argued that the Australian 
civil penalty regime provides a prime example of an effective public civil 
enforcement regime. Nigeria should therefore learn from this success in reforming its 
own public civil enforcement regime in order to attain effective enforcement of 
corporate law in the country.  
Overall, this thesis has shown, and argued, that the public civil enforcement regime 
offers the greatest potential for effective enforcement of corporate law in Nigeria. 
Therefore, in order for Nigeria to secure compliance by directors with its corporate 
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law requirements, there is a crucial need for it to develop, and reform, its public civil 
enforcement regime in line with the recommendations put forward in this thesis.  
11.3 Areas for Further Research  
My research explored various regimes for enforcement of corporate law in Nigeria. In 
the course of writing this thesis, other areas of future research have been identified 
which could not be accommodated within the ambit of this thesis. 
The first area of further research concerns the enforcement of corporate law using 
governance strategies. As mentioned in Chapter 1, this thesis has analysed 
enforcement of corporate law with regards to regulatory strategies.
3
 It has however 
not examined the effect of governance strategies such as shareholders voting rights on 
directors’ compliance. It has therefore not examined whether these governance 
strategies, if effectively used, can secure effective enforcement within the company. 
Future research into the effect of governance strategies on enforcement of corporate 
law would therefore be a worthwhile venture.  
Secondly, this thesis has prioritised reforms to the public civil enforcement regime. 
This, as discussed in the course of this thesis,
4
 is due to the significant advantages 
which it offers over both the criminal and private civil enforcement regimes in terms 
of delivering greater output in overall enforcement effectiveness for Nigeria’s 
corporate law. However, as noted in chapter 8,
5
 this does not connote that 
improvements should not be made to the criminal and private civil enforcement 
regimes. Future and more in depth research into potential reforms of these alternative 
enforcement regimes therefore remains important, even if the structural reforms to the 
public civil enforcement regime are pursued.  
                                                            
3 See section 1.5, Ch. 1. 
4 See Chapters 7 & 8.  
5 See section 8.1, Ch. 8. 
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Thirdly, Nigeria currently lacks comprehensive data on the incidences of enforcement 
action in corporate law. As mentioned in chapter 1, in the course of writing this 
thesis, significant difficulties were encountered in obtaining empirical data on 
enforcement actions in Nigeria. There are therefore significant gaps in literature in 
this regard. A comprehensive empirical study into the incidences of derivative actions 
in Nigeria would therefore be insightful and academically beneficial to the field of 
corporate law in Nigeria.  
Lastly, there is scope for further research into the practical effects of the reforms 
proposed in this thesis. This thesis has suggested reforms to the public civil 
enforcement regime in Nigeria. These have been proposed in light of the theoretical 
benefits offered by the public civil enforcement regime. This however leaves room 
for further research into the workings and practical benefits of the reformed 
enforcement regime.  A further empirical study, in a couple of years, investigating the 
practical effect of the recommended reforms in Nigeria would therefore make a 
significant contribution to the subject of enforcement.
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